Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies the GNS/LAF Controlled Territory of Libya as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
The overthrow of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year authoritarian rule in 2011 marked a turning point in Libyan history. However, the ensuing years have seen continued political upheaval, civil conflict, and the partition of Libya into two zones of control. In 2012, the National Transitional Council (NTC) was established as an interim governing body during Libya’s post-Gaddafi transition, overseeing the organization of the country’s first parliamentary and presidential elections. These elections resulted in the creation of the General National Congress (GNC), which served as the interim legislative authority. In 2014, Libya held another election, which led to the formation of a new legislative body, the House of Representatives (HoR). However, Islamist armed groups connected with the GNC rejected the election results and called for the GNC’s restoration by applying pressure on the Libyan Supreme Court (LSC), which effectively dissolved the HoR in favor of reinstating the GNC. As a result, members of the HoR were forced to flee Tripoli and relocate to Tobruk in eastern Libya, under the control of the Libyan Armed Forces (LAF), a coalition of armed groups loyal to and commanded by General Khalifa Haftar, which functions as the primary military opposition to the forces of the internationally recognized government based in Tripoli.
This effectively partitioned Libya into two separate areas of control. There, they continued to operate as a separate legislative body backed by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar until they established the Government of National Stability (GNS) in 2022. In the west, the GNC formed the Government of National Accord (GNA), and in the east, the HoR, backed by the LAF under Haftar, formed the Government of National Stability (GNS). Following a 14-month military effort to seize Tripoli in 2019, the GNA and the HoR/LAF agreed to a ceasefire in March 2021, monitored by the United Nations (UN). The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) facilitated bilateral negotiations in Geneva, culminating in the appointment of Abdul Hamid Dbeibah as the head of the new Government of National Unity (GNU), replacing the GNA, with the mandate to lead the country toward national elections. Nonetheless, by 2025, Libya remained in a state of ongoing political instability. The absence of a strong central authority has empowered numerous organized armed groups (OAGs), including various tribal factions, many of whom have pledged allegiance to different factions, further complicating efforts toward national reconciliation and stability.
Between 2014 and 2025, national elections were absent due to nonalignment between key stakeholders in Libya, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. Without national elections to establish its legitimacy, the GNS/LAF continues to operate as an unelected de facto authority in eastern Libya.
In eastern Libya, independent media, political figures, civil society organizations, and ordinary citizens frequently face overt and systematic retaliation when they openly criticize or question the GNS/LAF. This pattern of repression reflects a broader environment of political intolerance and control aimed at silencing dissent and consolidating authority within the region. GNS/LAF-aligned security forces and OAGs target media personnel to suppress investigative reporting, especially on issues such as corruption, human rights abuses, or governance failures. Civil society organizations (CSOs) that advocate for transparency, human rights, or political reform also face intimidation, legal restrictions, and sometimes physical attacks, aiming to deter activism and independent oversight. Political figures or activists who oppose or challenge the governing authority’s policies risk arrest and physical harm. The GNS/LAF employs a range of coercive tactics, including legal prosecutions on politically motivated charges, surveillance, and intimidation campaigns, to weaken opposition voices and maintain a monolithic political environment.
Institutions largely fail to check the governing authority. They lack the independence, capacity, and authority necessary to oversee or challenge the actions of powerful OAGs and political factions. The judiciary, for example, is often compromised by political influence or intimidation, limiting its ability to prosecute abuses or challenge illegal activities by the LAF or other OAGs. Legislative bodies such as the HoR lack the capacity or political will to scrutinize or regulate the actions of armed groups or the executive branch. The absence of robust oversight mechanisms enables these actors to operate with relative impunity.
National-level elections, such as parliamentary or presidential elections, are absent in the territory, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. The GNS/LAF exerts control by suppressing genuine elections and using the HoR primarily as a tool to legitimize Khalifa Haftar’s dominance. The body largely relies on 2014 appointments and unilateral constitutional changes, thus undermining its legitimacy and deepening Libya’s political crisis. Opposition figures face repression through violence, abductions, and disinformation, highlighting how GNS/LAF control is maintained through manipulation and coercion rather than democratic processes.
