Hybrid Authoritarian
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Population
HRF classifies Georgia as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Georgia, a parliamentary republic, gained independence from the Soviet Union in April 1991 after 70 years as a Soviet republic with limited autonomy. From the outset, internal turmoil, authoritarian legacies, and separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia—distinct ethnic enclaves in the Caucasus—hindered democratic progress. In 2003, the peaceful Rose Revolution ousted the incumbent president, Eduard Shevardnadze, whose 1992–2003 leadership was marred by corruption, electoral fraud, and government inefficiency. Mikheil Saakashvili and his party, the United National Movement (UNM), came to power the following year, winning the presidential and parliamentary elections. Saakashvili and the UNM pursued an openly pro-Western course, which aggravated relations with Russia. Ostensibly protecting the vulnerable population of South Ossetia, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, initiating a bloody 5-day war. It ended in Georgia’s defeat and Russia’s formal recognition of the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Deeply unpopular by then, Saakashvili and the UNM lost to the Georgian Dream (GD) coalition in 2012. Initially hailed as a harbinger of democratization, GD has overseen a steady erosion of electoral integrity and a shrinking of civic space.
In Georgia, electoral competition is significantly skewed to the point where the mainstream political opposition has an unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The Georgian Dream (GD) party, in power since 2012, has systematically engaged in anti-democratic tactics, including illegal voter mobilization and judicial persecution of prominent political opponents. The ruling party also commands significant and unfair incumbent advantages, from the abuse of administrative resources for political campaigning to the disproportionate control over the state agency overseeing elections. As a testament to the uneven playing field these measures have created, the opposition boycotted the second round of the 2020 legislative elections and called for an annulment of the results of the 2024 parliamentary elections.
Independent media, civil society and political leaders, and members of the general public have been seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime, as evident in the recent dismissals of critical journalists from publicly owned media outlets and the increasing judicial persecution of political opponents. At the same time, the regime has heavily limited civic space through the adoption of draconian “foreign agents” legislation and cracked down on dissenting demonstrations.
Reflecting the GD’s protracted consolidation of power, institutions are somewhat independent, occasionally checking the executive’s actions, but frequently constrained by the regime. The ruling party has significantly undermined the judiciary’s independence by politicizing the appointment and dismissal of magistrates, among other measures. As a result, the courts have enabled the persecution of opposition leaders and dissidents, as well as failed to guarantee effective legal remedies for electoral irregularities. The GD has also captured essential oversight bodies, reducing them to mere extensions, rather than independent checks, of the executive.
In Georgia, electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The systematic abuse of state resources and illicit voter mobilization have given the ruling GD party overwhelming campaign advantages, enabling it to defeat the mainstream opposition in the last four parliamentary elections with considerable margins. The regime has also increasingly obstructed its challengers’ campaigns through a combination of gratuitous legal restrictions and overt intimidation. It also engaged in widespread electoral fraud in the 2020 and 2024 parliamentary elections, prompting mass protests and condemnation at home and abroad.
In the 2024 and 2020 parliamentary elections, the ruling party enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. Observers noted numerous instances of state officials deploying various tactics to incentivize or intimidate potential voters, including manipulating welfare benefits as a roundabout strategy for vote-buying and a surge in short-term contracts with municipal administrations (e.g., for cleaners, construction workers, etc.) during the campaign period. In an extensive report on the 2020 campaign, Transparency International noted that members of the ruling party, acting in their official capacities, had offered significant benefits to specific individuals in exchange for their vote, such as early termination of their probation, reduction of charges in ongoing criminal trials, or restoration of driving rights following an earlier criminal conviction. In both electoral cycles, regime representatives exerted extensive pressure on public sector employees to support the ruling party’s campaign activities and cast their votes for it. Voter intimidation and coercion were also ubiquitous, with regime agents frequently harassing opposition supporters.
