Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies the Comoros as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The Union of Comoros is a federal republic composed of three semi-autonomous Indian Ocean islands – Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Mohéli – with a presidential system of government. The Head of State, Azali Assoumani, a former military officer who previously led a 1999 coup and served an elected term between 2002 and 2006, returned to power through disputed 2016 elections before extending his rule through fraudulent 2019 and 2024 polls. Since gaining independence from France in July 1975, the Union has experienced a turbulent political history, with French mercenary and other foreign military invasions, 21 coup attempts, and secessionist crises. From 2001 to 2016, the archipelago experienced interludes of democratization; however, since coming to power, Assoumani’s regime has consolidated control over all branches of government with no meaningful checks on executive power.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime has systematically barred opposition candidates, hindered the electoral campaign of opposition parties, undermined electoral oversight, and engaged in systematic, significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime has seriously and unfairly censored dissent, achieved a near monopoly over media coverage, harassed journalists, cracked down on political opposition leaders, and suppressed civil society organizations and public dissent. Authorities routinely deny authorizing protests or gatherings, subjecting protesters to indiscriminate violence and disproportionate force.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime, allowing it to repress criticism, significantly undermine electoral competition, and consolidate the systematic dismantling of accountability mechanisms. The regime has undermined institutional accountability by abolishing the constitutional court, directly appointing Supreme Court judges, dominating the legislature, and channeling politically sensitive cases to a parallel and contested, regime-controlled State Security Court.
In Comoros, elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete or win. The 2016 Comoros presidential election was the most closely contested poll in the country’s history, with Assoumani declared to have narrowly defeated his main rival Soilihi (41% to 39%). Since then, however, the regime’s repression and legal disqualification of main opposition candidates, combined with opposition boycotts, have caused electoral competition to significantly plummet. Assoumani has been credited with winning presidential polls in 2019 and 2024 by an average margin of 44 points, and his ruling Convention for the Renewal of the Comoros (CRC) has increased its control of parliament from 83% to 93% between 2020 and 2025. The regime has used politically motivated charges to disqualify prominent opposition challengers, imposed a de facto ban on political gatherings, hindered the monitoring of polls, engaged in systematic voting irregularities and electoral fraud, and controlled the electoral body, which has resulted in boycotts by major opposition parties.
Specifically, the regime has systematically and unfairly barred a mainstream opposition candidate. Ahead of elections, the regime targeted Assoumani’s most serious political opponents with politically motivated lawfare, resulting in convictions and heavy sentences. For example, former President Ahmed Sambi of the Juwa party, a top opposition challenger for the 2019 election, was arrested in 2018 and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2022 on politically motivated charges of high treason over a state corruption scandal, effectively excluding him ex ante from the 2019 and 2024 ballots. Also, Former Vice-President Mohamed Ali Soilihi, the runner-up in the 2016 election, was disqualified from the 2019 election on politically applied technical eligibility grounds, and later tried and sentenced in absentia to 20 years in prison on politically-motivated corruption-related charges. Additionally, Achmet Saïd Mohamed, a prominent opposition leader of the “Haraka Uhime Ritapilye Yentsi” (Hury Party), was barred from contesting in the 2024 presidential election and subsequently imprisoned five days before the election on politically-motivated charges of “attempting to commit terrorist acts,” and held in pretrial detention for more than a year before being provisionally released in May 2025.
Moreover, the regime has systematically, unfairly, and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign through a de facto ban on political gatherings and opposition rallies. Security forces violently disperse any opposition gatherings. For example, in June 2018, police detained opposition politicians Moustoipha Said Cheihk, Mohamed Wadaane, and Ibrahim Abdourazak aka Razida for holding a public gathering to denounce Assoumani’s controversial constitutional referendum.
In addition, the regime has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The regime controls the composition and funding of the Independent National Election Commission (CENI). Under the 2023 electoral law, the President, the majority party in the national assembly, and the governors of the three islands of the archipelago appoint all but two of the commissioners. The law also puts the regime in charge of budget allocations covering the production of electoral material, electoral operations, and compensations and benefits of commissioners.
