Democracy
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HRF classifies the Dominican Republic as democratic.
The Dominican Republic is a presidential republic that has experienced significant political and economic transformation since the end of the authoritarian rule of Rafael Trujillo in 1961 and the subsequent civil conflict and U.S. intervention of 1965. A new constitution in 1966 established a competitive electoral system, but for decades, politics was dominated by strong presidentialism, clientelism, and patronage networks. Democratic consolidation accelerated after the 1994 electoral crisis, which led to institutional reforms including independent electoral administration, limits on presidential reelection, and strengthened oversight institutions. Since the early 2000s, power has alternated among the country’s major parties, particularly the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), and, more recently, the Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM). The election of Luis Abinader in 2020 marked the first transfer of power away from the long-governing PLD in sixteen years and was accompanied by expanded anti-corruption investigations and judicial activity. Despite sustained economic growth and regular elections, the political system continues to be shaped by patronage, concentration of executive authority, and persistent concerns regarding corruption, migration policy, and institutional capacity.
National elections are largely free and fair. Opposition and governing parties have consistently been able to register candidates and compete nationwide, and incumbents have both won and lost office. Elections have been generally well organized and accepted by competitors, though recurring localized irregularities persist. Domestic and international observers documented vote-buying and clientelistic practices involving multiple parties. These weaknesses point to uneven enforcement of electoral rules rather than coordinated manipulation of results. Electoral oversight institutions, particularly the Central Electoral Board, have cooperated with independent observers and implemented legal reforms strengthening monitoring and reporting procedures, allowing electoral authorities to certify outcomes without executive interference.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Journalists and advocacy groups operate publicly and continue to investigate corruption and security issues, though some have faced surveillance, defamation complaints, and threats linked to their reporting. The Abinader administration has denied involvement, promised inquiries, and courts have dismissed previous targeted charges. Public demonstrations occur regularly across political and social causes; police have at times used tear gas or dispersed gatherings, but repression has been episodic rather than systematic. A broad media sector functions without formal censorship, and a proposed cybersecurity law that raised free-expression concerns was withdrawn after criticism. Dissent remains visible and lawful, though affected by legal pressures, concentrated media ownership, and occasional heavy-handed policing.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts remain a forum through which journalists, activists, and political actors can contest state actions, and the Constitutional Court has struck down legal provisions that restricted political expression and campaigning. Proceedings against critical voices have not typically resulted in punishment, and detainees arrested during protests have generally been released through ordinary judicial review. Accountability mechanisms also remain active. Prosecutors have pursued corruption cases against high-ranking officials from prior administrations, while police abuses prompted reform initiatives and legislative review of the security forces. Although corruption, impunity, and uneven enforcement persist, authorities have initiated investigations and institutional reforms rather than systematically shielding officials. The executive has not enacted structural changes to subordinate the judiciary, and judicial institutions continue to operate under established constitutional procedures, indicating functioning, though imperfect, oversight.
National elections are largely free and fair. Major parties are able to register and campaign, and incumbents both win and lose office, as shown by the opposition victory in 2020 and President Abinader’s reelection in 2024. While observers reported localized vote-buying and other clientelistic practices involving multiple parties, results were accepted by competitors and not credibly challenged. Electoral authorities have continued to work with domestic and international observers and certify results independently, indicating competitive elections with persistent but limited irregularities rather than systematic electoral manipulation.
Across different administrations, the government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. In the 2020 general elections, the ruling Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), after 16 consecutive years in power, was defeated by the opposition Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM), whose candidate, Luis Abinader, won the presidency with 52.5% of the vote. Competing candidates Gonzalo Castillo of the PLD and Leonel Fernández of the People’s Force (FP) obtained 37.5% and 8.9%, respectively, and both conceded the results. Similarly, in the 2024 presidential election, Abinader was reelected with 57.44% of the vote in the first round, while opposition candidates Leonel Fernández and Abel Martínez received 28.85% and 10.4%, respectively, and accepted the outcome. Across recent electoral cycles, major parties representing both governing and opposition forces have been able to register candidates, campaign nationwide, and compete for office, and electoral defeats of incumbents demonstrate that access to the ballot remains open and competitive.
