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HRF classifies Croatia as democratic.
Croatia is a parliamentary representative democratic republic in which executive authority is exercised by a government led by the prime minister, while the president serves as head of state and commander in chief, directly elected for a five-year term and empowered to appoint the prime minister subject to a parliamentary majority. Legislative power is vested in the unicameral Croatian Parliament (Sabor), whose 151 members are elected for four-year terms through proportional representation in multi-seat constituencies, with additional seats reserved for the diaspora and for national minorities. In the April 2024 snap parliamentary elections, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), in power since 2016, again finished first but short of a majority, and Prime Minister Andrej Plenković ultimately returned for a third term after establishing a governing majority through coalition bargaining.
In Croatia, national elections are largely free and fair. The electoral system is pluralistic and competitive: political parties are generally able to participate without undue restriction, and election outcomes are often close, routinely resulting in coalition governments rather than single-party rule. Across the political spectrum, parties can campaign freely and compete on broadly equal terms.
Independent media, political actors, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The country has a robust and diverse civil society, and the authorities have not obstructed the operation of independent or dissenting organizations. Similarly, the government has generally refrained from manipulating media coverage; Croatia maintains a pluralistic media landscape in which outlets have a demonstrated record of scrutinizing and challenging political elites. The government largely respects constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and does not systematically intimidate dissenting voices, although observers have noted a growing reliance on Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) by political and economic elites against journalists and media outlets. Croatia also generally respects the right to peaceful assembly, with authorities allowing and facilitating protests without excessive or repressive policing.
Institutions are generally independent and, taken together, function as effective checks on the governing authorities. The judiciary remains largely autonomous, protected by constitutional and institutional safeguards that prevent systematic political interference. As a result, courts have generally constrained government overreach, upheld electoral competition, and enforced accountability. Corruption laws are actively applied, and senior officials have been investigated, prosecuted, and convicted, underscoring the capacity of Croatia’s institutional framework to hold those in power to account.
In Croatia, national elections are largely free and fair. The electoral system is pluralistic and competitive: political parties are generally able to participate without undue restriction, and election outcomes are often close, routinely resulting in coalition governments rather than single-party rule. Across the political spectrum, parties can campaign freely and compete on broadly equal terms.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. While the HDZ and Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) have been dominant since Croatia’s independence, various political parties campaign on a relatively equal footing, leading to highly competitive elections. To illustrate, in the 2024 Croatian snap parliamentary elections, the incumbent HDZ, led by Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, finished first with 34.42% of the vote and 61 seats, down six seats and short of being able to govern alone. The main opposition, the “Rivers of Justice” alliance led by the SDP, took 25.40% and 42 seats, while the Homeland Movement (DP) won 9.56% and 14 seats. Two mid-sized blocks followed: Možemo! won 10 seats (9.10%), and the Most–HS coalition secured 11 (8.02%), alongside smaller parties and eight MPs reserved for minorities. The fragmented outcome made coalition bargaining unavoidable, and after negotiations, Plenković ultimately assembled a majority with the DP’s support, returning as prime minister for a third term. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), having observed the elections, concluded that they “were competitive and voters had a wide variety of choices across the political spectrum.” Similarly, in the previous two parliamentary elections (2020 and 2016), no single party or coalition won a majority of the popular vote. Relatively small margins of victory and frequent transfers of power have prevented any party from governing single-handedly for extended periods.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. The OSCE assessed that in both the 2024 and 2020 parliamentary elections, all contesting parties were able to campaign freely. Changes to the Campaign Finance Law in 2011 and 2013, which international observers, such as the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), assessed favorably, and 2014 media regulations requiring equitable coverage of election contestants, contributed to an equal playing field. Furthermore, the 2020 elections saw recently registered parties, such as We Can! (Možemo!) and the conservative Homeland Movement, winning seats in parliament, indicating sufficient opportunities for emerging opposition groups to gain popular support.
