Africa

Guinea

Conakry

Fully Authoritarian

0.18%

World’s Population

15,442,000

Population

HRF classifies Guinea as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.

Guinea is a unitary state. Since its independence in 1958, the country has experienced various forms of continuous authoritarian rule, from the one-party state of independence leader Ahmed Sekou Toure to civilian autocracies and military juntas. In September 2021, the Head of State, General Mamady Doumbouya, seized power through a military coup that deposed the last elected leader, Alpha Condé. The coup followed Condé’s re-election in the 2020 presidential election after forcing a third term through an unpopular constitutional change, which sparked mass protests that were met with deadly repression from his regime. The country just held its first elections since the coup on December 28, 2025.

Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. After the coup in September 2021, the ruling National Committee of Reconciliation and Development (CNRD) junta delayed the organization of new national elections for four years. They then held a controversial constitutional amendment to facilitate their transition to civilian power. In December 2025, General Mamady Doumbouya officially became president of the republic after a flawed electoral process during which he obstructed the opposition’s ability to compete by harassing their leaders, forcing the main opposition leader into exile, and engaging in widespread electoral fraud.

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The military has severely intimidated dissenting independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, repressed dissenting protests, shut down leading independent media outlets, and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor.

Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Following the 2021 coup, the junta dismantled state institutions and transferred their powers to transitional bodies aligned with its agenda. This capture of institutions has allowed the military to completely bypass mechanisms of checks and balances, enabling it to adopt measures that favored its continued hold on power. This included drafting a new constitution and validating it to facilitate the 2025 electoral process in the regime’s favor. Additionally, the establishment of a special court that exclusively targeted former members of previous regimes has deepened the existing culture of impunity.

Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Since the ruling CNRD junta deposed the last elected civilian leader, Condé, in September 2021, it has consistently postponed elections, barred significant opposition candidates, and engaged in widespread electoral fraud. These actions have guaranteed its complete victory in the December 2025 presidential elections, serving as a means to legitimize Doumbouya’s continued hold on power.

The regime unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. It has excluded its most formidable opponents from the 2025 post-coup presidential elections through forced exile, judicial harassment, and the dissolution of political parties. In October 2024, in an attempt to intimidate, it placed the Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) and the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG), the two largest opposition parties — among 67 others—under regulatory “observation” for three months, pending a review of their operations and finances, while it banned more than 50 others. Since 2022, the main opposition leader, Cellou Dalein Diallo, of the UFDG, has been in exile following harassment and intimidation from the junta, including the launch of an official corruption probe against him in a matter from 20 years ago. Another opposition leader, Sidya Touré, of the Union of Republican Forces (UFR), was forced to seek refuge in a neighboring country for his safety after the regime seized his house.

The junta engaged in significant voting irregularities. This includes voter intimidation, ballot stuffing, illegal vote counting, and logistical issues. Local pro-democracy organizations and opposition parties have labeled the December 2024 presidential election a charade, citing widespread irregularities. The Liberal Bloc, one of the opposition parties, alleged that regime supporters were allowed to enter the immediate vicinity of the voting booths to pressure voters. They noted that vote counting was not conducted on-site at most polling stations and that their representatives faced violent attacks whenever they attempted to intervene against blatant ballot box stuffing. Similar concerns were raised by other parties, including the Democratic Front of Guinea (FRONDEG), which denounced the exclusion of their representatives from the vote-counting committees and incidents of ballot box stuffing in certain areas. Additionally, reports indicated logistical problems on election day, with at least 18% of polling stations experiencing delays due to the late delivery of essential electoral materials—such as ballots, indelible ink, and voting booths—and the tardy arrival of some polling station staff. Moreover, the internet monitoring group NetBlocks reported that the junta restricted access to social media platforms while Guineans awaited the full election results. Although the authorities have not officially commented on these restrictions, opponents view them as an attempt to suppress criticism of the results.

The regime seriously undermined independent electoral oversight by placing the electoral management body under executive control, allowing for direct influence over the electoral process following the coup. In June 2025, transitional President Doumbouya issued a decree establishing the General Directorate of Elections (DGE), intended to replace the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). The DGE was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, which the opposition has accused of being a military stranglehold meant to maintain the coup leader’s power. Furthermore, the authorities exercise direct control over the composition of the DGE’s leadership, as the president appoints the director, deputy director, and all regional and local directors.