Moreover, the Dominican government has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud, although recurring localized irregularities and enforcement weaknesses persist. The 2024 general elections, held under the revised electoral framework (Law 20-23), were broadly well organized, and their results were accepted by competing parties and candidates. Domestic observer group Citizen Participation reported indicators of vote or ballot buying in 26% of the polling stations it monitored, involving multiple parties rather than a single governing actor: the Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM) appeared in 15% of observed cases, the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) in 11%, the People’s Force (FP) in 7%, and the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) in 4.5%. The Organization of American States (OAS) election observation mission likewise received 35 complaints, including seven involving vote buying, and directly observed such practices, as well as instances of unnecessary assisted voting in which the same individual accompanied multiple voters. Similar issues, such as the distribution of gifts and incomplete campaign-finance reporting, were noted in the 2020 elections, which nevertheless produced a peaceful alternation in power when the opposition won the presidency. These findings point to persistent clientelistic practices and uneven enforcement of electoral regulations, but not coordinated manipulation of results or systemic fraud capable of altering overall electoral outcomes.
Under the Abinader administration, the government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. Elections are administered by the Central Electoral Board (JCE), which operates with a degree of transparency and has cooperated with opposition parties, domestic civic monitors, and international observers. During recent electoral cycles, the JCE actively coordinated with the Organization of American States (OAS) electoral observation mission and permitted monitoring by domestic non-partisan groups such as Citizen Participation. The OAS has also welcomed the JCE’s implementation of recommendations issued following previous electoral processes, indicating ongoing institutional engagement with external oversight. Electoral monitoring has further been reinforced by legal reforms, including the 2018 Political Parties Law, the 2019 Electoral Regime Law, and the 2023 electoral framework, which clarified procedures, expanded sanctions, and strengthened monitoring capacities, including the creation of a Specialized Prosecutor’s Office for Electoral Crimes. A Constitutional Court decision additionally clarified the jurisdiction of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), contributing to a more defined division of institutional responsibilities. Although enforcement challenges persist, electoral authorities and observers have been able to operate and certify results without interference from the executive, suggesting that independent oversight mechanisms continue to function.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Investigative reporting and public protest continue, and opposition voices appear regularly in the press and public debate, though journalists face occasional surveillance claims, legal pressure, and threats, and police have sometimes dispersed demonstrations using crowd-control measures.
The Abinader administration has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Independent media and civil society actors generally operate openly, but journalists have faced episodes of surveillance and legal pressure linked to investigative reporting. In 2023, Amnesty International reported that the mobile phone of investigative journalist Nuria Piera had been targeted three times between 2020 and 2021 with Pegasus spyware while she was working on sensitive corruption investigations involving high-ranking public officials and relatives of a former president. Months after her reporting, criminal proceedings were opened against some of the individuals implicated. The Abinader government denied having any contractual relationship with the NSO Group since taking office, publicly stated it would investigate the origin of the surveillance, and officials contacted the journalist to facilitate an inquiry. As of the end of 2025, it is unclear whether responsibility for the intrusion has been resolved. Earlier in 2019, journalist Marino Zapete faced criminal defamation and insult charges after accusing a relative of the public prosecutor of corruption; although the charges were dropped in 2020 and the accuser was fined, the proceedings illustrate both the use of legal mechanisms against critical reporting and judicial checks on their misuse. Journalists covering corruption and organized crime have also reported threats and intimidation, though according to Reporters Without Borders, authorities have provided protection to threatened reporters. Overall, the environment reflects pressure and risk for investigative journalism, but not systematic obstruction directly attributable to the executive government.
Moreover, the Dominican government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Freedom of assembly is constitutionally protected, and demonstrations occur regularly, though policing has at times been forceful. Authorities have dispersed some protests using crowd-control measures, but without a consistent pattern of severe repression. In March 2023, security forces used tear gas to disperse supporters of a detained political figure gathered outside the Palace of Justice, with no injuries reported. Police also broke up a 2022 demonstration by members of the Dominican Medical College protesting hospital conditions, during which some protesters were reportedly assaulted. Earlier, officers removed abortion-rights activists who had camped outside the National Palace in 2021 while enforcing COVID-19 restrictions. Under the previous administration, Dominican-Haitian activists were arrested following a peaceful anti-racism protest in 2020 and released shortly afterward, and available footage did not indicate excessive force.