In Croatia, independent media, political actors, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The country has a robust and diverse civil society, and the authorities have not obstructed the operation of independent or dissenting organizations. Similarly, the government has generally refrained from manipulating media coverage; Croatia maintains a pluralistic media landscape in which outlets have a demonstrated record of scrutinizing and challenging political elites. The government largely respects constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and does not systematically intimidate dissenting voices, although observers have noted a growing reliance on SLAPPs by political and economic elites against journalists and media outlets. Croatia also generally respects the right to peaceful assembly, with authorities allowing and facilitating protests without excessive or repressive policing.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. With more than 52,000 civil society organizations (CSOs) active, as of 2020, Croatia has a robust civil society. In the late 2000s, Croatia established a sound legal framework for supporting the work of CSOs and promoting their advisory role in policy-making, notably through the Law on Associations and the Law on Foundations, which guarantee freedom of association, democratic internal governance, and the right of CSOs to engage in advocacy and policy dialogue. This framework is complemented by state institutions such as the Government Office for Cooperation with NGOs and the Council for the Development of Civil Society, which are tasked with coordinating cooperation between public authorities and civil society. These arrangements have been maintained and implemented by successive governments.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor, nor it has seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. The country has a relatively small but diverse media landscape, supported by the robust legal framework including the Law on Media, Law on Electronic Media, Law on Croatian Radio-Television (HRT), and the Law on the Right of Access to Information, and independent oversight bodies such as the Council for Electronic Media (VEM) and the Agency for Electronic Media, the Agency for the Protection of Market Competition. Within this framework, media pluralism is generally sustained, with foreign-owned Nova TV and RTL being the two most-watched commercial channels, competing with the public broadcaster HRT/HTV. Additionally, the three most popular national newspapers — the tabloid 24 Sata, the left-leaning Jutarnji List, and the conservative Vecernji List — are also not politically affiliated and have openly challenged political elites in the past. On the other hand, the public broadcaster HRT, whose Director General and Supervisory Board are appointed by a simple parliamentary majority, remains susceptible to political influence. The 2021 arrest and subsequent indictment of HRT’s former Director General, Kazimir Bačić, on suspicion of corruption, further exacerbated public distrust of the broadcaster. In 2021, 21% of citizens did not trust the HRT as a reliable and objective source of information, a historic high, compared to 10% for the other national TV channels. Bačić was indicted for transferring a $50,000 bribe from a prominent businessman to Zagreb’s mayor and HDZ member Milan Bandić to facilitate a construction project.
The government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. The constitution guarantees freedom of expression and explicitly prohibits censorship, and in practice, the government generally respects these safeguards, typically refraining from systematic retaliation against dissenting media outlets, civil society organizations, or other critical voices. Additionally, the government has taken steps to strengthen journalist safety, such as concluding a cooperation agreement between the Ministry of the Interior and journalist unions, accompanied by protocols for police conduct at public gatherings and for responding to attacks. At the same time, strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) impose a considerable burden upon some of the country’s most prominent critical outlets, where journalists increasingly face defamation suits brought by political and business elites seeking large damages. The Croatian Journalists’ Association reported that, as of the end of 2023, there were 951 active suits against journalists, seeking a total of about 10.5 million USD in damages. Some cases have resulted in damages awards against outlets, drawing criticism from international watchdogs for undermining public-interest reporting.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. In Croatia, the right to peaceful assembly is constitutionally guaranteed and regulated by the Public Assemblies Act of 1999, which requires prior notification to the police but does not impose undue restrictions. In practice, authorities generally facilitate and allow peaceful demonstrations to proceed unobstructed, as illustrated by the large protests in February 2024 opposing the appointment of Ivan Turudić as State Attorney and criticizing the government.
Croatia’s institutions are broadly independent and, taken together, function as effective checks on the governing authorities. The judiciary remains largely autonomous, protected by constitutional and institutional safeguards that prevent systematic political interference. As a result, courts have generally constrained government overreach, upheld electoral competition, and enforced accountability. Corruption laws are actively applied, and senior officials have been investigated, prosecuted, and convicted, underscoring the capacity of Croatia’s institutional framework to hold those in power to account.