The regime also seriously undermined independent electoral oversight, limiting the opposition’s avenues for challenging the policies and informal practices that systematically disadvantage it. In 2017, the GD introduced a new law that granted parties the right to nominate members of the Central Election Commission (CEC) in proportion to their vote share in the most recent elections. As a result, GD appointees dominated the CEC in 2020, which possibly contributed to the CEC’s biased handling of pre-election complaints, as criticized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The ruling party persisted in its attempts to hollow out the Commission ahead of the next national vote, adopting amendments to the Election Code in May 2024 that abolished the Advisory Group within the CEC, an impartial division dedicated specifically to overseeing dispute resolution. In prior elections, the Advisory Group had played an important role in ensuring at least some transparency regarding the handling of electoral complaints. Lastly, in March 2024, the Georgian parliament overrode a presidential veto to amend the electoral code, this time changing the procedure for electing the Chair and non-partisan members of the CEC. The reform transferred the prerogative to nominate those officials from the president to the speaker of parliament, contrary to the Venice Commission’s opinion, which highlighted the risks of excessive political interference in the body’s functioning.
The regime also seriously undermined independent electoral oversight, limiting the opposition’s avenues for challenging the policies and informal practices that systematically disadvantage it. In 2017, the GD introduced a new law that granted parties the right to nominate members of the Central Election Commission (CEC) in proportion to their vote share in the most recent elections. As a result, GD appointees dominated the CEC in 2020, which possibly contributed to the CEC’s biased handling of pre-election complaints, as criticized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The ruling party persisted in its attempts to hollow out the Commission ahead of the next national vote, adopting amendments to the Election Code in May 2024 that abolished the Advisory Group within the CEC, an impartial division dedicated specifically to overseeing dispute resolution. In prior elections, the Advisory Group had played an important role in ensuring at least some transparency regarding the handling of electoral complaints. Lastly, in March 2024, the Georgian parliament overrode a presidential veto to amend the electoral code, this time changing the procedure for electing the Chair and non-partisan members of the CEC. The reform transferred the prerogative to nominate those officials from the president to the speaker of parliament, contrary to an opinion by the Venice Commission that highlighted the risks of excessive political interference in the body’s functioning.
Though these measures already skew the playing field to a considerable extent, the regime also engaged in significant voting irregularities and electoral fraud. In the 2024 parliamentary elections, observers noted a range of tactics to manipulate the outcome, including voter surveillance and coercion at polling stations, vote-buying, chain voting, and breaches of vote secrecy. Procedural violations by election officials also compromised the certification of results, an issue compounded by the systemic obstruction of domestic observers who would normally oversee these processes. While ascertaining the true extent of fraud is challenging, it is likely that it contributed to its considerable margin of victory in the 2024 elections. The GD officially won 53.93% of the popular vote and 89 seats, securing its single-party rule, trailed by the runner-up, the Coalition for Change, which won 11.03% and 19 seats. The UNM had a historically poor result, coming in third with 10.17% and 16 seats.
To protest the GD’s overwhelming structural advantages and overt electoral manipulation, the mainstream opposition has challenged election outcomes or organized boycotts. On November 19, 2024, President Salome Zourabichvili appealed to the Constitutional Court, alleging violations of the secrecy of the vote in the recent parliamentary election. Thirty MPs from the outgoing parliament joined the appeal and sought to have the election results annulled. On December 3, 2024, the Constitutional Court rejected the claim, citing insufficient evidence of systemic irregularities. This wasn’t the opposition’s first attempt to contest the validity of elections and seek legal redress. Alleging that the first round of the 2020 parliamentary elections wаs rigged, opposition parties, including the GD’s main rival, UNM, boycotted the second round, called for a re-run under new CEC leadership, and organized mass protests. These extreme measures, which plunged the country into a political crisis, indicated the opposition’s perceived inability to win under the current electoral circumstances.
In Georgia, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Previously robust, independent media and dissenting organizations operate in a context of increasing obstruction by the regime via both legal and extrajudicial means. These infringements upon the freedom of dissent have galvanized mass protests in recent years, which the regime has arbitrarily repressed.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated and obstructed the work of independent dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. In April of 2024, it reintroduced the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence (colloquially known as the “foreign agents” bill), after public outcry prompted it to seemingly abandon the proposal in 2023. The bill was signed into law by the President of Georgia in April 2025. The law requires civil society organizations (CSOs) receiving more than 20% of their funding from abroad to register as “foreign agents” and clearly indicate this designation in their outreach. Non-compliance carries a fine of 25,000 lari (about $9,360), with additional monthly fines of 20,000 lari ($7,490) for continued non-compliance. Under the law, registered organizations are also required to submit detailed reports on their foreign funding and activities to the government. The law sparked international outcry – in July 2024, Brussels’ envoy, Paweł Herczyński, announced a halt to Georgia’s EU accession process in response to the legislation, reversing a December 2023 decision to grant the country candidate status. While the regime has not directly shut down dissenting organizations under the new law, the excessive reporting burden and concerns of state surveillance have already prompted some, such as the critical outlet Tabula, to relocate to neighboring countries or conduct their activities entirely online.
