Hybrid Authoritarian
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HRF classifies Honduras as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
After two decades of military rule, Honduras initiated a transition to democracy in the early 1980s that was at first characterized by a period of bipartisan consolidation in which power alternated between the right-wing National Party (PN) and the left-wing Liberal Party (PL). In 2009, however, a constitutional crisis broke out after President Manuel Zelaya declared that a referendum to reform the Constitution’s single-term limit would take place, in defiance of the Supreme Court’s ruling that blocked the government from hosting the referendum. The crisis resulted in a military coup that ousted Zelaya, then a PL member, from power. Following the coup, the PN rose to power and went on to rule Honduras for 12 years, between 2009 and 2022. In particular, PN rule under former president Juan Orlando Hernández (2014 – 2022) was characterized by electoral fraud and the undermining of the country’s already-flawed democratic institutions. Under pressure from international allies, electoral conditions improved somewhat under the PN after the 2017 elections, permitting the then-opposition Liberty and Refoundation Party (Libre) to achieve an electoral upset victory in 2020 under President Xiomara Castro. However, the transfer of power between the PN and Libre did not significantly improve Honduras’ electoral and institutional framework. Since 2022, the Castro administration has declared an extended state of exception to combat gang-related crime. While the activity of organized crime groups is a serious and pervasive public security issue in Honduras, the extended state of exception has been linked to human rights abuses and violations of due process. The general elections of 2025 also illustrate the continually skewed electoral conditions as well as institutional malfunctioning and interference from the ruling party, which delayed the official announcement of the new president-elect, PN party member Nasry Asfura.
Electoral competition in Honduras has been significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The country’s electoral oversight bodies, the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Tribunal of Electoral Justice (TJE), lack the full independence and capacity to effectively manage elections and resolve electoral disputes. In particular, the CNE is a politicized institution that is subject to interference from the country’s political parties, including the party in power. Moreover, the incumbent typically enjoys campaign advantages that derive from the misuse of public resources, which also distorts the electoral playing field. While this misuse of public resources violates Honduran law, the CNE and TJE lack the powers to hold incumbents accountable for electoral crimes. Notwithstanding the skewed electoral conditions, electoral fraud and widespread voting irregularities have not been detected in Honduran national elections during the last two electoral cycles.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people in Honduras are generally able to openly criticize or challenge the government. However, Honduras remains one of the region’s most dangerous countries for journalists, civil society leaders, and activists. Failures in the justice system allow perpetrators to commit crimes against civil society under anonymity and with impunity. Nonetheless, independent dissenting organizations are able to operate in the country. There is no evidence that the government systematically targets and obstructs the work of critics. The right to peacefully assemble and protest is guaranteed by the Honduran Constitution and generally upheld by the government. However, incidents of disproportionate use of force and police violence against protesters do occur.
Honduran institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the party in power. The country’s institutions suffer from longstanding weaknesses and are vulnerable to interference. Oversight institutions, such as the electoral management bodies, have faced undue pressure from the executive. Within the executive, some institutions have been weaponized to target government officials who do not adhere to the party line. Moreover, the independence of the National Congress has also been tested.
Electoral competition in Honduras has been significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where any political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. While opposition parties and candidates are able to campaign and compete in elections, electoral conditions are skewed by the absence of robust independent electoral oversight. The National Electoral Council (CNE) is a weak and politicized institution that is susceptible to outside influence, including the pressure exerted by the party in power. The Castro administration’s attempts to interfere with the functioning of the CNE during the 2025 general elections greatly undermined the integrity and legitimacy of the electoral process. Furthermore, the Libre party leveraged public resources to boost the campaigns of its legislative and presidential candidates, deriving an unfair advantage vis-à-vis opposition parties. Nonetheless, there are no recent occurrences of electoral fraud or widespread voting irregularities.
Independent electoral oversight has been seriously undermined by the Honduran government. The country’s electoral framework has suffered from longstanding and significant weaknesses inherited from the preceding National Party (NP) rule. However, not only did the Castro administration fail to strengthen electoral oversight in Honduras, but it also exacerbated the weaknesses of these institutions in the months leading up to the general elections of 2025. Furthermore, during the post-electoral period of December 2025, the Libre party openly undermined and sabotaged the work of the CNE in an attempt to annul electoral results that were unfavorable to its presidential candidate, Rixi Moncada. First founded in 2019, the CNE and the TJE inherited many of the issues that plagued their predecessor, the defunct Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). According to the European Union’s Electoral Observation Mission (EU EOM) of 2021, the CNE has confronted political interference at all levels from its inception. Meanwhile, the TJE suffers from a chronic lack of resources and the absence of a fundamental regulatory framework. The independence of both institutions is also greatly diminished by the politicized appointment process of electoral officials, who are selected to represent the partisan interests of each of the three major parties rather to be independent guarantors of the electoral process.
