Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Equatorial Guinea as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Equatorial Guinea is a presidential republic. The Head of State, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (Obiang), seized power in a coup d’état in 1979. Since gaining independence from Spain in 1968, the country has been under the dynastic rule of one family and known only two leaders: Francisco Macías Nguema, who imposed a totalitarian regime, and his nephew and security chief, Obiang. Despite the formal introduction of multi-party democracy in 1991 and the 1995 discovery of oil, the Obiang ruling family exercises absolute control of power and the economy under a highly patrimonial and kleptocratic regime, which legitimizes its rule through sham elections and maintains control through repression.
National elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Since the first multi-party elections in 1996, the country has held five presidential elections discredited by manipulation, repression, and opposition boycotts. Obiang has claimed victory in each election with no less than 93% of the vote, with his nearest opponent not surpassing 3%. The regime bans the most prominent opposition political parties, including the Citizens for Innovation (CI), and arrests opposition leaders ahead of elections. It engages in election rigging and controls the National Electoral Commission (CEN), leading to Obiang and the PDGE receiving astronomical and implausibly high vote shares of over 90%.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime arrests, tortures, and arbitrarily detains dissidents, and has engaged in transnational repression to kidnap dissidents from abroad. The regime uses arrests and other forms of punishment, like prolonged internet shutdowns, against protestors.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The courts allow the regime to rig elections, such as by upholding bans on political parties and imposing sentences on political opponents. At times, these cases are directed to separate military courts. A 2011 constitutional referendum consolidated executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of the president, allowing him to run for additional terms, appoint his son as vice president, appoint members of the Senate, and oversee the judiciary.
In Equatorial Guinea, national elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime bans political parties and arrests opposition leaders ahead of elections. It engages in election rigging and control of the election body, leading to Obiang and the PDGE receiving unrealistically high vote shares.
The regime has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections. The regime has forced many of its most serious political opponents into exile, while allowing only one opposition party to legally operate in the country—albeit under severe restrictions and relentless persecution—and compete in elections: the Convergence for Social Democracy (CPDS). Since 2018, the regime has banned another opposition party, the Citizens for Innovation (CI) party, citing vague security concerns, and relentlessly persecuted its leader and members. For example, ahead of the November 2022 elections, the regime arrested CI leader Gabriel Nsé Obiang Obono, along with as many as 170 party members in a police assault on the party’s headquarters. Previously, ahead of the 2017 legislative elections, the regime had also imprisoned Obiang Obono and dozens of CI members, leading to their disqualification in the election.
The regime has engaged in systematic, significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. On Election Day in 2022, the regime blocked Internet access, banned private cars from driving (preventing some people from reaching the polls), and deployed security forces to polling stations. The regime already banned access to Facebook at the beginning of the electoral campaign in October. Following the elections, observers noted election irregularities, including restrictions on political party representatives’ access to polling stations, repeat voting, and pre-filled ballots for the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE). The regime also allegedly counted unopened ballots for the PDGE.
As a result, Obiang has skewed the electoral playing field so much so that the regime generally claims victory with a very high vote share. In the 2022 election, the National Electoral Commission (CEN), which is controlled by the regime, coronated Obiang with a reported 98% of the vote against two challengers, including opposition leader Andrés Esono Ondó of the Convergence for Social Democracy party (CPDS), who received 2% of the vote. The CEN also awarded the PDGE and allies all 100 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and all 55 elected seats in the Senate. This pattern has been consistent throughout Obiang’s rule: the CEN coronated him with 93.7% of the vote in 2016, 95.8% in 2009, and 97% in 2002. Each of these elections was marred by allegations of voter manipulation, fraud, and the suppression of opposition parties, which has led to several boycotts by key opposition groups.
Obiang has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The National Electoral Commission (CEN) in Equatorial Guinea is structured in a way that makes it an arm or extension of the PDGE regime. The commission is chaired by the Minister of the Interior, who is appointed by President Obiang, ensuring that the leadership is loyal to the regime. Other key positions within the CEN are similarly filled by individuals who are either members of or closely aligned with the PDGE, including representatives from the military, police, and other state institutions. The impact of this structure is evident in how elections are administered. During the 2016 presidential election, the opposition reported that the CEN was complicit in various forms of electoral fraud, including the manipulation of voter rolls, ballot stuffing, and the intimidation of opposition polling agents. Moreover, the regime’s control over the CEN extends to the management of international observers. While the regime sometimes allows observers from regional bodies like the African Union (AU), these observers are often restricted in their activities and face limitations that prevent them from fully assessing the electoral process. Independent international observers are rarely granted full access, and when they do report irregularities, their findings are either dismissed or ignored.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime tightly controls the media and shuts down dissenting organizations. It arrests and tortures human rights activists, and has kidnapped dissidents from abroad. Protests lead to arrests and other forms of punishment, like prolonged internet shutdowns.