The GNS/LAF House of Representatives (HoR) continues to function as a de facto parliament, mainly representing eastern Libya and parts of the south. While members were originally elected from their respective districts in 2014, given the ongoing conflict and lack of any elections since, the body is largely composed of its original 2014 appointments. While theoretically an elected body, its decisions, such as forming the GNS and appointing public officials aligned with Haftar, serve to formalize and support his agenda. Effectively, the HoR is used to assert a civilian front for Haftar’s military control, channelling funds and resources, including those from oil revenues, to support the LAF and Haftar’s broader consolidation efforts. This control enables Haftar and the LAF to distribute patronage, influence local governance, and reward loyal factions, which consolidates their political base and discourages genuine political competition, as rivals have limited space to operate within a system heavily influenced by Haftar’s network.
The governing authority engaged in significant electoral law manipulation. Coinciding with UN efforts to mediate between political rivals in eastern and western Libya to reach an agreement for a constitutional basis for holding elections, the HoR in 2021 unilaterally amended Libya’s Constitutional Declaration and voted for the GNS, led by Fathi Bashagha at the time, with the backing of the LAF. The GNU Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeiba contested the HoR’s vote, remained in office, and promised to organize elections by June 2022. The move to establish the GNS and legitimize its own authority, at the expense of broader political negotiations with the GNU, was widely viewed as bypassing constitutional norms and thus undermining the legitimacy of the electoral legal framework. The HoR’s unilateral amendments and endorsement of the GNS, amidst a backdrop of intense political rivalry between rival governing authorities and external mediation efforts, deepened the political crisis and undermined efforts to organize credible elections by the promised June 2022 deadline.
The governing authority unfairly and significantly hinders opposition groups, including through violence or disinformation. For example, in May 2017, the LAF was accused of planting a car bomb that killed a tribal politician who had supported Al-Mahdi Al-Barghathi against Haftar. Al Barghathi, a former military commander serving under Haftar, became disillusioned with Haftar’s policies and, in 2016, became the Minister of Defense of the opposing Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA), the precursor to the GNU, serving in that capacity until 2018. As a result, his political allies continued to be targeted for assassination by Haftar’s LAF. In October 2023, Al Barghathi reportedly died while in detention after he was abducted by armed gunmen believed to be associated with the LAF in LAF-controlled Benghazi. Seham Sergiwa, a former member of the Tripoli-based GNC and a women’s rights defender, was abducted from her home in Benghazi in July 2019 after she had publicly criticized the LAF military offensive on Tripoli on the Haftar-funded Al-Hadath channel. Her fate and whereabouts remain unknown.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the GNS/LAF. The governing authority detains, disappears, and kills critics, censors the media, violently represses protests, and deploys affiliated armed groups to intimidate and punish dissent. Its actions extend from arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances to internet blackouts and propaganda campaigns.
The governing authority unfairly shuts down or takes measures that led to the shut down of major independent, dissenting organizations. In February 2017, GNS/LAF agents raided and shut down Al Wassat radio station’s headquarters in Benghazi and seized the station’s transmitter in Tobruk. The radio station was frequently critical of the governing authority. To justify the shutdown, the GNS/LAF stated that the closure took place due to the station’s interference with the local government’s broadcasts.
The governing authority heavily manipulates media coverage in its favor through censorship, shutdowns, and targeted attacks against journalists. Most media outlets, including newspapers, are controlled by political actors and serve as propaganda outlets or means to discredit their opponents. For instance, the daily Voice of the People newspaper publishes content critical of the new draft Constitution, the policies of the GNU, and appears to support GNS/LAF activities, propelling the image of Field Marshal Haftar. Similar GNS/LAF-aligned news outlets routinely receive backing from foreign actors supporting their beneficiaries. In the case of the Voice of the People newspaper, the outlet received technical backing from Russia, a benefactor of Field Marshal Haftar. In September 2023, in the city of Derna, following protests triggered by the Derna dams’ collapse disaster that resulted in numerous casualties, the GNS-LAF implemented a crackdown on media outlets and imposed a four-day internet and communication shutdown. In Sirte, internet and telecommunications faced recurrent disruptions because of demonstrations. In early October 2023, the GNS-LAF abruptly severed internet access in Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city, under the pretext of conducting counter terrorism operations, effectively isolating the city from the rest of the world for over a week.