The government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Legal protections for freedom of expression remain in place, and a diverse media environment operates without formal censorship. Several national daily newspapers, numerous local publications, more than 300 privately owned radio stations, and multiple private television networks operate alongside the state-owned Radio Televisión Dominicana (RTVD). However, ownership of major outlets is highly concentrated, and the allocation of public advertising lacks transparency, shaping incentives within the media landscape. Elements of the legal and regulatory framework have also raised concerns. Defamation laws have been used in cases involving journalists reporting on alleged corruption, and a cybersecurity bill introduced by the government in 2023 would have expanded criminal penalties for certain speech-related offenses. However, following strong public criticism, the administration withdrew the proposal, and President Abinader convened a commission led by journalists to update the country’s outdated press legislation.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts have limited legal restrictions on political expression, reviewed detentions linked to protests, and allowed challenges to government action. Prosecutors have pursued corruption cases involving senior officials, and authorities have initiated reforms addressing police abuses. While enforcement is uneven and political tensions persist, the executive has not attempted to restructure or weaken institutions and formal accountability channels continue to operate.
Dominican courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. They have generally remained available as a forum through which journalists, activists, and political actors can challenge actions affecting dissent and, in several instances, the judiciary has actively limited legal provisions that could restrict criticism. For example, in May 2019, the Constitutional Court struck down portions of a political party law that criminalized the dissemination of negative messages and affirmed social networks as important public spaces for political debate, a decision widely praised by press freedom advocates for protecting journalistic activity. Then, in August 2019, the Court invalidated additional sections of the same law that restricted certain political party activities, including aspects of pre-election campaigning and candidate participation, reinforcing protections for opposition expression and competition. Moreover, legal cases brought against critical voices, like that of journalist Marino Zapete, have likewise resulted in judicial restraint rather than punishment. In protest contexts, detainees arrested during demonstrations have generally been released through ordinary judicial procedures.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. Since 2020, the Public Ministry has brought corruption investigations against senior figures linked to prior administrations, including former ministers, legislators, and officials accused of embezzlement, bribery, and procurement fraud. In March 2023, authorities arrested 19 individuals as part of a large corruption investigation into members of former president Danilo Medina’s administration. Among those detained was Gonzalo Castillo, a former Minister of Public Works and the then-governing party’s 2020 presidential candidate, in a case involving allegations of illegal campaign financing and the embezzlement of roughly $350 million. Although Medina himself was not charged, the proceedings targeted high-ranking political actors and advanced through the courts.
Accountability efforts have also extended to security-sector conduct. Human rights organizations reported at least 41 extrajudicial killings by police and security forces in 2021. In response, President Luis Abinader created a special commission to reform the police, and in 2024 issued Decree 370-24 establishing a body under the Interior Ministry to review the Police Organic Law and propose legislative changes. In December 2025, the Senate formed a special commission to study a draft reform law restructuring the police career system, strengthening oversight, and emphasizing respect for fundamental rights. These measures, together with ongoing criminal proceedings in corruption cases, demonstrate that both judicial and political institutions have addressed allegations of wrongdoing by public officials. While corruption and impunity concerns persist and enforcement remains inconsistent, the initiation of prosecutions and institutional reforms indicates that authorities do not systematically shield officials from scrutiny and that formal accountability channels continue to function.
The government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Under the Abinader administration, there is no evidence that the executive has pursued structural reforms designed to subordinate the judiciary. Courts continue to operate under the existing constitutional framework, and the government has generally relied on judicial processes rather than attempting to bypass them. In 2021, new judges were appointed to the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) through the constitutionally established selection procedures carried out by the National Council of the Magistracy, and a subsequent Constitutional Court ruling clarified that ordinary criminal courts, rather than the TSE, would adjudicate electoral crimes, reinforcing a defined separation of jurisdiction rather than concentrating authority in a politically controlled forum.
