Democracy
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Ecuador as democratic.
Ecuador transitioned from military rule to democracy in 1979, operating as a presidential constitutional republic with competitive multiparty elections with a party system that has historically been fragmented and centered around personalistic leadership rather than stable ideological organizations. Over time, Ecuador has alternated between left- and right-leaning governments, and relations among the executive, legislature, and judiciary have often been conflictual. In recent decades, the country has also experienced recurrent political instability, including the removal of elected presidents in 1997, 2000, and 2005. During the 2007–2017 presidency of Rafael Correa, constitutional and institutional changes concentrated authority in the executive and weakened oversight institutions, contributing to serious democratic backsliding. Subsequent administrations attempted partial institutional rebalancing, but governance has remained fragile, marked by polarization, and low public trust. Since 2021, the country has faced mounting security and economic pressures, and early elections in 2023 brought current President Daniel Noboa to power, reflecting the continued volatility of Ecuadorian politics and the persistence of a competitive yet fragile democratic system.
National elections are largely free and fair in Ecuador. Recent electoral cycles have featured competitive races in which incumbents and strong opposition candidates have been able to register, campaign, and contest runoffs, with close vote margins and divided legislative results. Although campaigns have occurred amid significant violence linked to organized crime, there is no consistent evidence that the government systematically restricted opposition activity. Electoral authorities administered the vote according to established procedures, international observers verified the consistency of results, and competing parties largely accepted the certified outcome despite isolated fraud allegations.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Private and independent media remain widespread and generally able to report critically, and no major outlets of advocacy groups have been formally closed. However, the environment for dissent is increasingly uneven. Journalists face threats and violence from organized crime groups and, at times, pressure from state actors, including interference and obstacles in accessing official information. An Indigenous-led national strike was met with heavy security deployments and credible allegations of excessive force, and certain administrative measures affecting outspoken critics illustrate constraints but fall short of formal censorship. Overall, expression is permitted but not consistently safeguarded, as both government practices and broader insecurity complicate the exercise of dissent.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Ecuador’s Constitutional Court has reviewed executive measures affecting civil liberties and limited their scope, striking down several states of exception and requiring revisions to referendum questions. Judges have faced public criticism, stigmatization, and security threats after rulings against the government, but none have been formally removed, prosecuted, or sanctioned, and the Court has continued to operate. Prosecutors and courts have also pursued politically sensitive cases, including corruption investigations involving officials and criminal proceedings against members of the armed forces. Although investigations have been slow, the continued adjudication of such cases indicates that oversight mechanisms remain active and capable of constraining government authority.
National elections in Ecuador are largely free and fair. Recent presidential contests have featured very competitive races with viable incumbents and opposition candidates, including Correa-backed movements, who were able to participate unobstructed. While the campaign environment has been affected by criminal violence, there is no consistent evidence of systematic state interference in opposition activity. Electoral authorities administered the process according to established procedures, international observers corroborated the official results, and most political actors ultimately accepted the certified outcome, indicating that electoral competition and oversight mechanisms largely functioned as intended.
The Ecuadorian government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. In 2025, incumbent president Daniel Noboa stood for reelection against fifteen viable challengers, most prominently Luisa González of the Citizen Revolution (RC) movement associated with former president Rafael Correa. No candidate secured a majority in the first round, where Noboa received 44.17% of the vote and González 44%, triggering a competitive runoff. Noboa secured his reelection, winning the second round with 55.63% against González’s 44.37%. Moreover, no party secured a majority in the 151-seat National Assembly. The RC and allied RETO won 67 seats, just one more than Noboa’s National Democratic Action (ADN) party. Similarly, the 2023 snap presidential election triggered by the constitutional dissolution of the National Assembly, invoked by then-President Guillermo Lasso, also produced a runoff between Noboa and González, in which Noboa prevailed with 51.83% of the vote against González’s 48.17%. Earlier, in the 2021 election, conservative candidate Guillermo Lasso narrowly defeated Andrés Arauz, also backed by the Correísta political bloc. The repeated participation of this highly polarizing yet electorally competitive movement, including against sitting governments, demonstrates that major opposition forces are able to organize parties, nominate candidates, and compete for national office. Across these elections, results were recognized and peaceful transfers of power occurred, indicating that electoral competition has remained open despite political polarization and institutional tensions.
