Fully Authoritarian
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HRF classifies Yemen Houthi controlled territories as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, a Zaidi Shia Muslim rebel movement originating from Saada in northern Yemen, have a long history of opposition to central authority. In the 1990s, they emerged as a significant force, opposing the regime of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Their resistance was rooted in grievances over political marginalization, economic neglect, and religious and cultural tensions, particularly their efforts to preserve Zaidi traditions and autonomy in the face of centralization efforts by Saleh’s regime. The Houthis’ opposition culminated in several armed uprisings during the late 1990s, notably the Saada Wars of 2004, 2005, and 2009, which reflected their ongoing struggle against the Yemeni state. These conflicts laid the groundwork for their later expansion and eventual control of Sanaa in 2014. Their rise was also fueled by the broader regional and domestic unrest, including the Arab Spring protests of 2011, which further exposed Yemen’s political fragility. Today, the Houthis control Sanaa and approximately one-third of Yemen’s territory, including key northern regions and strategic ports, presiding over an estimated 70 percent of Yemen’s total population of 35 million people. They remain at odds with the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) based in Aden, which is backed by a Saudi-led coalition, driven by ideological differences, power struggles, and regional rivalries, making the Yemen conflict a complex and enduring crisis.
National-level elections are absent in Houthi areas of control, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. The governing authority is primarily formed through appointments and de facto governance structures rather than through elections, with the governance structures operating independently of the IRG in Aden. Since the Houthis took control of Sanaa in 2014, they established their own administrative and security institutions, often appointing officials loyal to their movement to key positions.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the governing authority. The Houthis maintain strict control over information and dissent, often employing intimidation, arbitrary detention, and violence to suppress opposition. Independent journalists and media outlets are frequently targeted for reporting critically on Houthi policies or military actions, resulting in censorship, harassment, or closure of outlets. Political figures and civil society organizations that challenge Houthi authority risk arrest, torture, or disappearance, as the group seeks to eliminate dissenting voices and consolidate its control. Ordinary citizens who voice criticism or support opposition movements often encounter reprisals such as threats, physical violence, or detention, creating an atmosphere of fear and silence.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. The judiciary is often compromised or politicized, with courts unable to operate independently due to intimidation and interference. This lack of judicial independence means that abuses committed by the Houthis go unpunished, and legal accountability remains elusive. The executive branch is effectively subordinate to the group’s authority, with Houthi leaders exercising direct political and military control, undermining state institutions and eroding centralized authority. The legislative branch is largely incapacitated or non-functional, with limited capacity to pass laws or oppose Houthi policies, which consolidates the group’s unilateral rule.
National-level elections are absent in Houthi areas of control, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. When the Houthis took over Sanaa in September 2014, they seized the House of Representatives (HoR), Yemen’s legislative body. In February 2015, they dissolved the HoR and created a 551-member transitional body, the Revolutionary Committee (later replaced by the Supreme Political Council, or SPC), to assume legislative and executive authority. While the Houthis later allowed the HoR to reconvene in 2016, they ensured it was a rubber-stamp body dominated by loyalists and members of their General People’s Congress (GPC) faction, effectively excluding opponents and those affiliated with the IRG.
The last general elections in Yemen took place in 2003, and the last presidential election was in 2012. In Houthi-controlled areas, the Houthi-led Supreme Political Council (SPC), a non-elected body formed in 2016, functions as the de facto executive authority in northern Yemen, appointing its own prime minister and cabinet. However, real control of executive powers rests in the Houthi movement, and its parallel supervisory system of loyal supervisors, known as Mushrifeen, who operate with more power and influence than the official ministers or governors. This dual system allows the Houthis to maintain the illusion of a functioning governing authority while ensuring that ultimate control remains in the hands of their unelected leadership.
The Houthi authorities unfairly bar opposition parties from operating in their area of control. The group has replaced all political structures with its own authoritarian rule, and any political activity or opposition to its movement is met with harsh repression, including arrests, forced disappearances, and violence. A key target of this suppression has been the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Al-Islah), a major Sunni Islamist party, member of the IRG/PLC, and a firm supporter of the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen. The Houthis have launched campaigns of arrests and detentions against Al-Islah members and leaders, and have seized party headquarters in various cities. While the Houthis have formed alliances with certain factions over time, such as with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) for a short period, the Houthis killed Saleh when he broke away from their alliance in December 2017, after he publicly called for dialogue with the Saudi-led coalition. This further consolidated their control by eliminating a major political rival. Other political groups that have also been unable to operate freely include, but are not limited to, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) and the Nasserist Unionist People’s Organisation (NUPO), and other secular and liberal groups.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge governing authority. By capturing all media outlets in their territory and flooding the information space with group-controlled messaging, the Houthis have effectively eliminated any competing narratives. To consolidate this control, they have violently silenced dissidents through murder, enforced disappearances, detentions, and assaults. The Houthis routinely leverage outdated penal codes to criminalize dissent, employing archaic laws related to treason, defamation, and subversion to unjustly imprison, intimidate, and silence critics under the guise of maintaining national security.
