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HRF classifies Guatemala as democratic.
Guatemala is a presidential constitutional republic that returned to civilian electoral rule with the adoption of the 1985 Constitution after decades of military rule during a 36-year civil war (1960–1996). The 1996 Peace Accords subsequently ended the armed conflict and deepened democratic and institutional reforms. The Constitution prohibits presidential reelection, creating a recurring pattern in which each election cycle opens space for new political figures rather than continuity of incumbents. Political parties are weakly institutionalized and tend to organize around prominent personalities or short-term political objectives rather than stable ideological programs. While elections have been competitive and have produced alternation in power, the country has long faced weak state capacity, corruption, and the influence of entrenched political and economic networks within public institutions. During the 2010s, international anti-corruption efforts led by the UN-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) exposed criminal structures embedded in the state, but the commission’s termination in 2019 marked a turning point, after which prosecutors, judges, and journalists involved in anti-corruption investigations faced increasing legal pressure. The 2023 election of Bernardo Arévalo represented a significant political disruption, as his anti-corruption platform challenged established political actors. His inauguration in January 2024 followed a prolonged institutional crisis in which judicial and prosecutorial authorities attempted to suspend his party and invalidate electoral results. Since taking office, the Arévalo administration has governed amid persistent conflict with parts of the justice system, especially the Public Prosecutor’s Office, producing a situation in which democratic competition continues to operate, but under sustained institutional pressure.
National elections in Guatemala are largely free and fair. However, the 2023 electoral cycle was marked by contested candidate exclusions and legal actions by prosecutorial and judicial actors that placed pressure on electoral authorities and sought to delay or delegitimize the results. Despite these interventions, domestic and international observation remained in place, the vote was ultimately certified, and opposition candidate Bernardo Arévalo was able to compete and assume office. Since his inauguration, there is no evidence that the executive branch has attempted to exclude competitors or manipulate electoral administration, although the process has operated under continued institutional strain from actors outside the government.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. President Bernardo Arévalo has publicly defended press freedom and has not directed repression against critics. However, a hostile environment for dissent persists due to actions by the Public Prosecutor’s Office under Attorney General Consuelo Porras, which has pursued criminal cases against investigative journalists, former judges and prosecutors, ex-CICIG personnel, human rights defenders, and student activists, leading to exile, detention, and prolonged proceedings. As a result, expression remains lawful and visible, but unevenly protected because intimidation largely originates from prosecutorial and allied actors rather than the executive branch.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts and oversight bodies continue to function autonomously and have at times upheld electoral results and constitutional procedures. However, prosecutorial and lower-court actions following the 2023 elections also challenged the certification of results, targeted electoral authorities, and constrained both the legislature and the presidency, including repeated attempts to lift President Arévalo’s immunity. These patterns reflect a fragmented accountability system in which autonomous judicial actors both check and, at times, disrupt democratic governance, rather than executive capture of institutions.
National elections are largely free and fair. The 2023 electoral cycle was nonetheless marked by interference carried out by prosecutorial and judicial actors prior to President Bernardo Arévalo’s inauguration. These actions placed pressure on institutions responsible for safeguarding electoral integrity, particularly the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), and sought to delay or delegitimize certification of the results. Despite such efforts, domestic and international observation remained in place, the vote was certified, and Arévalo assumed office in January 2024. Since taking office, there is no evidence that Arévalo’s executive branch has sought to reform or manipulate electoral institutions.