The repressive legislation is consistent with the regime’s overall pattern of retaliation against critical outlets and dissidents through various means, from overt editorial interference to politically motivated trials. In 2019, for instance, GD representatives were instrumental in removing Natia Kapanadze as director of the popular public channel Adjara TV. GD Chairman Ivanishvili and other party officials openly decried the channel’s editorial stance, and Natia Kapanadze was removed for “mismanagement” and declining ratings, even though during her tenure, the channel enjoyed wide viewership. In another instance, news anchor Irakli Absandze was dismissed in 2021 after he shared a Facebook post decrying the police response to peaceful anti-regime demonstrations. In 2022, following a sham trial, the owner of pro-opposition channel Mtavari TV, Nika Gvaramia, received a three-year sentence for abuse of power in his former capacity as director of Rustavi TV, another critical outlet. The court found he had unlawfully used a vehicle belonging to the channel for personal purposes, despite the owners testifying that they had allowed him to use it. The ruling also set a precedent for convicting a senior executive for using company assets. International observers condemned the conviction as unfounded and clearly retaliatory, given Gvaramia’s prior work as a lawyer for former President Mikheil Saakashvili, a prominent critic of GD and a member of the main opposition party, the UNM. In June 2023, Gvaramia was pardoned by President Zourabichvili, a staunch critic of the GD, and released from prison shortly after.
Confronted by rising public discontent with its policies, the regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. In 2024, it amended its Law on Assemblies and the Code of Administrative Offenses to impose a blanket ban on face coverings during protests, expand police powers for search and seizure, and significantly increase fines for protest-related offenses. The bill, rushed through Parliament by the GD, was a response to the multiple waves of protests Georgians had organized in 2023 and earlier in 2024. The protests against the reintroduction of the “foreign agents” bill in May 2024 were met with more than 100 arrests of protestors and multiple instances of police brutality. Law enforcement repeatedly used excessive force, including tear gas, chemically-laced water cannons, and rubber bullets against peaceful protesters. Fines for mere participation were pervasive, totalling more than $720,000, according to some estimates. There were similar instances at the 2019 Tbilisi protests denouncing Russian influence in the country: at least 275 people and 32 journalists suffered injuries as a result of law enforcement’s violent dispersal of the peaceful demonstrations.
Institutions are somewhat independent, but frequently constrained by the regime. The regime has hollowed out judicial institutions, largely by expanding the prerogatives of the High Council of Justice, whose dubious appointment practices have sparked international criticism. This capture, in turn, has seriously undermined the courts’ capacity to check the regime’s electoral manipulation and reprisals against dissidents. The ruling party has appointed loyalists to key oversight bodies, from campaign finance regulators to media authorities, and expanded their powers with few effective checks.
The regime subjected judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weakened their independence or operational effectiveness, disregarding recommendations by international experts. The highest judicial oversight body in Georgia, the High Council of Justice (HJC), which appoints, promotes, and sanctions magistrates for professional misconduct, is dominated by a small cohesive group of members, colloquially known as “the clan.” Observers have pointed to the clan’s clientelist links to the ruling GD party, which introduced generous incentives for members, and questionable professional integrity: In 2023, two HJC members, Mikheil Chinchaladze and Levan Murusidze, were sanctioned by the US State Department, which found they had abused their positions on the Council to enable high-level corruption. (Murusidze continues to serve on the HJC as of 2025). The existence of such informal clientelist networks, in turn, has undermined the Council’s independence, as evident from international observers’ generally unfavorable assessments of its functioning. After nearly two years of close impartial monitoring (2019-2020), the OSCE noted that the appointment procedures for Supreme Court judges “failed to ensure an impartial, merit-based process free from extraneous influences.” As the body responsible for vetting and assessing candidates’ professional credentials, the HCJ failed to establish clear selection criteria and to conduct interviews in an impartial, professional manner. Even more importantly, the Council did not address notable conflicts of interest, as some current members were simultaneously participating as candidates in the appointment process. Instead of reforming the Council in response to international criticism, however, the regime has empowered it further: in December 2021, parliament amended Article 37(1) of the Organic Law on Common Courts, granting the HCJ the authority to transfer judges to different courts without their consent for up to 4 years. As noted in a critical 2023 opinion of the Venice Commission, the measure effectively enables unchecked retaliation against dissenting judges.
