Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Hong Kong’s governing authority as fully authoritarian.
Hong Kong is formally a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and operates under the “one country, two systems” framework following its handover from British to Chinese rule in 1997. The framework affords Hong Kong limited autonomy over its governance, social, economic, and external affairs, but ultimately requires it to uphold the PRC’s sovereignty over Hong Kong. As part of the framework, the PRC’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee in Beijing drew up Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law of Hong Kong SAR, and reserves the power to amend and interpret it. Hong Kong’s autonomy is a central component of the handover conditions, which are set to expire in 2047. In recent years, however, China has accelerated its efforts to consolidate control over the city, more than two decades ahead of schedule. This tightening of Beijing’s grip is also a direct response to a series of pro-democracy movements that have gained momentum since 2014, as many Hong Kongers push for greater autonomy or even independence.
National elections are a sham. Hong Kong has a multi-party system and holds elections to its unicameral legislature, the Legislative Council (LegCo), every four years. Prior to 2021, these elections were semi-competitive and allowed for participation from candidates aligned with Beijing’s interests and those who advocate for democratic reforms or Hong Kong’s independence. The draconian National Security Law (NSL) and an electoral overhaul unilaterally imposed by China on Hong Kong between 2020 and 2021 effectively empower the Hong Kong governing authority, acting under China’s oversight, to eliminate all forms of political opposition. Most opposition figures have been detained or exiled.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the governing authority. The governing authority has shut down most major, independent organizations across the city since 2020. Dissidents are under a continued threat of arrest, harassment, and intimidation carried out under the pretext of protecting national security. Public demonstrations have become rare since the governing authority’s crackdown on the mass pro-democracy protests in 2019 and 2020. The governing authority, aided by China, has also engaged in extensive transnational repression against Hong Kong dissidents abroad.
Institutions largely or completely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. China’s rapid consolidation of control over Hong Kong since 2020 has led to radical institutional reforms that subjugate Hong Kong’s executive, legislative, and judicial branches to the Central People’s Government. The NSL creates parallel executive institutions that bypass domestic institutional constraints and are directly accountable to China. The absence of meaningful opposition in the LegCo has reduced it into a rubber-stamp institution. Courts have demonstrably failed to check challenges to the NSL and attempts to undermine dissent instituted under the law.
In Hong Kong, national elections are a sham and rendered meaningless by structural limits on representation, a political crackdown under the NSL, and a lack of independent electoral oversight.
As a special administrative region of China, Hong Kong is allowed under the “one country, two systems” framework to hold its own elections to the Legislative Council (LegCo) every four years. These elections have a limited impact on the composition of the LegCo and have been further undermined following an electoral overhaul introduced by China in March 2021. Prior to 2021, the LegCo comprised 70 seats, of which only half were directly elected. The remainder of the seats were filled through functional constituencies – special interest groups such as commercial and professional associations that are largely pro-Beijing. Hong Kong elections before 2021 were semi-competitive; it was possible for opposition parties and groups, which typically advocated for democratic reforms or Hong Kong’s increased autonomy, to secure representation in the LegCo, although they faced relative hurdles in doing so given the limited number of seats they were eligible to contest, initial waves of disqualifications of pro-democracy candidates, and various institutional and legal advantages enjoyed by pro-Beijing candidates.
The governing authority, under China’s control, has unfairly barred the real, mainstream opposition from competing in elections. The March 2021 electoral overhaul, introduced through an amendment to Hong Kong’s Basic Law by China’s National People’s Congress, increased the number of LegCo seats to 90, while reducing those directly elected to 20. Under these changes, a 1,500-member electoral college entirely appointed by the Central People’s Government in Beijing, named the Election Committee, is empowered to fill 40 LegCo seats. Functional constituencies continue to control the remaining 35 seats. The new system, therefore, effectively bars candidates not aligned with pro-Beijing interests from contesting.