The Arévalo Administration has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. The 2023 electoral cycle, which preceded President Bernardo Arévalo’s inauguration, was marked by controversial candidate exclusions carried out by electoral and judicial authorities during the administration of President Alejandro Giammattei. Several prominent candidates from across the ideological spectrum were disqualified on legally contested grounds. Conservative candidate Carlos Pineda, who was leading the polls with roughly 23% was barred by the Constitutional Court over alleged procedural irregularities in his party’s internal assemblies, despite the complaint being filed well after statutory deadlines. Right-wing candidate Roberto Arzú was excluded for alleged premature campaigning, and Jordán Rodas, the running mate to Indigenous leader Thelma Cabrera of the leftist Movement for the Liberation of Peoples (MLP), was disqualified over administrative issues linked to his prior tenure as the human rights ombudsman (2017-2022), following a late complaint. These exclusions affected viable contenders in a fragmented race and were widely viewed as politically motivated. However, the same electoral process ultimately allowed the participation and victory of Arévalo and the Semilla Movement, an anti-establishment party running on an anti-corruption platform. After advancing to the runoff and winning the presidency, prosecutorial authorities attempted to suspend the party’s legal status, but the electoral authorities and courts did not prevent the certification of the results or the transfer of power. Arévalo was inaugurated in January 2024, indicating that despite significant institutional interference, a real opposition candidate was not ultimately barred from competing or assuming office.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. However, the 2023 electoral process preceding President Bernardo Arévalo’s inauguration was marked by serious interference carried out by prosecutorial authorities during the final stages of the campaign. After Arévalo of the Seed Movement party unexpectedly surged in the first round with 15.5% of the vote and advanced to a runoff against establishment candidate Sandra Torres, the Public Prosecutor’s Office under Attorney General Consuelo Porras initiated criminal investigations into the Seed party over alleged irregularities in its registration process. Prosecutors ordered raids on the party’s offices and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) headquarters, as well as attempts to annul the party’s legal status. These actions were widely condemned by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) as politically motivated and risked disrupting the electoral process. Although these measures created significant uncertainty and pressure on the campaign environment, they were not directed by the executive branch and did not ultimately prevent the opposition candidate from competing in the runoff or winning the presidency. Since taking office in January 2024, there is no evidence that the Arévalo administration has used state resources to obstruct opposition campaign activity.
Furthermore, the government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. However, the 2023 electoral process that preceded President Bernardo Arévalo’s inauguration involved significant pressure on the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), the constitutionally mandated body responsible for administering elections. Following Arévalo’s advance to the runoff, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and segments of the judiciary undertook actions that risked weakening the electoral authority, including attempts to challenge tally sheets and voter records without clear evidentiary basis and raids on TSE facilities. Prosecutors also pressed the TSE to delay or reconsider Arévalo’s participation in the runoff. Despite these efforts, both domestic and international oversight remained operative. The Organization of American States (OAS) was allowed to deploy an electoral observation mission that monitored voting and tabulation procedures, publicly affirmed the integrity of the vote, and urged state institutions to respect the certified results. The TSE ultimately certified the outcome, and Arévalo was inaugurated in January 2024. Since taking office, there is no evidence that the executive branch has attempted to restructure or reform the electoral institutions in ways that would weaken their independence, although ongoing legal disputes continue to place the electoral system under strain. Given Guatemala’s four-year electoral cycle and the absence of midterm elections, the extent to which electoral oversight can recover will not be fully testable until the next general elections scheduled for June 2027.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. President Bernardo Arévalo has publicly defended press freedom and opposed the criminalization of journalists and civil society actors, and there is no evidence that his administration has directed repression against critics. However, dissent occurs in a constrained environment shaped by actions of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and allied judicial actors operating beyond the executive’s authority. Journalists, anti-corruption lawyers, former prosecutors, judges, and human rights defenders have faced criminal investigations, prolonged pretrial detention, or exile linked to earlier anti-corruption efforts. Protest activity has generally been tolerated without violent dispersal, but some organizers have later faced legal proceedings. As a result, criticism remains visible and lawful, though unevenly protected due to institutional pressures not originating from the executive branch.
