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HRF classifies Colombia as democratic.
Colombia’s recent history has been shaped by a prolonged armed conflict between the state and insurgent groups. For decades, violent confrontations have occurred between government security forces, paramilitary structures such as the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), also known as the Clan del Golfo, and insurgent organizations, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Although the 2016 peace agreement led to the demobilization of most FARC combatants, dissident factions remain active, and violence linked to armed groups and illicit economies has persisted or intensified in several regions in recent years. Colombia’s mountainous terrain and historically limited state presence in remote rural areas have allowed armed groups to establish territorial strongholds, particularly in regions tied to drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other illicit economies. In some local and regional contexts, these groups have exercised coercive influence over political and economic life. Despite persistent security challenges and uneven state control, Colombia has maintained competitive national elections, peaceful transfers of power, and a functioning constitutional order for decades. In 2002, President Álvaro Uribe intensified military operations against insurgent groups, marking a hardline security phase that reduced the territorial capacity of several guerrilla organizations but was also associated with serious human rights violations, including the “false positives” scandal involving extrajudicial killings by members of the security forces. His successor, Juan Manuel Santos, negotiated the 2016 Peace Accords with the FARC, leading to the demobilization of most of its fighters and its transition into a political party. However, dissident factions and other armed groups, including the ELN and the AGC, continued to compete for territorial control and illicit revenues. In 2022, President Gustavo Petro was elected on a “Total Peace” platform aimed at negotiating with remaining armed groups and implementing the 2016 accord. While his administration pursued ceasefires and dialogue, violence linked to territorial disputes and illicit economies remained elevated in 2025, particularly in rural and border areas.
National elections in Colombia are largely free and fair. However, longstanding challenges linked to electoral violence and vote-buying continue to impact elections in the country. Nonetheless, elections are competitive. Within Colombia’s multiparty system, the mainstream political parties regularly compete for the presidency and seats in the bicameral Congress. Smaller parties can also compete and win a small number of legislative seats. Colombia’s primary electoral body, the National Electoral Council (CNE), effectively manages elections but suffers from politicization. The CNE is also somewhat limited in its ability to oversee campaign finance and detect electoral irregularities, even as some improvements to its operational independence and technical capacities have been achieved. The Colombian government also regularly invites independent electoral observers and experts to provide additional oversight of national elections.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people in Colombia are generally able to openly criticize or challenge the government. However, Colombia remains one of the region’s most dangerous countries for journalists, civil society leaders, and activists. Failures in the justice system allow perpetrators to commit crimes against civil society under anonymity and with impunity. Nonetheless, independent dissenting organizations are able to operate in the country. There is no evidence that the government systematically targets and obstructs the work of critics. The right to peacefully assemble and protest is guaranteed by the Colombian Constitution and generally upheld by the government. However, incidents of disproportionate use of force and police violence against protesters do occur.
Institutions are independent and serve as a check on the government. Oversight institutions and courts are able to act and issue decisions that are unfavorable to the party in power. They are also able to check attempts to concentrate power in the executive. Moreover, the independence of the courts serves to mostly uphold Colombia’s electoral integrity and the rights of dissidents. However, procedural delays and operational complexity can hinder Colombian institutions’ ability to act effectively.
National elections are largely free and fair. However, longstanding challenges linked to electoral violence and vote-buying continue to impact elections. Still, multi-party politics in Colombia remain dynamic and competitive. Mainstream parties, such as the centrist Colombian Liberal Party (PLC) and the right-wing Democratic Center, regularly participate in legislative and presidential elections held every four years. Smaller parties are also able to compete and win seats in Congress. The party in power must therefore form coalitions and drive consensus to be able to effectively govern the country. Colombia’s electoral oversight institutions effectively manage elections; however, institutional weaknesses and complexity limit their oversight capacities and operational independence. The independence of CNE is also diminished by the politicized appointment process of electoral officials, who are selected to represent the partisan interests of major parties in Congress. The government regularly invites independent electoral observers to provide additional oversight of national elections.