After Xiomara Castro and the Libre party were elected into office in 2021, independent experts, electoral observers, and members of civil society urged the new government to address the weaknesses in the Honduran electoral system. Not only did reform stall and fail to pass prior to the 2025 elections, but the Castro administration went on to undermine and attack the functioning of the electoral institutions throughout the 2025 electoral cycle. In particular, the government targeted the two electoral officials who represented the PN and the PL within the CNE, Cossette López and Ana Paola Hall, respectively. Throughout the first half of the year, media outlets paid by the government engaged in smear campaigns to delegitimize López and Hall. Then, in July 2025, the Attorney General, Johel Zelaya, ordered the Public Ministry to open proceedings against Hall for delays in the transport of electoral materials during the primaries that took place in March 2025. While there were numerous technical and logistical errors that occurred during the 2025 electoral cycle, these issues were exacerbated by the Castro administration’s actions. For example, the government failed to provide the institutions with sufficient resources for them to operate efficiently. The TJE’s 2025 budget still had not been approved in January 2025, less than two months before primaries were scheduled to take place in March 2025. Furthermore, the Libre party also contributed significantly to the political deadlock that paralyzed the CNE. The Public Ministry’s aggressive investigations targeting electoral officials López and Hall did not adhere to proper protocols and seemed to weaken the electoral process rather than strengthen it. Hall was pressured to step down, but ultimately remained and replaced López as President of the CNE in August 2025. In October 2025, audio files were leaked by the Public Ministry that appeared to implicate López in electoral fraud, but the veracity of the audio files had not been confirmed by an independent third party.
Ultimately, the Castro administration exploited the operational weaknesses of the CNE to further undermine and delegitimize the institution, which in turn effectively sabotaged the already-troubled logistical and technical preparations for the elections. As a result, the CNE was ill-equipped to announce results in a timely manner after Election Day, which took place on November 30, 2025. The very close race between presidential candidates Nasry Asfura (PN) and Salvador Nasralla (PL) further complicated the transmission of the results. The preliminary figures indicated that Asfura and Nasralla were in a technical tie, with Asfura holding a slim lead, which triggered a recount of the votes. Nasralla, along with the Castro administration, raised allegations of electoral fraud as well as complaints that the threats from the United States president, who had backed Asfura, amounted to election interference. The recount process was further troubled by technical errors and serious threats levelled against the electoral officials. Members of the Castro administration refused to accept the results and attempted to annul elections that had not favored the Libre party. Rixi Moncada placed third in the presidential race with only 19.2% of the vote, and Libre lost 15 seats in the National Congress. Ultimately, on December 24, 2025, the CNE released official results, and Asfura was declared the President-elect of Honduras with 40.27% of the vote. Nasralla obtained 39.53% of the vote, but refused to concede the race.
In Honduras, the incumbent has enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. Due to weaknesses in electoral justice and oversight, the party in power is able to leverage public resources to campaign, including the state-owned media and its budget. Honduran electoral law includes provisions prohibiting the use of state resources for campaigning, including the use of state media for propaganda (Articles 229 and 232). The law also includes guarantees of equal access to media for candidates (Article 230). Nonetheless, the incumbent Libre party overtly violated these provisions throughout the entire campaign period leading up to the 2025 general elections, and even prior to the elections. According to the investigative news outlet, Expediente Público, in 2022, the Castro administration spent 127.4 million lempiras (approximately $5 million) on government advertising that largely echoed pro-Libre narratives and included attacks on the party’s political opponents. These funds were traced back to the Public Treasury, and the expenditures were managed by a state administrative body, the Secretary of Strategic Planning (SPE). In 2025, the SPE’s budget was increased to 1,025,092,000 lempiras (approximately $39 million). The Castro administration leveraged at least some of this increased budget to pay for campaign advertising and attacks on political opponents. For instance, investigative work by the CSO Red por la Defensa de la Democracia (RDD) revealed that between May and August 2025, the government paid 532,578 lempiras (approximately $20,000) to six digital media outlets that together published 346 posts echoing official Libre narratives. In addition to paying for government advertising with public funds, the SPE also manages the state-run print and digital publication, Poder Popular. The investigative media outlet, ContraCorriente, identified Poder Popular as one of the public media outlets that was abused to serve as propaganda to boost Rixi Moncada’s presidential campaign and that of other Libre candidates.
In July 2025, the lawyer Leonel Núñez filed a complaint with the CNE denouncing the Castro administration’s widespread misuse of state media to boost Moncada’s campaign–including the misuse of public television channels, Canal 8 and Canal 20, as well as the National Radio of Honduras (RNH). While the CNE opened up an investigation into Núñez’s complaint in August 2025 and collected evidence of the overt violation of electoral law, the investigation failed to move forward in the context of the government’s multiple attacks on the CNE and the degradation of electoral conditions. In addition to Libre’s widespread abuse of state media and the media budget to boost its campaign, the government also used public resources at campaign events. For example, when Libre officially declared Rixi Moncada as the party’s presidential candidate on January 19, 2025, state-owned vehicles were used to transport public employees so they could join the audience of Moncada’s campaign launch event. The incumbent party’s unchecked ability to boost its campaigns through the use of public funds provided a serious and unfair advantage that distorted the electoral playing field. In Honduras, this has been a persistent issue that independent electoral observation missions, including the EU EOM and the OAS, have highlighted across multiple election cycles.