The Noboa administration has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. While the 2025 campaign trail was marred by violence, including the assassination of anti-corruption advocate and presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, these incidents were attributed to organized crime groups linked to narcotics trafficking rather than government intervention. Opposition candidates were able to register, campaign nationally, hold rallies, and participate in debates and media appearances. Major challengers, including Luisa González, conducted nationwide campaigns. Although the electoral period took place under a state of emergency that was declared amid a sharp escalation in organized crime violence and prison riots , there is no consistent evidence that authorities selectively restricted opposition events, denied ballot access, or systematically applied campaign regulations to disadvantage specific candidates.
Moreover, the government has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. Recent electoral cycles were administered by electoral authorities according to established procedures, and no credible evidence of systematic fraud or nationwide irregularities emerged. Following the 2025 runoff, Luisa González alleged fraud and refused to concede defeat, including after Noboa was sworn in for a second term. However, other representatives and local officeholders of her Citizen Revolution movement, as well as leaders of other political parties, accepted the official results. The Organization of American States (OAS) electoral observation mission reported that voting occurred peacefully and verified the consistency of tally sheets across party copies and official records. Although contested rhetoric contributed to political polarization and uncertainty among supporters, the certified results were upheld, and the incumbent was peacefully inaugurated for a new term, indicating that the integrity of the electoral process was preserved.
The government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. Ecuador’s National Electoral Council (CNE) administered the 2025 general elections and continued to operate despite political pressure and post-election accusations from candidates. The authority publicly released results through its computerized tabulation system, processed challenges, and formally certified the outcome. International observation missions from the OAS and the European Union (EU), as well as domestic observers, were allowed to monitor polling stations and the counting process. While the CNE has faced criticism and operates under a difficult security environment, there is no evidence that the government replaced electoral officials, interfered with the tabulation process, or prevented the institution from performing its legal functions.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Authorities have not closed major outlets or organizations, and journalists, activists, and opposition figures continue to publish investigations and mobilize publicly. However, dissent operates under strain. Reporters have faced interference, limits on access to information, and aggression, and a major indigenous-led strike saw militarized responses and allegations of disproportionate force. Administrative actions affecting critical voices further illustrate pressure but fall short of outright censorship. Overall, criticism remains visible and lawful, but unevenly protected and at times constrained by both state actions and insecurity.
The Noboa Administration has not unfairly shut down independent and dissenting organizations. Ecuador maintains a pluralistic space for criticism in which private and independent media outlets, investigative platforms, and civil society organizations openly scrutinize public authorities. Major national newspapers such as El Universo, El Comercio, and Primicias, as well as television networks like Ecuavisa and Teleamazonas, regularly publish reporting critical of government policies and security strategies. Digital investigative outlets and watchdog organizations, including Fundamedios and other transparency and human rights groups, continue to monitor public spending, corruption allegations, and press freedom conditions. These actors operate publicly, publish investigations, and engage in advocacy without being legally dissolved, deregistered, or forcibly closed by the state. Although journalists and organizations face threats and operational challenges, particularly related to the broader security crisis, there is no evidence that the government has banned or shut down major dissenting media or civil society organizations.
The Ecuadorian government has not seriously intimidated or systematically obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, civil society, or political actors, though concerning incidents have occurred. Independent journalists and organizations continue to publish investigations and openly criticize public authorities. However, reporters have at times faced interference while carrying out their work. During the 2025 electoral process, journalists covering polling locations and vote tabulation reported being prevented by security personnel from recording near polling stations, having equipment temporarily confiscated, or being ordered to leave areas where counting activities were taking place. In other instances, reporters covering security operations or requesting official information encountered restrictions on access to public records or official briefings, complicating investigative reporting on corruption and security policy.