HRF classifies the Dominican Republic as democratic.
The Dominican Republic is a presidential republic that has experienced significant political and economic transformation since the end of the authoritarian rule of Rafael Trujillo in 1961 and the subsequent civil conflict and U.S. intervention of 1965. A new constitution in 1966 established a competitive electoral system, but for decades, politics was dominated by strong presidentialism, clientelism, and patronage networks. Democratic consolidation accelerated after the 1994 electoral crisis, which led to institutional reforms including independent electoral administration, limits on presidential reelection, and strengthened oversight institutions. Since the early 2000s, power has alternated among the country’s major parties, particularly the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), and, more recently, the Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM). The election of Luis Abinader in 2020 marked the first transfer of power away from the long-governing PLD in sixteen years and was accompanied by expanded anti-corruption investigations and judicial activity. Despite sustained economic growth and regular elections, the political system continues to be shaped by patronage, concentration of executive authority, and persistent concerns regarding corruption, migration policy, and institutional capacity.
National elections are largely free and fair. Opposition and governing parties have consistently been able to register candidates and compete nationwide, and incumbents have both won and lost office. Elections have been generally well organized and accepted by competitors, though recurring localized irregularities persist. Domestic and international observers documented vote-buying and clientelistic practices involving multiple parties. These weaknesses point to uneven enforcement of electoral rules rather than coordinated manipulation of results. Electoral oversight institutions, particularly the Central Electoral Board, have cooperated with independent observers and implemented legal reforms strengthening monitoring and reporting procedures, allowing electoral authorities to certify outcomes without executive interference.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Journalists and advocacy groups operate publicly and continue to investigate corruption and security issues, though some have faced surveillance, defamation complaints, and threats linked to their reporting. The Abinader administration has denied involvement, promised inquiries, and courts have dismissed previous targeted charges. Public demonstrations occur regularly across political and social causes; police have at times used tear gas or dispersed gatherings, but repression has been episodic rather than systematic. A broad media sector functions without formal censorship, and a proposed cybersecurity law that raised free-expression concerns was withdrawn after criticism. Dissent remains visible and lawful, though affected by legal pressures, concentrated media ownership, and occasional heavy-handed policing.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts remain a forum through which journalists, activists, and political actors can contest state actions, and the Constitutional Court has struck down legal provisions that restricted political expression and campaigning. Proceedings against critical voices have not typically resulted in punishment, and detainees arrested during protests have generally been released through ordinary judicial review. Accountability mechanisms also remain active. Prosecutors have pursued corruption cases against high-ranking officials from prior administrations, while police abuses prompted reform initiatives and legislative review of the security forces. Although corruption, impunity, and uneven enforcement persist, authorities have initiated investigations and institutional reforms rather than systematically shielding officials. The executive has not enacted structural changes to subordinate the judiciary, and judicial institutions continue to operate under established constitutional procedures, indicating functioning, though imperfect, oversight.
National elections are largely free and fair. Major parties are able to register and campaign, and incumbents both win and lose office, as shown by the opposition victory in 2020 and President Abinader’s reelection in 2024. While observers reported localized vote-buying and other clientelistic practices involving multiple parties, results were accepted by competitors and not credibly challenged. Electoral authorities have continued to work with domestic and international observers and certify results independently, indicating competitive elections with persistent but limited irregularities rather than systematic electoral manipulation.
Across different administrations, the government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. In the 2020 general elections, the ruling Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), after 16 consecutive years in power, was defeated by the opposition Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM), whose candidate, Luis Abinader, won the presidency with 52.5% of the vote. Competing candidates Gonzalo Castillo of the PLD and Leonel Fernández of the People’s Force (FP) obtained 37.5% and 8.9%, respectively, and both conceded the results. Similarly, in the 2024 presidential election, Abinader was reelected with 57.44% of the vote in the first round, while opposition candidates Leonel Fernández and Abel Martínez received 28.85% and 10.4%, respectively, and accepted the outcome. Across recent electoral cycles, major parties representing both governing and opposition forces have been able to register candidates, campaign nationwide, and compete for office, and electoral defeats of incumbents demonstrate that access to the ballot remains open and competitive.