The regime has systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. It employs regulatory censorship and denial of legal registration to intimidate independent civil society organizations (CSOs). In 2019, the regime dissolved the independent think tank Center for Development Studies and Initiatives (CEID), on vague accusations of engaging in “political activities.” The vice president of CEID, Alfredo Okenve, faced personal harassment, including arbitrary detention and physical assault by security officers. The regime has denied legal registration to a number of independent organizations, such as Somos + or the political party CI.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Human rights activists and civil society leaders are frequent targets of arrest and arbitrary detention. Since August 2024, human rights defender Joaquín Elo Ayeto has been imprisoned on baseless accusations of carrying out illegal activities through his civil society organization Somos+. He was previously arrested, tortured, and detained in 2019 after criticizing a government project. Since January 2024, human rights activist Anacleto Micha Ndong Nlang has been imprisoned on baseless charges of slander after filing a complaint against security officials for his kidnapping, torture, and detention from September 2022 to June 2023. In 2017, cartoonist and human rights activist Ramón Esono Ebalé was arrested and held in pre-trial detention for five months on politically motivated charges of “money laundering” and “counterfeiting money,” which were later dropped.
Obiang’s regime has systematically engaged in, or enabled, transnational repression against dissidents abroad. Julio Obama Mefuman, four members of the opposition group Movement for the Liberation of Equatorial Guinea Third Republic (MLGE3R), were abducted by Equatoguinean security forces in South Sudan in 2019 and transferred back to Equatorial Guinea. Two of the individuals, Julio Obama Mefuman and Feliciano Efa Mangue, were Spanish citizens, and the other two, Martín Obiang Ondo Mbasogo and Bienvenido Ndong Ono, were residing in Spain. Spain’s National High Court opened an investigation into the kidnapping, which resulted in a pilot admitting he transported the individuals on President Obiang’s plane. Mefuman died in custody in early 2023, allegedly due to torture. Since February 2024, an international arrest warrant has been issued in Spain against the Vice Minister of External Security and son of President Obiang, Carmelo Ovono Obiang, who resides in Spain, as well as against two other senior security officials for the alleged kidnapping and torture of opposition members.
The regime has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor through direct control of major outlets and the suppression of independent journalism. For example, Radio Television Guinea Ecuatorial (RTVGE), the only state-run television network, is the primary source of news and is fully controlled by the regime. It regularly broadcasts pro-regime propaganda while avoiding any criticism of President Teodoro Obiang or his ruling Democratic PDGE. Asonga is the only private television channel and radio broadcaster, and is controlled by the Vice President, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue (Nguema), who is also Obiang’s son. In 2020, Asonga’s news program “Buenos días, Guinea” was canceled after it aired footage of the military using violence to enforce COVID-19 confinement measures. Seven journalists associated with the program were also suspended. Another prominent example of media manipulation was during the 2016 elections, when only state media, owned by the regime or close associates, covered the campaigns. Opposition candidates were either denied airtime or given minimal, biased coverage. Additionally, the Ministry of Information, Press, and Radio is the only publishing facility available to newspapers, leading to censorship of printed materials. Nguema and others close to President Obiang are the only ones who own the few private media outlets in the country.
Equatoguinean officials have systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. In July 2024, residents of Annobón, an island of Equatorial Guinea, protested the environmental impact of mining operations on the island. Regime officials arrested more than 30 people from Annobón and shut down phone and internet services. As of September 2025, the internet was still shut down for Annobón. During the 2016 presidential elections, peaceful protests challenging the legitimacy of the results were met with violent crackdowns. Opposition members and activists attempting to voice their concerns were arrested, and security forces swiftly dispersed any gatherings that threatened the regime’s grip on power. The regime has also targeted protests before they happen. In 2022, security officials detained three activists and two opposition members after they called for demonstrations in a private social media group chat. They were held incommunicado for several months. They were convicted in 2023 for unlawful association, unlawful assembly and demonstration, and attempted terrorism.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The courts allow the regime to go after political opposition and uphold politically motivated sentences against dissidents. At times, these cases are directed to separate military courts. A 2011 constitutional referendum consolidated executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of the president.