In addition to overhauling Hong Kong’s elections, in June 2020, China unilaterally imposed the NSL on the city, a draconian legislation that criminalizes four vaguely defined categories of national security offenses: subversion, secession, terrorism, and collusion with foreign forces. In July 2020, the governing authority disqualified 12 opposition candidates to preempt an opposition win fueled by public backlash to the NLS. Most other opposition figures have been arrested under the law or forced into exile, including those who were implicated in the “Hong Kong 47” case – the largest NSL mass trial involving 47 opposition figures who were arrested and detained for organizing primaries ahead of the 2021 LegCo that was deemed illegal. In April 2025, the Democratic Party, Hong Kong’s largest and oldest opposition party, announced its plans for dissolution after it received threats from Chinese officials. The move is one in a string of closures of opposition parties that have cited coercive conditions and difficulties to maintain operations as reasons for their disbandment.
There is no independent electoral oversight. Election administration is vested with the Electoral Affairs Commission (EAC), which consists of a chairman and two members appointed by the pro-Beijing Chief Executive. Before the 2021 electoral overhaul, the EAC showed signs of partiality toward pro-Beijing candidates, but it still allowed limited opportunities for opposition candidates to gain electoral support. For example, under political pressure from China, the EAC disqualified six opposition figures ahead of the 2016 LegCo election and discouraged many others from running by enforcing a rule requiring all candidates to sign a pledge affirming that Hong Kong is part of China. The 2021 electoral overhaul institutionalized these existing biases. It established a new Candidate Eligibility Review Committee to run parallel to the EAC, tasked with ensuring that election candidates are demonstrated “patriots,” or those with loyalty to China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong. The EAC has publicly labeled disqualified opposition lawmakers as foreign hostile forces. Hong Kong’s 2021 LegCo election was the first to implement the changes made by China. No opposition parties or candidates contested in these polls.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the governing authority. This includes the forced closure of independent organizations, the imprisonment of prominent dissidents, the violent suppression of protests, and the targeting of activists abroad.
The governing authority has unfairly shut down or taken measures to shut down major, independent, and dissenting organizations. Between January 2021 and January 2022, a total of 68 Hong Kong organizations, including civil society and independent media outlets, shut down due to the imposition of the NSL. These included Apple Daily, an influential pro-democracy newspaper owned by Hong Kong tycoon and politician Jimmy Lai, which ceased operations in June 2021 after Lai was arrested under the NSL. The outlet’s assets had also been frozen and its offices raided by over 200 national security personnel due to its coverage and support of the 2019-2020 pro-democracy protests that precipitated China’s rapid consolidation of control over Hong Kong. Prominent independent online news site Stand News – which also played a key role in supporting the pro-democracy protests – shut down in December 2021. More organizations have shuttered in recent years. In February 2025, the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, a leading polling organization, announced it was suspending all self-funded research after its founder, Robert Chung, was interrogated twice under the NSL over allegations that he assisted a wanted person who had “absconded” overseas. It has indicated its plan to fully shut down. In June 2025, China Labor Bulletin, a labor rights group led by a former Tiananmen protest leader, similarly dissolved due to the untenable political environment and increased surveillance. Most groups associated with the 2014 Umbrella Movement – a series of sit-in protests against China’s encroachment on Hong Kong’s autonomy – and the 2019-2020 pro-democracy protests have dissolved to avoid retaliation.
Acting largely under the instructions of China, the governing authority has continued to seriously intimidate dissidents. As of June 2025, Jimmy Lai remains detained in a maximum security prison and, at 77 years old, is Hong Kong’s oldest political prisoner. In September 2024, a local court sentenced two Stand News former editors-in-chief, Chung Pui-kuen and Patrick Lam, to 21 months and 11 months in prison, respectively, under Hong Kong’s colonial-era sedition law. Opposition politicians and pro-democracy activists have largely stopped their work. These include individuals implicated Hong Kong 47 case in early 2021. This case stemmed from a series of unofficial primaries held to maximize electoral support for the opposition that drew 600,000 voters ahead of the September 2020 LegCo election, which was then postponed for a year. Forty-five of the 47 defendants in the case were convicted and received sentences ranging from four to 10 years’ imprisonment. In March 2024, Chief Executive John Lee signed into law a supplemental national security legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law (National Security Ordinance 2024), which expands the NSL’s scope to include new national security offenses, increases penalties for existing offenses, allows longer pre-trial detention without formal charges, grants law enforcement sweeping powers to surveil and conduct warrantless searches, obliges all Chinese citizens, including most Hong Kongers, to report any individual who has offended or may offend (peer reporting), and entrenches the NSL’s erasure of fair trial rights detainees are ordinarily entitled to. The first conviction under the ordinance was delivered in September 2024 against a Hong Kong man for wearing a t-shirt featuring a protest slogan. He was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment.
