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HRF classifies Chile as democratic.
In 1990, Chile initiated a transition to democracy after 17 years of military rule under General Augusto Pinochet. Prior to the military coup, the Chilean political system was characterized by stability and growing democratization. Pinochet rose to power in 1973 after the military led an assault on the presidential palace and deposed the democratically elected left-wing president, Salvador Allende, following a constitutional crisis. The military dictatorship, responsible for widespread human rights abuses, came to an end in 1990, after the historic 1988 plebiscite in which Chileans voted to restore elections. The country’s transition to democracy has proven to be largely successful, even as socioeconomic inequalities remain. These tensions contributed to the wave of social unrest that erupted in 2019 and to the subsequent constitutional process, which included two national referendums to replace the 1980 constitution, both of which were ultimately rejected by voters. Since 2022, the Macrozona Sur region, which Mapuche communities claim as their homeland, has been under a continuous state of emergency; confrontations between informal armed groups and state security forces take place occasionally. In November and December 2025, Chile held general elections in which 178 legislative seats were renewed, and a new president was elected in two rounds of voting. Republican Party (PRCh) member José Antonio Kast won the presidential race. President-elect Kast’s inauguration is scheduled for March 2026.
National elections in Chile are largely free and fair. Peaceful alternations of power between an increasingly broad range of parties and coalitions have shaped Chilean politics into a dynamic multiparty system. Many larger and more traditional parties often compete in general elections through formal coalitions, such as the right-wing Let’s Go Chile and successive center-left and left-wing alliances. Although established parties such as the Socialist Party (PS) and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) have remained key actors within their respective blocs, newer parties have gained prominence in recent years. The Electoral Service of Chile (Servel) is an independent electoral body that effectively manages elections, and the Election Certification Tribunal (Tricel) is the independent judicial body that resolves electoral disputes. Both the Servel and Tricel operate without any undue interference from the parties in power.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people in Chile are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Private media outlets are widespread, and civil society organizations (CSOs) operate freely and are able to organize effectively. While the right to peacefully assemble is protected by law, infringements upon the rights of protesters and dissidents do occur. The country’s national police, the “Carabineros,” has gendarmerie-style militarized structure and in recent years has been criticized for indiscriminate and excessive use of force as well as undue censorship of dissent. In response, the Chilean government has taken some steps to reform the Carabineros.
Institutions in Chile are independent and largely serve as a check on the government. The independence of the courts serves to mostly protect the rights of dissidents, even as the judicial harassment of dissidents continues to occur. The country’s institutions are also able to hold officials accountable for their actions; however, further room for improvement remains in holding state security agents accountable for human rights violations.
National elections in Chile are largely free and fair. The mainstream political parties and coalitions are able to compete fairly for the presidency and representation in the legislature. Elections are highly competitive, and presidential runoffs occur frequently. The country’s electoral landscape is characterized by dynamic multiparty politics in which political coalitions form and disband with relative ease. Chile’s electoral framework is robust, and its oversight institutions are independent, functional, and transparent.
The real, mainstream opposition party or candidate has not been unfairly barred from competing in elections by the Chilean government. Every four years, political parties and candidates are able to freely and fairly participate in presidential and legislative elections. Chile’s vibrant electoral landscape is populated by a large number of parties and political coalitions. The dynamic nature of coalition-building in Chile, linked to a broader reconfiguration of the party system, is illustrated in the last two electoral cycles. The left-wing coalition-turned-party Broad Front (founded in 2017) rose rapidly to prominence and won the presidency in 2021; meanwhile, the right-wing Republican Party (founded in 2019) won the presidency in 2025. In effect, the proliferation of political parties has also elicited some concerns of excessive political fragmentation. According to the Electoral Service of Chile’s (Servel) database, there were 25 political parties officially registered in the country in 2025—of these, 24 parties participated in the 2025 legislative race and 17 parties obtained representation in the National Congress. The 2025 general elections resulted in a political shift with the election of the Republican Party member José Antonio Kast to the presidency. The center-right and right-wing political coalitions also increased their presence in the legislature, while the former ruling left-wing coalition lost eleven seats.
The party in power has not engaged in voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Elections are highly competitive, and democratic rule in Chile is characterized by smooth and peaceful political transitions. Since 1999, no single presidential candidate has won an absolute majority, resulting in competitive presidential runoff races. Moreover, since 2009, presidential power has alternated between the major coalitions after each election. In 2025, Kast was elected to the presidency with 58.17 % of the vote, and his PRCh party gained 17 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 4 seats in the Senate. President-elect Kast had previously lost the presidential race against President Gabriel Boric, who was elected with 55.87% of the vote in 2021.