The regime has engaged in systematic, significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Three separate international poll monitoring missions (the African Union, the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, and the African Standby Forces of the East) discredited the 2024 presidential election as lacking credibility and transparency due to widespread fraud and irregularities. During the last two election cycles, independent monitors were hindered, barred, or expelled from polling stations. For example, the opposition alleges that their representatives were expelled from polling stations during the January 2025 parliamentary election for opposing ballot stuffing.
Consequently, the mainstream opposition has boycotted elections, citing a lack of transparency, electoral irregularities, repression, and an unfair playing field. The main opposition parties have thus fully or partially boycotted presidential elections in 2019 and 2024 and parliamentary polls in 2020 and 2025. For example, in January 2025, the mainstream Juwa Party boycotted parliamentary elections, resulting in the ruling CRC sweeping 31 out of 33 seats in the national assembly. Previously, in January 2024, voter turnout plunged to 16% in the presidential election after some opposition leaders called for a boycott.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime, which uses physical violence, arbitrary detentions, and regulatory censorship against journalists, enforces restrictive legislation, raids opposition offices, shuts down media outlets, arrests civil society leaders, deregisters organizations, and violently suppresses protests.
The regime has systematically intimidated independent journalists and news outlets with physical violence, arbitrary detentions, regulatory censorship, and lawfare. In March 2019, police detained prominent journalist Toufé Maecha and accused him of espionage after he went to a police station to inquire about arrests made during the presidential election. During the same month, security forces confiscated editions of 3 leading independent newspapers, La Gazette des Comores, Masiwa Komor, and Al-Fajr. In 2020, two journalists for the pro-regime state broadcaster, the Comoros Radio and Television Office (ORTC), were suspended for interviewing opposition leaders. In 2021, then-Finance Minister Kamalidine Souef publicly threatened to use henchmen to “tear to pieces” journalists who would criticize him. In January 2025, journalist Abdou Moustoifa was charged with spreading false news for accurately reporting controversial public remarks by Assoumani about handing power to his son. Moustoifa was detained again in November 2025 for publishing a post on the treatment of migrants in Moroni.
The regime has unfairly shut down major independent, dissenting organizations. It has enforced restrictive legislation, raided opposition offices, shut down media outlets, arrested civil society leaders, and deregistered organizations. For example, in 2018, authorities raided the headquarters of the Juwa Party in Moroni and sealed its offices. Around the same time, it proscribed the activities of the National Council of Transition—a parallel government—comprising major opposition parties and civil society figures.
Moreso, the regime has heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor through the state media’s near broadcasting monopoly, license denials, and the suppression of critical outlets. Independent outlets are routinely muzzled or co-opted, and state media uniformly toe the regime line. Successive regimes have progressively constrained and denied licenses to independent television in the Union, culminating in the closure of longstanding critical and independent outlets such as Djabal TV, leaving the ORTC as the sole television outlet.
In a similar pattern, the regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly censored dissenting speech through vague and restrictive legislation, internet shutdowns, and seizures of newspapers. For instance, authorities have repeatedly confiscated newspaper editions, blocked distribution, and raided the printing presses of prominent, critical, and leading newspapers, including La Gazette des Comores, Masiwa Komor, and Al-Fajr. In January 2024, during the post-election protest, authorities imposed a nationwide internet shutdown for 40 hours. Censorship is further entrenched by vaguely worded provisions in Articles 182 and 231 of the Information Code that prohibit the publication of news that “undermines public morale” or “discredits public institutions,” thereby enabling broad discretionary enforcement and promoting self-censorship.
Furthermore, the regime has systematically and seriously intimidated independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public, and has seriously and unfairly obstructed their work. In April 2024, police detained prominent opposition figure Razida after he called for protests against Assoumani’s swearing-in after the fraudulent January 2024 election. Razida was charged with inciting hatred.