The government of Xiomara Castro has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. Despite Libre’s attempts to annul the elections and undermine the embattled CNE, the party in power did not engage in fraud or other widespread irregularities. External independent electoral observers from the OAS and the EU EOM recognized the deeply flawed nature of the electoral process as well as the political attacks on electoral institutions. However, observers did not witness any form of widespread fraud that compromised the electoral results. With regard to the electoral recount that took place in December 2025, external political pressure and internal technical weaknesses undermined trust in the recount process, but ultimately, the results did not appear to be compromised. Asfura’s close victory over Nasralla reflected a general dissatisfaction with the incumbent Libre party that boosted the two opposition candidates and their parties. This was reflected in the legislative race, in which all three major parties obtained representation within the National Congress: 49 seats for the PN, 41 for the PL, and 35 for Libre.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are generally able to openly criticize or challenge the government in Honduras. Members of civil society work under dangerous conditions due to widespread violence, but are not openly and systematically targeted by the government. Perpetrators of serious crimes against journalists, activists, and civil society members remain largely unidentified due to Honduran institutions’ limited capacities to investigate crimes and hold individuals accountable. Some government workers and officials have been implicated in harassing and threatening critics; however, there is no evidence that the government systematically targets or obstructs the work of critics. Moreover, independent entities such as media outlets and CSOs are able to operate in Honduras without being unfairly shut down. Individuals have the right to peacefully protest and assemble, which is constitutionally protected and generally upheld by the government. The Castro administration’s prolonged state of exception (2022 – 2025) did not result in infringements on the rights of protesters, even if it has been linked with other violations of human rights.
Honduran government officials have not systematically intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. The government has not engaged in systematic obstruction campaigns against critics; however, there are government officials and workers who harass and threaten critics. These incidents became more frequent during the 2025 electoral cycle, in particular with regard to journalists who attempted to cover the political campaigns and electoral process. In Honduras, dissidents are able to overtly criticize the government. Prominent civil society leaders, such as Gabriela Castellanos and Dina Meza, regularly denounce corruption and the violation of rights at the head of civil society organizations, the National Anti-Corruption Council (CNA) and the Association for Democracy and Human Rights (ASOPODEHU), respectively. Nonetheless, dissidents do operate under dangerous conditions and are frequently subject to threats. Both Castellanos and Meza have had to temporarily leave Honduras in response to serious threats. Perpetrators operate under anonymity and impunity due to the institutional incapacity to investigate them and hold them accountable.
Moreover, there are members of the government who harass and threaten dissidents. In effect, some officials engage in judicial harassment to retaliate against journalists and activists who criticize them. The Committee of Free Speech (C-Libre) is a CSO that registers and denounces threats against journalists; in 2023, 32% of the 122 threats it registered implicated government workers and officials. Some of these threats involve retaliatory legal action. In Honduras, the Criminal Code establishes that “crimes against honor,” defined as slander and libel, are punishable with up to a year in prison or fines. Prior to 2020, during the Hernández administration, prison times could be longer. For instance, in 2016, Ariel D’Vicente Jarquin was sentenced to three years in prison and faced a professional ban for defamation after reporting on corruption within the police force. While the introduction of the one-year prison limit represents an improvement, the 2024 UN report on free expression in Honduras highlights that the misuse and abuse of the country’s criminal code continues to be an issue. For example, in February 2025, military chief Roosevelt Hernández initiated retaliatory legal action against twelve leading media outlets—including El Heraldo, La Prensa, Radio Cadena Voces (RCV), and La Tribuna—after a series of investigative articles were published on alleged irregularities occurring within higher ranks of the military. Meanwhile, in 2023, the director of the independent media organization, Reporteros de Investigación, Wendy Funes, received threats of legal action from the regional governor of Choluteca after Funes published an investigative piece on local officials’ involvement in the human trafficking of migrants.
In 2025, journalists also encountered some obstacles in covering the electoral process. C-Libre and ASOPODEHU reported that at least 60 journalists did not receive their press authorization from the CNE to cover electoral proceedings, which, according to one veteran journalist, Edward Denovan Galicia Padilla, had not occurred before in his five-decade career. Meanwhile, other journalists who attempted to cover electoral proceedings faced aggression from state security forces. For example, members of the military intimidated and obstructed veteran journalist Mauricio Ortega from covering preparations for Election Day in the municipality of Omoa. On November 30, 2025, presidential guards also employed disproportionate force against journalists who attempted to cover Xiomara Castro’s arrival at a polling station.
Independent, dissenting organizations have not been unfairly shut down by the Honduran government. CSOs, labor unions, media companies, and other entities are able to organize and publicly voice collective concerns. Prominent CSOs—such as the CNA, ASOPODEHU, C-Libre, and the RDD—act as government watchdogs denouncing corruption, democratic backsliding, and infringements on freedom of expression. The country’s media landscape is primarily populated by a few privately owned media companies, most notably El Heraldo, La Prensa, Televicentro, and Canal 6. Some investigative online media outlets, such as ContraCorriente and Expediente Público, also operate in Honduras. Nonetheless, independent dissenting organizations have denounced some threats stemming from direct pressure to align with Libre’s agenda as well as proposed legislative changes that would render them vulnerable to arbitrary closure. This type of threat dates back to the Hernández administration, which attempted to arbitrarily shut down over 5,000 CSOs in 2014, but ultimately reversed course. Despite the destabilizing effects of the Castro administration’s hostile discourse and invasive auditing, there are no reports of the Libre government shutting down independent organizations. On the other hand, these organizations also run under deeply adverse conditions due to ever-present violent threats from anonymous actors. Some organizations have been forced to close or leave the country due to the dangerous conditions for civil society in Honduras.