In Guatemala, the government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Since President Bernardo Arévalo took office, there is no evidence that the executive branch has directed repression against critics. However, intimidation and judicial harassment have continued through actions carried out by the Public Prosecutor’s Office and allied judicial actors operating outside the executive’s authority. Under Attorney General Consuelo Porras, criminal proceedings have been widely used against journalists, anti-corruption lawyers, former prosecutors, judges, and human rights defenders linked to earlier anti-corruption efforts. A report by the Institute of Comparative Studies in Criminal and Social Sciences (INECIP) documented at least 166 cases of judicial persecution, a substantial increase from the 86 cases identified in 2022. Of those targeted, approximately 100 individuals, including dozens of former prosecutors and judges, have gone into exile, while others face ongoing legal proceedings or detention. Moreover, according to a 2025 report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), prosecutorial authorities frequently file multiple or unfounded complaints against the same individuals, often invoking broadly defined crimes such as obstruction of justice, sedition, unlawful association, or abuse of authority and combining them with prolonged pretrial detention and delayed proceedings. High-profile cases include dozens of legal actions against former anti-corruption prosecutor Juan Francisco Sandoval and former Constitutional Court magistrate Gloria Porras, as well as the imprisonment of former prosecutor Virginia Laparra and the prosecution of student activist Plutarco De León. These patterns indicate that dissenting actors operate in a hostile legal environment shaped by prosecutorial pressure rather than direct executive repression.
Additional cases affecting the press reinforce this pattern. ElPeriódico, a leading investigative outlet, ceased operations in 2023 following sustained financial pressure and the criminal prosecution of its founder, José Rubén Zamora, whose reporting had exposed corruption allegations involving state officials linked to the Giammattei administration. By the end of 2025, Zamora had spent more than three years in detention; he was sentenced in 2023 to six years in prison for money laundering, while other charges were dismissed. In March 2024, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared his detention arbitrary, yet prosecutors later filed additional charges and, after a brief period of house arrest in late 2024, he was returned to prison in early 2025 at the request of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. President Arévalo publicly criticized the criminalization of journalists and called for respect for due process and press freedom, while noting that the executive lacks authority to intervene in prosecutorial decisions. Overall, dissent remains legally permitted, but is constrained by prosecutorial and judicial pressures rather than executive action. Despite such threats of harassment, intimidation, and legal challenges, independent media persists in Guatemala, with outlets like Plaza Pública and Prensa Libre continuing investigative journalism.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Large pro-democracy demonstrations following the 2023 election, organized in support of respecting the electoral results, were allowed to proceed without direct repression. However, protesters and organizers later faced legal intimidation through proceedings initiated by the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Arrest warrants were sought against activists linked to the 2023 mobilizations, and in April 2025, indigenous leaders Luis Pacheco and Héctor Chaclán of the 48 Cantons of Totonicapán were detained and charged with terrorism and obstruction of justice for organizing protests defending the electoral outcome. Because the prosecutions targeted actors associated with mobilizations supporting the certification of Arévalo’s election, they indicate institutional conflict between prosecutorial authorities and the elected executive rather than repression carried out by the government itself. Protests have also occurred during the Arévalo administration. In July 2024, thousands of demonstrators mobilized in Guatemala City, led by peasant and social organizations, to demand the resignation of Attorney General Consuelo Porras and to protest rising living costs and land conflicts; some demands were directed at the president’s economic policies. The demonstrations proceeded without repression. In 2025, Indigenous authorities organized blockades opposing prosecutions carried out by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and these actions likewise were not forcibly dispersed by executive authorities.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts and other oversight bodies continue to exercise authority over executive actions, and the administration has not altered institutional rules to shield itself from scrutiny. However, Guatemala’s accountability system is marked by intense conflict among state institutions. Prosecutorial and judicial actors have pursued actions affecting electoral authorities, legislators, and the presidency itself, generating repeated legal challenges and uncertainty around the functioning of government. In some cases, higher courts have intervened to uphold electoral outcomes and constitutional procedures, while in others, prosecutorial initiatives have constrained the operation of elected institutions. As a result, oversight mechanisms remain operative but uneven, reflecting institutional fragmentation and politicization rather than the consolidation of power by the executive.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check, or have enabled, the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition and skew the electoral process in its favor. In the aftermath of the 2023 general elections, judicial and prosecutorial authorities, most notably the Public Prosecutor’s Office under Chief Prosecutor General Consuelo Porras, played a central role in efforts to delegitimize and obstruct an electoral outcome. After Bernardo Arévalo advanced to the presidential runoff, prosecutors initiated criminal investigations against his Seed Movement, carried out raids on party offices and on the headquarters of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), and sought to suspend the party’s legal status. However, the TSE maintained its constitutional authority and certified the vote, enabling the peaceful transfer of power in January 2024. In October 2025, the Constitutional Court reaffirmed this position, annulling a criminal judge’s ruling that sought to declare the presidency vacant and explicitly warning the judge against actions that contravene the constitutional framework governing democratic elections. The Court held that such judicial actions threatened the rights to vote and be elected and exceeded the competence of ordinary criminal courts, reiterating that the suspension or cancellation of political parties is an exclusively electoral matter under the authority of the TSE and that electoral results are legally inalterable.