The governing authority seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. The repeated detention of journalists stifles investigative journalism, critical reporting, and the dissemination of information vital for accountability, and serves as a censorship tool that reflects the broader challenges faced by media personnel. Ahmed al-Sanussi, a journalist, was held for three days in July 2024 for reporting on corruption in Tripoli and was only released after the United Nations (UN) and the European Union condemned his illegal detention. In November 2021, the GNS Benghazi Internal Security Agency (BISA) detained at least seven citizens in Sirte, including two journalists, without any public charges. In November 2024, independent journalist Ayed Abdeljalil was arbitrarily detained after criticizing a local official in western Libya. Following several days of detention in Tawergha under inhumane conditions, he was eventually released but remained under judicial supervision. Earlier in the same year, he had been arbitrarily detained twice for posts condemning corruption and racial discrimination.
Non-state actors, with ties to the governing authority, contribute to seriously intimidating independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstruct their work. In addition to extrajudicial killings, OAGs affiliated with the GNS/LAF regularly abduct and torture activists, critics, or perceived opponents due to their family, tribal, or regional connections. For example, in November 2020, armed gunmen assassinated Hanan Al-Barassi, an outspoken critic of abuses in the eastern areas controlled by the GNS/LAF. In March 2021, Al-Bassri’s daughter, Haneen Al-Abdali, a blogger, was kidnapped after threatening to reveal the identities of those involved in her mother’s assassination.
The GNS/LAF seriously and unfairly represses protests and gatherings. In March 2022, the governing authority arbitrarily detained one journalist and at least 10 protesters who took part in a protest in Sirte, Gaddafi’s hometown, calling on the international community and local authorities to offer compensation for victims of the 2011 NATO-led attacks. In September 2020, the GNS/LAF and its affiliated OAGs violently suppressed anti-corruption protests in the eastern towns of Al-Marj and Benghazi, reportedly killing at least one protester and arresting an unknown number of people. GNS/LAF agents also detained several demonstrators ahead of the nationwide rallies of August 2020, which called on both the GNU and GNS/LAF to address basic needs and end corruption. Prior to detaining these protesters, GNS media outlets orchestrated a smear campaign against them, using both traditional media and social media. During the 2020 protests in Sirte, at least one protester was killed, and seven others were left injured after GNS security agents used excessive force to suppress demonstrations. The GNS also cut communication and internet services during the month-long protests in an attempt to impede nationwide communications between protest organizers and disrupt their ability to mobilize citizens.
The governing authority kills or forcibly disappears dissidents, or attempts to commit these crimes. The GNS/LAF has been reported to utilize both GNS internal security agencies and various armed groups affiliated with the LAF to suppress dissent and target opposition figures. This strategy involves leveraging military and paramilitary forces to maintain control and silence critics, often through intimidation, harassment, or violence. In July 2024, civil activist Mohammed Amoura was arbitrarily detained by GNS/LAF agents after calling for a peaceful sit-in to protest the deteriorating living conditions in Qatrun, a village in southwest Libya. Since then, all communication with him has been cut off, and his whereabouts remain unknown. In October 2023, the BISA arrested Siraj Dughman, together with Fathi al-Baaja, a former member of the 2011 NTC, and Tarek al-Bishari, a politician, falsely accusing them of plotting to “overthrow” the LAF. The BISA also arbitrarily arrested Nasser Eldaessi, a journalist and former diplomat, and Salem al-Oreibi, a political activist, in relation to the same case. These arrests took place after the Libyan Centre for Strategic and Future Studies, headed by Siraj Dughman, had an internal meeting to discuss the deadly collapse of the Derna dam. In April 2024, the BISA announced that Dughman died in prison while allegedly attempting to escape. Yet, the BISA did not appear to launch an inquiry or hold any prison officials accountable for his death. The BISA also refused to allow Dughman’s family to see his body, and no autopsy report was shared. The four other survivors were held for over 10 months of arbitrary detention without charge or trial before they were released.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. In the territories controlled by the GNS and LAF, key state institutions such as the judiciary, legislature, and executive have been largely co-opted to serve the interests of those in power. This undermines their role as independent checks on authority and consolidates Field Marshal Haftar’s control over the political and security landscape in these areas, and allows aligned OAGs to commit crimes with impunity.
Judges who rule contrary to GNS/LAF and OAG interests, or lawyers who file cases perceived as a threat to the governing authority, have faced systematic retaliation. Intimidation and deliberate attacks on judicial workers have impeded justice, leaving the criminal justice system either disrupted or suspended, particularly in the eastern and southern parts of Libya, areas controlled by the GNS/LAF. For example, in 2018, judge Abdelsalam Ismail and prosecutor Ali Abdelrahman were kidnapped and released two days later by an LAF-aligned armed group from a court in Waddan in southwest GNS/LAF-controlled Libya, where a trial for migrant smugglers was to take place.