In Honduras, protests or gatherings have not been seriously and unfairly repressed by the government. Moderate improvements to Hondurans’ right to protest have been observed during the Castro administration. However, incidents of excessive use of force against protesters were still reported, particularly in connection with the 2025 electoral cycle. Reports of police brutality against peaceful protesters were more commonplace during the administration of Juan Orlando Hernández. For instance, university students protesting against the PN’s hold on power in 2019 were met with open fire from the state security forces. By contrast, little to no police violence was reported when opposition forces held massive protests against Castro’s government in 2023. In effect, under Libre, the amount of protests that took place in Honduras increased, even as reports of excessive force against protestors generally decreased. Even so, during the 2025 electoral cycle, rising polarization and political hostility were reflected in incidents of excessive police force against protesters. For example, on July 30, 2025, members of the political opposition, including PL party supporters and political leaders, gathered in Tegucigalpa to protest against the worsening electoral conditions and to demand that the Castro administration respect the electoral process. When PL legislators led by congressman Jorge Cálix attempted to enter Congress, police forces prevented them from proceeding with force. The police then proceeded to disperse the crowd gathered in front of Congress, leaving some protesters injured.
Institutions in Honduras are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the party in power. Operational opacity and institutional weaknesses hinder institutions’ ability to act effectively and render them vulnerable to interference. Throughout the 2025 electoral cycle, Honduran institutions were subject to additional pressure from the Libre party. The work of the electoral management bodies was hindered by the Castro administration, which co-opted the Attorney General’s Office to launch legal attacks against electoral officials. Moreover, the independence of the National Congress was also tested with the irregular creation of a Libre-controlled Permanent Commission.
The Honduran government has subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence and operational effectiveness. When Xiomara Castro and the Libre party were elected to the presidency, the country’s oversight institutions—such as its electoral oversight bodies—already suffered from significant weaknesses due to sustained democratic backsliding under Juan Orlando Hernández and the PN. Throughout Castro’s presidential term, Libre has not only failed to significantly address the institutional flaws it inherited from the PN, but it has also leveraged these institutional weaknesses to justify new attacks on the country’s institutions. The National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Tribunal of Electoral Justice (TJE) were first founded in 2019 to replace the troubled Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), which was implicated in widespread voting irregularities and fraud linked to the re-election of Juan Orlando Hernández in 2017. Under the pressure of international allies and organizations, the Hernández administration issued a partial reform of electoral institutions that improved electoral conditions enough for the then-opposition Libre party to obtain an upset electoral victory in 2021. However, restrictions stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as stalling from government officials and legislators from the country’s mainstream parties who have benefited from illicit practices, left reform incomplete. Experts, such as the former UN Resident Coordinator in Honduras, Alice Shackelford, urged Xiomara Castro and the Libre party to fully reform the electoral process before the 2025 elections.
However, the Castro administration failed to address most of the pre-existing issues that weakened the country’s electoral oversight institutions. For instance, electoral observers and experts had highlighted that the longstanding politicization of the CNE threatened its independence and operational effectiveness. The members of the CNE and TJE are directly selected by the National Congress, and as a result of a political pact, each major political party is able to select and place a couple of officials. As a result, Honduran electoral officials often represent parties and their interests rather than working as independent guarantors of the electoral process, undermining its legitimacy and integrity. Throughout 2025, the partisan split among the electoral officials resulted in gridlock, which delayed the logistical and technical preparation of the elections. Furthermore, the country’s electoral institutions lack a reliable and independent funding mechanism, which further restricts their operational independence. For example, the TJE still lacked a budget at the start of an electoral year because Congress had not yet approved it. Due to the government’s inaction, the CNE and the TJE were therefore ill-equipped to manage the 2025 general elections.
Moreover, rather than bolstering and supporting the work and independence of Honduras’ electoral bodies, the Castro administration further undermined the CNE’s ability to conduct the elections. From July through November 2025, Attorney General Johel Zelaya, who is closely associated with the Libre Party, initiated multiple legal attacks against two of the three CNE electoral officials, Ana Paola Hall (associated with the PL) and Cossette López (associated with the PN). Attorney General Zelaya’s aggressive investigations failed to follow proper judicial protocol and served to destabilize the electoral process rather than protect its integrity.
Legislative institutions have been subjected to reforms by the Libre party that attempted to seriously weaken their independence. Only four weeks prior to the 2025 general elections, the president of the National Congress and Libre party member, Luis Redondo, declared the creation of a Permanent Commission to operate during the legislative recess. This act in itself is permitted by Article 207 of the Honduran Constitution. However, Redondo’s declaration followed a period of four months in which Congress failed to convene. As the president of Congress, Redondo is also responsible for convening congressional sessions. Despite his refusal to convene Congress between August and November 2025, 70 legislators invoked an extraordinary session and voted to prolong the legislative session until January 2026. This is permitted by Article 191 of the Constitution. This was meant to prevent the creation of the Permanent Commission, which can only operate during a legislative recess. However, Redondo refused to recognize the vote. The Permanent Commission was therefore illicitly called into session to supplant Congress. Six of its nine members are Libre party members; the remaining three belong to minor third parties. The two major opposition parties in the legislature, the PL and the PN, received no representation in Redondo’s Permanent Commission. This is not the first time that Redondo has convened a Permanent Commission. In 2023, Attorney General Johel Zelaya and Adjunct Attorney General Mario Morazán were sworn into office by a Permanent Commission made up of mostly Libre party members. Both Zelaya and Morazán had pre-existing close ties to the Libre party.