The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Since coming to power in 2016, the regime has enforced a de facto ban on political gatherings and opposition rallies. State-appointed district commissioners have systematically blocked protests or gatherings, citing vague public order concerns, while pro-regime rallies proceed freely. In June 2022, the Minister of Interior issued a press statement subjecting public protests to the formal approval of district commissioners, even though the law requires only a notice. Meanwhile, unsanctioned protests are systematically suppressed. For example, in January 2024, security forces violently suppressed protests against electoral fraud. Dozens were detained, and tear-gassed, and live fire killed one protester and injured at least 25 others. In October 2025, police detained activists Ahmed Hachim Said Hassane and Fahardine Msahazi of the civic movement Rilemewa for attempting to stage a protest against social injustices at the Independence Plaza in Moroni. Two weeks later, police in Mitsamihuli detained opposition political activist Mohamed Ibrahim Moindje and two others for four days on accusations of participating in an unsanctioned demonstration against corruption called by the Générationz269 youth civic movement. They were charged with the criminal offense of disturbing public order for demonstrating against corruption.
In Comoros, institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime, allowing it to repress criticism, undermine electoral competition, and dismantle accountability mechanisms. Through controversial constitutional amendments and presidential decrees, the regime has restructured the judiciary, increased control over judicial appointments, retaliated against dissenting judges, and directed politically sensitive cases to a special court. It has also subjected other oversight institutions to reforms that have weakened their operational autonomy.
The courts have systematically and frequently failed to check or enable the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition. The Supreme Court, enshrined with the constitutional authority in electoral matters, has validated disputed election results in favor of the regime and disqualified key opposition candidates from the ballot. The Court has consistently dismissed legal challenges on grounds of admissibility or form, without reviewing their merits or substance. For example, in 2019, the Supreme Court disqualified Assoumani’s most serious challengers, former Vice-President Mohamed Ali Soilihi and Ibrahim Mohamed Soule, on questionable grounds. For example, the court disqualified Soule because his nomination documents were signed by the deputy secretary-general of his party, instead of the secretary-general, who was in jail. Also, in December 2023, the Court invoked residency requirements to disqualify three opposition candidates from the Comorian diaspora, including the leader of the Hury Party, Achmet Mohamed.
Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In July 2018, a court in Moroni sentenced opposition politicians Moustoipha Said Cheihk, Mohamed Wadaane, and Razida to serve 20 days in prison over a protest against Assoumani’s controversial constitutional referendum. The trio was additionally handed a one-year suspended sentence. In August 2023, a court convicted four prominent journalists—Andjouza Abouheir, Toufé Maecha, Abdallah Mzembaba, and Oubeidillah Mchangama—on politically-motivated charges of defamation and insult for blowing the whistle and reporting about a culture of impunity and cover-up for sexual misconduct and abuse at the ORTC.
Members of the judicial branch who are perceived as a threat by the regime systematically face retaliation. The regime has dismantled courts, suspended, and fired judges who dissent. For example, after the Constitutional Court became a focal point for legal challenges to Assoumani’s plan to extend his term in 2018, the president described it as “useless, superfluous, and incompetent” before abolishing the court entirely. Additionally, ten days before the 2024 presidential election, President Assoumani fired Harima Ahmed, the Supreme Court judge responsible for monitoring the election’s integrity.