The GNS/LAF continues to leverage specialized military courts to suppress dissidents and prosecute alleged national security and terrorism crimes. In 2017, members of the GNS House of Representatives (HoR) passed Law No.4/2017, which established jurisdiction for the military courts over civilians accused of “terrorism” and crimes committed in “military areas,” effectively granting the LAF full impunity to hold military trials and persecute its opponents. Because all such trials are held in secret, and the accused’s families, human rights organizations, and the media are not permitted to attend, there is no public record of the number of civilians who appear before the specialized military judiciary. After one such secret trial in May 2020, a Benghazi military court sentenced freelance photojournalist Ismail Abuzreiba Al-Sway, who had been arbitrarily arrested in December 2018, to 15 years in prison on terrorism charges for allegedly “communicating with a TV station that supports terrorism,” in reference to his previous work with a private Libyan satellite television channel, Al Afbaa. During his two-year detainment, he was unable to contact his family or his lawyer and was tried in the absence of legal representation. He was eventually granted amnesty in September 2021, on the condition that he sign a commitment not to divulge his detention conditions. For example, between 2018 and 2021, military courts in GNS/LAF areas of control sentenced at least 22 individuals to death, and hundreds more to imprisonment without due process or investigations into their sudden abductions and pre-trial torture.
Judicial, legislative, and executive institutions frequently and unfairly fail to hold governing authority officials accountable. While extending immunity to aligned groups, GNS/LAF institutions have been weaponized against political opponents and dissidents alike. For instance, in the case of Dughman, none of these institutions demanded a thorough investigation into his death. The GNS/LAF leadership also continues to shield members of the Al-Kaniyat armed group from prosecution. The Al-Kaniyat, an OAG that ruled over Tarhuna from 2015 to June 2020, was initially integrated into the GNA security apparatus before joining the GNS/LAF in 2019. Al-Kinayat is suspected of committing numerous human rights crimes, including the extrajudicial killing of at least 336 individuals, including women and children.
HRF classifies the GNS/LAF Controlled Territory of Libya as ruled by a fully authoritarian governing authority.
The overthrow of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year authoritarian rule in 2011 marked a turning point in Libyan history. However, the ensuing years have seen continued political upheaval, civil conflict, and the partition of Libya into two zones of control. In 2012, the National Transitional Council (NTC) was established as an interim governing body during Libya’s post-Gaddafi transition, overseeing the organization of the country’s first parliamentary and presidential elections. These elections resulted in the creation of the General National Congress (GNC), which served as the interim legislative authority. In 2014, Libya held another election, which led to the formation of a new legislative body, the House of Representatives (HoR). However, Islamist armed groups connected with the GNC rejected the election results and called for the GNC’s restoration by applying pressure on the Libyan Supreme Court (LSC), which effectively dissolved the HoR in favor of reinstating the GNC. As a result, members of the HoR were forced to flee Tripoli and relocate to Tobruk in eastern Libya, under the control of the Libyan Armed Forces (LAF), a coalition of armed groups loyal to and commanded by General Khalifa Haftar, which functions as the primary military opposition to the forces of the internationally recognized government based in Tripoli.
This effectively partitioned Libya into two separate areas of control. There, they continued to operate as a separate legislative body backed by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar until they established the Government of National Stability (GNS) in 2022. In the west, the GNC formed the Government of National Accord (GNA), and in the east, the HoR, backed by the LAF under Haftar, formed the Government of National Stability (GNS). Following a 14-month military effort to seize Tripoli in 2019, the GNA and the HoR/LAF agreed to a ceasefire in March 2021, monitored by the United Nations (UN). The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) facilitated bilateral negotiations in Geneva, culminating in the appointment of Abdul Hamid Dbeibah as the head of the new Government of National Unity (GNU), replacing the GNA, with the mandate to lead the country toward national elections. Nonetheless, by 2025, Libya remained in a state of ongoing political instability. The absence of a strong central authority has empowered numerous organized armed groups (OAGs), including various tribal factions, many of whom have pledged allegiance to different factions, further complicating efforts toward national reconciliation and stability.
Between 2014 and 2025, national elections were absent due to nonalignment between key stakeholders in Libya, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. Without national elections to establish its legitimacy, the GNS/LAF continues to operate as an unelected de facto authority in eastern Libya.