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Since the 2021 coup, the military in power has systematically repressed pro-democracy rallies calling for a return to constitutional order. They have shut down leading opposition parties, suppressed content that is critical of their transitional rule, and even engaged in the abduction of dissenters and their family members.

The ruling CNRD has systematically killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents. Since the coup in September 2021, the military regime has increasingly engaged in enforced disappearances of dissenting voices and their family members. In November 2025, armed and hooded men linked to the junta abducted several family members of Guinean artist and dissident Élie Kamano. In September 2025, Elhadj Adama Keita, a 75-year-old merchant and father of exiled Guinean journalist Mamoudou Babila Keita, was taken from his home by unidentified individuals. Keita stated in a social media post that his father’s abduction was connected to his criticism of the military transition in Guinea, particularly since he himself fled the country in July 2024 after armed individuals, some in military uniforms, attempted to kidnap him. In December 2024, Habib Marouane Camara, an investigative journalist and editor-in-chief of the website lerevelateur224.com, was abducted by unidentified men wearing gendarmerie uniforms. Camara was brutally confronted and assaulted by these individuals before being taken to an unknown location. Another prominent example is the July 2024 abductions and enforced disappearances of FNDC leaders Foniké Menguè and Mamadou Billo Bah after Menguè’s call for a citizen mobilization to demand the reinstatement of suspended media outlets and to protest Guineans’ deteriorating living conditions.

The regime has systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. It has done so through presidential decrees that ban these organizations under the false pretext of undermining social order and violating regulatory laws. In March 2026, just under two months after President Doumbouya took office following a four-year transition period, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization issued a decree banning 40 political parties for allegedly failing to meet their obligations. This ban impacts all major opposition parties, including the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG), led by Cellou Dalein Diallo; the Rally of the People of Guinea (RPG), led by former President Condé; and the Union of Republican Forces (UFR), led by opposition figure Sidya Touré. As a result of the ban, these parties immediately lost their legal status, and all political activities and the use of any symbols associated with them were prohibited. Additionally, the authorities intend to place the parties’ assets under receivership and seal the premises housing their national headquarters and regional offices. In August 2022, the ruling CNRD banned the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC), a civil society platform that had been at the forefront of the demand for a return to civilian rule. The transitional authorities described the FNDC as a “de facto movement” and justified the ban with unsubstantiated charges, including alleged violence against individuals, damage to public and private property, and incitement to hatred. The peaceful demonstrations organized by the FNDC prior to its ban contradict the regime’s accusations.

The ruling power has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed dissenting protests. It has accomplished this by banning pro-democracy gatherings outright, deploying large security forces, using violence against protesters in the streets, and systematically arresting protest leaders. Since May 2022, the regime has formally banned all public demonstrations. In September 2025, Guinea’s Driving Forces (FVG), a coalition of major opposition parties and civil society groups, planned a protest against a constitutional referendum that would allow the junta leader to run for president. However, the authorities banned the protest and deployed a large security presence to prevent any gatherings. They violently engaged with the protesters in the capital and arrested several individuals involved in organizing the protest. In January 2025, security forces violently dispersed a demonstration organized by the FVG, which aimed to demand an end to military rule and a swift return to constitutional order. According to the coalition, security forces fired live rounds during this demonstration, resulting in the deaths of at least three people, including two children, and injuring several others.

The Doumbouya regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly censored dissenting speech. This has occurred through internet shutdowns and arbitrary arrests of individuals publicly criticizing the ruling CNRD. In December 2025, four days before the presidential election, the Guinean Bloggers Association (ABLOGUI) raised the alarm about targeted restrictions on internet access, particularly on Facebook, a social network widely used by Guinean citizens. According to ABLOGUI, the disruptions began the day before the end of the election campaign. Technical tests conducted by independent monitors and experts from the association confirmed that Facebook was difficult to access without using a VPN. In September 2022, Étienne Soropogui, a political opponent of former President Alpha Condé, was arrested after criticizing the military regime during a popular show on Fim FM radio. He denounced the authoritarian practices of the junta, including its silencing of journalists and political and civil society leaders.

Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The junta has fully seized control of political institutions and systematically weakened checks and balances to strengthen its grip on power. State institutions, including the courts and the National Assembly, have supported the military at every stage of the post-coup transition. This support includes backing a controversial constitutional amendment and facilitating an election marred by widespread irregularities, which ultimately led to the victory of junta leader Doumbouya as president of the republic.

Courts frequently and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition. Upon seizing power, the CNRD junta dissolved the nation’s then-highest court, the Constitutional Court, and transferred its authority to the Supreme Court. In September 2025, the Supreme Court upheld the results of a controversial constitutional referendum that removed barriers preventing members of the transitional government from running for office and extended the presidential term from five to seven years.

Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly enabled the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In January 2025, the Kaloum Court of First Instance in Conakry sentenced opposition figure Aliou Bah to two years in prison for insulting and defaming transitional leader Mamadi Doumbouya. Lawyers representing Bah characterized the circumstances of his arrest as judicial kidnapping. He was apprehended in December 2024 by security forces at the border between Guinea and Sierra Leone and taken to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Gendarmerie without any legal proceedings. In October 2024, the Supreme Court declined to review a legal petition brought by the Association of the Victims of Camp Boiro–a notorious concentration camp for real or perceived opponents of the regime of Guinea’s first President, Ahmed Sekou Touré, against junta leader Doumbouya’s decree renaming the capital Conakry’s international airport after Touré. The Supreme Court also dismissed several petitions filed by lawyers of Ibrahima Kassory Fofana, who was the prime minister of the deposed previous regime, against his prolonged detention without trial since April 2022 on alleged corruption charges. In February 2024, the courts sentenced Sekou Jamal Pendessa, secretary general of the Union of Press Professionals of Guinea (SPPG), to six months in prison (with three months suspended) for unlawful participation in a public demonstration and threatening public order. This followed his call for demonstrations against internet and media censorship by the ruling CNRD. His detention triggered a massive general strike by 13 union movements, slowing economic activities across the country. Following an appeal hearing, his sentence was reduced to one month (which he had already served), and he was released that month

The regime has seriously undermined judicial independence to the point where cases challenging the regime are no longer brought to the courts. In 2022, the FNDC filed a complaint in a Paris court alleging regime torture against its members. In July 2024, the wives of two forcibly disappeared FNDC leaders also filed a complaint in a Paris court, accusing the junta of enforced disappearance. On both occasions, the FNDC justified its resort to foreign or international courts by citing the junta’s alleged control of the judicial system in Guinea.

The regime has systematically directed cases to separate, junta-controlled courts. In 2021, the military regime created the CRIEF (Court for the Repression of Economic Crimes) to officially prosecute cases of misappropriation of public funds. However, the CRIEF has exclusively prosecuted members of the former Conde regime, many of whom have been held in prolonged detention without trial. In February 2025, the CRIEF sentenced Ibrahima Kassory Fofana, the former prime minister under ousted president Condé, to five years in prison. This conviction stemmed from charges of illicit enrichment, embezzlement of public funds, and money laundering. In December 2024, the CRIEF also sentenced Dr. Mohamed Diané, who served as Condé’s minister of defense from 2015 to 2021, to five years in prison. Additionally, he was fined $58.5 million and required to forfeit his assets. These actions took place after his arrest following the 2021 military coup, when he was prosecuted for embezzlement of public funds, illicit enrichment, and money laundering.

Even before the September 2021 military takeover, the courts failed to check the regime. In 2018, former President Condé sacked by decree Kéléfa Sall, the chief justice of the Constitutional Court, the nation’s highest court, in retaliation for Sall’s public opposition to Condé’s push for a constitutional amendment to scrap presidential term limits. The Constitutional Court subsequently dismissed all legal challenges to Condé’s controversial constitutional referendum and the results of the 2021 presidential elections, which the opposition denounced as fraudulent. Upon seizing power, the CNRD junta dissolved the Constitutional Court and transferred its powers to the Supreme Court.

The regime subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish their independence. After the 2021 coup d’état, the CNRD dissolved the National Assembly and established the National Council of Transition (CNT), an unelected legislative body whose members are handpicked by the junta as the sole legislative body. Members of the CNT are directly appointed by the junta and are responsible for drafting the country’s new constitution.