The regime has systematically directed cases to a separate, regime-controlled court. It has consistently brought political opponents before the controversial State Security Court, a relic of one-party rule created to try crimes and offenses deemed to be against state security. Created in 1983 under the dictatorship of Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane, the Court conducts summary trials and offers no possibility of appeal. It has systematically convicted political opponents and imposed heavy sentences on them. Prominent cases involve former president Ahmed Sambi (life imprisonment), former vice president Djaffar Hassane (life imprisonment), opposition politician and writer Saïd Ahmed Saïd Tourqui (life imprisonment), former vice president Mohamed Soilihi (20 years), Abdou Salami (12 years), and Ahmed El-Barwane (7 years). In a September 2021 decision on the case of Tourqui—who was convicted after a hasty two-day trial for peacefully opposing Assoumani’s 2018 efforts to change the constitution to extend his rule—the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared that the State Security Court does not meet the standards of independence and impartiality required under international human rights law and reiterated calls for its abolition.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that have abolished or seriously weakened their operational independence. While the executive has long enjoyed constitutional authority in judicial appointments, the Assoumani regime has taken controversial measures to further increase its control over the country’s top courts and their bench membership. In April 2018, Assoumani issued a controversial decree abolishing the Constitutional Court, which was at the time the country’s highest court and arbiter in electoral matters, and transferring its functions to a chamber of the Supreme Court. Assoumani had been accused of withholding nominations of justices to serve on the Constitutional Court, leading to a state of institutional paralysis, in which the Court remained four justices short of its required quorum to deliberate. In 2023, Assoumani issued a decree increasing executive control over the nomination process of Supreme Court justices. While the 2005 constitution stipulated that the President simply formalized appointments of justices chosen by and within the judiciary, the 2023 presidential decree put the Justice Minister, an executive cabinet member, in charge of nominations following consultations with the Supreme Council of the Judiciary (CSM), the top judicial oversight institution, which is chaired by the President and made up of presidential appointees. Finally, the 2018 Constitution stripped the Supreme Court of the ability to accept petitions from ordinary citizens and groups seeking to challenge the constitutionality of laws.
The regime has systematically subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that have abolished or seriously weakened their operational independence. In 2016, Assoumani controversially dissolved the National Commission for Preventing and Fighting Corruption (CNPLC), with the Constitutional Court ruling that he lacked the executive authority to do so. The regime responded by ceasing cooperation with the commission, allowing members’ terms to expire, and refusing to appoint replacements. In 2023, under international pressure, the regime created a small anti-corruption unit within the Supreme Court, which is widely seen as under its control.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold the regime accountable. The regime’s institutional capture of all branches of government and key oversight institutions has effectively negated constitutional separations of powers and democratic checks and balances. As a result, there is no meaningful check on the power of Assoumani and the ruling CRC. For example, in March 2022, in response to public pressure from civil society seeking the abolition of the controversial State Security Court, the Ministry of Interior petitioned the Supreme Court to issue an opinion. The Court ruled in favor of the regime and gave legal backing to maintain the Court.
HRF classifies the Comoros as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The Union of Comoros is a federal republic composed of three semi-autonomous Indian Ocean islands – Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Mohéli – with a presidential system of government. The Head of State, Azali Assoumani, a former military officer who previously led a 1999 coup and served an elected term between 2002 and 2006, returned to power through disputed 2016 elections before extending his rule through fraudulent 2019 and 2024 polls. Since gaining independence from France in July 1975, the Union has experienced a turbulent political history, with French mercenary and other foreign military invasions, 21 coup attempts, and secessionist crises. From 2001 to 2016, the archipelago experienced interludes of democratization; however, since coming to power, Assoumani’s regime has consolidated control over all branches of government with no meaningful checks on executive power.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime has systematically barred opposition candidates, hindered the electoral campaign of opposition parties, undermined electoral oversight, and engaged in systematic, significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime has seriously and unfairly censored dissent, achieved a near monopoly over media coverage, harassed journalists, cracked down on political opposition leaders, and suppressed civil society organizations and public dissent. Authorities routinely deny authorizing protests or gatherings, subjecting protesters to indiscriminate violence and disproportionate force.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime, allowing it to repress criticism, significantly undermine electoral competition, and consolidate the systematic dismantling of accountability mechanisms. The regime has undermined institutional accountability by abolishing the constitutional court, directly appointing Supreme Court judges, dominating the legislature, and channeling politically sensitive cases to a parallel and contested, regime-controlled State Security Court.
In Comoros, elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete or win. The 2016 Comoros presidential election was the most closely contested poll in the country’s history, with Assoumani declared to have narrowly defeated his main rival Soilihi (41% to 39%). Since then, however, the regime’s repression and legal disqualification of main opposition candidates, combined with opposition boycotts, have caused electoral competition to significantly plummet. Assoumani has been credited with winning presidential polls in 2019 and 2024 by an average margin of 44 points, and his ruling Convention for the Renewal of the Comoros (CRC) has increased its control of parliament from 83% to 93% between 2020 and 2025. The regime has used politically motivated charges to disqualify prominent opposition challengers, imposed a de facto ban on political gatherings, hindered the monitoring of polls, engaged in systematic voting irregularities and electoral fraud, and controlled the electoral body, which has resulted in boycotts by major opposition parties.