In eastern Libya, independent media, political figures, civil society organizations, and ordinary citizens frequently face overt and systematic retaliation when they openly criticize or question the GNS/LAF. This pattern of repression reflects a broader environment of political intolerance and control aimed at silencing dissent and consolidating authority within the region. GNS/LAF-aligned security forces and OAGs target media personnel to suppress investigative reporting, especially on issues such as corruption, human rights abuses, or governance failures. Civil society organizations (CSOs) that advocate for transparency, human rights, or political reform also face intimidation, legal restrictions, and sometimes physical attacks, aiming to deter activism and independent oversight. Political figures or activists who oppose or challenge the governing authority’s policies risk arrest and physical harm. The GNS/LAF employs a range of coercive tactics, including legal prosecutions on politically motivated charges, surveillance, and intimidation campaigns, to weaken opposition voices and maintain a monolithic political environment.
Institutions largely fail to check the governing authority. They lack the independence, capacity, and authority necessary to oversee or challenge the actions of powerful OAGs and political factions. The judiciary, for example, is often compromised by political influence or intimidation, limiting its ability to prosecute abuses or challenge illegal activities by the LAF or other OAGs. Legislative bodies such as the HoR lack the capacity or political will to scrutinize or regulate the actions of armed groups or the executive branch. The absence of robust oversight mechanisms enables these actors to operate with relative impunity.
National-level elections, such as parliamentary or presidential elections, are absent in the territory, rendering moot any assessment of electoral competition. The GNS/LAF exerts control by suppressing genuine elections and using the HoR primarily as a tool to legitimize Khalifa Haftar’s dominance. The body largely relies on 2014 appointments and unilateral constitutional changes, thus undermining its legitimacy and deepening Libya’s political crisis. Opposition figures face repression through violence, abductions, and disinformation, highlighting how GNS/LAF control is maintained through manipulation and coercion rather than democratic processes.
The GNS/LAF House of Representatives (HoR) continues to function as a de facto parliament, mainly representing eastern Libya and parts of the south. While members were originally elected from their respective districts in 2014, given the ongoing conflict and lack of any elections since, the body is largely composed of its original 2014 appointments. While theoretically an elected body, its decisions, such as forming the GNS and appointing public officials aligned with Haftar, serve to formalize and support his agenda. Effectively, the HoR is used to assert a civilian front for Haftar’s military control, channelling funds and resources, including those from oil revenues, to support the LAF and Haftar’s broader consolidation efforts. This control enables Haftar and the LAF to distribute patronage, influence local governance, and reward loyal factions, which consolidates their political base and discourages genuine political competition, as rivals have limited space to operate within a system heavily influenced by Haftar’s network.
The governing authority engaged in significant electoral law manipulation. Coinciding with UN efforts to mediate between political rivals in eastern and western Libya to reach an agreement for a constitutional basis for holding elections, the HoR in 2021 unilaterally amended Libya’s Constitutional Declaration and voted for the GNS, led by Fathi Bashagha at the time, with the backing of the LAF. The GNU Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeiba contested the HoR’s vote, remained in office, and promised to organize elections by June 2022. The move to establish the GNS and legitimize its own authority, at the expense of broader political negotiations with the GNU, was widely viewed as bypassing constitutional norms and thus undermining the legitimacy of the electoral legal framework. The HoR’s unilateral amendments and endorsement of the GNS, amidst a backdrop of intense political rivalry between rival governing authorities and external mediation efforts, deepened the political crisis and undermined efforts to organize credible elections by the promised June 2022 deadline.
The governing authority unfairly and significantly hinders opposition groups, including through violence or disinformation. For example, in May 2017, the LAF was accused of planting a car bomb that killed a tribal politician who had supported Al-Mahdi Al-Barghathi against Haftar. Al Barghathi, a former military commander serving under Haftar, became disillusioned with Haftar’s policies and, in 2016, became the Minister of Defense of the opposing Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA), the precursor to the GNU, serving in that capacity until 2018. As a result, his political allies continued to be targeted for assassination by Haftar’s LAF. In October 2023, Al Barghathi reportedly died while in detention after he was abducted by armed gunmen believed to be associated with the LAF in LAF-controlled Benghazi. Seham Sergiwa, a former member of the Tripoli-based GNC and a women’s rights defender, was abducted from her home in Benghazi in July 2019 after she had publicly criticized the LAF military offensive on Tripoli on the Haftar-funded Al-Hadath channel. Her fate and whereabouts remain unknown.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the GNS/LAF. The governing authority detains, disappears, and kills critics, censors the media, violently represses protests, and deploys affiliated armed groups to intimidate and punish dissent. Its actions extend from arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances to internet blackouts and propaganda campaigns.