Moreover, the Dominican government has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud, although recurring localized irregularities and enforcement weaknesses persist. The 2024 general elections, held under the revised electoral framework (Law 20-23), were broadly well organized, and their results were accepted by competing parties and candidates. Domestic observer group Citizen Participation reported indicators of vote or ballot buying in 26% of the polling stations it monitored, involving multiple parties rather than a single governing actor: the Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM) appeared in 15% of observed cases, the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) in 11%, the People’s Force (FP) in 7%, and the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) in 4.5%. The Organization of American States (OAS) election observation mission likewise received 35 complaints, including seven involving vote buying, and directly observed such practices, as well as instances of unnecessary assisted voting in which the same individual accompanied multiple voters. Similar issues, such as the distribution of gifts and incomplete campaign-finance reporting, were noted in the 2020 elections, which nevertheless produced a peaceful alternation in power when the opposition won the presidency. These findings point to persistent clientelistic practices and uneven enforcement of electoral regulations, but not coordinated manipulation of results or systemic fraud capable of altering overall electoral outcomes.
Under the Abinader administration, the government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. Elections are administered by the Central Electoral Board (JCE), which operates with a degree of transparency and has cooperated with opposition parties, domestic civic monitors, and international observers. During recent electoral cycles, the JCE actively coordinated with the Organization of American States (OAS) electoral observation mission and permitted monitoring by domestic non-partisan groups such as Citizen Participation. The OAS has also welcomed the JCE’s implementation of recommendations issued following previous electoral processes, indicating ongoing institutional engagement with external oversight. Electoral monitoring has further been reinforced by legal reforms, including the 2018 Political Parties Law, the 2019 Electoral Regime Law, and the 2023 electoral framework, which clarified procedures, expanded sanctions, and strengthened monitoring capacities, including the creation of a Specialized Prosecutor’s Office for Electoral Crimes. A Constitutional Court decision additionally clarified the jurisdiction of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), contributing to a more defined division of institutional responsibilities. Although enforcement challenges persist, electoral authorities and observers have been able to operate and certify results without interference from the executive, suggesting that independent oversight mechanisms continue to function.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Investigative reporting and public protest continue, and opposition voices appear regularly in the press and public debate, though journalists face occasional surveillance claims, legal pressure, and threats, and police have sometimes dispersed demonstrations using crowd-control measures.
The Abinader administration has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Independent media and civil society actors generally operate openly, but journalists have faced episodes of surveillance and legal pressure linked to investigative reporting. In 2023, Amnesty International reported that the mobile phone of investigative journalist Nuria Piera had been targeted three times between 2020 and 2021 with Pegasus spyware while she was working on sensitive corruption investigations involving high-ranking public officials and relatives of a former president. Months after her reporting, criminal proceedings were opened against some of the individuals implicated. The Abinader government denied having any contractual relationship with the NSO Group since taking office, publicly stated it would investigate the origin of the surveillance, and officials contacted the journalist to facilitate an inquiry. As of the end of 2025, it is unclear whether responsibility for the intrusion has been resolved. Earlier in 2019, journalist Marino Zapete faced criminal defamation and insult charges after accusing a relative of the public prosecutor of corruption; although the charges were dropped in 2020 and the accuser was fined, the proceedings illustrate both the use of legal mechanisms against critical reporting and judicial checks on their misuse. Journalists covering corruption and organized crime have also reported threats and intimidation, though according to Reporters Without Borders, authorities have provided protection to threatened reporters. Overall, the environment reflects pressure and risk for investigative journalism, but not systematic obstruction directly attributable to the executive government.
Moreover, the Dominican government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Freedom of assembly is constitutionally protected, and demonstrations occur regularly, though policing has at times been forceful. Authorities have dispersed some protests using crowd-control measures, but without a consistent pattern of severe repression. In March 2023, security forces used tear gas to disperse supporters of a detained political figure gathered outside the Palace of Justice, with no injuries reported. Police also broke up a 2022 demonstration by members of the Dominican Medical College protesting hospital conditions, during which some protesters were reportedly assaulted. Earlier, officers removed abortion-rights activists who had camped outside the National Palace in 2021 while enforcing COVID-19 restrictions. Under the previous administration, Dominican-Haitian activists were arrested following a peaceful anti-racism protest in 2020 and released shortly afterward, and available footage did not indicate excessive force.