Reflecting this institutional capture, the judiciary has enabled the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition. The courts’ review of multiple credible electoral complaints in the 2020 and 2024 elections was, in most instances, cursory. For instance, the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) contested the official results of the 2024 parliamentary elections in 73 electoral districts, presenting evidence that the CEC had compromised ballot secrecy. A district court reviewing one of the GYLA’s multiple complaints ruled in favor of the association and annulled the ballots from thirty polling stations. However, the Kutaisi and Tbilisi Appeals Courts merged all complaints by GYLA and another election watchdog, “My Vote,” into a single case, which precluded individual assessment of each claim on its merits and imposed a higher burden of proof on the plaintiffs. Both courts then found there were no systemic secrecy issues. At the same time, the district judge who had ruled in favor of GYLA, Vladimer Khuchua, was subjected to a smear campaign in pro-regime media. Similarly, the Constitutional Court hastily dismissed a lawsuit alleging electoral irregularities submitted by President Zourabichvili. Since the Constitutional Court is the highest instance, the ruling foreclosed subsequent legal challenges to the official results. These cases highlighted that, even if limited dissent exists on the ordinary courts, higher judicial bodies aligned with the regime can overturn rulings inimical to its interests.
In addition, courts have on consequential occasions failed to check regime attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. This was most evident in their handling of bogus charges against participants in the 2023-2025 anti-regime protests: judges routinely denied motions to examine police witnesses or present exculpatory evidence, and most cases resulted in convictions. Sentences were frequently based on fabricated evidence, often limited to selectively used video footage, and relied heavily on uniform, uncorroborated testimonies from law enforcement officers. In July 2025, a Tbilisi court sentenced 19-year-old protester Saba Jikia to four and a half years’ imprisonment for allegedly striking a police officer during the November 2024 demonstrations, even though the officer testified that he had not sustained any injuries and Jikia maintained his innocence. Human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, condemned the sentence as disproportionate to the alleged harm and politically motivated. In addition, the court had not applied relevant youth justice provisions, which stipulate that courts should seek the “least restrictive” legally prescribed sanction when the defendant is under 21.
In September 2025, for instance, a court in Tbilisi sentenced twenty participants in anti-government protests to prison terms ranging from two to two and a half years, including Saba Skhvitaridze, who reported to being tortured while in custody, and actor Andro Chichinadze, who participated in rallies and was subsequently charged with disruption of public order for throwing an object, most likely a stick, into a crowd of police officers. The trials were plagued with gross procedural violations, including violations of the presumption of innocence. Prominent political leaders have also been convicted on bogus charges. In 2021, former president Mikheil Saakashvili, who had been sentenced in absentia to six years imprisonment in 2018 following a politically-motivated trial, was promptly arrested upon his return to Georgia. As his health further declines, Saakashvili has been denied adequate medical care while in prison. International watchdogs and human rights NGOs have continuously called for Saakashvili’s pardon and release in the last few years.
The regime has also subjected formally independent oversight institutions to reforms and leadership arrangements that have seriously weakened their independence and effectiveness, consequently reducing them to extensions of the executive branch. For example, the regime transferred responsibility for monitoring political donations and campaign finance from the relatively independent State Audit Office to the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) on September 1, 2023. The move sparked serious concerns about impartial electoral monitoring, given that the Prime Minister directly appoints the ACB Chair. Media regulation exhibits similar patterns of executive capture. For instance, members of the Georgian National Communications Commission (GNNC) are directly appointed by the GD-led parliament. In 2023 and 2025, the regime expanded the Commission’s power to oversee media content and levy fines against outlets (up to 3% of annual revenue) based on vague criteria, such as “incitement of violence” and lack of “fairness,” prompting criticism from media watchdogs. Concerns regarding other oversight bodies, such as the CEC (discussed in more depth above) and the Personal Data Protection Service of Georgia, persist, indicating a pervasive strategic weakening of accountability mechanisms.