HRF classifies Honduras as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
After two decades of military rule, Honduras initiated a transition to democracy in the early 1980s that was at first characterized by a period of bipartisan consolidation in which power alternated between the right-wing National Party (PN) and the left-wing Liberal Party (PL). In 2009, however, a constitutional crisis broke out after President Manuel Zelaya declared that a referendum to reform the Constitution’s single-term limit would take place, in defiance of the Supreme Court’s ruling that blocked the government from hosting the referendum. The crisis resulted in a military coup that ousted Zelaya, then a PL member, from power. Following the coup, the PN rose to power and went on to rule Honduras for 12 years, between 2009 and 2022. In particular, PN rule under former president Juan Orlando Hernández (2014 – 2022) was characterized by electoral fraud and the undermining of the country’s already-flawed democratic institutions. Under pressure from international allies, electoral conditions improved somewhat under the PN after the 2017 elections, permitting the then-opposition Liberty and Refoundation Party (Libre) to achieve an electoral upset victory in 2020 under President Xiomara Castro. However, the transfer of power between the PN and Libre did not significantly improve Honduras’ electoral and institutional framework. Since 2022, the Castro administration has declared an extended state of exception to combat gang-related crime. While the activity of organized crime groups is a serious and pervasive public security issue in Honduras, the extended state of exception has been linked to human rights abuses and violations of due process. The general elections of 2025 also illustrate the continually skewed electoral conditions as well as institutional malfunctioning and interference from the ruling party, which delayed the official announcement of the new president-elect, PN party member Nasry Asfura.
Electoral competition in Honduras has been significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The country’s electoral oversight bodies, the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Tribunal of Electoral Justice (TJE), lack the full independence and capacity to effectively manage elections and resolve electoral disputes. In particular, the CNE is a politicized institution that is subject to interference from the country’s political parties, including the party in power. Moreover, the incumbent typically enjoys campaign advantages that derive from the misuse of public resources, which also distorts the electoral playing field. While this misuse of public resources violates Honduran law, the CNE and TJE lack the powers to hold incumbents accountable for electoral crimes. Notwithstanding the skewed electoral conditions, electoral fraud and widespread voting irregularities have not been detected in Honduran national elections during the last two electoral cycles.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people in Honduras are generally able to openly criticize or challenge the government. However, Honduras remains one of the region’s most dangerous countries for journalists, civil society leaders, and activists. Failures in the justice system allow perpetrators to commit crimes against civil society under anonymity and with impunity. Nonetheless, independent dissenting organizations are able to operate in the country. There is no evidence that the government systematically targets and obstructs the work of critics. The right to peacefully assemble and protest is guaranteed by the Honduran Constitution and generally upheld by the government. However, incidents of disproportionate use of force and police violence against protesters do occur.
Honduran institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the party in power. The country’s institutions suffer from longstanding weaknesses and are vulnerable to interference. Oversight institutions, such as the electoral management bodies, have faced undue pressure from the executive. Within the executive, some institutions have been weaponized to target government officials who do not adhere to the party line. Moreover, the independence of the National Congress has also been tested.
Electoral competition in Honduras has been significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where any political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. While opposition parties and candidates are able to campaign and compete in elections, electoral conditions are skewed by the absence of robust independent electoral oversight. The National Electoral Council (CNE) is a weak and politicized institution that is susceptible to outside influence, including the pressure exerted by the party in power. The Castro administration’s attempts to interfere with the functioning of the CNE during the 2025 general elections greatly undermined the integrity and legitimacy of the electoral process. Furthermore, the Libre party leveraged public resources to boost the campaigns of its legislative and presidential candidates, deriving an unfair advantage vis-à-vis opposition parties. Nonetheless, there are no recent occurrences of electoral fraud or widespread voting irregularities.
Independent electoral oversight has been seriously undermined by the Honduran government. The country’s electoral framework has suffered from longstanding and significant weaknesses inherited from the preceding National Party (NP) rule. However, not only did the Castro administration fail to strengthen electoral oversight in Honduras, but it also exacerbated the weaknesses of these institutions in the months leading up to the general elections of 2025. Furthermore, during the post-electoral period of December 2025, the Libre party openly undermined and sabotaged the work of the CNE in an attempt to annul electoral results that were unfavorable to its presidential candidate, Rixi Moncada. First founded in 2019, the CNE and the TJE inherited many of the issues that plagued their predecessor, the defunct Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). According to the European Union’s Electoral Observation Mission (EU EOM) of 2021, the CNE has confronted political interference at all levels from its inception. Meanwhile, the TJE suffers from a chronic lack of resources and the absence of a fundamental regulatory framework. The independence of both institutions is also greatly diminished by the politicized appointment process of electoral officials, who are selected to represent the partisan interests of each of the three major parties rather to be independent guarantors of the electoral process.