The Colombian government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Every four years, political parties and their candidates are able to compete for the presidency as well as for representation in Congress. At the same time, political parties and candidates do sometimes face risks stemming from longstanding political and electoral violence. The complexity of the country’s electoral framework can also make the candidate and party registration process confusing, causing some political tensions. Colombia’s vibrant electoral landscape is populated by a large number of parties and political coalitions. According to the CNE’s database, there were 35 political parties officially registered in the country in 2025. In addition to the mainstream parties, there are a variety of smaller parties that are able to win seats in Congress. Therefore, the party in power must form coalitions to be able to effectively govern the country. Moreover, power alternates frequently between the different mainstream parties. In 2022, Gustavo Petro won the presidency under a broad coalition of left-wing parties, the Historic Pact (PH), which marked a turning point in Colombian politics. President Petro was preceded by Iván Duque, a member of the right-wing Democratic Center. Despite the vibrant political environment, electoral violence casts a long shadow over Colombia’s political history. In June 2025, presidential hopeful Miguel Uribe Turbay of the Democratic Center was fatally shot at a campaign rally event in Bogotá. In the weeks following the assassination, Colombian authorities captured several individuals with ties to organized crime groups. In October 2025, Attorney General Luz Adriana Camargo announced that it was very likely that former FARC guerrilla members had commissioned the assassination, but investigations were still ongoing. The last assassination of a high-profile presidential candidate dates back to 1995, but local political leaders in rural Colombia have continually faced threats throughout the 2000s.
Independent electoral oversight has not been seriously undermined by the party in power. Colombia’s main electoral agency, the CNE, effectively manages and oversees elections. In addition to the CNE, the National Civil Registry (RNEC) and the Ministry of Interior are also involved with electoral oversight and management. International electoral observers are also regularly invited to oversee national elections and provide additional expertise. At the same time, Colombia’s electoral framework suffers from a high degree of complexity and opacity, which renders it challenging to understand and reform. The CNE is also somewhat limited in its capacities and operational independence, even as improvements have been made. Still, the independence of CNE is also diminished by the politicized appointment process of electoral officials, who are selected to represent the partisan interests of major parties in Congress. Vote buying and campaign finance irregularities are also longstanding issues that undermine trust in the electoral process in Colombia.
In 2022, the CNE and the RNCE successfully held national legislative and presidential elections. International observers from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU EOM) were present. Both the OAS and the EU EOM praised Colombia’s electoral authorities for applying recommendations issued by the observers during previous elections, including improving its technical infrastructure and the voting access of rural communities. According to the OAS, Colombia possesses one of the “fastest preliminary results systems” in the region, diminishing uncertainty and improving trust in the electoral process. The governments of Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro made some efforts to reform Colombia’s electoral law, which dates back to 1991. These reforms would have addressed some additional recommendations made by electoral experts; however, the Constitutional Court struck down both reform efforts in 2022 and 2024 due to procedural errors and the absence of consultation and debate required to make such a reform according to Colombian law. Even so, electoral authorities have been able to implement improvements after 2022. Most notably, the CNE has been able to increase its operational and budgetary autonomy vis-à-vis the RNCE, under which it has been traditionally subordinated. Observers from the OAS and EU EOM have remarked that Colombia’s electoral framework is complex and dispersed, which creates challenges in understanding, applying, and reforming the law. Moreover, there are some weaknesses in the law that hinder electoral officials’ ability to oversee electoral finance and address electoral complaints. Candidate registration processes are also slow, complex, and opaque, involving both the CNE and RNCE, which can generate some political tensions.
Despite the limitations of Colombia’s electoral framework, officials have made some progress in improving the detection of electoral crimes as well as strengthening the CNE’s oversight capacities. For example, in preparation for the 2026 legislative and presidential elections, the CNE launched the online platform, “Cuentas Claras,” which aims to improve transparency by streamlining the electoral witness registration process. Moreover, in 2022, the Ministry of the Interior launched a mobile application to make it easier for individuals to report electoral irregularities and crimes. At the same time, efforts to oversee and penalize electoral crimes are hindered by the politicization of the CNE. The nine electoral officials of the CNE are selected by Congress and must meet certain professional thresholds. But, as a result of a political pact, the selection of the officials is split along party lines. Electoral officials are then perceived as representatives of partisan interests rather than independent guarantors of the electoral process. Therefore, when the CNE launched investigations into President Petro’s campaign finances from 2022, the political affiliations of the officials (Democratic Center and PLC) who led the investigations roused suspicions of a politically-motivated attack. In November 2025, the CNE found that President Petro’s campaign exceeded the financial limits set by the electoral law and voted to sanction the campaign’s financial managers and fine the political parties under which Petro ran as president (Human Colombia and Patriotic Union (UP)). This is the first time a presidential campaign has been investigated and found guilty of electoral financial misconduct that is perceived to be widespread in Colombia. While this could represent a new benchmark for electoral oversight in Colombia, the enduring politicization of the CNE undermines the trust in the institution’s independence.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are generally able to openly criticize or challenge the government in Colombia. Members of civil society work under dangerous conditions due to widespread violence, but are not openly and systematically targeted by the government. Perpetrators of serious crimes against journalists, activists, and civil society members remain largely unidentified due to Colombian institutions’ limited capacities to investigate crimes and hold individuals accountable. Some government workers and officials have been implicated in harassing and threatening critics; however, there is no evidence that the government systematically targets or obstructs the work of critics. Moreover, independent entities such as media outlets and civil society organizations (CSOs) are able to operate in Colombia without being unfairly shut down. Individuals have the right to peacefully protest and assemble, which is constitutionally protected and generally upheld by the government.