The governing authority has seriously and unfairly repressed protests. The 2019-2020 pro-democracy protests saw extensive use of disproportionate force by police and security forces. The crackdown culminated in the governing authority’s invocation of emergency powers to ban facial coverings at public assemblies, the delay of the LegCo election scheduled for 2020, the imposition of the NSL, the mass exile of pro-democracy figures, the collapse of independent media, and the mass arrest of protesters. As of 2024, Hong Kong officials claimed to have arrested 10,279 people, aged 11 to 87, in connection with the protests. Around 7,000 people, or 72% of those arrested, have not been formally charged as of mid-2025. Officials have stated that it is not bound by a time limit to complete prosecutions against these protesters. There have been no notable pro-democracy demonstrations or gatherings since the crackdown as of June 2025.
The governing authority has engaged in transnational repression against dissidents abroad. Between July 2023 and December 2024, the Hong Kong police invoked the NSL’s broad and extraterritorial provisions, as well as the National Security Ordinance 2024, to issue arrest warrants and place bounties of up to HKD 1 million (US$128,000) per person on 19 pro-democracy figures exiled in the UK, US, Canada, and Australia. They include activists and former opposition lawmakers Nathan Law, Ted Hui, Anna Kwok, Dennis Kwok, and Joey Siu. The police have also harassed family members of these individuals who are still residing in Hong Kong. China and its proxies play a key role in coordinating the transnational repression campaign against Hong Kong dissidents. Hong Kongers who take part in pro-democracy protests overseas have reported receiving physical threats and harassment from pro-Beijing supporters. In April 2025, media reports revealed potential influence operations by China aimed at mobilizing far-right groups in the UK to attack wanted Hong Kong activists in the country on social media. During this period, Australian media also reported the distribution of fake pamphlets accusing Ted Hui of being a pro-Israel lawyer wishing to “wage war on Islamic terrorism” at Adelaide mosques, in an ostensible attempt to provoke religiously charged intimidation against Hui.
Institutions largely or completely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. Executive power is concentrated in designated national security bodies, the legislature has been hollowed out through rule changes and purges, and the judiciary operates under restricted authority.
The governing authority has subjected executive, legislative, and judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. The enforcement of the NSL largely hinges on parallel executive bodies that operate outside domestic institutional constraints to coordinate national security operations, thereby compromising traditional government functions. Article 12 of the NSL, for example, establishes the Committee for Safeguarding National Security (CSNS) to be in charge of formulating and implementing plans to safeguard national security, coordinating various government departments in national security matters, and providing guidance on national security issues. It is appointed by and accountable to the Central People’s Government, and its decisions are not subject to any review. Article 48 of the NSL also creates the Office for Safeguarding National Security (OSNS) to oversee the handling of national security crimes and collect intelligence – functions typically performed by the police and security bureau, forming part of the executive. The OSNS is similarly not subject to Hong Kong’s jurisdiction and laws. Both the CSNS and the OSNS hold an integral role in overseeing Hong Kong’s enforcement of the NSL. Many decisions taken by officials under the pretext of preserving national security, such as carrying out raids on independent media and disqualifying opposition politicians, have been directed by either or both of these bodies, bypassing judicial authority.
Article 62(5) of the Basic Law undercuts the operational effectiveness of the legislature by prohibiting individual lawmakers from proposing private bills concerning public expenditure, the political structure, and government operations. As a result, historically, most laws debated and passed by the LegCo have been tabled by the governing authority. These laws must also be reported to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee in Beijing, which is empowered to reject them when deemed to conflict with the Basic Law or the authority of the Central People’s Government. The imposition of the NSL in 2020 has triggered the mass removal and resignation of opposition lawmakers, eliminating any remaining counterweight to the incumbent in the legislative process. The sweeping changes to Hong Kong’s electoral system in March 2021 solidified the LegCo’s reduction into a rubber-stamp institution by requiring all LegCo seats to be reserved for “patriots” elected through a process strictly controlled by China and pro-regime bodies.