Courts have systematically and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. In February 2018, just a few months after the election took place, a provincial court dissolved CI entirely, while citing alleged security concerns and accusations of violent activities. This dissolution was later upheld by the Supreme Court, which effectively eliminated one of Equatorial Guinea’s two opposition parties from the political arena. Simultaneously, the court also upheld a 30-year jail term handed to 21 CI members and activists, who had been charged with “rebellion, attacks against authority, public disorder, and serious injury and damage.”
The regime has systematically directed cases to separate, regime-controlled courts. In June 2023, Obiang Obono and dozens of other members of the CI party were tried by a Malabo military court and given prison sentences ranging from 9 to 29 years. Obiang Obono received a 29-year sentence for “homicide, abusive exercise of fundamental rights, insults to security forces, illegal possession of ammunition.” The trial took place behind closed doors without independent legal representation for the defendants.
The regime has systematically subjected executive institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence. In 2012, Obiang consolidated his executive power by staging a constitutional referendum in 2011, which was widely seen as a sham, to validate the removal of the age limit for presidential candidates (75). This allowed Obiang (who was 69 at the time) to continue running for two additional terms. Despite ruling before the referendum, Obiang was grandfathered under the law, and his prior rule was not counted toward the term limit. This amendment also created the position of the vice president, to be filled by the president. Obiang appointed his son, Nguema. This move was seen by many as a step toward establishing a dynastic succession.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence. The regime maintains significant influence over the judiciary. The 2012 constitutional changes institutionalized Obiang’s control over the judiciary and the legislative branches by giving the president the power to chair the Supreme Council on Judicial Power, which oversees judges in the country. Vice President Nguema openly interferes in judicial matters. On his X (formerly Twitter) account, he has publicly admitted to giving instructions to the public prosecutor’s office, directly ordering arrests, and initiating investigations.
The regime has systematically subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. In practice, legislative power is exercised mainly through presidential decrees. The 2012 amendment created the second legislative chamber, the Senate, and gave the president the power to directly appoint 15 members, while the remaining 55 would be elected. In 2022, the regime combined the presidential election with the parliamentary and municipal elections, citing economic constraints as the reason. The National Electoral Commission, led by the Minister of the Interior, declared Obiang the winner with 99% of the vote. This outcome has given PDGE complete control over municipal, parliamentary, and senatorial seats.
HRF classifies Equatorial Guinea as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Equatorial Guinea is a presidential republic. The Head of State, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (Obiang), seized power in a coup d’état in 1979. Since gaining independence from Spain in 1968, the country has been under the dynastic rule of one family and known only two leaders: Francisco Macías Nguema, who imposed a totalitarian regime, and his nephew and security chief, Obiang. Despite the formal introduction of multi-party democracy in 1991 and the 1995 discovery of oil, the Obiang ruling family exercises absolute control of power and the economy under a highly patrimonial and kleptocratic regime, which legitimizes its rule through sham elections and maintains control through repression.
National elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Since the first multi-party elections in 1996, the country has held five presidential elections discredited by manipulation, repression, and opposition boycotts. Obiang has claimed victory in each election with no less than 93% of the vote, with his nearest opponent not surpassing 3%. The regime bans the most prominent opposition political parties, including the Citizens for Innovation (CI), and arrests opposition leaders ahead of elections. It engages in election rigging and controls the National Electoral Commission (CEN), leading to Obiang and the PDGE receiving astronomical and implausibly high vote shares of over 90%.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime arrests, tortures, and arbitrarily detains dissidents, and has engaged in transnational repression to kidnap dissidents from abroad. The regime uses arrests and other forms of punishment, like prolonged internet shutdowns, against protestors.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The courts allow the regime to rig elections, such as by upholding bans on political parties and imposing sentences on political opponents. At times, these cases are directed to separate military courts. A 2011 constitutional referendum consolidated executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of the president, allowing him to run for additional terms, appoint his son as vice president, appoint members of the Senate, and oversee the judiciary.
In Equatorial Guinea, national elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime bans political parties and arrests opposition leaders ahead of elections. It engages in election rigging and control of the election body, leading to Obiang and the PDGE receiving unrealistically high vote shares.
The regime has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections. The regime has forced many of its most serious political opponents into exile, while allowing only one opposition party to legally operate in the country—albeit under severe restrictions and relentless persecution—and compete in elections: the Convergence for Social Democracy (CPDS). Since 2018, the regime has banned another opposition party, the Citizens for Innovation (CI) party, citing vague security concerns, and relentlessly persecuted its leader and members. For example, ahead of the November 2022 elections, the regime arrested CI leader Gabriel Nsé Obiang Obono, along with as many as 170 party members in a police assault on the party’s headquarters. Previously, ahead of the 2017 legislative elections, the regime had also imprisoned Obiang Obono and dozens of CI members, leading to their disqualification in the election.