Government officials have not systematically intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. The Colombian government has not engaged in systematic obstruction campaigns against critics; however, there are government officials and workers who harass and threaten critics. Nonetheless, a variety of civil society members are able to effectively organize and openly express discontent with government policies and actions. For instance, a coalition of CSOs, Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE), works closely with both the CNE and members of the public to promote electoral equity and integrity. The MOE’s members do not hesitate to voice criticism of the CNE’s politicization or occasional inefficiencies, but at the same time, the MOE supports the CNE’s work and collaborates with officials to improve electoral processes and promote democratization throughout the country. Another prominent CSO, Foundation for Press Freedom (FLIP), is active in defending the rights of press workers and denouncing infringements on the freedom of the press. For example, in March 2025, FLIP issued a statement denouncing the skewing of Colombia’s public media in favor of Petro and the party in power under director Hollman Morris. Independent journalists from investigative media organizations, such as La Silla Vacía and Vorágine, are also able to act as government watchdogs and expose wrongdoing.
Nonetheless, dissidents do operate under dangerous conditions and are frequently subject to serious threats. In particular, civil society leaders operating in largely rural communities, known as “líderes sociales,” face the highest risks. In 2024, at least 157 civil society leaders were assassinated in Colombia. In November 2025, the offices of the television channel Radio Cadena Nacional (RCN) in the city of Cali were attacked with explosives. Perpetrators operate under anonymity and impunity due to the ongoing armed conflict and weak state presence in rural Colombia. Moreover, there are members of the government who harass and threaten dissidents. In the most extreme cases, there are former officials who have been condemned or are under investigation for serious crimes against journalists and activists, including spying, torture, and assassination. Although the government does not retaliate against its critics, President Gustavo Petro has a fraught relationship with the press and often uses aggressive rhetoric against his government’s critics. In October 2025, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling that required the President to retract and apologize for comments publicly insulting female journalists.
In Colombia, protests or gatherings have not been systematically repressed by the government. However, police violence against protesters does occur. In particular, a rise in excessive and deadly use of force was reported during the administration of Iván Duque, but has decreased somewhat under Petro. Nonetheless, a network of CSOs that protect protest rights, Campaña Defender la Libertad, has continued to register instances of arbitrary detentions and excessive use of force. Even so, protesters are able to organize and voice criticism of the government. For instance, in April 2024, thousands of protesters gathered across the country’s major cities to protest one of Petro’s reform projects. Numerous peaceful anti-government protests have taken place, with none experiencing the level of police repression witnessed during the tenure of Iván Duque. In 2019 and 2021, massive protests took place, and police repression was significant, resulting in arbitrary detentions of protesters and bystanders, numerous injuries, and some killings. According to Campaña Defender la Libertad, police officers leverage a measure from Colombia’s police code (Law 1801 of 2016), the “transfer for protection,” which is meant to protect individuals who are in a vulnerable situation. It is instead misused to arbitrarily detain individuals. In 2021, Campaña Defender la Libertad registered 3,546 detentions during protests (known as the National Strike or “Paro Nacional”); of these, only 537 had arrest warrants and were legally detained. The remaining almost 3,009 registered cases would then qualify as arbitrary detentions through the “transfer for protection” mechanism. The Presidential Council for Human Rights sets the estimate higher, with approximately 7,020 arbitrary detentions through the “transfer for protection” mechanism during the 2021 protests. In response to the widespread human rights violations of 2019 and 2021, the Ministry of Defense initiated investigations into the officers involved as well as a dialogue to revise police protocols, incorporating input from civil society organizations. However, most cases linked to these human rights violations have experienced long delays, and broader security force reforms, such as moving the police out of the Ministry of Defense’s purview, were discussed but remain to be advanced by the government. According to Campaña Defender la Libertad, arbitrary detentions of protesters continue to take place, even if there is a notable decrease—in 2022, they registered 208 detentions in the context of protests. Between January and August 2023, the network registered the detention of 62 protesters.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as a check on the government. Colombia’s judiciary, as well as the country’s oversight institutions, operate with a degree of independence that allows them to issue decisions that challenge the agenda of the party in power. At times, President Gustavo Petro has relied heavily on presidential decrees to unilaterally move his government’s agenda forward, which represents an effort to circumvent some of the country’s institutional checks. Still, Colombian institutions have been able to respond to these attempts to aggrandize executive power. The courts are also able to uphold electoral integrity and the rights of dissidents. Nonetheless, operational opacity and complexity can hinder institutions’ ability to be responsive and act effectively.