The government has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Since President Bernardo Arévalo took office, oversight institutions have continued to operate autonomously and, in many cases, in open confrontation with the executive. Attorney General Consuelo Porras has remained in office despite the president’s public efforts to seek her removal, as Guatemalan law does not grant the executive authority to dismiss the Attorney General before the end of her term. The Public Prosecutor’s Office has repeatedly sought to undermine the effective functioning of the administration by attempting to strip the president of his constitutional immunity. As of late 2025, the Chief Prosecutor General had requested the Supreme Court more than ten times to lift Arévalo’s immunity in order to enable congressional investigations into alleged crimes, including a “breach of duties” accusation following the escape of gang leaders from a prison near the capital. These petitions have generated persistent uncertainty around the presidency and consumed institutional resources, yet courts have continued to process them. Prosecutorial authorities have also pursued investigations affecting the governing party, including actions against members of the Seed Movement party. Rather than neutralizing oversight bodies, the executive faces sustained legal scrutiny from prosecutorial and judicial actors operating beyond presidential control, indicating that institutions retain the capacity to challenge the government even amid significant political conflict.
Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to government interests, have not faced retaliation by the governing authority, although they have been subject to pressure and legal action from other state actors. Since 2023, anti-corruption judges and prosecutors linked to CICIG and the Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity (FECI), including former prosecutor Virginia Laparra, former FECI head Juan Francisco Sandoval, and former Constitutional Court magistrate Gloria Porras, have faced criminal proceedings or exile. Following the 2023 elections, similar actions extended to officials within the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). Prosecutors initiated investigations, raids, and legal complaints against magistrates involved in certifying the election results, and in January 2024, four of the five TSE magistrates were suspended as a result of proceedings promoted by the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Lower-level TSE staff were also detained or investigated. In 2025, the Supreme Court of Justice ruled that the magistrates could return to their posts, although the Prosecutor’s Office appealed the decision. These measures significantly affected judicial and electoral officials but were carried out by prosecutorial and judicial actors operating independently of the executive branch, indicating institutional conflict rather than retaliation by the Arévalo administration.
Judicial, legislative, and oversight institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable, and the government has not enacted reforms that abolish or seriously weaken institutional independence. Since taking office, President Bernardo Arévalo has not proposed or implemented legal or constitutional changes aimed at subordinating the courts, Congress, executive agencies, or autonomous oversight bodies. The institutional framework governing the judiciary, legislature, and supervisory entities, including the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Comptroller General, has remained formally intact, and these bodies continue to exercise their legal authority. While Guatemala’s broader political conflict has generated disputes among state institutions, there is no evidence that the executive has attempted to dissolve, restructure, or replace them to consolidate power. Rather than altering the institutional rules to shield itself, the administration has operated within existing legal constraints, indicating that mechanisms of horizontal accountability remain in place despite ongoing political tensions.
