Africa

Ghana

Accra

Democracy

0.43%

World’s Population

35,697,600

Population

HRF classifies Ghana as democratic.

Ghana is a presidential republic. The Head of State, John Dramani Mahama, was democratically elected in the December 2024 presidential election, returning to power after previously serving a presidential term between 2012 and 2017. After gaining independence in 1957, Ghana experienced a series of military coups in 1966, 1972, 1978, and 1981 ushered in a quarter of a century of near-uninterrupted military rule. Since the advent of multi-party democracy in 1992, Ghana has maintained the longest period of uninterrupted civilian rule in its history, with nine consecutive elections marked by four peaceful handovers of power between the two major parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP).

National elections are largely free and fair. Under the Fourth Republic, Ghana has enjoyed nine credible general elections and four peaceful transfers of power between the NPP and the NDC. Political parties can freely campaign and contest elections, and there have been no reported instances of incumbent governments restricting the activities of opposition candidates. Ghana’s Electoral Commission is generally viewed as one of the more reputable electoral management bodies on the African continent, though it has faced some past controversies.

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Civil society in Ghana is robust and offers a vital check on government. The media space is vibrant, and journalists are not seriously repressed. However, the eight years of the last NPP administration (2016-24) saw a concerning pattern of government intimidation of critics and violent suppression of dissenting protests, prompting concerns about democratic backsliding.

Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Electoral disputes are settled in the Supreme Court, and opposition election petitions are deliberated in a way that appears evidence-based and independent of external influence. Civil society uses the court system to check executive overreach, and institutions such as the Office of the Special Prosecutor help promote accountability. At the same time, the president’s expansive constitutional powers over other branches of government undermine healthy checks and balances necessary for institutional accountability. Capacity constraints and selective anticorruption efforts have limited the effectiveness of formal accountability bodies.

National elections are largely free and fair. Ghana is considered one of the most stable democracies on the African continent, experiencing regular elections, peaceful transfers of power, and high levels of citizen participation. In the 2024 presidential election, former president John Mahama ran as an opposition challenger, decisively defeating incumbent Vice President Mahamudu Bawumia with 56% of the vote to win a second non-consecutive term in office.

The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Ghana’s political party system is dominated by two major parties: the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the National Patriotic Party (NPP). The NDC and the NPP have alternated in power through competitive elections since Ghana’s return to multiparty democracy in 1992. There has been no instance of the incumbent government outright barring the mainstream opposition party from competing, although there have been instances of disqualifications for parties or independent candidates over procedural issues such as missing signatures or unpaid fees.

Since 1992, the government has not unfairly or significantly hindered the electoral campaigns of a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate. Historically, the NDC and NPP have been able to campaign freely without restrictions on movement or activities. For example, in 2024, there are no reports of the Akufo-Addo (NPP) government preventing John Mahama (the NDC flagbearer) from accessing venues, nor are there reports of the state using its own resources to stifle opposition activities. The 2024 election was generally peaceful, and NPP flagbearer Bawumia conceded promptly. The system allows genuine competition, as evidenced by routine peaceful transfers of power.

There has been no evidence of significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Since 1992, there has been no substantiated evidence of large-scale, government-orchestrated fraud that altered national outcomes. Despite challenges such as voter register roll disputes and biometric voting machine failures, elections are largely free and fair without major manipulation. Post-election disputes have occurred, such as in 2012 and 2020, but the courts consistently rule in favor of the Electoral Commission by rejecting petitions due to a lack of credible evidence. Independent analysis (such as through the prominent civil society group CODEO) has generally supported electoral outcomes and dispelled suspicions of systemic fraud.

Independent electoral oversight has not been seriously undermined. Since taking office, the Mahama administration has not taken steps to interfere with the Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC). However, the presidency’s expansive constitutional powers in the appointment of electoral commissioners foster disproportionate presidential influence over election oversight. This power dynamic opens the door for potential abuse, as in 2018, when former President Nana Akuffo-Addo controversially dismissed EC Chairperson Charlotte Osei in what some believed to be a politically motivated effort to replace the Commission’s leadership with someone more sympathetic to the incumbent government. Despite its flaws, the EC has successfully overseen multiple credible elections leading to peaceful alternations of power, and no government within the Fourth Republic has dissolved the institution or stripped its powers outright.

A democratically elected government has not been overthrown through a coup d’etat. Since 1992, the country has maintained uninterrupted elected civilian rule. It has exhibited democratic resilience while the region has seen a resurgence of coups since 2020. Ghana’s last successful coup occurred in 1981 when Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings seized power from President Hilla Limann.