Country Context

HRF classifies Guinea as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.

Guinea is a unitary state. Since its independence in 1958, the country has experienced various forms of continuous authoritarian rule, from the one-party state of independence leader Ahmed Sekou Toure to civilian autocracies and military juntas. In September 2021, the Head of State, General Mamady Doumbouya, seized power through a military coup that deposed the last elected leader, Alpha Condé. The coup followed Condé’s re-election in the 2020 presidential election after forcing a third term through an unpopular constitutional change, which sparked mass protests that were met with deadly repression from his regime. The country just held its first elections since the coup on December 28, 2025.

Key Highlights

Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. After the coup in September 2021, the ruling National Committee of Reconciliation and Development (CNRD) junta delayed the organization of new national elections for four years. They then held a controversial constitutional amendment to facilitate their transition to civilian power. In December 2025, General Mamady Doumbouya officially became president of the republic after a flawed electoral process during which he obstructed the opposition’s ability to compete by harassing their leaders, forcing the main opposition leader into exile, and engaging in widespread electoral fraud.

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The military has severely intimidated dissenting independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, repressed dissenting protests, shut down leading independent media outlets, and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor.

Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Following the 2021 coup, the junta dismantled state institutions and transferred their powers to transitional bodies aligned with its agenda. This capture of institutions has allowed the military to completely bypass mechanisms of checks and balances, enabling it to adopt measures that favored its continued hold on power. This included drafting a new constitution and validating it to facilitate the 2025 electoral process in the regime’s favor. Additionally, the establishment of a special court that exclusively targeted former members of previous regimes has deepened the existing culture of impunity.

Electoral Competition

Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Since the ruling CNRD junta deposed the last elected civilian leader, Condé, in September 2021, it has consistently postponed elections, barred significant opposition candidates, and engaged in widespread electoral fraud. These actions have guaranteed its complete victory in the December 2025 presidential elections, serving as a means to legitimize Doumbouya’s continued hold on power.

The regime unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. It has excluded its most formidable opponents from the 2025 post-coup presidential elections through forced exile, judicial harassment, and the dissolution of political parties. In October 2024, in an attempt to intimidate, it placed the Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) and the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG), the two largest opposition parties — among 67 others—under regulatory “observation” for three months, pending a review of their operations and finances, while it banned more than 50 others. Since 2022, the main opposition leader, Cellou Dalein Diallo, of the UFDG, has been in exile following harassment and intimidation from the junta, including the launch of an official corruption probe against him in a matter from 20 years ago. Another opposition leader, Sidya Touré, of the Union of Republican Forces (UFR), was forced to seek refuge in a neighboring country for his safety after the regime seized his house.

The junta engaged in significant voting irregularities. This includes voter intimidation, ballot stuffing, illegal vote counting, and logistical issues. Local pro-democracy organizations and opposition parties have labeled the December 2024 presidential election a charade, citing widespread irregularities. The Liberal Bloc, one of the opposition parties, alleged that regime supporters were allowed to enter the immediate vicinity of the voting booths to pressure voters. They noted that vote counting was not conducted on-site at most polling stations and that their representatives faced violent attacks whenever they attempted to intervene against blatant ballot box stuffing. Similar concerns were raised by other parties, including the Democratic Front of Guinea (FRONDEG), which denounced the exclusion of their representatives from the vote-counting committees and incidents of ballot box stuffing in certain areas. Additionally, reports indicated logistical problems on election day, with at least 18% of polling stations experiencing delays due to the late delivery of essential electoral materials—such as ballots, indelible ink, and voting booths—and the tardy arrival of some polling station staff. Moreover, the internet monitoring group NetBlocks reported that the junta restricted access to social media platforms while Guineans awaited the full election results. Although the authorities have not officially commented on these restrictions, opponents view them as an attempt to suppress criticism of the results.

The regime seriously undermined independent electoral oversight by placing the electoral management body under executive control, allowing for direct influence over the electoral process following the coup. In June 2025, transitional President Doumbouya issued a decree establishing the General Directorate of Elections (DGE), intended to replace the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). The DGE was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, which the opposition has accused of being a military stranglehold meant to maintain the coup leader’s power. Furthermore, the authorities exercise direct control over the composition of the DGE’s leadership, as the president appoints the director, deputy director, and all regional and local directors.