Judicial independence has suffered significant deterioration. The Chief Executive makes judicial appointments in Hong Kong on the recommendation of the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission (JORC). This Commission is chaired by the Chief Executive, who also appoints seven of its eight members. The remaining member is the Secretary of Justice. As such, while the JORC enjoys statutory independence, it is under overwhelming executive control. Many judges are appointed from among barristers from the Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA) and solicitors from the Law Society of Hong Kong. Many members of the HKBA have left Hong Kong due to the increasingly repressive political climate. They included the HKBA’s former chair, Paul Harris, who left the city in March 2022, hours after being threatened with sedition charges over his book and social media comments. The HKBA and Law Society of Hong Kong have rejected concerns over the erosion of judicial independence in Hong Kong and accused foreign interference in criticisms surrounding the NSL.
Importantly, the NSL significantly restricts judicial authority to the point where cases challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or frequently dismissed, and the courts are unable to check government attempts to undermine electoral competition and repress criticism. The NSL empowers the Chief Executive to appoint a list of judges who can preside over NSL cases, without checks and balances. It also does not entitle defendants to conventional fair trial standards, such as the presumption of bail during the pre-trial stage and the right to have a jury or a public trial. As of June 2025, cases initiated under the NSL have a near-100% conviction rate, with the only acquittals granted to two defendants in the Hong Kong 47 trial. Forty-five others were convicted, including 31 who pleaded guilty to avoid heavier sentences or protracted litigation. The scale and outcome of this case have substantially contributed to the collapse of Hong Kong’s political opposition and mark the effective end of the city’s semi-competitive elections. Additionally, the manner in which China imposed the NSL on Hong Kong, which circumvented the LegCo’s legislative powers, precludes courts from reviewing or invalidating the law. Courts have repeatedly refused to review the NSL on jurisdictional grounds. The Court of Final Appeal, for example, dismissed a challenge against the NSL’s constitutionality brought by Jimmy Lai in February 2021. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed this ruling in July 2024. Lai’s other requests pertaining to bail and representation by a foreign counsel of his choosing were all similarly dismissed by the courts, which cited limitations to the defendant’s rights under the NSL in their decisions.
HRF classifies Hong Kong’s governing authority as fully authoritarian.
Hong Kong is formally a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and operates under the “one country, two systems” framework following its handover from British to Chinese rule in 1997. The framework affords Hong Kong limited autonomy over its governance, social, economic, and external affairs, but ultimately requires it to uphold the PRC’s sovereignty over Hong Kong. As part of the framework, the PRC’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee in Beijing drew up Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law of Hong Kong SAR, and reserves the power to amend and interpret it. Hong Kong’s autonomy is a central component of the handover conditions, which are set to expire in 2047. In recent years, however, China has accelerated its efforts to consolidate control over the city, more than two decades ahead of schedule. This tightening of Beijing’s grip is also a direct response to a series of pro-democracy movements that have gained momentum since 2014, as many Hong Kongers push for greater autonomy or even independence.
National elections are a sham. Hong Kong has a multi-party system and holds elections to its unicameral legislature, the Legislative Council (LegCo), every four years. Prior to 2021, these elections were semi-competitive and allowed for participation from candidates aligned with Beijing’s interests and those who advocate for democratic reforms or Hong Kong’s independence. The draconian National Security Law (NSL) and an electoral overhaul unilaterally imposed by China on Hong Kong between 2020 and 2021 effectively empower the Hong Kong governing authority, acting under China’s oversight, to eliminate all forms of political opposition. Most opposition figures have been detained or exiled.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the governing authority. The governing authority has shut down most major, independent organizations across the city since 2020. Dissidents are under a continued threat of arrest, harassment, and intimidation carried out under the pretext of protecting national security. Public demonstrations have become rare since the governing authority’s crackdown on the mass pro-democracy protests in 2019 and 2020. The governing authority, aided by China, has also engaged in extensive transnational repression against Hong Kong dissidents abroad.
Institutions largely or completely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. China’s rapid consolidation of control over Hong Kong since 2020 has led to radical institutional reforms that subjugate Hong Kong’s executive, legislative, and judicial branches to the Central People’s Government. The NSL creates parallel executive institutions that bypass domestic institutional constraints and are directly accountable to China. The absence of meaningful opposition in the LegCo has reduced it into a rubber-stamp institution. Courts have demonstrably failed to check challenges to the NSL and attempts to undermine dissent instituted under the law.