After Xiomara Castro and the Libre party were elected into office in 2021, independent experts, electoral observers, and members of civil society urged the new government to address the weaknesses in the Honduran electoral system. Not only did reform stall and fail to pass prior to the 2025 elections, but the Castro administration went on to undermine and attack the functioning of the electoral institutions throughout the 2025 electoral cycle. In particular, the government targeted the two electoral officials who represented the PN and the PL within the CNE, Cossette López and Ana Paola Hall, respectively. Throughout the first half of the year, media outlets paid by the government engaged in smear campaigns to delegitimize López and Hall. Then, in July 2025, the Attorney General, Johel Zelaya, ordered the Public Ministry to open proceedings against Hall for delays in the transport of electoral materials during the primaries that took place in March 2025. While there were numerous technical and logistical errors that occurred during the 2025 electoral cycle, these issues were exacerbated by the Castro administration’s actions. For example, the government failed to provide the institutions with sufficient resources for them to operate efficiently. The TJE’s 2025 budget still had not been approved in January 2025, less than two months before primaries were scheduled to take place in March 2025. Furthermore, the Libre party also contributed significantly to the political deadlock that paralyzed the CNE. The Public Ministry’s aggressive investigations targeting electoral officials López and Hall did not adhere to proper protocols and seemed to weaken the electoral process rather than strengthen it. Hall was pressured to step down, but ultimately remained and replaced López as President of the CNE in August 2025. In October 2025, audio files were leaked by the Public Ministry that appeared to implicate López in electoral fraud, but the veracity of the audio files had not been confirmed by an independent third party.
Ultimately, the Castro administration exploited the operational weaknesses of the CNE to further undermine and delegitimize the institution, which in turn effectively sabotaged the already-troubled logistical and technical preparations for the elections. As a result, the CNE was ill-equipped to announce results in a timely manner after Election Day, which took place on November 30, 2025. The very close race between presidential candidates Nasry Asfura (PN) and Salvador Nasralla (PL) further complicated the transmission of the results. The preliminary figures indicated that Asfura and Nasralla were in a technical tie, with Asfura holding a slim lead, which triggered a recount of the votes. Nasralla, along with the Castro administration, raised allegations of electoral fraud as well as complaints that the threats from the United States president, who had backed Asfura, amounted to election interference. The recount process was further troubled by technical errors and serious threats levelled against the electoral officials. Members of the Castro administration refused to accept the results and attempted to annul elections that had not favored the Libre party. Rixi Moncada placed third in the presidential race with only 19.2% of the vote, and Libre lost 15 seats in the National Congress. Ultimately, on December 24, 2025, the CNE released official results, and Asfura was declared the President-elect of Honduras with 40.27% of the vote. Nasralla obtained 39.53% of the vote, but refused to concede the race.
In Honduras, the incumbent has enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. Due to weaknesses in electoral justice and oversight, the party in power is able to leverage public resources to campaign, including the state-owned media and its budget. Honduran electoral law includes provisions prohibiting the use of state resources for campaigning, including the use of state media for propaganda (Articles 229 and 232). The law also includes guarantees of equal access to media for candidates (Article 230). Nonetheless, the incumbent Libre party overtly violated these provisions throughout the entire campaign period leading up to the 2025 general elections, and even prior to the elections. According to the investigative news outlet, Expediente Público, in 2022, the Castro administration spent 127.4 million lempiras (approximately $5 million) on government advertising that largely echoed pro-Libre narratives and included attacks on the party’s political opponents. These funds were traced back to the Public Treasury, and the expenditures were managed by a state administrative body, the Secretary of Strategic Planning (SPE). In 2025, the SPE’s budget was increased to 1,025,092,000 lempiras (approximately $39 million). The Castro administration leveraged at least some of this increased budget to pay for campaign advertising and attacks on political opponents. For instance, investigative work by the CSO Red por la Defensa de la Democracia (RDD) revealed that between May and August 2025, the government paid 532,578 lempiras (approximately $20,000) to six digital media outlets that together published 346 posts echoing official Libre narratives. In addition to paying for government advertising with public funds, the SPE also manages the state-run print and digital publication, Poder Popular. The investigative media outlet, ContraCorriente, identified Poder Popular as one of the public media outlets that was abused to serve as propaganda to boost Rixi Moncada’s presidential campaign and that of other Libre candidates.
In July 2025, the lawyer Leonel Núñez filed a complaint with the CNE denouncing the Castro administration’s widespread misuse of state media to boost Moncada’s campaign–including the misuse of public television channels, Canal 8 and Canal 20, as well as the National Radio of Honduras (RNH). While the CNE opened up an investigation into Núñez’s complaint in August 2025 and collected evidence of the overt violation of electoral law, the investigation failed to move forward in the context of the government’s multiple attacks on the CNE and the degradation of electoral conditions. In addition to Libre’s widespread abuse of state media and the media budget to boost its campaign, the government also used public resources at campaign events. For example, when Libre officially declared Rixi Moncada as the party’s presidential candidate on January 19, 2025, state-owned vehicles were used to transport public employees so they could join the audience of Moncada’s campaign launch event. The incumbent party’s unchecked ability to boost its campaigns through the use of public funds provided a serious and unfair advantage that distorted the electoral playing field. In Honduras, this has been a persistent issue that independent electoral observation missions, including the EU EOM and the OAS, have highlighted across multiple election cycles.