Freedom of Dissent

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Since the 2021 coup, the military in power has systematically repressed pro-democracy rallies calling for a return to constitutional order. They have shut down leading opposition parties, suppressed content that is critical of their transitional rule, and even engaged in the abduction of dissenters and their family members.

The ruling CNRD has systematically killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents. Since the coup in September 2021, the military regime has increasingly engaged in enforced disappearances of dissenting voices and their family members. In November 2025, armed and hooded men linked to the junta abducted several family members of Guinean artist and dissident Élie Kamano. In September 2025, Elhadj Adama Keita, a 75-year-old merchant and father of exiled Guinean journalist Mamoudou Babila Keita, was taken from his home by unidentified individuals. Keita stated in a social media post that his father’s abduction was connected to his criticism of the military transition in Guinea, particularly since he himself fled the country in July 2024 after armed individuals, some in military uniforms, attempted to kidnap him. In December 2024, Habib Marouane Camara, an investigative journalist and editor-in-chief of the website lerevelateur224.com, was abducted by unidentified men wearing gendarmerie uniforms. Camara was brutally confronted and assaulted by these individuals before being taken to an unknown location. Another prominent example is the July 2024 abductions and enforced disappearances of FNDC leaders Foniké Menguè and Mamadou Billo Bah after Menguè’s call for a citizen mobilization to demand the reinstatement of suspended media outlets and to protest Guineans’ deteriorating living conditions.

The regime has systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. It has done so through presidential decrees that ban these organizations under the false pretext of undermining social order and violating regulatory laws. In March 2026, just under two months after President Doumbouya took office following a four-year transition period, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization issued a decree banning 40 political parties for allegedly failing to meet their obligations. This ban impacts all major opposition parties, including the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG), led by Cellou Dalein Diallo; the Rally of the People of Guinea (RPG), led by former President Condé; and the Union of Republican Forces (UFR), led by opposition figure Sidya Touré. As a result of the ban, these parties immediately lost their legal status, and all political activities and the use of any symbols associated with them were prohibited. Additionally, the authorities intend to place the parties’ assets under receivership and seal the premises housing their national headquarters and regional offices. In August 2022, the ruling CNRD banned the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC), a civil society platform that had been at the forefront of the demand for a return to civilian rule. The transitional authorities described the FNDC as a “de facto movement” and justified the ban with unsubstantiated charges, including alleged violence against individuals, damage to public and private property, and incitement to hatred. The peaceful demonstrations organized by the FNDC prior to its ban contradict the regime’s accusations.

The ruling power has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed dissenting protests. It has accomplished this by banning pro-democracy gatherings outright, deploying large security forces, using violence against protesters in the streets, and systematically arresting protest leaders. Since May 2022, the regime has formally banned all public demonstrations. In September 2025, Guinea’s Driving Forces (FVG), a coalition of major opposition parties and civil society groups, planned a protest against a constitutional referendum that would allow the junta leader to run for president. However, the authorities banned the protest and deployed a large security presence to prevent any gatherings. They violently engaged with the protesters in the capital and arrested several individuals involved in organizing the protest. In January 2025, security forces violently dispersed a demonstration organized by the FVG, which aimed to demand an end to military rule and a swift return to constitutional order. According to the coalition, security forces fired live rounds during this demonstration, resulting in the deaths of at least three people, including two children, and injuring several others.

The Doumbouya regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly censored dissenting speech. This has occurred through internet shutdowns and arbitrary arrests of individuals publicly criticizing the ruling CNRD. In December 2025, four days before the presidential election, the Guinean Bloggers Association (ABLOGUI) raised the alarm about targeted restrictions on internet access, particularly on Facebook, a social network widely used by Guinean citizens. According to ABLOGUI, the disruptions began the day before the end of the election campaign. Technical tests conducted by independent monitors and experts from the association confirmed that Facebook was difficult to access without using a VPN. In September 2022, Étienne Soropogui, a political opponent of former President Alpha Condé, was arrested after criticizing the military regime during a popular show on Fim FM radio. He denounced the authoritarian practices of the junta, including its silencing of journalists and political and civil society leaders.