In Hong Kong, national elections are a sham and rendered meaningless by structural limits on representation, a political crackdown under the NSL, and a lack of independent electoral oversight.
As a special administrative region of China, Hong Kong is allowed under the “one country, two systems” framework to hold its own elections to the Legislative Council (LegCo) every four years. These elections have a limited impact on the composition of the LegCo and have been further undermined following an electoral overhaul introduced by China in March 2021. Prior to 2021, the LegCo comprised 70 seats, of which only half were directly elected. The remainder of the seats were filled through functional constituencies – special interest groups such as commercial and professional associations that are largely pro-Beijing. Hong Kong elections before 2021 were semi-competitive; it was possible for opposition parties and groups, which typically advocated for democratic reforms or Hong Kong’s increased autonomy, to secure representation in the LegCo, although they faced relative hurdles in doing so given the limited number of seats they were eligible to contest, initial waves of disqualifications of pro-democracy candidates, and various institutional and legal advantages enjoyed by pro-Beijing candidates.
The governing authority, under China’s control, has unfairly barred the real, mainstream opposition from competing in elections. The March 2021 electoral overhaul, introduced through an amendment to Hong Kong’s Basic Law by China’s National People’s Congress, increased the number of LegCo seats to 90, while reducing those directly elected to 20. Under these changes, a 1,500-member electoral college entirely appointed by the Central People’s Government in Beijing, named the Election Committee, is empowered to fill 40 LegCo seats. Functional constituencies continue to control the remaining 35 seats. The new system, therefore, effectively bars candidates not aligned with pro-Beijing interests from contesting.
In addition to overhauling Hong Kong’s elections, in June 2020, China unilaterally imposed the NSL on the city, a draconian legislation that criminalizes four vaguely defined categories of national security offenses: subversion, secession, terrorism, and collusion with foreign forces. In July 2020, the governing authority disqualified 12 opposition candidates to preempt an opposition win fueled by public backlash to the NLS. Most other opposition figures have been arrested under the law or forced into exile, including those who were implicated in the “Hong Kong 47” case – the largest NSL mass trial involving 47 opposition figures who were arrested and detained for organizing primaries ahead of the 2021 LegCo that was deemed illegal. In April 2025, the Democratic Party, Hong Kong’s largest and oldest opposition party, announced its plans for dissolution after it received threats from Chinese officials. The move is one in a string of closures of opposition parties that have cited coercive conditions and difficulties to maintain operations as reasons for their disbandment.
There is no independent electoral oversight. Election administration is vested with the Electoral Affairs Commission (EAC), which consists of a chairman and two members appointed by the pro-Beijing Chief Executive. Before the 2021 electoral overhaul, the EAC showed signs of partiality toward pro-Beijing candidates, but it still allowed limited opportunities for opposition candidates to gain electoral support. For example, under political pressure from China, the EAC disqualified six opposition figures ahead of the 2016 LegCo election and discouraged many others from running by enforcing a rule requiring all candidates to sign a pledge affirming that Hong Kong is part of China. The 2021 electoral overhaul institutionalized these existing biases. It established a new Candidate Eligibility Review Committee to run parallel to the EAC, tasked with ensuring that election candidates are demonstrated “patriots,” or those with loyalty to China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong. The EAC has publicly labeled disqualified opposition lawmakers as foreign hostile forces. Hong Kong’s 2021 LegCo election was the first to implement the changes made by China. No opposition parties or candidates contested in these polls.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the governing authority. This includes the forced closure of independent organizations, the imprisonment of prominent dissidents, the violent suppression of protests, and the targeting of activists abroad.