The government has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. The Croatian judiciary is largely independent. Croatia’s legal and institutional framework formally safeguards judicial independence through the Constitution’s separation of powers, statutory guarantees of judges’ permanence and immunity, and procedural rules that prevent political branches from interfering in adjudication while allowing oversight only over court administration. The State Council for the Judiciary, whose 11 members are elected by fellow judges, rather than MPs, is responsible for appointing, transferring, and dismissing magistrates in the lower courts. European Commission experts monitoring Croatia’s democratic institutions have assessed the work of the Council positively overall, noting its role in curbing potential political influence in the judiciary. Additionally, the Ministry of Justice, responsible for administration, resources, and supervision of material and financial operations of the judiciary, is barred from influencing courts’ proceedings.
Courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who oppose it. When alleged retaliation has been litigated, judges have generally applied established protections for free expression and workplace rights rather than deferring to the authorities. To illustrate, despite the aforementioned rise in SLAPPs, convictions against critical journalists and independent media outlets are exceedingly rare: The Croatian Journalists’ Association only reported seven such instances between 2022 and 2023 (without disclosing the penalties or the names of the defendants). The courts have also upheld journalists’ freedom of dissent in labor disputes, as in the case of Hrvoje Zovko, a journalist at the national broadcaster HRT. In 2018, Zovko was dismissed after publicly decrying the culture of editorial interference and censorship at HRT and served with a defamation lawsuit seeking 33,000 USD in damages for reputational harms initiated by the broadcaster’s Board. The Zagreb Municipal Labour Court ruled in 2019 that Zovko’s dismissal was unlawful, as the HRT had limited its employees’ “unhindered expression and exchange of thoughts and ideas” and Zovko’s statements had sufficient factual basis. The HRT’s abusive lawsuit against Zovko was dismissed by another court as unfounded.
Additionally, Courts have not unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to undermine electoral competition. While election complaints are rare in practice, as the electoral oversight body, the State Election Commission, performs its functions in a largely impartial and transparent manner, Croatia’s system for electoral dispute resolution is sound, according to OSCE assessments. In addition, the Constitutional Court has, on several occasions, intervened to guarantee the integrity of the electoral process. To illustrate, when current president Zoran Milanović announced his intention to become Prime Minister should his party, the SDP, win the 2024 snap elections, the Court issued Milanović and the SDP a warning the following day. The warning reiterated that the constitutional role of the president is incompatible with running in parliamentary elections and any attempts by the incumbent to circumvent these restrictions could result in an annulment of the election results.
Finally, Croatia’s judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. The Criminal Code criminalizes a wide range of corruption-related offenses, including abuse of office, active and passive bribery, and embezzlement, and applies equally to public officials and private actors, with penalties that include substantial prison sentences and corporate liability. Institutionally, accountability is reinforced by the work of the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (“Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta,” USKOK), a specialized prosecutorial body with nationwide jurisdiction over corruption and organized crime, whose indictments are adjudicated before designated county courts. Corruption cases are formally accorded high priority, and courts have enforced convictions against senior political and administrative officials. To illustrate, in 2010, former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader was arrested under an international warrant after attempting to flee the country and was extradited to Croatia from Austria in 2011 to face corruption charges brought by USKOK. Following a lengthy and complex trial, Sanader was convicted in 2012 of large-scale corruption, including the offence of accepting bribes contrary to Article 347(1) of the Croatian Criminal Code, involving illegal kickbacks totaling approximately €10 million (around $13 million), and was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. Although some verdicts were later annulled or retried on procedural grounds, subsequent proceedings resulted in further convictions, including for the misuse of political party funds (so-called “party slush funds”). In 2023, Croatian courts consolidated his final convictions into a single long-term prison sentence of 18 years. In 2025, a court ruled that he was eligible for early release, and he was released from prison in July of that year. More recently, in November 2024, Health Minister Vili Beroš was arrested in an anti-corruption raid and promptly dismissed by Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, after investigators alleged serious procurement-related wrongdoing at the top of the health administration. The investigation is led by USKOK and, as of December 2025, the case is pending before the Zagreb County Court.