HRF classifies Georgia as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Georgia, a parliamentary republic, gained independence from the Soviet Union in April 1991 after 70 years as a Soviet republic with limited autonomy. From the outset, internal turmoil, authoritarian legacies, and separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia—distinct ethnic enclaves in the Caucasus—hindered democratic progress. In 2003, the peaceful Rose Revolution ousted the incumbent president, Eduard Shevardnadze, whose 1992–2003 leadership was marred by corruption, electoral fraud, and government inefficiency. Mikheil Saakashvili and his party, the United National Movement (UNM), came to power the following year, winning the presidential and parliamentary elections. Saakashvili and the UNM pursued an openly pro-Western course, which aggravated relations with Russia. Ostensibly protecting the vulnerable population of South Ossetia, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, initiating a bloody 5-day war. It ended in Georgia’s defeat and Russia’s formal recognition of the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Deeply unpopular by then, Saakashvili and the UNM lost to the Georgian Dream (GD) coalition in 2012. Initially hailed as a harbinger of democratization, GD has overseen a steady erosion of electoral integrity and a shrinking of civic space.
In Georgia, electoral competition is significantly skewed to the point where the mainstream political opposition has an unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The Georgian Dream (GD) party, in power since 2012, has systematically engaged in anti-democratic tactics, including illegal voter mobilization and judicial persecution of prominent political opponents. The ruling party also commands significant and unfair incumbent advantages, from the abuse of administrative resources for political campaigning to the disproportionate control over the state agency overseeing elections. As a testament to the uneven playing field these measures have created, the opposition boycotted the second round of the 2020 legislative elections and called for an annulment of the results of the 2024 parliamentary elections.
Independent media, civil society and political leaders, and members of the general public have been seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime, as evident in the recent dismissals of critical journalists from publicly owned media outlets and the increasing judicial persecution of political opponents. At the same time, the regime has heavily limited civic space through the adoption of draconian “foreign agents” legislation and cracked down on dissenting demonstrations.
Reflecting the GD’s protracted consolidation of power, institutions are somewhat independent, occasionally checking the executive’s actions, but frequently constrained by the regime. The ruling party has significantly undermined the judiciary’s independence by politicizing the appointment and dismissal of magistrates, among other measures. As a result, the courts have enabled the persecution of opposition leaders and dissidents, as well as failed to guarantee effective legal remedies for electoral irregularities. The GD has also captured essential oversight bodies, reducing them to mere extensions, rather than independent checks, of the executive.
In Georgia, electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The systematic abuse of state resources and illicit voter mobilization have given the ruling GD party overwhelming campaign advantages, enabling it to defeat the mainstream opposition in the last four parliamentary elections with considerable margins. The regime has also increasingly obstructed its challengers’ campaigns through a combination of gratuitous legal restrictions and overt intimidation. It also engaged in widespread electoral fraud in the 2020 and 2024 parliamentary elections, prompting mass protests and condemnation at home and abroad.
In the 2024 and 2020 parliamentary elections, the ruling party enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. Observers noted numerous instances of state officials deploying various tactics to incentivize or intimidate potential voters, including manipulating welfare benefits as a roundabout strategy for vote-buying and a surge in short-term contracts with municipal administrations (e.g., for cleaners, construction workers, etc.) during the campaign period. In an extensive report on the 2020 campaign, Transparency International noted that members of the ruling party, acting in their official capacities, had offered significant benefits to specific individuals in exchange for their vote, such as early termination of their probation, reduction of charges in ongoing criminal trials, or restoration of driving rights following an earlier criminal conviction. In both electoral cycles, regime representatives exerted extensive pressure on public sector employees to support the ruling party’s campaign activities and cast their votes for it. Voter intimidation and coercion were also ubiquitous, with regime agents frequently harassing opposition supporters.