The governing authority has unfairly shut down or taken measures to shut down major, independent, and dissenting organizations. Between January 2021 and January 2022, a total of 68 Hong Kong organizations, including civil society and independent media outlets, shut down due to the imposition of the NSL. These included Apple Daily, an influential pro-democracy newspaper owned by Hong Kong tycoon and politician Jimmy Lai, which ceased operations in June 2021 after Lai was arrested under the NSL. The outlet’s assets had also been frozen and its offices raided by over 200 national security personnel due to its coverage and support of the 2019-2020 pro-democracy protests that precipitated China’s rapid consolidation of control over Hong Kong. Prominent independent online news site Stand News – which also played a key role in supporting the pro-democracy protests – shut down in December 2021. More organizations have shuttered in recent years. In February 2025, the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, a leading polling organization, announced it was suspending all self-funded research after its founder, Robert Chung, was interrogated twice under the NSL over allegations that he assisted a wanted person who had “absconded” overseas. It has indicated its plan to fully shut down. In June 2025, China Labor Bulletin, a labor rights group led by a former Tiananmen protest leader, similarly dissolved due to the untenable political environment and increased surveillance. Most groups associated with the 2014 Umbrella Movement – a series of sit-in protests against China’s encroachment on Hong Kong’s autonomy – and the 2019-2020 pro-democracy protests have dissolved to avoid retaliation.
Acting largely under the instructions of China, the governing authority has continued to seriously intimidate dissidents. As of June 2025, Jimmy Lai remains detained in a maximum security prison and, at 77 years old, is Hong Kong’s oldest political prisoner. In September 2024, a local court sentenced two Stand News former editors-in-chief, Chung Pui-kuen and Patrick Lam, to 21 months and 11 months in prison, respectively, under Hong Kong’s colonial-era sedition law. Opposition politicians and pro-democracy activists have largely stopped their work. These include individuals implicated Hong Kong 47 case in early 2021. This case stemmed from a series of unofficial primaries held to maximize electoral support for the opposition that drew 600,000 voters ahead of the September 2020 LegCo election, which was then postponed for a year. Forty-five of the 47 defendants in the case were convicted and received sentences ranging from four to 10 years’ imprisonment. In March 2024, Chief Executive John Lee signed into law a supplemental national security legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law (National Security Ordinance 2024), which expands the NSL’s scope to include new national security offenses, increases penalties for existing offenses, allows longer pre-trial detention without formal charges, grants law enforcement sweeping powers to surveil and conduct warrantless searches, obliges all Chinese citizens, including most Hong Kongers, to report any individual who has offended or may offend (peer reporting), and entrenches the NSL’s erasure of fair trial rights detainees are ordinarily entitled to. The first conviction under the ordinance was delivered in September 2024 against a Hong Kong man for wearing a t-shirt featuring a protest slogan. He was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment.
The governing authority has seriously and unfairly repressed protests. The 2019-2020 pro-democracy protests saw extensive use of disproportionate force by police and security forces. The crackdown culminated in the governing authority’s invocation of emergency powers to ban facial coverings at public assemblies, the delay of the LegCo election scheduled for 2020, the imposition of the NSL, the mass exile of pro-democracy figures, the collapse of independent media, and the mass arrest of protesters. As of 2024, Hong Kong officials claimed to have arrested 10,279 people, aged 11 to 87, in connection with the protests. Around 7,000 people, or 72% of those arrested, have not been formally charged as of mid-2025. Officials have stated that it is not bound by a time limit to complete prosecutions against these protesters. There have been no notable pro-democracy demonstrations or gatherings since the crackdown as of June 2025.
The governing authority has engaged in transnational repression against dissidents abroad. Between July 2023 and December 2024, the Hong Kong police invoked the NSL’s broad and extraterritorial provisions, as well as the National Security Ordinance 2024, to issue arrest warrants and place bounties of up to HKD 1 million (US$128,000) per person on 19 pro-democracy figures exiled in the UK, US, Canada, and Australia. They include activists and former opposition lawmakers Nathan Law, Ted Hui, Anna Kwok, Dennis Kwok, and Joey Siu. The police have also harassed family members of these individuals who are still residing in Hong Kong. China and its proxies play a key role in coordinating the transnational repression campaign against Hong Kong dissidents. Hong Kongers who take part in pro-democracy protests overseas have reported receiving physical threats and harassment from pro-Beijing supporters. In April 2025, media reports revealed potential influence operations by China aimed at mobilizing far-right groups in the UK to attack wanted Hong Kong activists in the country on social media. During this period, Australian media also reported the distribution of fake pamphlets accusing Ted Hui of being a pro-Israel lawyer wishing to “wage war on Islamic terrorism” at Adelaide mosques, in an ostensible attempt to provoke religiously charged intimidation against Hui.