The government in Colombia has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the government are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Courts and oversight institutions in Colombia can issue decisions that are unfavorable to the party in power. For example, in June 2025, President Petro issued the Presidential Decree 639, unilaterally calling for a national “Popular Consultation” (Consulta Popular) or referendum on a series of reforms on health, labor, and pensions that had failed to pass through the legislature. However, the Senate had previously refused the government’s request to hold the referendum; as a result, Decree 639 represented an effort to bypass the Senate as well as the institutional protocol to hold a referendum. In response, twelve senators filed an urgent measure before the Council of State, the highest national judicial instance with jurisdiction over administrative matters. The Council of State acted quickly to suspend Decree 639 due to the absence of congressional approval. Subsequently, Petro agreed to repeal the Decree, and one of the government’s reform packages was passed by Congress. The Petro administration’s difficulties in driving consensus and the President’s attempts to take unilateral action via decrees have challenged the country’s institutions. For instance, the Council of State has acted as an important check throughout Petro’s presidency. In July 2025, the President issued Decree 799, which claims that the President is the “supreme administrative authority” and therefore has the right to reconfigure the judicial hierarchies. With this decree, Petro redirected the way complaints against the president would be handled—first reviewed by lower circuit judges rather than directly sent to the Council of State. While the government claims that this improves the impartiality of judges, critics and legal experts have criticized the administration’s attempts to circumvent the Council of State, and the constitutionality of the Decree has been challenged.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The real independence of Colombian institutions serves to protect electoral integrity. At the same time, the complexity of the country’s judiciary and the fragmentation of judicial authority among a variety of government bodies can foster uncertainty and delay the resolution of electoral disputes. The Constitutional Court is the highest judicial instance that determines the constitutionality of laws, acts, and statutes. It operates with real independence to uphold constitutional precepts and protocols. In 2022 and 2024, the Constitutional Court struck down two efforts to reform electoral law undertaken by the governments of Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro, respectively. Both governments failed to follow all the necessary protocols to reform the electoral law. While Colombia’s electoral law from 1991 is in need of reform and the country’s administrative and legal processes can suffer from too much complexity, some of the protocols skipped by the Petro government act as important safeguards to protect the integrity of the law. For instance, there is a requirement that congressional debate takes place before the reform is passed. Furthermore, in June 2025, the Constitutional Court ruled on the CNE’s capacity to investigate political parties, campaigns, and workers for electoral misdeeds, upholding the CNE’s operational effectiveness. At the same time, the Court ruled that the CNE is unable to investigate sitting presidents, as only the Commission of Accusations of the Chamber of Representatives has the jurisdiction to investigate the president in office. In 2024, the Council of State had originally granted the CNE jurisdiction to investigate the President. These judicial decisions took place in the context of the CNE’s investigation into President Petro and his political coalition, who have been found to have exceeded the legal financial limits that can be spent on a campaign. The CNE has fined the political parties Human Colombia and UP, which is the first time a major presidential campaign is sanctioned for this type of infraction—which is perceived to be widespread due to the absence of finance oversight. The politicization of the CNE has somewhat undermined trust in its investigations; nonetheless, the Constitutional Court has been able to set clear limits and guidelines that strengthen electoral oversight in Colombia.
Courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The judiciary in Colombia regularly issues decisions that uphold the rights of dissidents and hold accountable perpetrators who violate these rights, including government officials. For example, in January 2025, the Constitutional Court found that the government of the Cesar region had engaged in censorship when it blocked a journalist on X (formerly Twitter), thereby preventing the journalist from participating in a public forum set up on the platform. The Court highlighted the fact that the account was a public government account, rather than a private one, and that it therefore must guarantee equal access to citizens, including critics. Similarly, in July 2025, the 61st administrative court of Bogotá set a historic precedent for press freedom in a ruling that held the National Police and the Ministry of Defence responsible for injuries that the journalist Andrés Cardona sustained during the 2021 National Strike protests. The Court ordered the government to pay damages to Cardona. Another important ruling to improve press safeguards in Colombia was issued by the Supreme Court of Justice in August 2025. The Court overturned a lower court ruling that treated the assassination of journalist Luis Antonio Peralta Cuéllar as a common homicide. Instead, the Court found that evidence pointed to an assassination targeting Peralta for his journalistic work, and set a precedent that crimes against journalists in retaliation for their work must be considered as attacks on the freedom of expression, rather than petty crimes. This ruling has the potential to change how crimes against journalists are investigated and treated, thereby reducing impunity that empowers perpetrators. At the same time, Colombia’s institutions sometimes operate with a lack of transparency and significant delays, which can hinder dissidents’ ability to seek judicial protection in a timely manner.