Independent electoral oversight has not been seriously undermined by the Chilean government. The country’s two electoral entities, the Election Certification Tribunal (Tricel) and Servel, operate with real autonomy. Tricel is the independent judicial body responsible for ensuring that electoral law is respected and announcing final election results, while Servel is the independent electoral body that effectively hosts elections and manages party registration and other logistics. Since the country’s transition to democracy, the Chilean government has taken steps to strengthen Servel, so as to ensure its independence from the executive as well as improve electoral transparency. For instance, in 2015, Servel’s autonomy was enshrined in the Constitution. Independent electoral observers from international organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and Transparencia Electoral, have also highlighted the efficiency and professionalism with which Servel and Tricel operate.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Media workers, activists, and civil society leaders work in a largely free and favorable environment, but some dissidents have faced harassment when investigating government officials implicated in wrongdoing. Individuals have the right to peacefully protest and assemble, which is constitutionally protected. However, state security forces have also been known to use excessive force against protesters. Rights violations against dissidents are generally investigated, and some reform has been introduced to alter police practices.
Independent, dissenting organizations have not been unfairly shut down by the Chilean government. A wide variety of international and national civil society organizations (CSOs) operate freely in Chile. According to data from 2023, approximately 403,159 CSOs were officially registered in the country. Moreover, between 2005 and 2023, the average growth rate for the total number of CSOs in Chile was approximately 10.8%. The government provides clear and accessible procedures for creating and maintaining CSOs, which fosters a diverse and active civic space. Furthermore, media companies are also able to operate without undue interference from the government; large private entities, such as El Mercurio and La Tercera, dominate the media landscape. Some smaller media outlets, such as the investigative online journal CIPER, also operate in Chile.
Government officials have not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. While dissidents are generally able to operate in a free and favorable environment, they occasionally face harassment from officials. In Chile, the lack of safeguards around defamation law, such as the vague legal definitions of slander or libel, makes the law vulnerable to abuse by government officials who seek retaliation for negative media coverage. For example, in January 2023, Felipe Soto, an independent journalist and director of the digital media company Resumen, was found guilty of criminal defamation after publishing an article investigating corruption allegations implicating a government official from the Bío Bío region. Soto was condemned to 61 days in prison and fined 680,000 Chilean pesos ($850). Similarly, on May 22, 2023, a criminal court convicted Victor Herrero, journalist and editor of digital media outlet Interferencia, on a defamation charge leveled by a former police official. Herrero was fined 126.000 pesos ($157) for his investigative coverage of alleged corruption within regional police forces. While this practice is not systematic, press rights groups such as the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) and the Committee to Protect Journalists have raised concerns about the undue criminalization of critical press coverage in Chile.
Furthermore, there exists credible evidence that, during the second presidency of Sebastian Piñera, Chilean military intelligence officers led an illicit espionage operation targeting at least six investigative journalists between 2019 and 2021. At the time of surveillance, all six journalists were investigating allegations of corruption, wrongdoing, and human rights violations linked to members of the military. The journalists also reported having been victims of break-ins, thefts, and threats dating back to at least 2012, during the first Piñera administration. In response, the Chilean government launched investigations that resulted in a criminal trial of former intelligence chief Schafik Nazal, which is still ongoing as of 2025. The government also called together a team of journalists, experts, and CSOs to create a new legal protection mechanism for journalists, which had been partially approved by the legislature but is still pending full adoption as of 2025.
Protests or gatherings in Chile have not been seriously and unfairly repressed by the government. CSOs, labor unions, other civil entities, and members of the public are able to organize effectively to publicly voice collective concerns. For instance, in April 2022, truck drivers successfully organized a nationwide protest linked to the price of fuel and the growing prevalence of crime. Generally, protests have been less frequent during the Boric administration compared to the previous Piñera administration. While the right to protest is generally upheld by the government, police units have been criticized for employing excessive use of force against protesters. This issue gained greater visibility during the Piñera administration, when protests against socioeconomic inequality erupted nationwide in 2019. Known as the “Estallido Social,” the protest movement successfully mobilized diverse segments of Chilean society. While some violent rioting did take place, many marches and gatherings that were peaceful were nonetheless subject to excessive and indiscriminate force. In the aftermath of the Estallido Social, hundreds of protesters reported experiencing violence at the hands of state security agents, including incidents involving serious injury, arbitrary arrest, sexual assault, and torture. Journalists who cover protests are also sometimes unfairly harassed by police. For instance, in 2021, reporter Daniel Labbé Yáñez was covering a protest denouncing detentions that took place during the Estallido Social when he was arbitrarily detained and beaten by police officers. Labbé, who was wearing a press badge, was then charged with causing public disorder. In July 2024, an appeals court called for a new trial after inconsistencies in the police account emerged and witnesses testified to Labbé’s work as a journalist on the day of his arrest.