HRF classifies Croatia as democratic.
Croatia is a parliamentary representative democratic republic in which executive authority is exercised by a government led by the prime minister, while the president serves as head of state and commander in chief, directly elected for a five-year term and empowered to appoint the prime minister subject to a parliamentary majority. Legislative power is vested in the unicameral Croatian Parliament (Sabor), whose 151 members are elected for four-year terms through proportional representation in multi-seat constituencies, with additional seats reserved for the diaspora and for national minorities. In the April 2024 snap parliamentary elections, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), in power since 2016, again finished first but short of a majority, and Prime Minister Andrej Plenković ultimately returned for a third term after establishing a governing majority through coalition bargaining.
In Croatia, national elections are largely free and fair. The electoral system is pluralistic and competitive: political parties are generally able to participate without undue restriction, and election outcomes are often close, routinely resulting in coalition governments rather than single-party rule. Across the political spectrum, parties can campaign freely and compete on broadly equal terms.
Independent media, political actors, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The country has a robust and diverse civil society, and the authorities have not obstructed the operation of independent or dissenting organizations. Similarly, the government has generally refrained from manipulating media coverage; Croatia maintains a pluralistic media landscape in which outlets have a demonstrated record of scrutinizing and challenging political elites. The government largely respects constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and does not systematically intimidate dissenting voices, although observers have noted a growing reliance on Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) by political and economic elites against journalists and media outlets. Croatia also generally respects the right to peaceful assembly, with authorities allowing and facilitating protests without excessive or repressive policing.
Institutions are generally independent and, taken together, function as effective checks on the governing authorities. The judiciary remains largely autonomous, protected by constitutional and institutional safeguards that prevent systematic political interference. As a result, courts have generally constrained government overreach, upheld electoral competition, and enforced accountability. Corruption laws are actively applied, and senior officials have been investigated, prosecuted, and convicted, underscoring the capacity of Croatia’s institutional framework to hold those in power to account.
In Croatia, national elections are largely free and fair. The electoral system is pluralistic and competitive: political parties are generally able to participate without undue restriction, and election outcomes are often close, routinely resulting in coalition governments rather than single-party rule. Across the political spectrum, parties can campaign freely and compete on broadly equal terms.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. While the HDZ and Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) have been dominant since Croatia’s independence, various political parties campaign on a relatively equal footing, leading to highly competitive elections. To illustrate, in the 2024 Croatian snap parliamentary elections, the incumbent HDZ, led by Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, finished first with 34.42% of the vote and 61 seats, down six seats and short of being able to govern alone. The main opposition, the “Rivers of Justice” alliance led by the SDP, took 25.40% and 42 seats, while the Homeland Movement (DP) won 9.56% and 14 seats. Two mid-sized blocks followed: Možemo! won 10 seats (9.10%), and the Most–HS coalition secured 11 (8.02%), alongside smaller parties and eight MPs reserved for minorities. The fragmented outcome made coalition bargaining unavoidable, and after negotiations, Plenković ultimately assembled a majority with the DP’s support, returning as prime minister for a third term. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), having observed the elections, concluded that they “were competitive and voters had a wide variety of choices across the political spectrum.” Similarly, in the previous two parliamentary elections (2020 and 2016), no single party or coalition won a majority of the popular vote. Relatively small margins of victory and frequent transfers of power have prevented any party from governing single-handedly for extended periods.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. The OSCE assessed that in both the 2024 and 2020 parliamentary elections, all contesting parties were able to campaign freely. Changes to the Campaign Finance Law in 2011 and 2013, which international observers, such as the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), assessed favorably, and 2014 media regulations requiring equitable coverage of election contestants, contributed to an equal playing field. Furthermore, the 2020 elections saw recently registered parties, such as We Can! (Možemo!) and the conservative Homeland Movement, winning seats in parliament, indicating sufficient opportunities for emerging opposition groups to gain popular support.