The Houthi authority heavily manipulates media coverage in its favor. The Houthis primarily focus on centralizing and monopolizing media platforms in the territories they control. Upon taking over Sanaa in 2014, they seized control of state-run media outlets, including television and radio stations. By dominating these channels, they effectively create an information bubble, restricting public access to alternative viewpoints and shaping the narrative to suit their interests. Following the collapse of their alliance with former President Saleh, Houthi agents stormed the Yemen Today television channel’s offices in Sanaa in December 2017. They attacked the building with grenades and detained dozens of journalists. The shutdown was a direct act of retaliation against the channel’s affiliation with Saleh.
The Houthis seriously intimidate independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstruct their work. In the absence of formal bureaucratic channels, dissidents rely on informal patronage networks to obtain consent and access letters from irregular officials, who, in turn, expect displays of loyalty when reporting on or engaging with various issues. To enforce their control, the Houthis have been accused of employing broadly defined articles in the 1994 Penal Code to arrest, imprison, and even execute journalists, activists, human rights advocates, and political figures who criticize their authority. Charges such as “treason,” “collaboration with the enemy,” and “damaging national unity” are loosely interpreted and have been systematically used to stifle dissent. In 2024 alone, at least 40 journalists were summoned and interrogated by the specialized criminal court in Sanaa, which is normally reserved for terrorism-related cases, despite the existence of dedicated press and publication courts. Others were tried in absentia, including Taha Ahmed Rashid Al-Maamari, owner of Yemen Digital Media and Yemen Live for Media Production and Satellite Broadcasting, who was sentenced to death while his home and property were confiscated. He currently resides in Spain. In March 2023, four activists were sentenced to prison terms ranging from six months to three years, ordered to shut down their YouTube channels, and fined 10 million Yemeni Riyals each, or about $40,000. The four activists were found guilty of inciting chaos and disrupting public peace after airing social media videos in 2022 in which they criticized the Houthis over alleged corruption and the group’s mishandling of the economy.
Beyond weaponizing archaic penal codes, the Houthi have also relied on extrajudicial violence to silence dissent among the general public and civil society. A chilling example is the case of popular social media activist Hamdi Abdul Razaq, who was arbitrarily detained in October 2022 after publicly criticizing the Houthi leadership online. Razaq was then tortured by Houthi agents while in detention and killed in March 2023; crucially, he was never charged with any crime and did not appear in court, being killed while detained. This calculated act of violence against a member of the general public demonstrates the Houthis’ pillar of intimidation, which uses abduction, torture, and murder to seriously and unfairly obstruct independent voices and civil society, thereby creating a pervasive climate of fear that ensures widespread self-censorship.
The work of UN and NGO staff in Houthi areas of control is increasingly undermined by the Houthis’ systematic detention and kidnapping of workers, often on baseless charges of espionage. In June 2024, Houthi forces launched a coordinated crackdown, forcibly disappearing dozens of Yemeni aid workers, including 11 UN personnel and over 50 staff from various international and local NGOs across Sanaa, Hodeida, Amran, and Saada. Houthi authorities claimed the aid workers were part of an alleged “American-Israeli spy network.” This campaign followed the sentencing of 44 Yemenis to death on spying charges and accusations of collaborating with the Saudi-led coalition. Among those sentenced to death was Adnan al-Harazi, CEO of Prodigy Systems, a Sanaa-based company that developed systems to help humanitarian groups register and verify the distribution of aid to those in need in the war-stricken country.