HRF classifies Guatemala as democratic.
Guatemala is a presidential constitutional republic that returned to civilian electoral rule with the adoption of the 1985 Constitution after decades of military rule during a 36-year civil war (1960–1996). The 1996 Peace Accords subsequently ended the armed conflict and deepened democratic and institutional reforms. The Constitution prohibits presidential reelection, creating a recurring pattern in which each election cycle opens space for new political figures rather than continuity of incumbents. Political parties are weakly institutionalized and tend to organize around prominent personalities or short-term political objectives rather than stable ideological programs. While elections have been competitive and have produced alternation in power, the country has long faced weak state capacity, corruption, and the influence of entrenched political and economic networks within public institutions. During the 2010s, international anti-corruption efforts led by the UN-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) exposed criminal structures embedded in the state, but the commission’s termination in 2019 marked a turning point, after which prosecutors, judges, and journalists involved in anti-corruption investigations faced increasing legal pressure. The 2023 election of Bernardo Arévalo represented a significant political disruption, as his anti-corruption platform challenged established political actors. His inauguration in January 2024 followed a prolonged institutional crisis in which judicial and prosecutorial authorities attempted to suspend his party and invalidate electoral results. Since taking office, the Arévalo administration has governed amid persistent conflict with parts of the justice system, especially the Public Prosecutor’s Office, producing a situation in which democratic competition continues to operate, but under sustained institutional pressure.
National elections in Guatemala are largely free and fair. However, the 2023 electoral cycle was marked by contested candidate exclusions and legal actions by prosecutorial and judicial actors that placed pressure on electoral authorities and sought to delay or delegitimize the results. Despite these interventions, domestic and international observation remained in place, the vote was ultimately certified, and opposition candidate Bernardo Arévalo was able to compete and assume office. Since his inauguration, there is no evidence that the executive branch has attempted to exclude competitors or manipulate electoral administration, although the process has operated under continued institutional strain from actors outside the government.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. President Bernardo Arévalo has publicly defended press freedom and has not directed repression against critics. However, a hostile environment for dissent persists due to actions by the Public Prosecutor’s Office under Attorney General Consuelo Porras, which has pursued criminal cases against investigative journalists, former judges and prosecutors, ex-CICIG personnel, human rights defenders, and student activists, leading to exile, detention, and prolonged proceedings. As a result, expression remains lawful and visible, but unevenly protected because intimidation largely originates from prosecutorial and allied actors rather than the executive branch.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts and oversight bodies continue to function autonomously and have at times upheld electoral results and constitutional procedures. However, prosecutorial and lower-court actions following the 2023 elections also challenged the certification of results, targeted electoral authorities, and constrained both the legislature and the presidency, including repeated attempts to lift President Arévalo’s immunity. These patterns reflect a fragmented accountability system in which autonomous judicial actors both check and, at times, disrupt democratic governance, rather than executive capture of institutions.
National elections are largely free and fair. The 2023 electoral cycle was nonetheless marked by interference carried out by prosecutorial and judicial actors prior to President Bernardo Arévalo’s inauguration. These actions placed pressure on institutions responsible for safeguarding electoral integrity, particularly the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), and sought to delay or delegitimize certification of the results. Despite such efforts, domestic and international observation remained in place, the vote was certified, and Arévalo assumed office in January 2024. Since taking office, there is no evidence that Arévalo’s executive branch has sought to reform or manipulate electoral institutions.