The regime also seriously undermined independent electoral oversight, limiting the opposition’s avenues for challenging the policies and informal practices that systematically disadvantage it. In 2017, the GD introduced a new law that granted parties the right to nominate members of the Central Election Commission (CEC) in proportion to their vote share in the most recent elections. As a result, GD appointees dominated the CEC in 2020, which possibly contributed to the CEC’s biased handling of pre-election complaints, as criticized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The ruling party persisted in its attempts to hollow out the Commission ahead of the next national vote, adopting amendments to the Election Code in May 2024 that abolished the Advisory Group within the CEC, an impartial division dedicated specifically to overseeing dispute resolution. In prior elections, the Advisory Group had played an important role in ensuring at least some transparency regarding the handling of electoral complaints. Lastly, in March 2024, the Georgian parliament overrode a presidential veto to amend the electoral code, this time changing the procedure for electing the Chair and non-partisan members of the CEC. The reform transferred the prerogative to nominate those officials from the president to the speaker of parliament, contrary to the Venice Commission’s opinion, which highlighted the risks of excessive political interference in the body’s functioning.
The regime also seriously undermined independent electoral oversight, limiting the opposition’s avenues for challenging the policies and informal practices that systematically disadvantage it. In 2017, the GD introduced a new law that granted parties the right to nominate members of the Central Election Commission (CEC) in proportion to their vote share in the most recent elections. As a result, GD appointees dominated the CEC in 2020, which possibly contributed to the CEC’s biased handling of pre-election complaints, as criticized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The ruling party persisted in its attempts to hollow out the Commission ahead of the next national vote, adopting amendments to the Election Code in May 2024 that abolished the Advisory Group within the CEC, an impartial division dedicated specifically to overseeing dispute resolution. In prior elections, the Advisory Group had played an important role in ensuring at least some transparency regarding the handling of electoral complaints. Lastly, in March 2024, the Georgian parliament overrode a presidential veto to amend the electoral code, this time changing the procedure for electing the Chair and non-partisan members of the CEC. The reform transferred the prerogative to nominate those officials from the president to the speaker of parliament, contrary to an opinion by the Venice Commission that highlighted the risks of excessive political interference in the body’s functioning.
Though these measures already skew the playing field to a considerable extent, the regime also engaged in significant voting irregularities and electoral fraud. In the 2024 parliamentary elections, observers noted a range of tactics to manipulate the outcome, including voter surveillance and coercion at polling stations, vote-buying, chain voting, and breaches of vote secrecy. Procedural violations by election officials also compromised the certification of results, an issue compounded by the systemic obstruction of domestic observers who would normally oversee these processes. While ascertaining the true extent of fraud is challenging, it is likely that it contributed to its considerable margin of victory in the 2024 elections. The GD officially won 53.93% of the popular vote and 89 seats, securing its single-party rule, trailed by the runner-up, the Coalition for Change, which won 11.03% and 19 seats. The UNM had a historically poor result, coming in third with 10.17% and 16 seats.
To protest the GD’s overwhelming structural advantages and overt electoral manipulation, the mainstream opposition has challenged election outcomes or organized boycotts. On November 19, 2024, President Salome Zourabichvili appealed to the Constitutional Court, alleging violations of the secrecy of the vote in the recent parliamentary election. Thirty MPs from the outgoing parliament joined the appeal and sought to have the election results annulled. On December 3, 2024, the Constitutional Court rejected the claim, citing insufficient evidence of systemic irregularities. This wasn’t the opposition’s first attempt to contest the validity of elections and seek legal redress. Alleging that the first round of the 2020 parliamentary elections wаs rigged, opposition parties, including the GD’s main rival, UNM, boycotted the second round, called for a re-run under new CEC leadership, and organized mass protests. These extreme measures, which plunged the country into a political crisis, indicated the opposition’s perceived inability to win under the current electoral circumstances.
In Georgia, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Previously robust, independent media and dissenting organizations operate in a context of increasing obstruction by the regime via both legal and extrajudicial means. These infringements upon the freedom of dissent have galvanized mass protests in recent years, which the regime has arbitrarily repressed.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated and obstructed the work of independent dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. In April of 2024, it reintroduced the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence (colloquially known as the “foreign agents” bill), after public outcry prompted it to seemingly abandon the proposal in 2023. The bill was signed into law by the President of Georgia in April 2025. The law requires civil society organizations (CSOs) receiving more than 20% of their funding from abroad to register as “foreign agents” and clearly indicate this designation in their outreach. Non-compliance carries a fine of 25,000 lari (about $9,360), with additional monthly fines of 20,000 lari ($7,490) for continued non-compliance. Under the law, registered organizations are also required to submit detailed reports on their foreign funding and activities to the government. The law sparked international outcry – in July 2024, Brussels’ envoy, Paweł Herczyński, announced a halt to Georgia’s EU accession process in response to the legislation, reversing a December 2023 decision to grant the country candidate status. While the regime has not directly shut down dissenting organizations under the new law, the excessive reporting burden and concerns of state surveillance have already prompted some, such as the critical outlet Tabula, to relocate to neighboring countries or conduct their activities entirely online.