HRF classifies Colombia as democratic.
Colombia’s recent history has been shaped by a prolonged armed conflict between the state and insurgent groups. For decades, violent confrontations have occurred between government security forces, paramilitary structures such as the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), also known as the Clan del Golfo, and insurgent organizations, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Although the 2016 peace agreement led to the demobilization of most FARC combatants, dissident factions remain active, and violence linked to armed groups and illicit economies has persisted or intensified in several regions in recent years. Colombia’s mountainous terrain and historically limited state presence in remote rural areas have allowed armed groups to establish territorial strongholds, particularly in regions tied to drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other illicit economies. In some local and regional contexts, these groups have exercised coercive influence over political and economic life. Despite persistent security challenges and uneven state control, Colombia has maintained competitive national elections, peaceful transfers of power, and a functioning constitutional order for decades. In 2002, President Álvaro Uribe intensified military operations against insurgent groups, marking a hardline security phase that reduced the territorial capacity of several guerrilla organizations but was also associated with serious human rights violations, including the “false positives” scandal involving extrajudicial killings by members of the security forces. His successor, Juan Manuel Santos, negotiated the 2016 Peace Accords with the FARC, leading to the demobilization of most of its fighters and its transition into a political party. However, dissident factions and other armed groups, including the ELN and the AGC, continued to compete for territorial control and illicit revenues. In 2022, President Gustavo Petro was elected on a “Total Peace” platform aimed at negotiating with remaining armed groups and implementing the 2016 accord. While his administration pursued ceasefires and dialogue, violence linked to territorial disputes and illicit economies remained elevated in 2025, particularly in rural and border areas.
National elections in Colombia are largely free and fair. However, longstanding challenges linked to electoral violence and vote-buying continue to impact elections in the country. Nonetheless, elections are competitive. Within Colombia’s multiparty system, the mainstream political parties regularly compete for the presidency and seats in the bicameral Congress. Smaller parties can also compete and win a small number of legislative seats. Colombia’s primary electoral body, the National Electoral Council (CNE), effectively manages elections but suffers from politicization. The CNE is also somewhat limited in its ability to oversee campaign finance and detect electoral irregularities, even as some improvements to its operational independence and technical capacities have been achieved. The Colombian government also regularly invites independent electoral observers and experts to provide additional oversight of national elections.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people in Colombia are generally able to openly criticize or challenge the government. However, Colombia remains one of the region’s most dangerous countries for journalists, civil society leaders, and activists. Failures in the justice system allow perpetrators to commit crimes against civil society under anonymity and with impunity. Nonetheless, independent dissenting organizations are able to operate in the country. There is no evidence that the government systematically targets and obstructs the work of critics. The right to peacefully assemble and protest is guaranteed by the Colombian Constitution and generally upheld by the government. However, incidents of disproportionate use of force and police violence against protesters do occur.
Institutions are independent and serve as a check on the government. Oversight institutions and courts are able to act and issue decisions that are unfavorable to the party in power. They are also able to check attempts to concentrate power in the executive. Moreover, the independence of the courts serves to mostly uphold Colombia’s electoral integrity and the rights of dissidents. However, procedural delays and operational complexity can hinder Colombian institutions’ ability to act effectively.
National elections are largely free and fair. However, longstanding challenges linked to electoral violence and vote-buying continue to impact elections. Still, multi-party politics in Colombia remain dynamic and competitive. Mainstream parties, such as the centrist Colombian Liberal Party (PLC) and the right-wing Democratic Center, regularly participate in legislative and presidential elections held every four years. Smaller parties are also able to compete and win seats in Congress. The party in power must therefore form coalitions and drive consensus to be able to effectively govern the country. Colombia’s electoral oversight institutions effectively manage elections; however, institutional weaknesses and complexity limit their oversight capacities and operational independence. The independence of CNE is also diminished by the politicized appointment process of electoral officials, who are selected to represent the partisan interests of major parties in Congress. The government regularly invites independent electoral observers to provide additional oversight of national elections.