The Arévalo Administration has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. The 2023 electoral cycle, which preceded President Bernardo Arévalo’s inauguration, was marked by controversial candidate exclusions carried out by electoral and judicial authorities during the administration of President Alejandro Giammattei. Several prominent candidates from across the ideological spectrum were disqualified on legally contested grounds. Conservative candidate Carlos Pineda, who was leading the polls with roughly 23% was barred by the Constitutional Court over alleged procedural irregularities in his party’s internal assemblies, despite the complaint being filed well after statutory deadlines. Right-wing candidate Roberto Arzú was excluded for alleged premature campaigning, and Jordán Rodas, the running mate to Indigenous leader Thelma Cabrera of the leftist Movement for the Liberation of Peoples (MLP), was disqualified over administrative issues linked to his prior tenure as the human rights ombudsman (2017-2022), following a late complaint. These exclusions affected viable contenders in a fragmented race and were widely viewed as politically motivated. However, the same electoral process ultimately allowed the participation and victory of Arévalo and the Semilla Movement, an anti-establishment party running on an anti-corruption platform. After advancing to the runoff and winning the presidency, prosecutorial authorities attempted to suspend the party’s legal status, but the electoral authorities and courts did not prevent the certification of the results or the transfer of power. Arévalo was inaugurated in January 2024, indicating that despite significant institutional interference, a real opposition candidate was not ultimately barred from competing or assuming office.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. However, the 2023 electoral process preceding President Bernardo Arévalo’s inauguration was marked by serious interference carried out by prosecutorial authorities during the final stages of the campaign. After Arévalo of the Seed Movement party unexpectedly surged in the first round with 15.5% of the vote and advanced to a runoff against establishment candidate Sandra Torres, the Public Prosecutor’s Office under Attorney General Consuelo Porras initiated criminal investigations into the Seed party over alleged irregularities in its registration process. Prosecutors ordered raids on the party’s offices and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) headquarters, as well as attempts to annul the party’s legal status. These actions were widely condemned by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) as politically motivated and risked disrupting the electoral process. Although these measures created significant uncertainty and pressure on the campaign environment, they were not directed by the executive branch and did not ultimately prevent the opposition candidate from competing in the runoff or winning the presidency. Since taking office in January 2024, there is no evidence that the Arévalo administration has used state resources to obstruct opposition campaign activity.
Furthermore, the government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. However, the 2023 electoral process that preceded President Bernardo Arévalo’s inauguration involved significant pressure on the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), the constitutionally mandated body responsible for administering elections. Following Arévalo’s advance to the runoff, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and segments of the judiciary undertook actions that risked weakening the electoral authority, including attempts to challenge tally sheets and voter records without clear evidentiary basis and raids on TSE facilities. Prosecutors also pressed the TSE to delay or reconsider Arévalo’s participation in the runoff. Despite these efforts, both domestic and international oversight remained operative. The Organization of American States (OAS) was allowed to deploy an electoral observation mission that monitored voting and tabulation procedures, publicly affirmed the integrity of the vote, and urged state institutions to respect the certified results. The TSE ultimately certified the outcome, and Arévalo was inaugurated in January 2024. Since taking office, there is no evidence that the executive branch has attempted to restructure or reform the electoral institutions in ways that would weaken their independence, although ongoing legal disputes continue to place the electoral system under strain. Given Guatemala’s four-year electoral cycle and the absence of midterm elections, the extent to which electoral oversight can recover will not be fully testable until the next general elections scheduled for June 2027.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. President Bernardo Arévalo has publicly defended press freedom and opposed the criminalization of journalists and civil society actors, and there is no evidence that his administration has directed repression against critics. However, dissent occurs in a constrained environment shaped by actions of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and allied judicial actors operating beyond the executive’s authority. Journalists, anti-corruption lawyers, former prosecutors, judges, and human rights defenders have faced criminal investigations, prolonged pretrial detention, or exile linked to earlier anti-corruption efforts. Protest activity has generally been tolerated without violent dispersal, but some organizers have later faced legal proceedings. As a result, criticism remains visible and lawful, though unevenly protected due to institutional pressures not originating from the executive branch.