The Houthis seriously and unfairly repress protests or gatherings. In 2024, Houthi authorities arbitrarily detained hundreds of peaceful demonstrators gathered to celebrate the 1962 revolution, symbolizing the day that North Yemen — the Republic of Yemen — was formed after the overthrow of the Zaidi Imamate, a long-standing political and religious leadership in North Yemen, established in 897. The Houthis view this anniversary not as a cause for celebration but as a symbol of injustice, as their movement draws inspiration from the Zaidi Imamate, which they seek to revive as the exclusive basis for their political and religious leadership. At least 209 people were arrested in Amran governorate alone. Others were arrested for commemorating the event online on social media platforms. In 2023, marking the same occasions, and despite the gatherings being peaceful, security agents used force to disperse the crowds and detained at least 20 demonstrators, highlighting the Houthis’ ongoing pattern of suppressing dissent and silencing voices advocating for political change and greater freedoms.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. The Houthis have deliberately repurposed existing executive, legislative, and judicial institutions to serve their political agenda. They strategically direct politically sensitive cases to specific courts under their control, with legislative and judicial decisions often made by a parallel supervisory system of loyal Houthi supervisors known as Mushrifeen, which wield more power and influence than official ministers, governors, or local officials. This dual system enables the Houthis to maintain the appearance of a functioning government while ensuring that ultimate authority remains firmly in the hands of their unelected leadership.
Members of the judicial branch, who act contrary to governing authority interests or who are perceived as a threat to the governing authority, frequently face governing authority retaliation. Under the Yemeni Judicial Authority Law of 1991, judges should enjoy immunity, which precludes their arrest without permission from the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), the highest judicial authority in Houthi-administered areas, responsible for the management, appointment, and supervision of all judges and prosecutors. Despite this, in January 2024, judge Abdulwahab Mohammad Qatran was arrested without a warrant in Sanaa after voicing criticism of the Houthi human rights violations on social media. He was released in June 2024, after spending more than five months in arbitrary detention at the Houthi-run security and intelligence detention center.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check, and enable the governing authority’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition. In the case of Razaq, despite his detention and death causing a public outcry, the judiciary failed to protect him or launch an inquiry into his extrajudicial death, and no Houthi official has been held accountable. By refusing to intervene and hold perpetrators accountable, the courts have effectively sanctioned political violence and intimidation, communicating to critics that there will be no legal consequence for abuses.
The governing authority directs certain cases, such as politically sensitive cases, to separate, Houthi-controlled courts, such as military courts or tribunals. The most prominent example of this is the Specialized Criminal Court (SCC) in Sanaa. While the court was established before the Houthi takeover to deal with terrorism and organized crime, the Houthis have transformed it into a primary tool for political repression. The SCC’s proceedings are frequently held without due process, and the outcomes—often death sentences or lengthy prison terms—are widely seen as predetermined. In April 2020, under the guise of national security, the SCC sentenced Abdulkhaleq Amran, Akram al-Walidi, Hareth Hamid, and Tawfiq al-Mansouri to death. They were accused of spying for the Saudi-led Coalition in a trial that was a clear example of the judiciary being used to silence and intimidate journalists. With all four defendants arbitrarily detained since 2015, their trial was marked by allegations of torture and forced confessions.
The Houthis subject legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. After seizing Sanaa in 2014, the Houthi movement effectively took control of the HoR. To ensure the subservience of the HoR, the Houthis removed the deputies who opposed them through by-elections in their areas to fill their seats with supporters. By 2025, the parliament in Sana’a functioned as a remnant body that serves the Houthi leadership, rather than as a truly representative legislative body. As a result, the conflict in Yemen has essentially created two parallel governing authorities. Like the parallel IRG/PLC in Aden, the Houthi movement uses its legislature to pass laws and resolutions that legitimize its rule.
The governing authority subjects executive institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. The Houthi governing authority combines formal institutions with a covert control system, with ultimate power held by their religious leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, and his loyal inner circle, including family and key figures known as the mujahideen, who receive their directives from the Jihad Council, a command-and-control body composed of hand-picked individuals specializing in military, intelligence, and security affairs. This structure, which is not tied to the official ministries, ensures that the group’s political and military decisions are made and implemented regardless of who holds formal cabinet positions. To accomplish this, loyal Mushrifeen supervisors are placed into ministries and institutions to enforce the Houthi agenda.
Within this system, cabinet ministers are largely a façade, serving only to administer basic civilian functions and project a semblance of statehood to the international community. This dual system of governance accounts for the Houthi movement’s resilience, as evidenced by the limited impact of the August 2025 Israeli airstrike that killed several Supreme Political Council (SPC) cabinet ministers. In contrast, real executive power, resource control, and military authority reside with the parallel informal network of Supervisors (Mushrifin). These Supervisors are embedded at every level, ensuring operational continuity, resource flow, military command, and the enforcement of Houthi ideology regardless of losses among public-facing officials.