The Colombian government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Every four years, political parties and their candidates are able to compete for the presidency as well as for representation in Congress. At the same time, political parties and candidates do sometimes face risks stemming from longstanding political and electoral violence. The complexity of the country’s electoral framework can also make the candidate and party registration process confusing, causing some political tensions. Colombia’s vibrant electoral landscape is populated by a large number of parties and political coalitions. According to the CNE’s database, there were 35 political parties officially registered in the country in 2025. In addition to the mainstream parties, there are a variety of smaller parties that are able to win seats in Congress. Therefore, the party in power must form coalitions to be able to effectively govern the country. Moreover, power alternates frequently between the different mainstream parties. In 2022, Gustavo Petro won the presidency under a broad coalition of left-wing parties, the Historic Pact (PH), which marked a turning point in Colombian politics. President Petro was preceded by Iván Duque, a member of the right-wing Democratic Center. Despite the vibrant political environment, electoral violence casts a long shadow over Colombia’s political history. In June 2025, presidential hopeful Miguel Uribe Turbay of the Democratic Center was fatally shot at a campaign rally event in Bogotá. In the weeks following the assassination, Colombian authorities captured several individuals with ties to organized crime groups. In October 2025, Attorney General Luz Adriana Camargo announced that it was very likely that former FARC guerrilla members had commissioned the assassination, but investigations were still ongoing. The last assassination of a high-profile presidential candidate dates back to 1995, but local political leaders in rural Colombia have continually faced threats throughout the 2000s.
Independent electoral oversight has not been seriously undermined by the party in power. Colombia’s main electoral agency, the CNE, effectively manages and oversees elections. In addition to the CNE, the National Civil Registry (RNEC) and the Ministry of Interior are also involved with electoral oversight and management. International electoral observers are also regularly invited to oversee national elections and provide additional expertise. At the same time, Colombia’s electoral framework suffers from a high degree of complexity and opacity, which renders it challenging to understand and reform. The CNE is also somewhat limited in its capacities and operational independence, even as improvements have been made. Still, the independence of CNE is also diminished by the politicized appointment process of electoral officials, who are selected to represent the partisan interests of major parties in Congress. Vote buying and campaign finance irregularities are also longstanding issues that undermine trust in the electoral process in Colombia.
In 2022, the CNE and the RNCE successfully held national legislative and presidential elections. International observers from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU EOM) were present. Both the OAS and the EU EOM praised Colombia’s electoral authorities for applying recommendations issued by the observers during previous elections, including improving its technical infrastructure and the voting access of rural communities. According to the OAS, Colombia possesses one of the “fastest preliminary results systems” in the region, diminishing uncertainty and improving trust in the electoral process. The governments of Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro made some efforts to reform Colombia’s electoral law, which dates back to 1991. These reforms would have addressed some additional recommendations made by electoral experts; however, the Constitutional Court struck down both reform efforts in 2022 and 2024 due to procedural errors and the absence of consultation and debate required to make such a reform according to Colombian law. Even so, electoral authorities have been able to implement improvements after 2022. Most notably, the CNE has been able to increase its operational and budgetary autonomy vis-à-vis the RNCE, under which it has been traditionally subordinated. Observers from the OAS and EU EOM have remarked that Colombia’s electoral framework is complex and dispersed, which creates challenges in understanding, applying, and reforming the law. Moreover, there are some weaknesses in the law that hinder electoral officials’ ability to oversee electoral finance and address electoral complaints. Candidate registration processes are also slow, complex, and opaque, involving both the CNE and RNCE, which can generate some political tensions.
Despite the limitations of Colombia’s electoral framework, officials have made some progress in improving the detection of electoral crimes as well as strengthening the CNE’s oversight capacities. For example, in preparation for the 2026 legislative and presidential elections, the CNE launched the online platform, “Cuentas Claras,” which aims to improve transparency by streamlining the electoral witness registration process. Moreover, in 2022, the Ministry of the Interior launched a mobile application to make it easier for individuals to report electoral irregularities and crimes. At the same time, efforts to oversee and penalize electoral crimes are hindered by the politicization of the CNE. The nine electoral officials of the CNE are selected by Congress and must meet certain professional thresholds. But, as a result of a political pact, the selection of the officials is split along party lines. Electoral officials are then perceived as representatives of partisan interests rather than independent guarantors of the electoral process. Therefore, when the CNE launched investigations into President Petro’s campaign finances from 2022, the political affiliations of the officials (Democratic Center and PLC) who led the investigations roused suspicions of a politically-motivated attack. In November 2025, the CNE found that President Petro’s campaign exceeded the financial limits set by the electoral law and voted to sanction the campaign’s financial managers and fine the political parties under which Petro ran as president (Human Colombia and Patriotic Union (UP)). This is the first time a presidential campaign has been investigated and found guilty of electoral financial misconduct that is perceived to be widespread in Colombia. While this could represent a new benchmark for electoral oversight in Colombia, the enduring politicization of the CNE undermines the trust in the institution’s independence.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are generally able to openly criticize or challenge the government in Colombia. Members of civil society work under dangerous conditions due to widespread violence, but are not openly and systematically targeted by the government. Perpetrators of serious crimes against journalists, activists, and civil society members remain largely unidentified due to Colombian institutions’ limited capacities to investigate crimes and hold individuals accountable. Some government workers and officials have been implicated in harassing and threatening critics; however, there is no evidence that the government systematically targets or obstructs the work of critics. Moreover, independent entities such as media outlets and civil society organizations (CSOs) are able to operate in Colombia without being unfairly shut down. Individuals have the right to peacefully protest and assemble, which is constitutionally protected and generally upheld by the government.