In Guatemala, the government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Since President Bernardo Arévalo took office, there is no evidence that the executive branch has directed repression against critics. However, intimidation and judicial harassment have continued through actions carried out by the Public Prosecutor’s Office and allied judicial actors operating outside the executive’s authority. Under Attorney General Consuelo Porras, criminal proceedings have been widely used against journalists, anti-corruption lawyers, former prosecutors, judges, and human rights defenders linked to earlier anti-corruption efforts. A report by the Institute of Comparative Studies in Criminal and Social Sciences (INECIP) documented at least 166 cases of judicial persecution, a substantial increase from the 86 cases identified in 2022. Of those targeted, approximately 100 individuals, including dozens of former prosecutors and judges, have gone into exile, while others face ongoing legal proceedings or detention. Moreover, according to a 2025 report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), prosecutorial authorities frequently file multiple or unfounded complaints against the same individuals, often invoking broadly defined crimes such as obstruction of justice, sedition, unlawful association, or abuse of authority and combining them with prolonged pretrial detention and delayed proceedings. High-profile cases include dozens of legal actions against former anti-corruption prosecutor Juan Francisco Sandoval and former Constitutional Court magistrate Gloria Porras, as well as the imprisonment of former prosecutor Virginia Laparra and the prosecution of student activist Plutarco De León. These patterns indicate that dissenting actors operate in a hostile legal environment shaped by prosecutorial pressure rather than direct executive repression.
Additional cases affecting the press reinforce this pattern. ElPeriódico, a leading investigative outlet, ceased operations in 2023 following sustained financial pressure and the criminal prosecution of its founder, José Rubén Zamora, whose reporting had exposed corruption allegations involving state officials linked to the Giammattei administration. By the end of 2025, Zamora had spent more than three years in detention; he was sentenced in 2023 to six years in prison for money laundering, while other charges were dismissed. In March 2024, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared his detention arbitrary, yet prosecutors later filed additional charges and, after a brief period of house arrest in late 2024, he was returned to prison in early 2025 at the request of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. President Arévalo publicly criticized the criminalization of journalists and called for respect for due process and press freedom, while noting that the executive lacks authority to intervene in prosecutorial decisions. Overall, dissent remains legally permitted, but is constrained by prosecutorial and judicial pressures rather than executive action. Despite such threats of harassment, intimidation, and legal challenges, independent media persists in Guatemala, with outlets like Plaza Pública and Prensa Libre continuing investigative journalism.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Large pro-democracy demonstrations following the 2023 election, organized in support of respecting the electoral results, were allowed to proceed without direct repression. However, protesters and organizers later faced legal intimidation through proceedings initiated by the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Arrest warrants were sought against activists linked to the 2023 mobilizations, and in April 2025, indigenous leaders Luis Pacheco and Héctor Chaclán of the 48 Cantons of Totonicapán were detained and charged with terrorism and obstruction of justice for organizing protests defending the electoral outcome. Because the prosecutions targeted actors associated with mobilizations supporting the certification of Arévalo’s election, they indicate institutional conflict between prosecutorial authorities and the elected executive rather than repression carried out by the government itself. Protests have also occurred during the Arévalo administration. In July 2024, thousands of demonstrators mobilized in Guatemala City, led by peasant and social organizations, to demand the resignation of Attorney General Consuelo Porras and to protest rising living costs and land conflicts; some demands were directed at the president’s economic policies. The demonstrations proceeded without repression. In 2025, Indigenous authorities organized blockades opposing prosecutions carried out by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and these actions likewise were not forcibly dispersed by executive authorities.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts and other oversight bodies continue to exercise authority over executive actions, and the administration has not altered institutional rules to shield itself from scrutiny. However, Guatemala’s accountability system is marked by intense conflict among state institutions. Prosecutorial and judicial actors have pursued actions affecting electoral authorities, legislators, and the presidency itself, generating repeated legal challenges and uncertainty around the functioning of government. In some cases, higher courts have intervened to uphold electoral outcomes and constitutional procedures, while in others, prosecutorial initiatives have constrained the operation of elected institutions. As a result, oversight mechanisms remain operative but uneven, reflecting institutional fragmentation and politicization rather than the consolidation of power by the executive.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check, or have enabled, the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition and skew the electoral process in its favor. In the aftermath of the 2023 general elections, judicial and prosecutorial authorities, most notably the Public Prosecutor’s Office under Chief Prosecutor General Consuelo Porras, played a central role in efforts to delegitimize and obstruct an electoral outcome. After Bernardo Arévalo advanced to the presidential runoff, prosecutors initiated criminal investigations against his Seed Movement, carried out raids on party offices and on the headquarters of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), and sought to suspend the party’s legal status. However, the TSE maintained its constitutional authority and certified the vote, enabling the peaceful transfer of power in January 2024. In October 2025, the Constitutional Court reaffirmed this position, annulling a criminal judge’s ruling that sought to declare the presidency vacant and explicitly warning the judge against actions that contravene the constitutional framework governing democratic elections. The Court held that such judicial actions threatened the rights to vote and be elected and exceeded the competence of ordinary criminal courts, reiterating that the suspension or cancellation of political parties is an exclusively electoral matter under the authority of the TSE and that electoral results are legally inalterable.