HRF classifies Yemen Houthi controlled territories as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, a Zaidi Shia Muslim rebel movement originating from Saada in northern Yemen, have a long history of opposition to central authority. In the 1990s, they emerged as a significant force, opposing the regime of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Their resistance was rooted in grievances over political marginalization, economic neglect, and religious and cultural tensions, particularly their efforts to preserve Zaidi traditions and autonomy in the face of centralization efforts by Saleh’s regime. The Houthis’ opposition culminated in several armed uprisings during the late 1990s, notably the Saada Wars of 2004, 2005, and 2009, which reflected their ongoing struggle against the Yemeni state. These conflicts laid the groundwork for their later expansion and eventual control of Sanaa in 2014. Their rise was also fueled by the broader regional and domestic unrest, including the Arab Spring protests of 2011, which further exposed Yemen’s political fragility. Today, the Houthis control Sanaa and approximately one-third of Yemen’s territory, including key northern regions and strategic ports, presiding over an estimated 70 percent of Yemen’s total population of 35 million people. They remain at odds with the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) based in Aden, which is backed by a Saudi-led coalition, driven by ideological differences, power struggles, and regional rivalries, making the Yemen conflict a complex and enduring crisis.
National-level elections are absent in Houthi areas of control, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. The governing authority is primarily formed through appointments and de facto governance structures rather than through elections, with the governance structures operating independently of the IRG in Aden. Since the Houthis took control of Sanaa in 2014, they established their own administrative and security institutions, often appointing officials loyal to their movement to key positions.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the governing authority. The Houthis maintain strict control over information and dissent, often employing intimidation, arbitrary detention, and violence to suppress opposition. Independent journalists and media outlets are frequently targeted for reporting critically on Houthi policies or military actions, resulting in censorship, harassment, or closure of outlets. Political figures and civil society organizations that challenge Houthi authority risk arrest, torture, or disappearance, as the group seeks to eliminate dissenting voices and consolidate its control. Ordinary citizens who voice criticism or support opposition movements often encounter reprisals such as threats, physical violence, or detention, creating an atmosphere of fear and silence.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. The judiciary is often compromised or politicized, with courts unable to operate independently due to intimidation and interference. This lack of judicial independence means that abuses committed by the Houthis go unpunished, and legal accountability remains elusive. The executive branch is effectively subordinate to the group’s authority, with Houthi leaders exercising direct political and military control, undermining state institutions and eroding centralized authority. The legislative branch is largely incapacitated or non-functional, with limited capacity to pass laws or oppose Houthi policies, which consolidates the group’s unilateral rule.
National-level elections are absent in Houthi areas of control, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. When the Houthis took over Sanaa in September 2014, they seized the House of Representatives (HoR), Yemen’s legislative body. In February 2015, they dissolved the HoR and created a 551-member transitional body, the Revolutionary Committee (later replaced by the Supreme Political Council, or SPC), to assume legislative and executive authority. While the Houthis later allowed the HoR to reconvene in 2016, they ensured it was a rubber-stamp body dominated by loyalists and members of their General People’s Congress (GPC) faction, effectively excluding opponents and those affiliated with the IRG.
The last general elections in Yemen took place in 2003, and the last presidential election was in 2012. In Houthi-controlled areas, the Houthi-led Supreme Political Council (SPC), a non-elected body formed in 2016, functions as the de facto executive authority in northern Yemen, appointing its own prime minister and cabinet. However, real control of executive powers rests in the Houthi movement, and its parallel supervisory system of loyal supervisors, known as Mushrifeen, who operate with more power and influence than the official ministers or governors. This dual system allows the Houthis to maintain the illusion of a functioning governing authority while ensuring that ultimate control remains in the hands of their unelected leadership.
The Houthi authorities unfairly bar opposition parties from operating in their area of control. The group has replaced all political structures with its own authoritarian rule, and any political activity or opposition to its movement is met with harsh repression, including arrests, forced disappearances, and violence. A key target of this suppression has been the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Al-Islah), a major Sunni Islamist party, member of the IRG/PLC, and a firm supporter of the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen. The Houthis have launched campaigns of arrests and detentions against Al-Islah members and leaders, and have seized party headquarters in various cities. While the Houthis have formed alliances with certain factions over time, such as with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) for a short period, the Houthis killed Saleh when he broke away from their alliance in December 2017, after he publicly called for dialogue with the Saudi-led coalition. This further consolidated their control by eliminating a major political rival. Other political groups that have also been unable to operate freely include, but are not limited to, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) and the Nasserist Unionist People’s Organisation (NUPO), and other secular and liberal groups.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge governing authority. By capturing all media outlets in their territory and flooding the information space with group-controlled messaging, the Houthis have effectively eliminated any competing narratives. To consolidate this control, they have violently silenced dissidents through murder, enforced disappearances, detentions, and assaults. The Houthis routinely leverage outdated penal codes to criminalize dissent, employing archaic laws related to treason, defamation, and subversion to unjustly imprison, intimidate, and silence critics under the guise of maintaining national security.