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The NDC government’s tenure has seen to date an easing of the previous NPP administration’s frequent intimidation of critics, and suppression of dissenting speech, organizations, and protests. Ghana’s civic space remains vibrant with strong media and civil society sectors. Independent organizations are largely able to publish critical reports without facing existential threats. Ghana also has a range of civil society organizations (CSOs) that significantly influence political governance in several ways. CSOs participate in public protests and public debates and have the right to resort to the courts to contest government policies.

The government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. With more than 100 TV stations, 400 radio broadcasting stations, and a plethora of news websites, the country has a pluralistic and robust media sector. Some of the most popular private TV stations, UTV and Joy News, operate freely and can challenge the government.

However, since taking office, the Mahama administration has faced criticism from civil society and concerns about censorship for continuing the previous NPP government’s pattern of abusing regulatory power to unilaterally shut down radio stations over content without the validation of the independent National Media Commission (NMC). For example, in May 2019, the Ministry of Communication’s National Communication Authority (NCA) deployed armed police to force off the air broadcasters Radio XYZ and Radio Gold as they carried live coverage of an NDC party press conference. NCA declared the stations illegal in a selective and politically motivated enforcement of regulations. In response to the concerns, in June 2025, President Mahama issued a directive to the National Communication Authority (NCA), which operates under the Ministry of Communication, to halt the shutdown of 63 radio stations, citing the importance of radio stations for freedom of expression in the country. The government has also faced criticism and expressions of concern for the ongoing enforcement of laws criminalizing the dissemination of false news to prosecute government critics. A notable case occurred in November 2025 when police detained journalist Samuel Amadotor for more than 48 hours and charged him with two counts of publication of false news based on a complaint filed by a former NCA board chair.

The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Throughout 2025, opposition and civil society organized major protests against the controversial removal of the chief justice, illegal gold mining, and the country’s debt without major interference. However, ongoing concerns about police brutality reemerged in September 2025 when officers stormed Tamale Technical University during a student protest. They used water cannons, shot live ammunition into the air, and assaulted some demonstrators, resulting in injuries to several students. Still, the government’s response does not compare to the deadly force used by the previous NPP administration against protests.

One example of these abuses occurred in 2021 when soldiers opened fire against a demonstration of the #FixTheCountry movement, a youth-led protest movement against worsening living standards, corruption, and police abuses in Ghana, resulting in the deaths of two demonstrators. Similarly, in September 2023, police forcibly dispersed peaceful picketers in an #OccupyJulorbiJouse protest against corruption and moral decay. Over 50 protesters were arrested, and excessive force, including shovings, beatings, and phone seizures, was used.

The government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Independent media, political leaders, and regular citizens are largely free to openly criticize and challenge the government, both under NDC and NPP administrations. Ghana has avoided severe and systematic censorship tactics common in other West African countries, such as internet shutdowns or social media bans, or the blocking of websites or platforms for political reasons.

Since assuming office, the NDC government has sporadically initiated criminal prosecutions against a few critics. For example, in September 2025, police detained opposition NPP party regional chairman Kwame Baffoe and arraigned him before the Accra Circuit Court on charges of publication of false news for criticizing the Inspector-General of Police. In May 2025, armed intelligence agents detained opposition activist and former parliamentarian Alfred Kumi and charged him with publication of false news over social media comments alleging judicial misconduct in the removal of former Chief Justice Gertrude Torkornoo. However, this is nowhere near the repression of the previous NPP government on free speech, which reached its peak with the February 2022 arrest by state security agents of Mawuse Oliver Barker-Vormawor, the founder of the #FixtheCountry movement, over a Facebook post in which he jokingly threatened a coup if parliament passed an unpopular tax bill. Barker-Vormawor was held for a month and charged with treason. The government dropped the charge in March 2025.

Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. The Supreme Court upholds electoral integrity through hearing opposition petitions, and the judiciary remains a legitimate channel through which disputes are resolved and government power is checked. Prosecutions by the Office of the Special Prosecutor also demonstrate a willingness to hold government officials accountable and combat corruption.

Courts have not unfairly enabled the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The court system in Ghana has played a pivotal role in adjudicating electoral disputes and upholding results where claims of fraud lacked substantiation. The 2012 and 2020 presidential election petitions were two such instances of institutional accountability. In 2012, opposition leader Nana Akufo-Addo challenged incumbent Mahama’s win, alleging that some polling stations breached the constitution by allowing voting without proper biometric verification. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld the results, although the justices acknowledged flaws in the electoral process and proposed several reforms. Some justices did favor annulling the votes of the affected polling regions and a partial rerun, demonstrating genuine debate rather than deference to incumbent Mahama. In 2020, roles reversed when Mahama alleged fraud and double-voting after Akufo-Addo’s narrow win. Although the COVID-19 pandemic posed challenges for the December 2020 election, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the petition and ruled that there was no credible evidence to justify an annulment or re-run. This ruling aligned with international analyses that affirmed the electoral process was thorough and transparent.