In Croatia, independent media, political actors, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The country has a robust and diverse civil society, and the authorities have not obstructed the operation of independent or dissenting organizations. Similarly, the government has generally refrained from manipulating media coverage; Croatia maintains a pluralistic media landscape in which outlets have a demonstrated record of scrutinizing and challenging political elites. The government largely respects constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and does not systematically intimidate dissenting voices, although observers have noted a growing reliance on SLAPPs by political and economic elites against journalists and media outlets. Croatia also generally respects the right to peaceful assembly, with authorities allowing and facilitating protests without excessive or repressive policing.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. With more than 52,000 civil society organizations (CSOs) active, as of 2020, Croatia has a robust civil society. In the late 2000s, Croatia established a sound legal framework for supporting the work of CSOs and promoting their advisory role in policy-making, notably through the Law on Associations and the Law on Foundations, which guarantee freedom of association, democratic internal governance, and the right of CSOs to engage in advocacy and policy dialogue. This framework is complemented by state institutions such as the Government Office for Cooperation with NGOs and the Council for the Development of Civil Society, which are tasked with coordinating cooperation between public authorities and civil society. These arrangements have been maintained and implemented by successive governments.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor, nor it has seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. The country has a relatively small but diverse media landscape, supported by the robust legal framework including the Law on Media, Law on Electronic Media, Law on Croatian Radio-Television (HRT), and the Law on the Right of Access to Information, and independent oversight bodies such as the Council for Electronic Media (VEM) and the Agency for Electronic Media, the Agency for the Protection of Market Competition. Within this framework, media pluralism is generally sustained, with foreign-owned Nova TV and RTL being the two most-watched commercial channels, competing with the public broadcaster HRT/HTV. Additionally, the three most popular national newspapers — the tabloid 24 Sata, the left-leaning Jutarnji List, and the conservative Vecernji List — are also not politically affiliated and have openly challenged political elites in the past. On the other hand, the public broadcaster HRT, whose Director General and Supervisory Board are appointed by a simple parliamentary majority, remains susceptible to political influence. The 2021 arrest and subsequent indictment of HRT’s former Director General, Kazimir Bačić, on suspicion of corruption, further exacerbated public distrust of the broadcaster. In 2021, 21% of citizens did not trust the HRT as a reliable and objective source of information, a historic high, compared to 10% for the other national TV channels. Bačić was indicted for transferring a $50,000 bribe from a prominent businessman to Zagreb’s mayor and HDZ member Milan Bandić to facilitate a construction project.
The government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. The constitution guarantees freedom of expression and explicitly prohibits censorship, and in practice, the government generally respects these safeguards, typically refraining from systematic retaliation against dissenting media outlets, civil society organizations, or other critical voices. Additionally, the government has taken steps to strengthen journalist safety, such as concluding a cooperation agreement between the Ministry of the Interior and journalist unions, accompanied by protocols for police conduct at public gatherings and for responding to attacks. At the same time, strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) impose a considerable burden upon some of the country’s most prominent critical outlets, where journalists increasingly face defamation suits brought by political and business elites seeking large damages. The Croatian Journalists’ Association reported that, as of the end of 2023, there were 951 active suits against journalists, seeking a total of about 10.5 million USD in damages. Some cases have resulted in damages awards against outlets, drawing criticism from international watchdogs for undermining public-interest reporting.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. In Croatia, the right to peaceful assembly is constitutionally guaranteed and regulated by the Public Assemblies Act of 1999, which requires prior notification to the police but does not impose undue restrictions. In practice, authorities generally facilitate and allow peaceful demonstrations to proceed unobstructed, as illustrated by the large protests in February 2024 opposing the appointment of Ivan Turudić as State Attorney and criticizing the government.
Croatia’s institutions are broadly independent and, taken together, function as effective checks on the governing authorities. The judiciary remains largely autonomous, protected by constitutional and institutional safeguards that prevent systematic political interference. As a result, courts have generally constrained government overreach, upheld electoral competition, and enforced accountability. Corruption laws are actively applied, and senior officials have been investigated, prosecuted, and convicted, underscoring the capacity of Croatia’s institutional framework to hold those in power to account.