The Houthi authority heavily manipulates media coverage in its favor. The Houthis primarily focus on centralizing and monopolizing media platforms in the territories they control. Upon taking over Sanaa in 2014, they seized control of state-run media outlets, including television and radio stations. By dominating these channels, they effectively create an information bubble, restricting public access to alternative viewpoints and shaping the narrative to suit their interests. Following the collapse of their alliance with former President Saleh, Houthi agents stormed the Yemen Today television channel’s offices in Sanaa in December 2017. They attacked the building with grenades and detained dozens of journalists. The shutdown was a direct act of retaliation against the channel’s affiliation with Saleh.
The Houthis seriously intimidate independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstruct their work. In the absence of formal bureaucratic channels, dissidents rely on informal patronage networks to obtain consent and access letters from irregular officials, who, in turn, expect displays of loyalty when reporting on or engaging with various issues. To enforce their control, the Houthis have been accused of employing broadly defined articles in the 1994 Penal Code to arrest, imprison, and even execute journalists, activists, human rights advocates, and political figures who criticize their authority. Charges such as “treason,” “collaboration with the enemy,” and “damaging national unity” are loosely interpreted and have been systematically used to stifle dissent. In 2024 alone, at least 40 journalists were summoned and interrogated by the specialized criminal court in Sanaa, which is normally reserved for terrorism-related cases, despite the existence of dedicated press and publication courts. Others were tried in absentia, including Taha Ahmed Rashid Al-Maamari, owner of Yemen Digital Media and Yemen Live for Media Production and Satellite Broadcasting, who was sentenced to death while his home and property were confiscated. He currently resides in Spain. In March 2023, four activists were sentenced to prison terms ranging from six months to three years, ordered to shut down their YouTube channels, and fined 10 million Yemeni Riyals each, or about $40,000. The four activists were found guilty of inciting chaos and disrupting public peace after airing social media videos in 2022 in which they criticized the Houthis over alleged corruption and the group’s mishandling of the economy.
Beyond weaponizing archaic penal codes, the Houthi have also relied on extrajudicial violence to silence dissent among the general public and civil society. A chilling example is the case of popular social media activist Hamdi Abdul Razaq, who was arbitrarily detained in October 2022 after publicly criticizing the Houthi leadership online. Razaq was then tortured by Houthi agents while in detention and killed in March 2023; crucially, he was never charged with any crime and did not appear in court, being killed while detained. This calculated act of violence against a member of the general public demonstrates the Houthis’ pillar of intimidation, which uses abduction, torture, and murder to seriously and unfairly obstruct independent voices and civil society, thereby creating a pervasive climate of fear that ensures widespread self-censorship.
The work of UN and NGO staff in Houthi areas of control is increasingly undermined by the Houthis’ systematic detention and kidnapping of workers, often on baseless charges of espionage. In June 2024, Houthi forces launched a coordinated crackdown, forcibly disappearing dozens of Yemeni aid workers, including 11 UN personnel and over 50 staff from various international and local NGOs across Sanaa, Hodeida, Amran, and Saada. Houthi authorities claimed the aid workers were part of an alleged “American-Israeli spy network.” This campaign followed the sentencing of 44 Yemenis to death on spying charges and accusations of collaborating with the Saudi-led coalition. Among those sentenced to death was Adnan al-Harazi, CEO of Prodigy Systems, a Sanaa-based company that developed systems to help humanitarian groups register and verify the distribution of aid to those in need in the war-stricken country.