The regime has engaged in systematic, significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. On Election Day in 2022, the regime blocked Internet access, banned private cars from driving (preventing some people from reaching the polls), and deployed security forces to polling stations. The regime already banned access to Facebook at the beginning of the electoral campaign in October. Following the elections, observers noted election irregularities, including restrictions on political party representatives’ access to polling stations, repeat voting, and pre-filled ballots for the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE). The regime also allegedly counted unopened ballots for the PDGE.
As a result, Obiang has skewed the electoral playing field so much so that the regime generally claims victory with a very high vote share. In the 2022 election, the National Electoral Commission (CEN), which is controlled by the regime, coronated Obiang with a reported 98% of the vote against two challengers, including opposition leader Andrés Esono Ondó of the Convergence for Social Democracy party (CPDS), who received 2% of the vote. The CEN also awarded the PDGE and allies all 100 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and all 55 elected seats in the Senate. This pattern has been consistent throughout Obiang’s rule: the CEN coronated him with 93.7% of the vote in 2016, 95.8% in 2009, and 97% in 2002. Each of these elections was marred by allegations of voter manipulation, fraud, and the suppression of opposition parties, which has led to several boycotts by key opposition groups.
Obiang has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The National Electoral Commission (CEN) in Equatorial Guinea is structured in a way that makes it an arm or extension of the PDGE regime. The commission is chaired by the Minister of the Interior, who is appointed by President Obiang, ensuring that the leadership is loyal to the regime. Other key positions within the CEN are similarly filled by individuals who are either members of or closely aligned with the PDGE, including representatives from the military, police, and other state institutions. The impact of this structure is evident in how elections are administered. During the 2016 presidential election, the opposition reported that the CEN was complicit in various forms of electoral fraud, including the manipulation of voter rolls, ballot stuffing, and the intimidation of opposition polling agents. Moreover, the regime’s control over the CEN extends to the management of international observers. While the regime sometimes allows observers from regional bodies like the African Union (AU), these observers are often restricted in their activities and face limitations that prevent them from fully assessing the electoral process. Independent international observers are rarely granted full access, and when they do report irregularities, their findings are either dismissed or ignored.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime tightly controls the media and shuts down dissenting organizations. It arrests and tortures human rights activists, and has kidnapped dissidents from abroad. Protests lead to arrests and other forms of punishment, like prolonged internet shutdowns.
The regime has systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. It employs regulatory censorship and denial of legal registration to intimidate independent civil society organizations (CSOs). In 2019, the regime dissolved the independent think tank Center for Development Studies and Initiatives (CEID), on vague accusations of engaging in “political activities.” The vice president of CEID, Alfredo Okenve, faced personal harassment, including arbitrary detention and physical assault by security officers. The regime has denied legal registration to a number of independent organizations, such as Somos + or the political party CI.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Human rights activists and civil society leaders are frequent targets of arrest and arbitrary detention. Since August 2024, human rights defender Joaquín Elo Ayeto has been imprisoned on baseless accusations of carrying out illegal activities through his civil society organization Somos+. He was previously arrested, tortured, and detained in 2019 after criticizing a government project. Since January 2024, human rights activist Anacleto Micha Ndong Nlang has been imprisoned on baseless charges of slander after filing a complaint against security officials for his kidnapping, torture, and detention from September 2022 to June 2023. In 2017, cartoonist and human rights activist Ramón Esono Ebalé was arrested and held in pre-trial detention for five months on politically motivated charges of “money laundering” and “counterfeiting money,” which were later dropped.
Obiang’s regime has systematically engaged in, or enabled, transnational repression against dissidents abroad. Julio Obama Mefuman, four members of the opposition group Movement for the Liberation of Equatorial Guinea Third Republic (MLGE3R), were abducted by Equatoguinean security forces in South Sudan in 2019 and transferred back to Equatorial Guinea. Two of the individuals, Julio Obama Mefuman and Feliciano Efa Mangue, were Spanish citizens, and the other two, Martín Obiang Ondo Mbasogo and Bienvenido Ndong Ono, were residing in Spain. Spain’s National High Court opened an investigation into the kidnapping, which resulted in a pilot admitting he transported the individuals on President Obiang’s plane. Mefuman died in custody in early 2023, allegedly due to torture. Since February 2024, an international arrest warrant has been issued in Spain against the Vice Minister of External Security and son of President Obiang, Carmelo Ovono Obiang, who resides in Spain, as well as against two other senior security officials for the alleged kidnapping and torture of opposition members.