The government has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. The Croatian judiciary is largely independent. Croatia’s legal and institutional framework formally safeguards judicial independence through the Constitution’s separation of powers, statutory guarantees of judges’ permanence and immunity, and procedural rules that prevent political branches from interfering in adjudication while allowing oversight only over court administration. The State Council for the Judiciary, whose 11 members are elected by fellow judges, rather than MPs, is responsible for appointing, transferring, and dismissing magistrates in the lower courts. European Commission experts monitoring Croatia’s democratic institutions have assessed the work of the Council positively overall, noting its role in curbing potential political influence in the judiciary. Additionally, the Ministry of Justice, responsible for administration, resources, and supervision of material and financial operations of the judiciary, is barred from influencing courts’ proceedings.
Courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who oppose it. When alleged retaliation has been litigated, judges have generally applied established protections for free expression and workplace rights rather than deferring to the authorities. To illustrate, despite the aforementioned rise in SLAPPs, convictions against critical journalists and independent media outlets are exceedingly rare: The Croatian Journalists’ Association only reported seven such instances between 2022 and 2023 (without disclosing the penalties or the names of the defendants). The courts have also upheld journalists’ freedom of dissent in labor disputes, as in the case of Hrvoje Zovko, a journalist at the national broadcaster HRT. In 2018, Zovko was dismissed after publicly decrying the culture of editorial interference and censorship at HRT and served with a defamation lawsuit seeking 33,000 USD in damages for reputational harms initiated by the broadcaster’s Board. The Zagreb Municipal Labour Court ruled in 2019 that Zovko’s dismissal was unlawful, as the HRT had limited its employees’ “unhindered expression and exchange of thoughts and ideas” and Zovko’s statements had sufficient factual basis. The HRT’s abusive lawsuit against Zovko was dismissed by another court as unfounded.
Additionally, Courts have not unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to undermine electoral competition. While election complaints are rare in practice, as the electoral oversight body, the State Election Commission, performs its functions in a largely impartial and transparent manner, Croatia’s system for electoral dispute resolution is sound, according to OSCE assessments. In addition, the Constitutional Court has, on several occasions, intervened to guarantee the integrity of the electoral process. To illustrate, when current president Zoran Milanović announced his intention to become Prime Minister should his party, the SDP, win the 2024 snap elections, the Court issued Milanović and the SDP a warning the following day. The warning reiterated that the constitutional role of the president is incompatible with running in parliamentary elections and any attempts by the incumbent to circumvent these restrictions could result in an annulment of the election results.
Finally, Croatia’s judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. The Criminal Code criminalizes a wide range of corruption-related offenses, including abuse of office, active and passive bribery, and embezzlement, and applies equally to public officials and private actors, with penalties that include substantial prison sentences and corporate liability. Institutionally, accountability is reinforced by the work of the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (“Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta,” USKOK), a specialized prosecutorial body with nationwide jurisdiction over corruption and organized crime, whose indictments are adjudicated before designated county courts. Corruption cases are formally accorded high priority, and courts have enforced convictions against senior political and administrative officials. To illustrate, in 2010, former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader was arrested under an international warrant after attempting to flee the country and was extradited to Croatia from Austria in 2011 to face corruption charges brought by USKOK. Following a lengthy and complex trial, Sanader was convicted in 2012 of large-scale corruption, including the offence of accepting bribes contrary to Article 347(1) of the Croatian Criminal Code, involving illegal kickbacks totaling approximately €10 million (around $13 million), and was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. Although some verdicts were later annulled or retried on procedural grounds, subsequent proceedings resulted in further convictions, including for the misuse of political party funds (so-called “party slush funds”). In 2023, Croatian courts consolidated his final convictions into a single long-term prison sentence of 18 years. In 2025, a court ruled that he was eligible for early release, and he was released from prison in July of that year. More recently, in November 2024, Health Minister Vili Beroš was arrested in an anti-corruption raid and promptly dismissed by Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, after investigators alleged serious procurement-related wrongdoing at the top of the health administration. The investigation is led by USKOK and, as of December 2025, the case is pending before the Zagreb County Court.