The Houthis seriously and unfairly repress protests or gatherings. In 2024, Houthi authorities arbitrarily detained hundreds of peaceful demonstrators gathered to celebrate the 1962 revolution, symbolizing the day that North Yemen — the Republic of Yemen — was formed after the overthrow of the Zaidi Imamate, a long-standing political and religious leadership in North Yemen, established in 897. The Houthis view this anniversary not as a cause for celebration but as a symbol of injustice, as their movement draws inspiration from the Zaidi Imamate, which they seek to revive as the exclusive basis for their political and religious leadership. At least 209 people were arrested in Amran governorate alone. Others were arrested for commemorating the event online on social media platforms. In 2023, marking the same occasions, and despite the gatherings being peaceful, security agents used force to disperse the crowds and detained at least 20 demonstrators, highlighting the Houthis’ ongoing pattern of suppressing dissent and silencing voices advocating for political change and greater freedoms.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. The Houthis have deliberately repurposed existing executive, legislative, and judicial institutions to serve their political agenda. They strategically direct politically sensitive cases to specific courts under their control, with legislative and judicial decisions often made by a parallel supervisory system of loyal Houthi supervisors known as Mushrifeen, which wield more power and influence than official ministers, governors, or local officials. This dual system enables the Houthis to maintain the appearance of a functioning government while ensuring that ultimate authority remains firmly in the hands of their unelected leadership.
Members of the judicial branch, who act contrary to governing authority interests or who are perceived as a threat to the governing authority, frequently face governing authority retaliation. Under the Yemeni Judicial Authority Law of 1991, judges should enjoy immunity, which precludes their arrest without permission from the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), the highest judicial authority in Houthi-administered areas, responsible for the management, appointment, and supervision of all judges and prosecutors. Despite this, in January 2024, judge Abdulwahab Mohammad Qatran was arrested without a warrant in Sanaa after voicing criticism of the Houthi human rights violations on social media. He was released in June 2024, after spending more than five months in arbitrary detention at the Houthi-run security and intelligence detention center.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check, and enable the governing authority’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition. In the case of Razaq, despite his detention and death causing a public outcry, the judiciary failed to protect him or launch an inquiry into his extrajudicial death, and no Houthi official has been held accountable. By refusing to intervene and hold perpetrators accountable, the courts have effectively sanctioned political violence and intimidation, communicating to critics that there will be no legal consequence for abuses.
The governing authority directs certain cases, such as politically sensitive cases, to separate, Houthi-controlled courts, such as military courts or tribunals. The most prominent example of this is the Specialized Criminal Court (SCC) in Sanaa. While the court was established before the Houthi takeover to deal with terrorism and organized crime, the Houthis have transformed it into a primary tool for political repression. The SCC’s proceedings are frequently held without due process, and the outcomes—often death sentences or lengthy prison terms—are widely seen as predetermined. In April 2020, under the guise of national security, the SCC sentenced Abdulkhaleq Amran, Akram al-Walidi, Hareth Hamid, and Tawfiq al-Mansouri to death. They were accused of spying for the Saudi-led Coalition in a trial that was a clear example of the judiciary being used to silence and intimidate journalists. With all four defendants arbitrarily detained since 2015, their trial was marked by allegations of torture and forced confessions.
The Houthis subject legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. After seizing Sanaa in 2014, the Houthi movement effectively took control of the HoR. To ensure the subservience of the HoR, the Houthis removed the deputies who opposed them through by-elections in their areas to fill their seats with supporters. By 2025, the parliament in Sana’a functioned as a remnant body that serves the Houthi leadership, rather than as a truly representative legislative body. As a result, the conflict in Yemen has essentially created two parallel governing authorities. Like the parallel IRG/PLC in Aden, the Houthi movement uses its legislature to pass laws and resolutions that legitimize its rule.
The governing authority subjects executive institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. The Houthi governing authority combines formal institutions with a covert control system, with ultimate power held by their religious leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, and his loyal inner circle, including family and key figures known as the mujahideen, who receive their directives from the Jihad Council, a command-and-control body composed of hand-picked individuals specializing in military, intelligence, and security affairs. This structure, which is not tied to the official ministries, ensures that the group’s political and military decisions are made and implemented regardless of who holds formal cabinet positions. To accomplish this, loyal Mushrifeen supervisors are placed into ministries and institutions to enforce the Houthi agenda.
Within this system, cabinet ministers are largely a façade, serving only to administer basic civilian functions and project a semblance of statehood to the international community. This dual system of governance accounts for the Houthi movement’s resilience, as evidenced by the limited impact of the August 2025 Israeli airstrike that killed several Supreme Political Council (SPC) cabinet ministers. In contrast, real executive power, resource control, and military authority reside with the parallel informal network of Supervisors (Mushrifin). These Supervisors are embedded at every level, ensuring operational continuity, resource flow, military command, and the enforcement of Houthi ideology regardless of losses among public-facing officials.