The regime has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor through direct control of major outlets and the suppression of independent journalism. For example, Radio Television Guinea Ecuatorial (RTVGE), the only state-run television network, is the primary source of news and is fully controlled by the regime. It regularly broadcasts pro-regime propaganda while avoiding any criticism of President Teodoro Obiang or his ruling Democratic PDGE. Asonga is the only private television channel and radio broadcaster, and is controlled by the Vice President, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue (Nguema), who is also Obiang’s son. In 2020, Asonga’s news program “Buenos días, Guinea” was canceled after it aired footage of the military using violence to enforce COVID-19 confinement measures. Seven journalists associated with the program were also suspended. Another prominent example of media manipulation was during the 2016 elections, when only state media, owned by the regime or close associates, covered the campaigns. Opposition candidates were either denied airtime or given minimal, biased coverage. Additionally, the Ministry of Information, Press, and Radio is the only publishing facility available to newspapers, leading to censorship of printed materials. Nguema and others close to President Obiang are the only ones who own the few private media outlets in the country.
Equatoguinean officials have systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. In July 2024, residents of Annobón, an island of Equatorial Guinea, protested the environmental impact of mining operations on the island. Regime officials arrested more than 30 people from Annobón and shut down phone and internet services. As of September 2025, the internet was still shut down for Annobón. During the 2016 presidential elections, peaceful protests challenging the legitimacy of the results were met with violent crackdowns. Opposition members and activists attempting to voice their concerns were arrested, and security forces swiftly dispersed any gatherings that threatened the regime’s grip on power. The regime has also targeted protests before they happen. In 2022, security officials detained three activists and two opposition members after they called for demonstrations in a private social media group chat. They were held incommunicado for several months. They were convicted in 2023 for unlawful association, unlawful assembly and demonstration, and attempted terrorism.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The courts allow the regime to go after political opposition and uphold politically motivated sentences against dissidents. At times, these cases are directed to separate military courts. A 2011 constitutional referendum consolidated executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of the president.
Courts have systematically and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. In February 2018, just a few months after the election took place, a provincial court dissolved CI entirely, while citing alleged security concerns and accusations of violent activities. This dissolution was later upheld by the Supreme Court, which effectively eliminated one of Equatorial Guinea’s two opposition parties from the political arena. Simultaneously, the court also upheld a 30-year jail term handed to 21 CI members and activists, who had been charged with “rebellion, attacks against authority, public disorder, and serious injury and damage.”
The regime has systematically directed cases to separate, regime-controlled courts. In June 2023, Obiang Obono and dozens of other members of the CI party were tried by a Malabo military court and given prison sentences ranging from 9 to 29 years. Obiang Obono received a 29-year sentence for “homicide, abusive exercise of fundamental rights, insults to security forces, illegal possession of ammunition.” The trial took place behind closed doors without independent legal representation for the defendants.
The regime has systematically subjected executive institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence. In 2012, Obiang consolidated his executive power by staging a constitutional referendum in 2011, which was widely seen as a sham, to validate the removal of the age limit for presidential candidates (75). This allowed Obiang (who was 69 at the time) to continue running for two additional terms. Despite ruling before the referendum, Obiang was grandfathered under the law, and his prior rule was not counted toward the term limit. This amendment also created the position of the vice president, to be filled by the president. Obiang appointed his son, Nguema. This move was seen by many as a step toward establishing a dynastic succession.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence. The regime maintains significant influence over the judiciary. The 2012 constitutional changes institutionalized Obiang’s control over the judiciary and the legislative branches by giving the president the power to chair the Supreme Council on Judicial Power, which oversees judges in the country. Vice President Nguema openly interferes in judicial matters. On his X (formerly Twitter) account, he has publicly admitted to giving instructions to the public prosecutor’s office, directly ordering arrests, and initiating investigations.
The regime has systematically subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. In practice, legislative power is exercised mainly through presidential decrees. The 2012 amendment created the second legislative chamber, the Senate, and gave the president the power to directly appoint 15 members, while the remaining 55 would be elected. In 2022, the regime combined the presidential election with the parliamentary and municipal elections, citing economic constraints as the reason. The National Electoral Commission, led by the Minister of the Interior, declared Obiang the winner with 99% of the vote. This outcome has given PDGE complete control over municipal, parliamentary, and senatorial seats.