Data from the NGO Fundamedios illustrate the broader environment. In 2025, it documented 230 aggressions against journalists and media workers, including five killings, judicial proceedings against reporters, threats, harassment, and state-imposed restrictions on access to information. Of these incidents, 114 were attributed to state actors, 68 to non-state actors, 16 to organized criminal groups, and 32 to unidentified perpetrators. Although the number of attacks remained in decline since the 2022 peak, 2025 marked the first in several years in which state actors constituted the largest single source of aggressions. Even where the government was not responsible for violence or obstruction, it was criticized for failing to provide effective protection or pursue accountability: three of the five killings recorded in 2025 remained in impunity by year’s end. These patterns indicate that dissenting actors are generally able to work and publish, but their activities are sometimes obstructed and insufficiently protected rather than systematically suppressed.
Moreover, the government in Ecuador has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings in recent years, though the 2025 mobilizations revealed significant tensions. Between September and October 2025, demonstrations protesting the removal of fuel subsidies and other state policies took place across several provinces. The protests were primarily led by the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), the country’s largest and most politically influential social movement organization, which called for a national strike. In some areas, demonstrations turned violent, prompting the government to declare states of exception and deploy police and military forces; prosecutors also ordered the temporary freezing of bank accounts linked to certain protest organizers. Some protesters burned public buildings and infrastructure and kidnapped a group of military personnel. The Constitutional Court limited the emergency measures to provinces where violence had been most acute. However, credible reports documented disproportionate use of force by security forces, including in locations where protests were largely peaceful. The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association reported at least three deaths, 282 injuries, 172 arrests, and 15 alleged enforced disappearances, and called on the state to open channels of genuine dialogue and consultation with civil society. After 31 days of mobilization, the CONAIE announced that it would end the national strike, citing concern over President Noboa’s warning that the province of Imbabura would be intervened “with the full force of the State.” Protests throughout 2024 occurred without significant repression, and marches and campaigns surrounding the November 2025 referendum, as well as additional anti-government demonstrations later that year, proceeded without major incidents, indicating episodic, though concerning, confrontation rather than a systematic prohibition of public assembly.
Furthermore, under Noboa, the government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Journalists, political commentators, and civil society actors continue to publicly criticize authorities without prior restraint or formal prohibition, and there is no consistent evidence of media closures, systematic website blocking, or criminal penalties imposed for expressing dissenting opinions. However, authorities have at times restricted access to public information, limited press access during security operations and electoral coverage, and publicly discredited critical media and civil society organizations (CSOs). A notable case occurred in 2024 when Cuban journalist Alondra Santiago, a radio host and political commentator critical of government policy, had her residency revoked on national security grounds and was forced to leave Ecuador after nearly two decades in the country. Although framed by the government as an immigration decision, the measure drew concern from press freedom organizations and illustrated how administrative actions can affect critical voices. These practices have created pressure and operational constraints but have not prevented the publication of dissenting views.
In Ecuador, institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. The Constitutional Court has limited executive measures affecting civil liberties, striking down several states of exception during the 2025 protests and requiring revisions to referendum questions, with the executive complying. Although judges have faced public criticism and security threats, none have been formally sanctioned, and the Court has continued to operate. Oversight institutions, such as the Attorney General’s Office, have also pursued politically sensitive cases, including corruption investigations into judicial authorities, and proceedings against members of the armed forces for alleged human rights violations, indicating that oversight mechanisms remain active despite slow and uneven accountability.
Courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The Constitutional Court has reviewed executive actions affecting civil liberties and limited their scope. For example, during the 2025 nationwide protests, it examined emergency decrees issued by the executive and ruled several states of exception unconstitutional, allowing them to remain only in provinces where authorities demonstrated concrete security risks. The Court’s intervention curtailed the geographic reach and duration of extraordinary powers and reinforced judicial oversight of measures that could affect freedom of expression and opposition activity. The Court has also exercised preventive review over political processes. For example, it evaluated the legality and constitutionality of questions proposed by the Noboa government for a national referendum that took place in November 2025, including proposals related to institutional reforms and the convening of a constituent assembly, requiring modifications or rejecting provisions that conflicted with constitutional guarantees, with the executive ultimately complying with the Court’s rulings.
Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to government interests or who are perceived as a threat to the governing authority, have not faced retaliation, though they have been subject to significant pressure and stigmatization. The Constitutional Court has continued to issue rulings affecting executive policy, including the temporary suspension of provisions in several security and transparency laws promoted by President Daniel Noboa while their constitutionality was reviewed. Following these decisions, members of the executive and allied actors publicly criticized the Court and portrayed its judges as obstructing public security. In August, President Noboa himself called for and led a march against the Court, while large banners were installed displaying the judges’ faces and accusing them of being “enemies of the people.” The march also featured a military tank. In September, a bomb threat forced the evacuation of the Court’s building, and judges reported threats of criminal proceedings and alleged hacking of communications. International actors, including the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, condemned these developments as harmful to judicial independence. However, despite intimidation and public pressure, there is no evidence that judges were removed from office, prosecuted, or formally sanctioned for their rulings, and the Court has continued to operate and issue decisions, indicating pressure rather than institutionalized retaliation.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. Prosecutorial and judicial authorities have continued to initiate proceedings involving politically sensitive actors and state institutions. In 2024, the Attorney General’s Office announced corruption indictments against several current and former public officials, including members of the judiciary. The most significant development stemmed from a large anti-corruption operation launched in December 2023, when prosecutors and police raided the headquarters of the Judicial Council — the body responsible for regulating courts and judges — as well as the homes of dozens of judges, police commanders, and officials across multiple provinces. Among those arrested were Judicial Council president Wilman Terán and former national prisons director Pablo Ramírez, in connection with investigations into credible links between officials and organized criminal groups. In 2025, Terán was also accused of interfering in the process of appointing judges to the National Court of Justice.
In addition, authorities have pursued investigations involving the security forces. Prosecutors detained multiple members of the armed forces and initiated criminal proceedings in connection with the 2024 killing of four children in Guayaquil, with 17 soldiers placed in pre-trial detention and the case continuing before the courts during 2025. However, the lack of cooperation from the armed forces has stalled the investigations. Prosecutors also opened a case into the death of indigenous leader Efraín Fuertes during the 2025 national mobilizations. These proceedings indicate that allegations against officials, including members of the armed forces, continue to be formally investigated, suggesting that courts and prosecutors remain a venue for challenging state conduct, even if accountability outcomes remain uncertain and proceedings slow.
HRF classifies Ecuador as democratic.
Ecuador transitioned from military rule to democracy in 1979, operating as a presidential constitutional republic with competitive multiparty elections with a party system that has historically been fragmented and centered around personalistic leadership rather than stable ideological organizations. Over time, Ecuador has alternated between left- and right-leaning governments, and relations among the executive, legislature, and judiciary have often been conflictual. In recent decades, the country has also experienced recurrent political instability, including the removal of elected presidents in 1997, 2000, and 2005. During the 2007–2017 presidency of Rafael Correa, constitutional and institutional changes concentrated authority in the executive and weakened oversight institutions, contributing to serious democratic backsliding. Subsequent administrations attempted partial institutional rebalancing, but governance has remained fragile, marked by polarization, and low public trust. Since 2021, the country has faced mounting security and economic pressures, and early elections in 2023 brought current President Daniel Noboa to power, reflecting the continued volatility of Ecuadorian politics and the persistence of a competitive yet fragile democratic system.
National elections are largely free and fair in Ecuador. Recent electoral cycles have featured competitive races in which incumbents and strong opposition candidates have been able to register, campaign, and contest runoffs, with close vote margins and divided legislative results. Although campaigns have occurred amid significant violence linked to organized crime, there is no consistent evidence that the government systematically restricted opposition activity. Electoral authorities administered the vote according to established procedures, international observers verified the consistency of results, and competing parties largely accepted the certified outcome despite isolated fraud allegations.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Private and independent media remain widespread and generally able to report critically, and no major outlets of advocacy groups have been formally closed. However, the environment for dissent is increasingly uneven. Journalists face threats and violence from organized crime groups and, at times, pressure from state actors, including interference and obstacles in accessing official information. An Indigenous-led national strike was met with heavy security deployments and credible allegations of excessive force, and certain administrative measures affecting outspoken critics illustrate constraints but fall short of formal censorship. Overall, expression is permitted but not consistently safeguarded, as both government practices and broader insecurity complicate the exercise of dissent.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Ecuador’s Constitutional Court has reviewed executive measures affecting civil liberties and limited their scope, striking down several states of exception and requiring revisions to referendum questions. Judges have faced public criticism, stigmatization, and security threats after rulings against the government, but none have been formally removed, prosecuted, or sanctioned, and the Court has continued to operate. Prosecutors and courts have also pursued politically sensitive cases, including corruption investigations involving officials and criminal proceedings against members of the armed forces. Although investigations have been slow, the continued adjudication of such cases indicates that oversight mechanisms remain active and capable of constraining government authority.