Specifically, the regime has systematically and unfairly barred a mainstream opposition candidate. Ahead of elections, the regime targeted Assoumani’s most serious political opponents with politically motivated lawfare, resulting in convictions and heavy sentences. For example, former President Ahmed Sambi of the Juwa party, a top opposition challenger for the 2019 election, was arrested in 2018 and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2022 on politically motivated charges of high treason over a state corruption scandal, effectively excluding him ex ante from the 2019 and 2024 ballots. Also, Former Vice-President Mohamed Ali Soilihi, the runner-up in the 2016 election, was disqualified from the 2019 election on politically applied technical eligibility grounds, and later tried and sentenced in absentia to 20 years in prison on politically-motivated corruption-related charges. Additionally, Achmet Saïd Mohamed, a prominent opposition leader of the “Haraka Uhime Ritapilye Yentsi” (Hury Party), was barred from contesting in the 2024 presidential election and subsequently imprisoned five days before the election on politically-motivated charges of “attempting to commit terrorist acts,” and held in pretrial detention for more than a year before being provisionally released in May 2025.
Moreover, the regime has systematically, unfairly, and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign through a de facto ban on political gatherings and opposition rallies. Security forces violently disperse any opposition gatherings. For example, in June 2018, police detained opposition politicians Moustoipha Said Cheihk, Mohamed Wadaane, and Ibrahim Abdourazak aka Razida for holding a public gathering to denounce Assoumani’s controversial constitutional referendum.
In addition, the regime has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The regime controls the composition and funding of the Independent National Election Commission (CENI). Under the 2023 electoral law, the President, the majority party in the national assembly, and the governors of the three islands of the archipelago appoint all but two of the commissioners. The law also puts the regime in charge of budget allocations covering the production of electoral material, electoral operations, and compensations and benefits of commissioners.
The regime has engaged in systematic, significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Three separate international poll monitoring missions (the African Union, the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, and the African Standby Forces of the East) discredited the 2024 presidential election as lacking credibility and transparency due to widespread fraud and irregularities. During the last two election cycles, independent monitors were hindered, barred, or expelled from polling stations. For example, the opposition alleges that their representatives were expelled from polling stations during the January 2025 parliamentary election for opposing ballot stuffing.
Consequently, the mainstream opposition has boycotted elections, citing a lack of transparency, electoral irregularities, repression, and an unfair playing field. The main opposition parties have thus fully or partially boycotted presidential elections in 2019 and 2024 and parliamentary polls in 2020 and 2025. For example, in January 2025, the mainstream Juwa Party boycotted parliamentary elections, resulting in the ruling CRC sweeping 31 out of 33 seats in the national assembly. Previously, in January 2024, voter turnout plunged to 16% in the presidential election after some opposition leaders called for a boycott.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime, which uses physical violence, arbitrary detentions, and regulatory censorship against journalists, enforces restrictive legislation, raids opposition offices, shuts down media outlets, arrests civil society leaders, deregisters organizations, and violently suppresses protests.
The regime has systematically intimidated independent journalists and news outlets with physical violence, arbitrary detentions, regulatory censorship, and lawfare. In March 2019, police detained prominent journalist Toufé Maecha and accused him of espionage after he went to a police station to inquire about arrests made during the presidential election. During the same month, security forces confiscated editions of 3 leading independent newspapers, La Gazette des Comores, Masiwa Komor, and Al-Fajr. In 2020, two journalists for the pro-regime state broadcaster, the Comoros Radio and Television Office (ORTC), were suspended for interviewing opposition leaders. In 2021, then-Finance Minister Kamalidine Souef publicly threatened to use henchmen to “tear to pieces” journalists who would criticize him. In January 2025, journalist Abdou Moustoifa was charged with spreading false news for accurately reporting controversial public remarks by Assoumani about handing power to his son. Moustoifa was detained again in November 2025 for publishing a post on the treatment of migrants in Moroni.