Government officials have not systematically intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. The Colombian government has not engaged in systematic obstruction campaigns against critics; however, there are government officials and workers who harass and threaten critics. Nonetheless, a variety of civil society members are able to effectively organize and openly express discontent with government policies and actions. For instance, a coalition of CSOs, Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE), works closely with both the CNE and members of the public to promote electoral equity and integrity. The MOE’s members do not hesitate to voice criticism of the CNE’s politicization or occasional inefficiencies, but at the same time, the MOE supports the CNE’s work and collaborates with officials to improve electoral processes and promote democratization throughout the country. Another prominent CSO, Foundation for Press Freedom (FLIP), is active in defending the rights of press workers and denouncing infringements on the freedom of the press. For example, in March 2025, FLIP issued a statement denouncing the skewing of Colombia’s public media in favor of Petro and the party in power under director Hollman Morris. Independent journalists from investigative media organizations, such as La Silla Vacía and Vorágine, are also able to act as government watchdogs and expose wrongdoing.
Nonetheless, dissidents do operate under dangerous conditions and are frequently subject to serious threats. In particular, civil society leaders operating in largely rural communities, known as “líderes sociales,” face the highest risks. In 2024, at least 157 civil society leaders were assassinated in Colombia. In November 2025, the offices of the television channel Radio Cadena Nacional (RCN) in the city of Cali were attacked with explosives. Perpetrators operate under anonymity and impunity due to the ongoing armed conflict and weak state presence in rural Colombia. Moreover, there are members of the government who harass and threaten dissidents. In the most extreme cases, there are former officials who have been condemned or are under investigation for serious crimes against journalists and activists, including spying, torture, and assassination. Although the government does not retaliate against its critics, President Gustavo Petro has a fraught relationship with the press and often uses aggressive rhetoric against his government’s critics. In October 2025, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling that required the President to retract and apologize for comments publicly insulting female journalists.
In Colombia, protests or gatherings have not been systematically repressed by the government. However, police violence against protesters does occur. In particular, a rise in excessive and deadly use of force was reported during the administration of Iván Duque, but has decreased somewhat under Petro. Nonetheless, a network of CSOs that protect protest rights, Campaña Defender la Libertad, has continued to register instances of arbitrary detentions and excessive use of force. Even so, protesters are able to organize and voice criticism of the government. For instance, in April 2024, thousands of protesters gathered across the country’s major cities to protest one of Petro’s reform projects. Numerous peaceful anti-government protests have taken place, with none experiencing the level of police repression witnessed during the tenure of Iván Duque. In 2019 and 2021, massive protests took place, and police repression was significant, resulting in arbitrary detentions of protesters and bystanders, numerous injuries, and some killings. According to Campaña Defender la Libertad, police officers leverage a measure from Colombia’s police code (Law 1801 of 2016), the “transfer for protection,” which is meant to protect individuals who are in a vulnerable situation. It is instead misused to arbitrarily detain individuals. In 2021, Campaña Defender la Libertad registered 3,546 detentions during protests (known as the National Strike or “Paro Nacional”); of these, only 537 had arrest warrants and were legally detained. The remaining almost 3,009 registered cases would then qualify as arbitrary detentions through the “transfer for protection” mechanism. The Presidential Council for Human Rights sets the estimate higher, with approximately 7,020 arbitrary detentions through the “transfer for protection” mechanism during the 2021 protests. In response to the widespread human rights violations of 2019 and 2021, the Ministry of Defense initiated investigations into the officers involved as well as a dialogue to revise police protocols, incorporating input from civil society organizations. However, most cases linked to these human rights violations have experienced long delays, and broader security force reforms, such as moving the police out of the Ministry of Defense’s purview, were discussed but remain to be advanced by the government. According to Campaña Defender la Libertad, arbitrary detentions of protesters continue to take place, even if there is a notable decrease—in 2022, they registered 208 detentions in the context of protests. Between January and August 2023, the network registered the detention of 62 protesters.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as a check on the government. Colombia’s judiciary, as well as the country’s oversight institutions, operate with a degree of independence that allows them to issue decisions that challenge the agenda of the party in power. At times, President Gustavo Petro has relied heavily on presidential decrees to unilaterally move his government’s agenda forward, which represents an effort to circumvent some of the country’s institutional checks. Still, Colombian institutions have been able to respond to these attempts to aggrandize executive power. The courts are also able to uphold electoral integrity and the rights of dissidents. Nonetheless, operational opacity and complexity can hinder institutions’ ability to be responsive and act effectively.