National elections in Ecuador are largely free and fair. Recent presidential contests have featured very competitive races with viable incumbents and opposition candidates, including Correa-backed movements, who were able to participate unobstructed. While the campaign environment has been affected by criminal violence, there is no consistent evidence of systematic state interference in opposition activity. Electoral authorities administered the process according to established procedures, international observers corroborated the official results, and most political actors ultimately accepted the certified outcome, indicating that electoral competition and oversight mechanisms largely functioned as intended.
The Ecuadorian government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. In 2025, incumbent president Daniel Noboa stood for reelection against fifteen viable challengers, most prominently Luisa González of the Citizen Revolution (RC) movement associated with former president Rafael Correa. No candidate secured a majority in the first round, where Noboa received 44.17% of the vote and González 44%, triggering a competitive runoff. Noboa secured his reelection, winning the second round with 55.63% against González’s 44.37%. Moreover, no party secured a majority in the 151-seat National Assembly. The RC and allied RETO won 67 seats, just one more than Noboa’s National Democratic Action (ADN) party. Similarly, the 2023 snap presidential election triggered by the constitutional dissolution of the National Assembly, invoked by then-President Guillermo Lasso, also produced a runoff between Noboa and González, in which Noboa prevailed with 51.83% of the vote against González’s 48.17%. Earlier, in the 2021 election, conservative candidate Guillermo Lasso narrowly defeated Andrés Arauz, also backed by the Correísta political bloc. The repeated participation of this highly polarizing yet electorally competitive movement, including against sitting governments, demonstrates that major opposition forces are able to organize parties, nominate candidates, and compete for national office. Across these elections, results were recognized and peaceful transfers of power occurred, indicating that electoral competition has remained open despite political polarization and institutional tensions.
The Noboa administration has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. While the 2025 campaign trail was marred by violence, including the assassination of anti-corruption advocate and presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, these incidents were attributed to organized crime groups linked to narcotics trafficking rather than government intervention. Opposition candidates were able to register, campaign nationally, hold rallies, and participate in debates and media appearances. Major challengers, including Luisa González, conducted nationwide campaigns. Although the electoral period took place under a state of emergency that was declared amid a sharp escalation in organized crime violence and prison riots , there is no consistent evidence that authorities selectively restricted opposition events, denied ballot access, or systematically applied campaign regulations to disadvantage specific candidates.
Moreover, the government has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. Recent electoral cycles were administered by electoral authorities according to established procedures, and no credible evidence of systematic fraud or nationwide irregularities emerged. Following the 2025 runoff, Luisa González alleged fraud and refused to concede defeat, including after Noboa was sworn in for a second term. However, other representatives and local officeholders of her Citizen Revolution movement, as well as leaders of other political parties, accepted the official results. The Organization of American States (OAS) electoral observation mission reported that voting occurred peacefully and verified the consistency of tally sheets across party copies and official records. Although contested rhetoric contributed to political polarization and uncertainty among supporters, the certified results were upheld, and the incumbent was peacefully inaugurated for a new term, indicating that the integrity of the electoral process was preserved.
The government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. Ecuador’s National Electoral Council (CNE) administered the 2025 general elections and continued to operate despite political pressure and post-election accusations from candidates. The authority publicly released results through its computerized tabulation system, processed challenges, and formally certified the outcome. International observation missions from the OAS and the European Union (EU), as well as domestic observers, were allowed to monitor polling stations and the counting process. While the CNE has faced criticism and operates under a difficult security environment, there is no evidence that the government replaced electoral officials, interfered with the tabulation process, or prevented the institution from performing its legal functions.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Authorities have not closed major outlets or organizations, and journalists, activists, and opposition figures continue to publish investigations and mobilize publicly. However, dissent operates under strain. Reporters have faced interference, limits on access to information, and aggression, and a major indigenous-led strike saw militarized responses and allegations of disproportionate force. Administrative actions affecting critical voices further illustrate pressure but fall short of outright censorship. Overall, criticism remains visible and lawful, but unevenly protected and at times constrained by both state actions and insecurity.