The government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Legal protections for freedom of expression remain in place, and a diverse media environment operates without formal censorship. Several national daily newspapers, numerous local publications, more than 300 privately owned radio stations, and multiple private television networks operate alongside the state-owned Radio Televisión Dominicana (RTVD). However, ownership of major outlets is highly concentrated, and the allocation of public advertising lacks transparency, shaping incentives within the media landscape. Elements of the legal and regulatory framework have also raised concerns. Defamation laws have been used in cases involving journalists reporting on alleged corruption, and a cybersecurity bill introduced by the government in 2023 would have expanded criminal penalties for certain speech-related offenses. However, following strong public criticism, the administration withdrew the proposal, and President Abinader convened a commission led by journalists to update the country’s outdated press legislation.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts have limited legal restrictions on political expression, reviewed detentions linked to protests, and allowed challenges to government action. Prosecutors have pursued corruption cases involving senior officials, and authorities have initiated reforms addressing police abuses. While enforcement is uneven and political tensions persist, the executive has not attempted to restructure or weaken institutions and formal accountability channels continue to operate.
Dominican courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. They have generally remained available as a forum through which journalists, activists, and political actors can challenge actions affecting dissent and, in several instances, the judiciary has actively limited legal provisions that could restrict criticism. For example, in May 2019, the Constitutional Court struck down portions of a political party law that criminalized the dissemination of negative messages and affirmed social networks as important public spaces for political debate, a decision widely praised by press freedom advocates for protecting journalistic activity. Then, in August 2019, the Court invalidated additional sections of the same law that restricted certain political party activities, including aspects of pre-election campaigning and candidate participation, reinforcing protections for opposition expression and competition. Moreover, legal cases brought against critical voices, like that of journalist Marino Zapete, have likewise resulted in judicial restraint rather than punishment. In protest contexts, detainees arrested during demonstrations have generally been released through ordinary judicial procedures.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. Since 2020, the Public Ministry has brought corruption investigations against senior figures linked to prior administrations, including former ministers, legislators, and officials accused of embezzlement, bribery, and procurement fraud. In March 2023, authorities arrested 19 individuals as part of a large corruption investigation into members of former president Danilo Medina’s administration. Among those detained was Gonzalo Castillo, a former Minister of Public Works and the then-governing party’s 2020 presidential candidate, in a case involving allegations of illegal campaign financing and the embezzlement of roughly $350 million. Although Medina himself was not charged, the proceedings targeted high-ranking political actors and advanced through the courts.
Accountability efforts have also extended to security-sector conduct. Human rights organizations reported at least 41 extrajudicial killings by police and security forces in 2021. In response, President Luis Abinader created a special commission to reform the police, and in 2024 issued Decree 370-24 establishing a body under the Interior Ministry to review the Police Organic Law and propose legislative changes. In December 2025, the Senate formed a special commission to study a draft reform law restructuring the police career system, strengthening oversight, and emphasizing respect for fundamental rights. These measures, together with ongoing criminal proceedings in corruption cases, demonstrate that both judicial and political institutions have addressed allegations of wrongdoing by public officials. While corruption and impunity concerns persist and enforcement remains inconsistent, the initiation of prosecutions and institutional reforms indicates that authorities do not systematically shield officials from scrutiny and that formal accountability channels continue to function.
The government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Under the Abinader administration, there is no evidence that the executive has pursued structural reforms designed to subordinate the judiciary. Courts continue to operate under the existing constitutional framework, and the government has generally relied on judicial processes rather than attempting to bypass them. In 2021, new judges were appointed to the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) through the constitutionally established selection procedures carried out by the National Council of the Magistracy, and a subsequent Constitutional Court ruling clarified that ordinary criminal courts, rather than the TSE, would adjudicate electoral crimes, reinforcing a defined separation of jurisdiction rather than concentrating authority in a politically controlled forum.