The government has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Ghana’s courts have not reached the point of deterring or automatically dismissing challenges to authority. In 2020, a group of civil society organizations sued the government for forcing Auditor-General Daniel Yao Domelevo to take accumulated leave, which they believed was an attempt to undermine his anti-corruption audits. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the CSOs, finding the president’s actions unconstitutional.

Although Ghana’s judiciary still serves as a mechanism of accountability, there are growing concerns about its independence. Public trust in the judiciary has significantly declined over the past decade, as evidenced by Afrobarometer data. One contributing factor to this perception is the extensive appointment of Supreme Court justices by presidents (referred to as “court packing”). President Akufo-Addo appointed 12 out of the 13 serving justices during his 8-year term. More recently, President Mahama took the unprecedented action of removing Chief Justice Gertrude Torkornoo on grounds of alleged misconduct and cronyism, although critics viewed this as a retaliatory move against an NPP-leaning judiciary.

Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. There have been several instances of substantial oversight actions within the previous two administrations that demonstrate active institutional mechanisms of accountability. For example, in late 2022, President Akufo-Addo fired his deputy finance minister, Charles Adu Boahen, after Boahen was found soliciting bribes. Further, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) was established in 2017 as an independent executive institution to combat corruption. Although there is debate as to whether the OSP’s efforts are genuine or merely political theater, it has pursued multiple high-profile corruption cases. The office launched an investigation in 2024 on former Finance Minister Ken Ofori-Atta after exposés by civil society revealed his participation in a corruption scandal with Strategic Mobilisation Limited, a private company that monitored petroleum activities for the Ghana Revenue Authority. The OSP filed a 78-count indictment against Ofori-Atta and seven others in late 2025, and the trial remains ongoing. President Mahama has publicly supported the OSP and opposed a private member’s bill in Parliament to repeal the OSP Act, reinforcing his administration’s anti-corruption commitment.

Country Context

HRF classifies Ghana as democratic.

Ghana is a presidential republic. The Head of State, John Dramani Mahama, was democratically elected in the December 2024 presidential election, returning to power after previously serving a presidential term between 2012 and 2017. After gaining independence in 1957, Ghana experienced a series of military coups in 1966, 1972, 1978, and 1981 ushered in a quarter of a century of near-uninterrupted military rule. Since the advent of multi-party democracy in 1992, Ghana has maintained the longest period of uninterrupted civilian rule in its history, with nine consecutive elections marked by four peaceful handovers of power between the two major parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP).

Key Highlights

National elections are largely free and fair. Under the Fourth Republic, Ghana has enjoyed nine credible general elections and four peaceful transfers of power between the NPP and the NDC. Political parties can freely campaign and contest elections, and there have been no reported instances of incumbent governments restricting the activities of opposition candidates. Ghana’s Electoral Commission is generally viewed as one of the more reputable electoral management bodies on the African continent, though it has faced some past controversies.

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Civil society in Ghana is robust and offers a vital check on government. The media space is vibrant, and journalists are not seriously repressed. However, the eight years of the last NPP administration (2016-24) saw a concerning pattern of government intimidation of critics and violent suppression of dissenting protests, prompting concerns about democratic backsliding.

Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Electoral disputes are settled in the Supreme Court, and opposition election petitions are deliberated in a way that appears evidence-based and independent of external influence. Civil society uses the court system to check executive overreach, and institutions such as the Office of the Special Prosecutor help promote accountability. At the same time, the president’s expansive constitutional powers over other branches of government undermine healthy checks and balances necessary for institutional accountability. Capacity constraints and selective anticorruption efforts have limited the effectiveness of formal accountability bodies.

Electoral Competition

National elections are largely free and fair. Ghana is considered one of the most stable democracies on the African continent, experiencing regular elections, peaceful transfers of power, and high levels of citizen participation. In the 2024 presidential election, former president John Mahama ran as an opposition challenger, decisively defeating incumbent Vice President Mahamudu Bawumia with 56% of the vote to win a second non-consecutive term in office.