The Noboa Administration has not unfairly shut down independent and dissenting organizations. Ecuador maintains a pluralistic space for criticism in which private and independent media outlets, investigative platforms, and civil society organizations openly scrutinize public authorities. Major national newspapers such as El Universo, El Comercio, and Primicias, as well as television networks like Ecuavisa and Teleamazonas, regularly publish reporting critical of government policies and security strategies. Digital investigative outlets and watchdog organizations, including Fundamedios and other transparency and human rights groups, continue to monitor public spending, corruption allegations, and press freedom conditions. These actors operate publicly, publish investigations, and engage in advocacy without being legally dissolved, deregistered, or forcibly closed by the state. Although journalists and organizations face threats and operational challenges, particularly related to the broader security crisis, there is no evidence that the government has banned or shut down major dissenting media or civil society organizations.
The Ecuadorian government has not seriously intimidated or systematically obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, civil society, or political actors, though concerning incidents have occurred. Independent journalists and organizations continue to publish investigations and openly criticize public authorities. However, reporters have at times faced interference while carrying out their work. During the 2025 electoral process, journalists covering polling locations and vote tabulation reported being prevented by security personnel from recording near polling stations, having equipment temporarily confiscated, or being ordered to leave areas where counting activities were taking place. In other instances, reporters covering security operations or requesting official information encountered restrictions on access to public records or official briefings, complicating investigative reporting on corruption and security policy.
Data from the NGO Fundamedios illustrate the broader environment. In 2025, it documented 230 aggressions against journalists and media workers, including five killings, judicial proceedings against reporters, threats, harassment, and state-imposed restrictions on access to information. Of these incidents, 114 were attributed to state actors, 68 to non-state actors, 16 to organized criminal groups, and 32 to unidentified perpetrators. Although the number of attacks remained in decline since the 2022 peak, 2025 marked the first in several years in which state actors constituted the largest single source of aggressions. Even where the government was not responsible for violence or obstruction, it was criticized for failing to provide effective protection or pursue accountability: three of the five killings recorded in 2025 remained in impunity by year’s end. These patterns indicate that dissenting actors are generally able to work and publish, but their activities are sometimes obstructed and insufficiently protected rather than systematically suppressed.
Moreover, the government in Ecuador has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings in recent years, though the 2025 mobilizations revealed significant tensions. Between September and October 2025, demonstrations protesting the removal of fuel subsidies and other state policies took place across several provinces. The protests were primarily led by the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), the country’s largest and most politically influential social movement organization, which called for a national strike. In some areas, demonstrations turned violent, prompting the government to declare states of exception and deploy police and military forces; prosecutors also ordered the temporary freezing of bank accounts linked to certain protest organizers. Some protesters burned public buildings and infrastructure and kidnapped a group of military personnel. The Constitutional Court limited the emergency measures to provinces where violence had been most acute. However, credible reports documented disproportionate use of force by security forces, including in locations where protests were largely peaceful. The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association reported at least three deaths, 282 injuries, 172 arrests, and 15 alleged enforced disappearances, and called on the state to open channels of genuine dialogue and consultation with civil society. After 31 days of mobilization, the CONAIE announced that it would end the national strike, citing concern over President Noboa’s warning that the province of Imbabura would be intervened “with the full force of the State.” Protests throughout 2024 occurred without significant repression, and marches and campaigns surrounding the November 2025 referendum, as well as additional anti-government demonstrations later that year, proceeded without major incidents, indicating episodic, though concerning, confrontation rather than a systematic prohibition of public assembly.