The government of Xiomara Castro has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. Despite Libre’s attempts to annul the elections and undermine the embattled CNE, the party in power did not engage in fraud or other widespread irregularities. External independent electoral observers from the OAS and the EU EOM recognized the deeply flawed nature of the electoral process as well as the political attacks on electoral institutions. However, observers did not witness any form of widespread fraud that compromised the electoral results. With regard to the electoral recount that took place in December 2025, external political pressure and internal technical weaknesses undermined trust in the recount process, but ultimately, the results did not appear to be compromised. Asfura’s close victory over Nasralla reflected a general dissatisfaction with the incumbent Libre party that boosted the two opposition candidates and their parties. This was reflected in the legislative race, in which all three major parties obtained representation within the National Congress: 49 seats for the PN, 41 for the PL, and 35 for Libre.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are generally able to openly criticize or challenge the government in Honduras. Members of civil society work under dangerous conditions due to widespread violence, but are not openly and systematically targeted by the government. Perpetrators of serious crimes against journalists, activists, and civil society members remain largely unidentified due to Honduran institutions’ limited capacities to investigate crimes and hold individuals accountable. Some government workers and officials have been implicated in harassing and threatening critics; however, there is no evidence that the government systematically targets or obstructs the work of critics. Moreover, independent entities such as media outlets and CSOs are able to operate in Honduras without being unfairly shut down. Individuals have the right to peacefully protest and assemble, which is constitutionally protected and generally upheld by the government. The Castro administration’s prolonged state of exception (2022 – 2025) did not result in infringements on the rights of protesters, even if it has been linked with other violations of human rights.
Honduran government officials have not systematically intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. The government has not engaged in systematic obstruction campaigns against critics; however, there are government officials and workers who harass and threaten critics. These incidents became more frequent during the 2025 electoral cycle, in particular with regard to journalists who attempted to cover the political campaigns and electoral process. In Honduras, dissidents are able to overtly criticize the government. Prominent civil society leaders, such as Gabriela Castellanos and Dina Meza, regularly denounce corruption and the violation of rights at the head of civil society organizations, the National Anti-Corruption Council (CNA) and the Association for Democracy and Human Rights (ASOPODEHU), respectively. Nonetheless, dissidents do operate under dangerous conditions and are frequently subject to threats. Both Castellanos and Meza have had to temporarily leave Honduras in response to serious threats. Perpetrators operate under anonymity and impunity due to the institutional incapacity to investigate them and hold them accountable.
Moreover, there are members of the government who harass and threaten dissidents. In effect, some officials engage in judicial harassment to retaliate against journalists and activists who criticize them. The Committee of Free Speech (C-Libre) is a CSO that registers and denounces threats against journalists; in 2023, 32% of the 122 threats it registered implicated government workers and officials. Some of these threats involve retaliatory legal action. In Honduras, the Criminal Code establishes that “crimes against honor,” defined as slander and libel, are punishable with up to a year in prison or fines. Prior to 2020, during the Hernández administration, prison times could be longer. For instance, in 2016, Ariel D’Vicente Jarquin was sentenced to three years in prison and faced a professional ban for defamation after reporting on corruption within the police force. While the introduction of the one-year prison limit represents an improvement, the 2024 UN report on free expression in Honduras highlights that the misuse and abuse of the country’s criminal code continues to be an issue. For example, in February 2025, military chief Roosevelt Hernández initiated retaliatory legal action against twelve leading media outlets—including El Heraldo, La Prensa, Radio Cadena Voces (RCV), and La Tribuna—after a series of investigative articles were published on alleged irregularities occurring within higher ranks of the military. Meanwhile, in 2023, the director of the independent media organization, Reporteros de Investigación, Wendy Funes, received threats of legal action from the regional governor of Choluteca after Funes published an investigative piece on local officials’ involvement in the human trafficking of migrants.
In 2025, journalists also encountered some obstacles in covering the electoral process. C-Libre and ASOPODEHU reported that at least 60 journalists did not receive their press authorization from the CNE to cover electoral proceedings, which, according to one veteran journalist, Edward Denovan Galicia Padilla, had not occurred before in his five-decade career. Meanwhile, other journalists who attempted to cover electoral proceedings faced aggression from state security forces. For example, members of the military intimidated and obstructed veteran journalist Mauricio Ortega from covering preparations for Election Day in the municipality of Omoa. On November 30, 2025, presidential guards also employed disproportionate force against journalists who attempted to cover Xiomara Castro’s arrival at a polling station.
Independent, dissenting organizations have not been unfairly shut down by the Honduran government. CSOs, labor unions, media companies, and other entities are able to organize and publicly voice collective concerns. Prominent CSOs—such as the CNA, ASOPODEHU, C-Libre, and the RDD—act as government watchdogs denouncing corruption, democratic backsliding, and infringements on freedom of expression. The country’s media landscape is primarily populated by a few privately owned media companies, most notably El Heraldo, La Prensa, Televicentro, and Canal 6. Some investigative online media outlets, such as ContraCorriente and Expediente Público, also operate in Honduras. Nonetheless, independent dissenting organizations have denounced some threats stemming from direct pressure to align with Libre’s agenda as well as proposed legislative changes that would render them vulnerable to arbitrary closure. This type of threat dates back to the Hernández administration, which attempted to arbitrarily shut down over 5,000 CSOs in 2014, but ultimately reversed course. Despite the destabilizing effects of the Castro administration’s hostile discourse and invasive auditing, there are no reports of the Libre government shutting down independent organizations. On the other hand, these organizations also run under deeply adverse conditions due to ever-present violent threats from anonymous actors. Some organizations have been forced to close or leave the country due to the dangerous conditions for civil society in Honduras.