The regime has unfairly shut down major independent, dissenting organizations. It has enforced restrictive legislation, raided opposition offices, shut down media outlets, arrested civil society leaders, and deregistered organizations. For example, in 2018, authorities raided the headquarters of the Juwa Party in Moroni and sealed its offices. Around the same time, it proscribed the activities of the National Council of Transition—a parallel government—comprising major opposition parties and civil society figures.
Moreso, the regime has heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor through the state media’s near broadcasting monopoly, license denials, and the suppression of critical outlets. Independent outlets are routinely muzzled or co-opted, and state media uniformly toe the regime line. Successive regimes have progressively constrained and denied licenses to independent television in the Union, culminating in the closure of longstanding critical and independent outlets such as Djabal TV, leaving the ORTC as the sole television outlet.
In a similar pattern, the regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly censored dissenting speech through vague and restrictive legislation, internet shutdowns, and seizures of newspapers. For instance, authorities have repeatedly confiscated newspaper editions, blocked distribution, and raided the printing presses of prominent, critical, and leading newspapers, including La Gazette des Comores, Masiwa Komor, and Al-Fajr. In January 2024, during the post-election protest, authorities imposed a nationwide internet shutdown for 40 hours. Censorship is further entrenched by vaguely worded provisions in Articles 182 and 231 of the Information Code that prohibit the publication of news that “undermines public morale” or “discredits public institutions,” thereby enabling broad discretionary enforcement and promoting self-censorship.
Furthermore, the regime has systematically and seriously intimidated independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public, and has seriously and unfairly obstructed their work. In April 2024, police detained prominent opposition figure Razida after he called for protests against Assoumani’s swearing-in after the fraudulent January 2024 election. Razida was charged with inciting hatred.
The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Since coming to power in 2016, the regime has enforced a de facto ban on political gatherings and opposition rallies. State-appointed district commissioners have systematically blocked protests or gatherings, citing vague public order concerns, while pro-regime rallies proceed freely. In June 2022, the Minister of Interior issued a press statement subjecting public protests to the formal approval of district commissioners, even though the law requires only a notice. Meanwhile, unsanctioned protests are systematically suppressed. For example, in January 2024, security forces violently suppressed protests against electoral fraud. Dozens were detained, and tear-gassed, and live fire killed one protester and injured at least 25 others. In October 2025, police detained activists Ahmed Hachim Said Hassane and Fahardine Msahazi of the civic movement Rilemewa for attempting to stage a protest against social injustices at the Independence Plaza in Moroni. Two weeks later, police in Mitsamihuli detained opposition political activist Mohamed Ibrahim Moindje and two others for four days on accusations of participating in an unsanctioned demonstration against corruption called by the Générationz269 youth civic movement. They were charged with the criminal offense of disturbing public order for demonstrating against corruption.
In Comoros, institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime, allowing it to repress criticism, undermine electoral competition, and dismantle accountability mechanisms. Through controversial constitutional amendments and presidential decrees, the regime has restructured the judiciary, increased control over judicial appointments, retaliated against dissenting judges, and directed politically sensitive cases to a special court. It has also subjected other oversight institutions to reforms that have weakened their operational autonomy.
The courts have systematically and frequently failed to check or enable the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition. The Supreme Court, enshrined with the constitutional authority in electoral matters, has validated disputed election results in favor of the regime and disqualified key opposition candidates from the ballot. The Court has consistently dismissed legal challenges on grounds of admissibility or form, without reviewing their merits or substance. For example, in 2019, the Supreme Court disqualified Assoumani’s most serious challengers, former Vice-President Mohamed Ali Soilihi and Ibrahim Mohamed Soule, on questionable grounds. For example, the court disqualified Soule because his nomination documents were signed by the deputy secretary-general of his party, instead of the secretary-general, who was in jail. Also, in December 2023, the Court invoked residency requirements to disqualify three opposition candidates from the Comorian diaspora, including the leader of the Hury Party, Achmet Mohamed.
Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In July 2018, a court in Moroni sentenced opposition politicians Moustoipha Said Cheihk, Mohamed Wadaane, and Razida to serve 20 days in prison over a protest against Assoumani’s controversial constitutional referendum. The trio was additionally handed a one-year suspended sentence. In August 2023, a court convicted four prominent journalists—Andjouza Abouheir, Toufé Maecha, Abdallah Mzembaba, and Oubeidillah Mchangama—on politically-motivated charges of defamation and insult for blowing the whistle and reporting about a culture of impunity and cover-up for sexual misconduct and abuse at the ORTC.
Members of the judicial branch who are perceived as a threat by the regime systematically face retaliation. The regime has dismantled courts, suspended, and fired judges who dissent. For example, after the Constitutional Court became a focal point for legal challenges to Assoumani’s plan to extend his term in 2018, the president described it as “useless, superfluous, and incompetent” before abolishing the court entirely. Additionally, ten days before the 2024 presidential election, President Assoumani fired Harima Ahmed, the Supreme Court judge responsible for monitoring the election’s integrity.
The regime has systematically directed cases to a separate, regime-controlled court. It has consistently brought political opponents before the controversial State Security Court, a relic of one-party rule created to try crimes and offenses deemed to be against state security. Created in 1983 under the dictatorship of Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane, the Court conducts summary trials and offers no possibility of appeal. It has systematically convicted political opponents and imposed heavy sentences on them. Prominent cases involve former president Ahmed Sambi (life imprisonment), former vice president Djaffar Hassane (life imprisonment), opposition politician and writer Saïd Ahmed Saïd Tourqui (life imprisonment), former vice president Mohamed Soilihi (20 years), Abdou Salami (12 years), and Ahmed El-Barwane (7 years). In a September 2021 decision on the case of Tourqui—who was convicted after a hasty two-day trial for peacefully opposing Assoumani’s 2018 efforts to change the constitution to extend his rule—the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared that the State Security Court does not meet the standards of independence and impartiality required under international human rights law and reiterated calls for its abolition.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that have abolished or seriously weakened their operational independence. While the executive has long enjoyed constitutional authority in judicial appointments, the Assoumani regime has taken controversial measures to further increase its control over the country’s top courts and their bench membership. In April 2018, Assoumani issued a controversial decree abolishing the Constitutional Court, which was at the time the country’s highest court and arbiter in electoral matters, and transferring its functions to a chamber of the Supreme Court. Assoumani had been accused of withholding nominations of justices to serve on the Constitutional Court, leading to a state of institutional paralysis, in which the Court remained four justices short of its required quorum to deliberate. In 2023, Assoumani issued a decree increasing executive control over the nomination process of Supreme Court justices. While the 2005 constitution stipulated that the President simply formalized appointments of justices chosen by and within the judiciary, the 2023 presidential decree put the Justice Minister, an executive cabinet member, in charge of nominations following consultations with the Supreme Council of the Judiciary (CSM), the top judicial oversight institution, which is chaired by the President and made up of presidential appointees. Finally, the 2018 Constitution stripped the Supreme Court of the ability to accept petitions from ordinary citizens and groups seeking to challenge the constitutionality of laws.
The regime has systematically subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that have abolished or seriously weakened their operational independence. In 2016, Assoumani controversially dissolved the National Commission for Preventing and Fighting Corruption (CNPLC), with the Constitutional Court ruling that he lacked the executive authority to do so. The regime responded by ceasing cooperation with the commission, allowing members’ terms to expire, and refusing to appoint replacements. In 2023, under international pressure, the regime created a small anti-corruption unit within the Supreme Court, which is widely seen as under its control.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold the regime accountable. The regime’s institutional capture of all branches of government and key oversight institutions has effectively negated constitutional separations of powers and democratic checks and balances. As a result, there is no meaningful check on the power of Assoumani and the ruling CRC. For example, in March 2022, in response to public pressure from civil society seeking the abolition of the controversial State Security Court, the Ministry of Interior petitioned the Supreme Court to issue an opinion. The Court ruled in favor of the regime and gave legal backing to maintain the Court.