Furthermore, under Noboa, the government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Journalists, political commentators, and civil society actors continue to publicly criticize authorities without prior restraint or formal prohibition, and there is no consistent evidence of media closures, systematic website blocking, or criminal penalties imposed for expressing dissenting opinions. However, authorities have at times restricted access to public information, limited press access during security operations and electoral coverage, and publicly discredited critical media and civil society organizations (CSOs). A notable case occurred in 2024 when Cuban journalist Alondra Santiago, a radio host and political commentator critical of government policy, had her residency revoked on national security grounds and was forced to leave Ecuador after nearly two decades in the country. Although framed by the government as an immigration decision, the measure drew concern from press freedom organizations and illustrated how administrative actions can affect critical voices. These practices have created pressure and operational constraints but have not prevented the publication of dissenting views.
In Ecuador, institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. The Constitutional Court has limited executive measures affecting civil liberties, striking down several states of exception during the 2025 protests and requiring revisions to referendum questions, with the executive complying. Although judges have faced public criticism and security threats, none have been formally sanctioned, and the Court has continued to operate. Oversight institutions, such as the Attorney General’s Office, have also pursued politically sensitive cases, including corruption investigations into judicial authorities, and proceedings against members of the armed forces for alleged human rights violations, indicating that oversight mechanisms remain active despite slow and uneven accountability.
Courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The Constitutional Court has reviewed executive actions affecting civil liberties and limited their scope. For example, during the 2025 nationwide protests, it examined emergency decrees issued by the executive and ruled several states of exception unconstitutional, allowing them to remain only in provinces where authorities demonstrated concrete security risks. The Court’s intervention curtailed the geographic reach and duration of extraordinary powers and reinforced judicial oversight of measures that could affect freedom of expression and opposition activity. The Court has also exercised preventive review over political processes. For example, it evaluated the legality and constitutionality of questions proposed by the Noboa government for a national referendum that took place in November 2025, including proposals related to institutional reforms and the convening of a constituent assembly, requiring modifications or rejecting provisions that conflicted with constitutional guarantees, with the executive ultimately complying with the Court’s rulings.
Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to government interests or who are perceived as a threat to the governing authority, have not faced retaliation, though they have been subject to significant pressure and stigmatization. The Constitutional Court has continued to issue rulings affecting executive policy, including the temporary suspension of provisions in several security and transparency laws promoted by President Daniel Noboa while their constitutionality was reviewed. Following these decisions, members of the executive and allied actors publicly criticized the Court and portrayed its judges as obstructing public security. In August, President Noboa himself called for and led a march against the Court, while large banners were installed displaying the judges’ faces and accusing them of being “enemies of the people.” The march also featured a military tank. In September, a bomb threat forced the evacuation of the Court’s building, and judges reported threats of criminal proceedings and alleged hacking of communications. International actors, including the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, condemned these developments as harmful to judicial independence. However, despite intimidation and public pressure, there is no evidence that judges were removed from office, prosecuted, or formally sanctioned for their rulings, and the Court has continued to operate and issue decisions, indicating pressure rather than institutionalized retaliation.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. Prosecutorial and judicial authorities have continued to initiate proceedings involving politically sensitive actors and state institutions. In 2024, the Attorney General’s Office announced corruption indictments against several current and former public officials, including members of the judiciary. The most significant development stemmed from a large anti-corruption operation launched in December 2023, when prosecutors and police raided the headquarters of the Judicial Council — the body responsible for regulating courts and judges — as well as the homes of dozens of judges, police commanders, and officials across multiple provinces. Among those arrested were Judicial Council president Wilman Terán and former national prisons director Pablo Ramírez, in connection with investigations into credible links between officials and organized criminal groups. In 2025, Terán was also accused of interfering in the process of appointing judges to the National Court of Justice.
In addition, authorities have pursued investigations involving the security forces. Prosecutors detained multiple members of the armed forces and initiated criminal proceedings in connection with the 2024 killing of four children in Guayaquil, with 17 soldiers placed in pre-trial detention and the case continuing before the courts during 2025. However, the lack of cooperation from the armed forces has stalled the investigations. Prosecutors also opened a case into the death of indigenous leader Efraín Fuertes during the 2025 national mobilizations. These proceedings indicate that allegations against officials, including members of the armed forces, continue to be formally investigated, suggesting that courts and prosecutors remain a venue for challenging state conduct, even if accountability outcomes remain uncertain and proceedings slow.