The repressive legislation is consistent with the regime’s overall pattern of retaliation against critical outlets and dissidents through various means, from overt editorial interference to politically motivated trials. In 2019, for instance, GD representatives were instrumental in removing Natia Kapanadze as director of the popular public channel Adjara TV. GD Chairman Ivanishvili and other party officials openly decried the channel’s editorial stance, and Natia Kapanadze was removed for “mismanagement” and declining ratings, even though during her tenure, the channel enjoyed wide viewership. In another instance, news anchor Irakli Absandze was dismissed in 2021 after he shared a Facebook post decrying the police response to peaceful anti-regime demonstrations. In 2022, following a sham trial, the owner of pro-opposition channel Mtavari TV, Nika Gvaramia, received a three-year sentence for abuse of power in his former capacity as director of Rustavi TV, another critical outlet. The court found he had unlawfully used a vehicle belonging to the channel for personal purposes, despite the owners testifying that they had allowed him to use it. The ruling also set a precedent for convicting a senior executive for using company assets. International observers condemned the conviction as unfounded and clearly retaliatory, given Gvaramia’s prior work as a lawyer for former President Mikheil Saakashvili, a prominent critic of GD and a member of the main opposition party, the UNM. In June 2023, Gvaramia was pardoned by President Zourabichvili, a staunch critic of the GD, and released from prison shortly after.
Confronted by rising public discontent with its policies, the regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. In 2024, it amended its Law on Assemblies and the Code of Administrative Offenses to impose a blanket ban on face coverings during protests, expand police powers for search and seizure, and significantly increase fines for protest-related offenses. The bill, rushed through Parliament by the GD, was a response to the multiple waves of protests Georgians had organized in 2023 and earlier in 2024. The protests against the reintroduction of the “foreign agents” bill in May 2024 were met with more than 100 arrests of protestors and multiple instances of police brutality. Law enforcement repeatedly used excessive force, including tear gas, chemically-laced water cannons, and rubber bullets against peaceful protesters. Fines for mere participation were pervasive, totalling more than $720,000, according to some estimates. There were similar instances at the 2019 Tbilisi protests denouncing Russian influence in the country: at least 275 people and 32 journalists suffered injuries as a result of law enforcement’s violent dispersal of the peaceful demonstrations.
Institutions are somewhat independent, but frequently constrained by the regime. The regime has hollowed out judicial institutions, largely by expanding the prerogatives of the High Council of Justice, whose dubious appointment practices have sparked international criticism. This capture, in turn, has seriously undermined the courts’ capacity to check the regime’s electoral manipulation and reprisals against dissidents. The ruling party has appointed loyalists to key oversight bodies, from campaign finance regulators to media authorities, and expanded their powers with few effective checks.
The regime subjected judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weakened their independence or operational effectiveness, disregarding recommendations by international experts. The highest judicial oversight body in Georgia, the High Council of Justice (HJC), which appoints, promotes, and sanctions magistrates for professional misconduct, is dominated by a small cohesive group of members, colloquially known as “the clan.” Observers have pointed to the clan’s clientelist links to the ruling GD party, which introduced generous incentives for members, and questionable professional integrity: In 2023, two HJC members, Mikheil Chinchaladze and Levan Murusidze, were sanctioned by the US State Department, which found they had abused their positions on the Council to enable high-level corruption. (Murusidze continues to serve on the HJC as of 2025). The existence of such informal clientelist networks, in turn, has undermined the Council’s independence, as evident from international observers’ generally unfavorable assessments of its functioning. After nearly two years of close impartial monitoring (2019-2020), the OSCE noted that the appointment procedures for Supreme Court judges “failed to ensure an impartial, merit-based process free from extraneous influences.” As the body responsible for vetting and assessing candidates’ professional credentials, the HCJ failed to establish clear selection criteria and to conduct interviews in an impartial, professional manner. Even more importantly, the Council did not address notable conflicts of interest, as some current members were simultaneously participating as candidates in the appointment process. Instead of reforming the Council in response to international criticism, however, the regime has empowered it further: in December 2021, parliament amended Article 37(1) of the Organic Law on Common Courts, granting the HCJ the authority to transfer judges to different courts without their consent for up to 4 years. As noted in a critical 2023 opinion of the Venice Commission, the measure effectively enables unchecked retaliation against dissenting judges.