The governing authority unfairly shuts down or takes measures that led to the shut down of major independent, dissenting organizations. In February 2017, GNS/LAF agents raided and shut down Al Wassat radio station’s headquarters in Benghazi and seized the station’s transmitter in Tobruk. The radio station was frequently critical of the governing authority. To justify the shutdown, the GNS/LAF stated that the closure took place due to the station’s interference with the local government’s broadcasts.
The governing authority heavily manipulates media coverage in its favor through censorship, shutdowns, and targeted attacks against journalists. Most media outlets, including newspapers, are controlled by political actors and serve as propaganda outlets or means to discredit their opponents. For instance, the daily Voice of the People newspaper publishes content critical of the new draft Constitution, the policies of the GNU, and appears to support GNS/LAF activities, propelling the image of Field Marshal Haftar. Similar GNS/LAF-aligned news outlets routinely receive backing from foreign actors supporting their beneficiaries. In the case of the Voice of the People newspaper, the outlet received technical backing from Russia, a benefactor of Field Marshal Haftar. In September 2023, in the city of Derna, following protests triggered by the Derna dams’ collapse disaster that resulted in numerous casualties, the GNS-LAF implemented a crackdown on media outlets and imposed a four-day internet and communication shutdown. In Sirte, internet and telecommunications faced recurrent disruptions because of demonstrations. In early October 2023, the GNS-LAF abruptly severed internet access in Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city, under the pretext of conducting counter terrorism operations, effectively isolating the city from the rest of the world for over a week.
The governing authority seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. The repeated detention of journalists stifles investigative journalism, critical reporting, and the dissemination of information vital for accountability, and serves as a censorship tool that reflects the broader challenges faced by media personnel. Ahmed al-Sanussi, a journalist, was held for three days in July 2024 for reporting on corruption in Tripoli and was only released after the United Nations (UN) and the European Union condemned his illegal detention. In November 2021, the GNS Benghazi Internal Security Agency (BISA) detained at least seven citizens in Sirte, including two journalists, without any public charges. In November 2024, independent journalist Ayed Abdeljalil was arbitrarily detained after criticizing a local official in western Libya. Following several days of detention in Tawergha under inhumane conditions, he was eventually released but remained under judicial supervision. Earlier in the same year, he had been arbitrarily detained twice for posts condemning corruption and racial discrimination.
Non-state actors, with ties to the governing authority, contribute to seriously intimidating independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstruct their work. In addition to extrajudicial killings, OAGs affiliated with the GNS/LAF regularly abduct and torture activists, critics, or perceived opponents due to their family, tribal, or regional connections. For example, in November 2020, armed gunmen assassinated Hanan Al-Barassi, an outspoken critic of abuses in the eastern areas controlled by the GNS/LAF. In March 2021, Al-Bassri’s daughter, Haneen Al-Abdali, a blogger, was kidnapped after threatening to reveal the identities of those involved in her mother’s assassination.
The GNS/LAF seriously and unfairly represses protests and gatherings. In March 2022, the governing authority arbitrarily detained one journalist and at least 10 protesters who took part in a protest in Sirte, Gaddafi’s hometown, calling on the international community and local authorities to offer compensation for victims of the 2011 NATO-led attacks. In September 2020, the GNS/LAF and its affiliated OAGs violently suppressed anti-corruption protests in the eastern towns of Al-Marj and Benghazi, reportedly killing at least one protester and arresting an unknown number of people. GNS/LAF agents also detained several demonstrators ahead of the nationwide rallies of August 2020, which called on both the GNU and GNS/LAF to address basic needs and end corruption. Prior to detaining these protesters, GNS media outlets orchestrated a smear campaign against them, using both traditional media and social media. During the 2020 protests in Sirte, at least one protester was killed, and seven others were left injured after GNS security agents used excessive force to suppress demonstrations. The GNS also cut communication and internet services during the month-long protests in an attempt to impede nationwide communications between protest organizers and disrupt their ability to mobilize citizens.