Institutions largely or completely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. Executive power is concentrated in designated national security bodies, the legislature has been hollowed out through rule changes and purges, and the judiciary operates under restricted authority.
The governing authority has subjected executive, legislative, and judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. The enforcement of the NSL largely hinges on parallel executive bodies that operate outside domestic institutional constraints to coordinate national security operations, thereby compromising traditional government functions. Article 12 of the NSL, for example, establishes the Committee for Safeguarding National Security (CSNS) to be in charge of formulating and implementing plans to safeguard national security, coordinating various government departments in national security matters, and providing guidance on national security issues. It is appointed by and accountable to the Central People’s Government, and its decisions are not subject to any review. Article 48 of the NSL also creates the Office for Safeguarding National Security (OSNS) to oversee the handling of national security crimes and collect intelligence – functions typically performed by the police and security bureau, forming part of the executive. The OSNS is similarly not subject to Hong Kong’s jurisdiction and laws. Both the CSNS and the OSNS hold an integral role in overseeing Hong Kong’s enforcement of the NSL. Many decisions taken by officials under the pretext of preserving national security, such as carrying out raids on independent media and disqualifying opposition politicians, have been directed by either or both of these bodies, bypassing judicial authority.
Article 62(5) of the Basic Law undercuts the operational effectiveness of the legislature by prohibiting individual lawmakers from proposing private bills concerning public expenditure, the political structure, and government operations. As a result, historically, most laws debated and passed by the LegCo have been tabled by the governing authority. These laws must also be reported to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee in Beijing, which is empowered to reject them when deemed to conflict with the Basic Law or the authority of the Central People’s Government. The imposition of the NSL in 2020 has triggered the mass removal and resignation of opposition lawmakers, eliminating any remaining counterweight to the incumbent in the legislative process. The sweeping changes to Hong Kong’s electoral system in March 2021 solidified the LegCo’s reduction into a rubber-stamp institution by requiring all LegCo seats to be reserved for “patriots” elected through a process strictly controlled by China and pro-regime bodies.
Judicial independence has suffered significant deterioration. The Chief Executive makes judicial appointments in Hong Kong on the recommendation of the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission (JORC). This Commission is chaired by the Chief Executive, who also appoints seven of its eight members. The remaining member is the Secretary of Justice. As such, while the JORC enjoys statutory independence, it is under overwhelming executive control. Many judges are appointed from among barristers from the Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA) and solicitors from the Law Society of Hong Kong. Many members of the HKBA have left Hong Kong due to the increasingly repressive political climate. They included the HKBA’s former chair, Paul Harris, who left the city in March 2022, hours after being threatened with sedition charges over his book and social media comments. The HKBA and Law Society of Hong Kong have rejected concerns over the erosion of judicial independence in Hong Kong and accused foreign interference in criticisms surrounding the NSL.
Importantly, the NSL significantly restricts judicial authority to the point where cases challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or frequently dismissed, and the courts are unable to check government attempts to undermine electoral competition and repress criticism. The NSL empowers the Chief Executive to appoint a list of judges who can preside over NSL cases, without checks and balances. It also does not entitle defendants to conventional fair trial standards, such as the presumption of bail during the pre-trial stage and the right to have a jury or a public trial. As of June 2025, cases initiated under the NSL have a near-100% conviction rate, with the only acquittals granted to two defendants in the Hong Kong 47 trial. Forty-five others were convicted, including 31 who pleaded guilty to avoid heavier sentences or protracted litigation. The scale and outcome of this case have substantially contributed to the collapse of Hong Kong’s political opposition and mark the effective end of the city’s semi-competitive elections. Additionally, the manner in which China imposed the NSL on Hong Kong, which circumvented the LegCo’s legislative powers, precludes courts from reviewing or invalidating the law. Courts have repeatedly refused to review the NSL on jurisdictional grounds. The Court of Final Appeal, for example, dismissed a challenge against the NSL’s constitutionality brought by Jimmy Lai in February 2021. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed this ruling in July 2024. Lai’s other requests pertaining to bail and representation by a foreign counsel of his choosing were all similarly dismissed by the courts, which cited limitations to the defendant’s rights under the NSL in their decisions.