The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Ghana’s political party system is dominated by two major parties: the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the National Patriotic Party (NPP). The NDC and the NPP have alternated in power through competitive elections since Ghana’s return to multiparty democracy in 1992. There has been no instance of the incumbent government outright barring the mainstream opposition party from competing, although there have been instances of disqualifications for parties or independent candidates over procedural issues such as missing signatures or unpaid fees.

Since 1992, the government has not unfairly or significantly hindered the electoral campaigns of a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate. Historically, the NDC and NPP have been able to campaign freely without restrictions on movement or activities. For example, in 2024, there are no reports of the Akufo-Addo (NPP) government preventing John Mahama (the NDC flagbearer) from accessing venues, nor are there reports of the state using its own resources to stifle opposition activities. The 2024 election was generally peaceful, and NPP flagbearer Bawumia conceded promptly. The system allows genuine competition, as evidenced by routine peaceful transfers of power.

There has been no evidence of significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Since 1992, there has been no substantiated evidence of large-scale, government-orchestrated fraud that altered national outcomes. Despite challenges such as voter register roll disputes and biometric voting machine failures, elections are largely free and fair without major manipulation. Post-election disputes have occurred, such as in 2012 and 2020, but the courts consistently rule in favor of the Electoral Commission by rejecting petitions due to a lack of credible evidence. Independent analysis (such as through the prominent civil society group CODEO) has generally supported electoral outcomes and dispelled suspicions of systemic fraud.

Independent electoral oversight has not been seriously undermined. Since taking office, the Mahama administration has not taken steps to interfere with the Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC). However, the presidency’s expansive constitutional powers in the appointment of electoral commissioners foster disproportionate presidential influence over election oversight. This power dynamic opens the door for potential abuse, as in 2018, when former President Nana Akuffo-Addo controversially dismissed EC Chairperson Charlotte Osei in what some believed to be a politically motivated effort to replace the Commission’s leadership with someone more sympathetic to the incumbent government. Despite its flaws, the EC has successfully overseen multiple credible elections leading to peaceful alternations of power, and no government within the Fourth Republic has dissolved the institution or stripped its powers outright.

A democratically elected government has not been overthrown through a coup d’etat. Since 1992, the country has maintained uninterrupted elected civilian rule. It has exhibited democratic resilience while the region has seen a resurgence of coups since 2020. Ghana’s last successful coup occurred in 1981 when Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings seized power from President Hilla Limann.

Freedom of Dissent

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The NDC government’s tenure has seen to date an easing of the previous NPP administration’s frequent intimidation of critics, and suppression of dissenting speech, organizations, and protests. Ghana’s civic space remains vibrant with strong media and civil society sectors. Independent organizations are largely able to publish critical reports without facing existential threats. Ghana also has a range of civil society organizations (CSOs) that significantly influence political governance in several ways. CSOs participate in public protests and public debates and have the right to resort to the courts to contest government policies.

The government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. With more than 100 TV stations, 400 radio broadcasting stations, and a plethora of news websites, the country has a pluralistic and robust media sector. Some of the most popular private TV stations, UTV and Joy News, operate freely and can challenge the government.

However, since taking office, the Mahama administration has faced criticism from civil society and concerns about censorship for continuing the previous NPP government’s pattern of abusing regulatory power to unilaterally shut down radio stations over content without the validation of the independent National Media Commission (NMC). For example, in May 2019, the Ministry of Communication’s National Communication Authority (NCA) deployed armed police to force off the air broadcasters Radio XYZ and Radio Gold as they carried live coverage of an NDC party press conference. NCA declared the stations illegal in a selective and politically motivated enforcement of regulations. In response to the concerns, in June 2025, President Mahama issued a directive to the National Communication Authority (NCA), which operates under the Ministry of Communication, to halt the shutdown of 63 radio stations, citing the importance of radio stations for freedom of expression in the country. The government has also faced criticism and expressions of concern for the ongoing enforcement of laws criminalizing the dissemination of false news to prosecute government critics. A notable case occurred in November 2025 when police detained journalist Samuel Amadotor for more than 48 hours and charged him with two counts of publication of false news based on a complaint filed by a former NCA board chair.

The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Throughout 2025, opposition and civil society organized major protests against the controversial removal of the chief justice, illegal gold mining, and the country’s debt without major interference. However, ongoing concerns about police brutality reemerged in September 2025 when officers stormed Tamale Technical University during a student protest. They used water cannons, shot live ammunition into the air, and assaulted some demonstrators, resulting in injuries to several students. Still, the government’s response does not compare to the deadly force used by the previous NPP administration against protests.