Reflecting this institutional capture, the judiciary has enabled the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition. The courts’ review of multiple credible electoral complaints in the 2020 and 2024 elections was, in most instances, cursory. For instance, the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) contested the official results of the 2024 parliamentary elections in 73 electoral districts, presenting evidence that the CEC had compromised ballot secrecy. A district court reviewing one of the GYLA’s multiple complaints ruled in favor of the association and annulled the ballots from thirty polling stations. However, the Kutaisi and Tbilisi Appeals Courts merged all complaints by GYLA and another election watchdog, “My Vote,” into a single case, which precluded individual assessment of each claim on its merits and imposed a higher burden of proof on the plaintiffs. Both courts then found there were no systemic secrecy issues. At the same time, the district judge who had ruled in favor of GYLA, Vladimer Khuchua, was subjected to a smear campaign in pro-regime media. Similarly, the Constitutional Court hastily dismissed a lawsuit alleging electoral irregularities submitted by President Zourabichvili. Since the Constitutional Court is the highest instance, the ruling foreclosed subsequent legal challenges to the official results. These cases highlighted that, even if limited dissent exists on the ordinary courts, higher judicial bodies aligned with the regime can overturn rulings inimical to its interests.
In addition, courts have on consequential occasions failed to check regime attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. This was most evident in their handling of bogus charges against participants in the 2023-2025 anti-regime protests: judges routinely denied motions to examine police witnesses or present exculpatory evidence, and most cases resulted in convictions. Sentences were frequently based on fabricated evidence, often limited to selectively used video footage, and relied heavily on uniform, uncorroborated testimonies from law enforcement officers. In July 2025, a Tbilisi court sentenced 19-year-old protester Saba Jikia to four and a half years’ imprisonment for allegedly striking a police officer during the November 2024 demonstrations, even though the officer testified that he had not sustained any injuries and Jikia maintained his innocence. Human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, condemned the sentence as disproportionate to the alleged harm and politically motivated. In addition, the court had not applied relevant youth justice provisions, which stipulate that courts should seek the “least restrictive” legally prescribed sanction when the defendant is under 21.
In September 2025, for instance, a court in Tbilisi sentenced twenty participants in anti-government protests to prison terms ranging from two to two and a half years, including Saba Skhvitaridze, who reported to being tortured while in custody, and actor Andro Chichinadze, who participated in rallies and was subsequently charged with disruption of public order for throwing an object, most likely a stick, into a crowd of police officers. The trials were plagued with gross procedural violations, including violations of the presumption of innocence. Prominent political leaders have also been convicted on bogus charges. In 2021, former president Mikheil Saakashvili, who had been sentenced in absentia to six years imprisonment in 2018 following a politically-motivated trial, was promptly arrested upon his return to Georgia. As his health further declines, Saakashvili has been denied adequate medical care while in prison. International watchdogs and human rights NGOs have continuously called for Saakashvili’s pardon and release in the last few years.
The regime has also subjected formally independent oversight institutions to reforms and leadership arrangements that have seriously weakened their independence and effectiveness, consequently reducing them to extensions of the executive branch. For example, the regime transferred responsibility for monitoring political donations and campaign finance from the relatively independent State Audit Office to the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) on September 1, 2023. The move sparked serious concerns about impartial electoral monitoring, given that the Prime Minister directly appoints the ACB Chair. Media regulation exhibits similar patterns of executive capture. For instance, members of the Georgian National Communications Commission (GNNC) are directly appointed by the GD-led parliament. In 2023 and 2025, the regime expanded the Commission’s power to oversee media content and levy fines against outlets (up to 3% of annual revenue) based on vague criteria, such as “incitement of violence” and lack of “fairness,” prompting criticism from media watchdogs. Concerns regarding other oversight bodies, such as the CEC (discussed in more depth above) and the Personal Data Protection Service of Georgia, persist, indicating a pervasive strategic weakening of accountability mechanisms.