In Honduras, protests or gatherings have not been seriously and unfairly repressed by the government. Moderate improvements to Hondurans’ right to protest have been observed during the Castro administration. However, incidents of excessive use of force against protesters were still reported, particularly in connection with the 2025 electoral cycle. Reports of police brutality against peaceful protesters were more commonplace during the administration of Juan Orlando Hernández. For instance, university students protesting against the PN’s hold on power in 2019 were met with open fire from the state security forces. By contrast, little to no police violence was reported when opposition forces held massive protests against Castro’s government in 2023. In effect, under Libre, the amount of protests that took place in Honduras increased, even as reports of excessive force against protestors generally decreased. Even so, during the 2025 electoral cycle, rising polarization and political hostility were reflected in incidents of excessive police force against protesters. For example, on July 30, 2025, members of the political opposition, including PL party supporters and political leaders, gathered in Tegucigalpa to protest against the worsening electoral conditions and to demand that the Castro administration respect the electoral process. When PL legislators led by congressman Jorge Cálix attempted to enter Congress, police forces prevented them from proceeding with force. The police then proceeded to disperse the crowd gathered in front of Congress, leaving some protesters injured.
Institutions in Honduras are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the party in power. Operational opacity and institutional weaknesses hinder institutions’ ability to act effectively and render them vulnerable to interference. Throughout the 2025 electoral cycle, Honduran institutions were subject to additional pressure from the Libre party. The work of the electoral management bodies was hindered by the Castro administration, which co-opted the Attorney General’s Office to launch legal attacks against electoral officials. Moreover, the independence of the National Congress was also tested with the irregular creation of a Libre-controlled Permanent Commission.
The Honduran government has subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence and operational effectiveness. When Xiomara Castro and the Libre party were elected to the presidency, the country’s oversight institutions—such as its electoral oversight bodies—already suffered from significant weaknesses due to sustained democratic backsliding under Juan Orlando Hernández and the PN. Throughout Castro’s presidential term, Libre has not only failed to significantly address the institutional flaws it inherited from the PN, but it has also leveraged these institutional weaknesses to justify new attacks on the country’s institutions. The National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Tribunal of Electoral Justice (TJE) were first founded in 2019 to replace the troubled Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), which was implicated in widespread voting irregularities and fraud linked to the re-election of Juan Orlando Hernández in 2017. Under the pressure of international allies and organizations, the Hernández administration issued a partial reform of electoral institutions that improved electoral conditions enough for the then-opposition Libre party to obtain an upset electoral victory in 2021. However, restrictions stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as stalling from government officials and legislators from the country’s mainstream parties who have benefited from illicit practices, left reform incomplete. Experts, such as the former UN Resident Coordinator in Honduras, Alice Shackelford, urged Xiomara Castro and the Libre party to fully reform the electoral process before the 2025 elections.
However, the Castro administration failed to address most of the pre-existing issues that weakened the country’s electoral oversight institutions. For instance, electoral observers and experts had highlighted that the longstanding politicization of the CNE threatened its independence and operational effectiveness. The members of the CNE and TJE are directly selected by the National Congress, and as a result of a political pact, each major political party is able to select and place a couple of officials. As a result, Honduran electoral officials often represent parties and their interests rather than working as independent guarantors of the electoral process, undermining its legitimacy and integrity. Throughout 2025, the partisan split among the electoral officials resulted in gridlock, which delayed the logistical and technical preparation of the elections. Furthermore, the country’s electoral institutions lack a reliable and independent funding mechanism, which further restricts their operational independence. For example, the TJE still lacked a budget at the start of an electoral year because Congress had not yet approved it. Due to the government’s inaction, the CNE and the TJE were therefore ill-equipped to manage the 2025 general elections.
Moreover, rather than bolstering and supporting the work and independence of Honduras’ electoral bodies, the Castro administration further undermined the CNE’s ability to conduct the elections. From July through November 2025, Attorney General Johel Zelaya, who is closely associated with the Libre Party, initiated multiple legal attacks against two of the three CNE electoral officials, Ana Paola Hall (associated with the PL) and Cossette López (associated with the PN). Attorney General Zelaya’s aggressive investigations failed to follow proper judicial protocol and served to destabilize the electoral process rather than protect its integrity.
Legislative institutions have been subjected to reforms by the Libre party that attempted to seriously weaken their independence. Only four weeks prior to the 2025 general elections, the president of the National Congress and Libre party member, Luis Redondo, declared the creation of a Permanent Commission to operate during the legislative recess. This act in itself is permitted by Article 207 of the Honduran Constitution. However, Redondo’s declaration followed a period of four months in which Congress failed to convene. As the president of Congress, Redondo is also responsible for convening congressional sessions. Despite his refusal to convene Congress between August and November 2025, 70 legislators invoked an extraordinary session and voted to prolong the legislative session until January 2026. This is permitted by Article 191 of the Constitution. This was meant to prevent the creation of the Permanent Commission, which can only operate during a legislative recess. However, Redondo refused to recognize the vote. The Permanent Commission was therefore illicitly called into session to supplant Congress. Six of its nine members are Libre party members; the remaining three belong to minor third parties. The two major opposition parties in the legislature, the PL and the PN, received no representation in Redondo’s Permanent Commission. This is not the first time that Redondo has convened a Permanent Commission. In 2023, Attorney General Johel Zelaya and Adjunct Attorney General Mario Morazán were sworn into office by a Permanent Commission made up of mostly Libre party members. Both Zelaya and Morazán had pre-existing close ties to the Libre party.