The government has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Since President Bernardo Arévalo took office, oversight institutions have continued to operate autonomously and, in many cases, in open confrontation with the executive. Attorney General Consuelo Porras has remained in office despite the president’s public efforts to seek her removal, as Guatemalan law does not grant the executive authority to dismiss the Attorney General before the end of her term. The Public Prosecutor’s Office has repeatedly sought to undermine the effective functioning of the administration by attempting to strip the president of his constitutional immunity. As of late 2025, the Chief Prosecutor General had requested the Supreme Court more than ten times to lift Arévalo’s immunity in order to enable congressional investigations into alleged crimes, including a “breach of duties” accusation following the escape of gang leaders from a prison near the capital. These petitions have generated persistent uncertainty around the presidency and consumed institutional resources, yet courts have continued to process them. Prosecutorial authorities have also pursued investigations affecting the governing party, including actions against members of the Seed Movement party. Rather than neutralizing oversight bodies, the executive faces sustained legal scrutiny from prosecutorial and judicial actors operating beyond presidential control, indicating that institutions retain the capacity to challenge the government even amid significant political conflict.
Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to government interests, have not faced retaliation by the governing authority, although they have been subject to pressure and legal action from other state actors. Since 2023, anti-corruption judges and prosecutors linked to CICIG and the Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity (FECI), including former prosecutor Virginia Laparra, former FECI head Juan Francisco Sandoval, and former Constitutional Court magistrate Gloria Porras, have faced criminal proceedings or exile. Following the 2023 elections, similar actions extended to officials within the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). Prosecutors initiated investigations, raids, and legal complaints against magistrates involved in certifying the election results, and in January 2024, four of the five TSE magistrates were suspended as a result of proceedings promoted by the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Lower-level TSE staff were also detained or investigated. In 2025, the Supreme Court of Justice ruled that the magistrates could return to their posts, although the Prosecutor’s Office appealed the decision. These measures significantly affected judicial and electoral officials but were carried out by prosecutorial and judicial actors operating independently of the executive branch, indicating institutional conflict rather than retaliation by the Arévalo administration.
Judicial, legislative, and oversight institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable, and the government has not enacted reforms that abolish or seriously weaken institutional independence. Since taking office, President Bernardo Arévalo has not proposed or implemented legal or constitutional changes aimed at subordinating the courts, Congress, executive agencies, or autonomous oversight bodies. The institutional framework governing the judiciary, legislature, and supervisory entities, including the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Comptroller General, has remained formally intact, and these bodies continue to exercise their legal authority. While Guatemala’s broader political conflict has generated disputes among state institutions, there is no evidence that the executive has attempted to dissolve, restructure, or replace them to consolidate power. Rather than altering the institutional rules to shield itself, the administration has operated within existing legal constraints, indicating that mechanisms of horizontal accountability remain in place despite ongoing political tensions.