One example of these abuses occurred in 2021 when soldiers opened fire against a demonstration of the #FixTheCountry movement, a youth-led protest movement against worsening living standards, corruption, and police abuses in Ghana, resulting in the deaths of two demonstrators. Similarly, in September 2023, police forcibly dispersed peaceful picketers in an #OccupyJulorbiJouse protest against corruption and moral decay. Over 50 protesters were arrested, and excessive force, including shovings, beatings, and phone seizures, was used.

The government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Independent media, political leaders, and regular citizens are largely free to openly criticize and challenge the government, both under NDC and NPP administrations. Ghana has avoided severe and systematic censorship tactics common in other West African countries, such as internet shutdowns or social media bans, or the blocking of websites or platforms for political reasons.

Since assuming office, the NDC government has sporadically initiated criminal prosecutions against a few critics. For example, in September 2025, police detained opposition NPP party regional chairman Kwame Baffoe and arraigned him before the Accra Circuit Court on charges of publication of false news for criticizing the Inspector-General of Police. In May 2025, armed intelligence agents detained opposition activist and former parliamentarian Alfred Kumi and charged him with publication of false news over social media comments alleging judicial misconduct in the removal of former Chief Justice Gertrude Torkornoo. However, this is nowhere near the repression of the previous NPP government on free speech, which reached its peak with the February 2022 arrest by state security agents of Mawuse Oliver Barker-Vormawor, the founder of the #FixtheCountry movement, over a Facebook post in which he jokingly threatened a coup if parliament passed an unpopular tax bill. Barker-Vormawor was held for a month and charged with treason. The government dropped the charge in March 2025.

Institutional Accountability

Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. The Supreme Court upholds electoral integrity through hearing opposition petitions, and the judiciary remains a legitimate channel through which disputes are resolved and government power is checked. Prosecutions by the Office of the Special Prosecutor also demonstrate a willingness to hold government officials accountable and combat corruption.

Courts have not unfairly enabled the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The court system in Ghana has played a pivotal role in adjudicating electoral disputes and upholding results where claims of fraud lacked substantiation. The 2012 and 2020 presidential election petitions were two such instances of institutional accountability. In 2012, opposition leader Nana Akufo-Addo challenged incumbent Mahama’s win, alleging that some polling stations breached the constitution by allowing voting without proper biometric verification. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld the results, although the justices acknowledged flaws in the electoral process and proposed several reforms. Some justices did favor annulling the votes of the affected polling regions and a partial rerun, demonstrating genuine debate rather than deference to incumbent Mahama. In 2020, roles reversed when Mahama alleged fraud and double-voting after Akufo-Addo’s narrow win. Although the COVID-19 pandemic posed challenges for the December 2020 election, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the petition and ruled that there was no credible evidence to justify an annulment or re-run. This ruling aligned with international analyses that affirmed the electoral process was thorough and transparent.

The government has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Ghana’s courts have not reached the point of deterring or automatically dismissing challenges to authority. In 2020, a group of civil society organizations sued the government for forcing Auditor-General Daniel Yao Domelevo to take accumulated leave, which they believed was an attempt to undermine his anti-corruption audits. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the CSOs, finding the president’s actions unconstitutional.

Although Ghana’s judiciary still serves as a mechanism of accountability, there are growing concerns about its independence. Public trust in the judiciary has significantly declined over the past decade, as evidenced by Afrobarometer data. One contributing factor to this perception is the extensive appointment of Supreme Court justices by presidents (referred to as “court packing”). President Akufo-Addo appointed 12 out of the 13 serving justices during his 8-year term. More recently, President Mahama took the unprecedented action of removing Chief Justice Gertrude Torkornoo on grounds of alleged misconduct and cronyism, although critics viewed this as a retaliatory move against an NPP-leaning judiciary.

Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. There have been several instances of substantial oversight actions within the previous two administrations that demonstrate active institutional mechanisms of accountability. For example, in late 2022, President Akufo-Addo fired his deputy finance minister, Charles Adu Boahen, after Boahen was found soliciting bribes. Further, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) was established in 2017 as an independent executive institution to combat corruption. Although there is debate as to whether the OSP’s efforts are genuine or merely political theater, it has pursued multiple high-profile corruption cases. The office launched an investigation in 2024 on former Finance Minister Ken Ofori-Atta after exposés by civil society revealed his participation in a corruption scandal with Strategic Mobilisation Limited, a private company that monitored petroleum activities for the Ghana Revenue Authority. The OSP filed a 78-count indictment against Ofori-Atta and seven others in late 2025, and the trial remains ongoing. President Mahama has publicly supported the OSP and opposed a private member’s bill in Parliament to repeal the OSP Act, reinforcing his administration’s anti-corruption commitment.