Institutional Accountability

Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The junta has fully seized control of political institutions and systematically weakened checks and balances to strengthen its grip on power. State institutions, including the courts and the National Assembly, have supported the military at every stage of the post-coup transition. This support includes backing a controversial constitutional amendment and facilitating an election marred by widespread irregularities, which ultimately led to the victory of junta leader Doumbouya as president of the republic.

Courts frequently and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition. Upon seizing power, the CNRD junta dissolved the nation’s then-highest court, the Constitutional Court, and transferred its authority to the Supreme Court. In September 2025, the Supreme Court upheld the results of a controversial constitutional referendum that removed barriers preventing members of the transitional government from running for office and extended the presidential term from five to seven years.

Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly enabled the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In January 2025, the Kaloum Court of First Instance in Conakry sentenced opposition figure Aliou Bah to two years in prison for insulting and defaming transitional leader Mamadi Doumbouya. Lawyers representing Bah characterized the circumstances of his arrest as judicial kidnapping. He was apprehended in December 2024 by security forces at the border between Guinea and Sierra Leone and taken to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Gendarmerie without any legal proceedings. In October 2024, the Supreme Court declined to review a legal petition brought by the Association of the Victims of Camp Boiro–a notorious concentration camp for real or perceived opponents of the regime of Guinea’s first President, Ahmed Sekou Touré, against junta leader Doumbouya’s decree renaming the capital Conakry’s international airport after Touré. The Supreme Court also dismissed several petitions filed by lawyers of Ibrahima Kassory Fofana, who was the prime minister of the deposed previous regime, against his prolonged detention without trial since April 2022 on alleged corruption charges. In February 2024, the courts sentenced Sekou Jamal Pendessa, secretary general of the Union of Press Professionals of Guinea (SPPG), to six months in prison (with three months suspended) for unlawful participation in a public demonstration and threatening public order. This followed his call for demonstrations against internet and media censorship by the ruling CNRD. His detention triggered a massive general strike by 13 union movements, slowing economic activities across the country. Following an appeal hearing, his sentence was reduced to one month (which he had already served), and he was released that month

The regime has seriously undermined judicial independence to the point where cases challenging the regime are no longer brought to the courts. In 2022, the FNDC filed a complaint in a Paris court alleging regime torture against its members. In July 2024, the wives of two forcibly disappeared FNDC leaders also filed a complaint in a Paris court, accusing the junta of enforced disappearance. On both occasions, the FNDC justified its resort to foreign or international courts by citing the junta’s alleged control of the judicial system in Guinea.

The regime has systematically directed cases to separate, junta-controlled courts. In 2021, the military regime created the CRIEF (Court for the Repression of Economic Crimes) to officially prosecute cases of misappropriation of public funds. However, the CRIEF has exclusively prosecuted members of the former Conde regime, many of whom have been held in prolonged detention without trial. In February 2025, the CRIEF sentenced Ibrahima Kassory Fofana, the former prime minister under ousted president Condé, to five years in prison. This conviction stemmed from charges of illicit enrichment, embezzlement of public funds, and money laundering. In December 2024, the CRIEF also sentenced Dr. Mohamed Diané, who served as Condé’s minister of defense from 2015 to 2021, to five years in prison. Additionally, he was fined $58.5 million and required to forfeit his assets. These actions took place after his arrest following the 2021 military coup, when he was prosecuted for embezzlement of public funds, illicit enrichment, and money laundering.

Even before the September 2021 military takeover, the courts failed to check the regime. In 2018, former President Condé sacked by decree Kéléfa Sall, the chief justice of the Constitutional Court, the nation’s highest court, in retaliation for Sall’s public opposition to Condé’s push for a constitutional amendment to scrap presidential term limits. The Constitutional Court subsequently dismissed all legal challenges to Condé’s controversial constitutional referendum and the results of the 2021 presidential elections, which the opposition denounced as fraudulent. Upon seizing power, the CNRD junta dissolved the Constitutional Court and transferred its powers to the Supreme Court.

The regime subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish their independence. After the 2021 coup d’état, the CNRD dissolved the National Assembly and established the National Council of Transition (CNT), an unelected legislative body whose members are handpicked by the junta as the sole legislative body. Members of the CNT are directly appointed by the junta and are responsible for drafting the country’s new constitution.