The governing authority kills or forcibly disappears dissidents, or attempts to commit these crimes. The GNS/LAF has been reported to utilize both GNS internal security agencies and various armed groups affiliated with the LAF to suppress dissent and target opposition figures. This strategy involves leveraging military and paramilitary forces to maintain control and silence critics, often through intimidation, harassment, or violence. In July 2024, civil activist Mohammed Amoura was arbitrarily detained by GNS/LAF agents after calling for a peaceful sit-in to protest the deteriorating living conditions in Qatrun, a village in southwest Libya. Since then, all communication with him has been cut off, and his whereabouts remain unknown. In October 2023, the BISA arrested Siraj Dughman, together with Fathi al-Baaja, a former member of the 2011 NTC, and Tarek al-Bishari, a politician, falsely accusing them of plotting to “overthrow” the LAF. The BISA also arbitrarily arrested Nasser Eldaessi, a journalist and former diplomat, and Salem al-Oreibi, a political activist, in relation to the same case. These arrests took place after the Libyan Centre for Strategic and Future Studies, headed by Siraj Dughman, had an internal meeting to discuss the deadly collapse of the Derna dam. In April 2024, the BISA announced that Dughman died in prison while allegedly attempting to escape. Yet, the BISA did not appear to launch an inquiry or hold any prison officials accountable for his death. The BISA also refused to allow Dughman’s family to see his body, and no autopsy report was shared. The four other survivors were held for over 10 months of arbitrary detention without charge or trial before they were released.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the governing authority. In the territories controlled by the GNS and LAF, key state institutions such as the judiciary, legislature, and executive have been largely co-opted to serve the interests of those in power. This undermines their role as independent checks on authority and consolidates Field Marshal Haftar’s control over the political and security landscape in these areas, and allows aligned OAGs to commit crimes with impunity.
Judges who rule contrary to GNS/LAF and OAG interests, or lawyers who file cases perceived as a threat to the governing authority, have faced systematic retaliation. Intimidation and deliberate attacks on judicial workers have impeded justice, leaving the criminal justice system either disrupted or suspended, particularly in the eastern and southern parts of Libya, areas controlled by the GNS/LAF. For example, in 2018, judge Abdelsalam Ismail and prosecutor Ali Abdelrahman were kidnapped and released two days later by an LAF-aligned armed group from a court in Waddan in southwest GNS/LAF-controlled Libya, where a trial for migrant smugglers was to take place.
The GNS/LAF continues to leverage specialized military courts to suppress dissidents and prosecute alleged national security and terrorism crimes. In 2017, members of the GNS House of Representatives (HoR) passed Law No.4/2017, which established jurisdiction for the military courts over civilians accused of “terrorism” and crimes committed in “military areas,” effectively granting the LAF full impunity to hold military trials and persecute its opponents. Because all such trials are held in secret, and the accused’s families, human rights organizations, and the media are not permitted to attend, there is no public record of the number of civilians who appear before the specialized military judiciary. After one such secret trial in May 2020, a Benghazi military court sentenced freelance photojournalist Ismail Abuzreiba Al-Sway, who had been arbitrarily arrested in December 2018, to 15 years in prison on terrorism charges for allegedly “communicating with a TV station that supports terrorism,” in reference to his previous work with a private Libyan satellite television channel, Al Afbaa. During his two-year detainment, he was unable to contact his family or his lawyer and was tried in the absence of legal representation. He was eventually granted amnesty in September 2021, on the condition that he sign a commitment not to divulge his detention conditions. For example, between 2018 and 2021, military courts in GNS/LAF areas of control sentenced at least 22 individuals to death, and hundreds more to imprisonment without due process or investigations into their sudden abductions and pre-trial torture.
Judicial, legislative, and executive institutions frequently and unfairly fail to hold governing authority officials accountable. While extending immunity to aligned groups, GNS/LAF institutions have been weaponized against political opponents and dissidents alike. For instance, in the case of Dughman, none of these institutions demanded a thorough investigation into his death. The GNS/LAF leadership also continues to shield members of the Al-Kaniyat armed group from prosecution. The Al-Kaniyat, an OAG that ruled over Tarhuna from 2015 to June 2020, was initially integrated into the GNA security apparatus before joining the GNS/LAF in 2019. Al-Kinayat is suspected of committing numerous human rights crimes, including the extrajudicial killing of at least 336 individuals, including women and children.