The government in Colombia has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the government are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Courts and oversight institutions in Colombia can issue decisions that are unfavorable to the party in power. For example, in June 2025, President Petro issued the Presidential Decree 639, unilaterally calling for a national “Popular Consultation” (Consulta Popular) or referendum on a series of reforms on health, labor, and pensions that had failed to pass through the legislature. However, the Senate had previously refused the government’s request to hold the referendum; as a result, Decree 639 represented an effort to bypass the Senate as well as the institutional protocol to hold a referendum. In response, twelve senators filed an urgent measure before the Council of State, the highest national judicial instance with jurisdiction over administrative matters. The Council of State acted quickly to suspend Decree 639 due to the absence of congressional approval. Subsequently, Petro agreed to repeal the Decree, and one of the government’s reform packages was passed by Congress. The Petro administration’s difficulties in driving consensus and the President’s attempts to take unilateral action via decrees have challenged the country’s institutions. For instance, the Council of State has acted as an important check throughout Petro’s presidency. In July 2025, the President issued Decree 799, which claims that the President is the “supreme administrative authority” and therefore has the right to reconfigure the judicial hierarchies. With this decree, Petro redirected the way complaints against the president would be handled—first reviewed by lower circuit judges rather than directly sent to the Council of State. While the government claims that this improves the impartiality of judges, critics and legal experts have criticized the administration’s attempts to circumvent the Council of State, and the constitutionality of the Decree has been challenged.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The real independence of Colombian institutions serves to protect electoral integrity. At the same time, the complexity of the country’s judiciary and the fragmentation of judicial authority among a variety of government bodies can foster uncertainty and delay the resolution of electoral disputes. The Constitutional Court is the highest judicial instance that determines the constitutionality of laws, acts, and statutes. It operates with real independence to uphold constitutional precepts and protocols. In 2022 and 2024, the Constitutional Court struck down two efforts to reform electoral law undertaken by the governments of Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro, respectively. Both governments failed to follow all the necessary protocols to reform the electoral law. While Colombia’s electoral law from 1991 is in need of reform and the country’s administrative and legal processes can suffer from too much complexity, some of the protocols skipped by the Petro government act as important safeguards to protect the integrity of the law. For instance, there is a requirement that congressional debate takes place before the reform is passed. Furthermore, in June 2025, the Constitutional Court ruled on the CNE’s capacity to investigate political parties, campaigns, and workers for electoral misdeeds, upholding the CNE’s operational effectiveness. At the same time, the Court ruled that the CNE is unable to investigate sitting presidents, as only the Commission of Accusations of the Chamber of Representatives has the jurisdiction to investigate the president in office. In 2024, the Council of State had originally granted the CNE jurisdiction to investigate the President. These judicial decisions took place in the context of the CNE’s investigation into President Petro and his political coalition, who have been found to have exceeded the legal financial limits that can be spent on a campaign. The CNE has fined the political parties Human Colombia and UP, which is the first time a major presidential campaign is sanctioned for this type of infraction—which is perceived to be widespread due to the absence of finance oversight. The politicization of the CNE has somewhat undermined trust in its investigations; nonetheless, the Constitutional Court has been able to set clear limits and guidelines that strengthen electoral oversight in Colombia.
Courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The judiciary in Colombia regularly issues decisions that uphold the rights of dissidents and hold accountable perpetrators who violate these rights, including government officials. For example, in January 2025, the Constitutional Court found that the government of the Cesar region had engaged in censorship when it blocked a journalist on X (formerly Twitter), thereby preventing the journalist from participating in a public forum set up on the platform. The Court highlighted the fact that the account was a public government account, rather than a private one, and that it therefore must guarantee equal access to citizens, including critics. Similarly, in July 2025, the 61st administrative court of Bogotá set a historic precedent for press freedom in a ruling that held the National Police and the Ministry of Defence responsible for injuries that the journalist Andrés Cardona sustained during the 2021 National Strike protests. The Court ordered the government to pay damages to Cardona. Another important ruling to improve press safeguards in Colombia was issued by the Supreme Court of Justice in August 2025. The Court overturned a lower court ruling that treated the assassination of journalist Luis Antonio Peralta Cuéllar as a common homicide. Instead, the Court found that evidence pointed to an assassination targeting Peralta for his journalistic work, and set a precedent that crimes against journalists in retaliation for their work must be considered as attacks on the freedom of expression, rather than petty crimes. This ruling has the potential to change how crimes against journalists are investigated and treated, thereby reducing impunity that empowers perpetrators. At the same time, Colombia’s institutions sometimes operate with a lack of transparency and significant delays, which can hinder dissidents’ ability to seek judicial protection in a timely manner.