Similarly, members of indigenous Mapuche communities have also reported facing arbitrary detainment and abuse from state security forces, particularly during protests over land rights. It is important to note that there are some armed indigenous groups that engage in violent acts against state officials. However, anti-terrorist initiatives have also been abused to unfairly target peaceful dissidents. The Boric administration has taken some measures to improve the ethical standards of the police force and reduce the lethality of weapons. Top officials from the Carabineros police force were also removed and are subject to ongoing trials.
Institutions in Chile are independent and largely serve as a check on the government. The real independence of the judiciary serves to mostly protect the rights of dissidents; however, journalists continue to face the risk of being charged with criminal defamation in retaliation for critical coverage. Chilean institutions generally hold officials accountable for their actions. Still, human rights abuses committed by state security forces are not always investigated in a timely manner.
Chilean courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In Chile, the constitutional right to honor, along with the criminalization of insult and slander, has occasionally been leveraged to judicially harass journalists, activists, and critics. However, the judiciary has tended to support an interpretation of the law that broadly protects freedom of dissent. For example, in 2021, the judiciary acted to protect the freedom of dissent when a Valparaiso court dismissed criminal charges raised against the artist collective LasTesis by the Carabineros. Police officials claimed that LasTesis threatened and undermined the authority of the Carabineros with an online performance video that criticized the police. However, the judiciary found no proof that LasTesis incited acts of violence and, therefore, acted to protect the collective’s right to express criticism. Similarly, in 2018, Judge Alicia Rosend acquitted the journalist Javier Rebolledo, who was facing charges of criminal defamation. Former military official Raúl Quintana Salazar and his daughter had raised the charges against Rebolledo after he published a book about the Pinochet dictatorship that implicated Quintana Salazar in serious human rights violations.
Yet, the judiciary has sometimes issued decisions that do not align with free expression standards, which creates unstable ground for media companies and independent journalists to operate in. For example, in 2023, independent journalists Victor Herrero and Felipe Soto Cortés were found guilty and fined 126.000 pesos ($157) and 680,000 Chilean pesos ($850), respectively, for investigative reporting into corruption allegations. In 2020, the Supreme Court ordered Radio Bío Bío to take down an audio recording implicating political campaign worker John Campos in the improper influencing of judicial appointments and disciplinary hearings. Campos argued that the publication of that phone call violated his constitutional right to honor. However, free expression advocates contend that the Supreme Court’s decision in favor of Campos undermined journalists’ ability to publish information of public interest.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. Chilean institutions have demonstrated their capacity to investigate wrongdoing by top officials. In November 2023, a judicial corruption scandal emerged involving Supreme Court justices. Private messages between former Supreme Court justice Ángela Vivanco and the influential lawyer Luis Hermosilla revealed serious and recurring influence peddling, which compromised Vivanco’s own nomination to the Supreme Court along with the appointment of other members of the judiciary. Investigations into Hermosilla’s web of judicial influence are ongoing as of 2025, implicating at least two more Supreme Court justices, Antonio Ulloa and Verónica Sabaj, who were removed from their posts along with Vivanco and barred from holding office for five years. Despite the damage done to public trust in the judiciary, the government has demonstrated its ability to mostly hold the officials involved accountable. The government has also acted to initiate reform of the judicial nomination process, which is an initiative that has received support across party lines and began to advance through the legislature in 2025. Similarly, the Public Ministry and the judiciary have also demonstrated their ability to investigate and hold accountable officials with ties to the government in the context of another corruption scandal, known as the “Convenios” case, which also came to light in 2023. Members of President Boric’s political coalition, in particular officials working in regional governments, were implicated in large-scale fraud involving public funds. As of 2025, multiple trials related to the Convenios corruption scandal are still ongoing.
Nonetheless, Chilean institutions’ abilities to hold officials accountable have also come under scrutiny due to delays that can foster impunity. In October 2024, three high-ranking police officials, including the former head of the Carabineros, General Ricardo Yáñez, were indicted for failing in their responsibilities as police leadership and face criminal liability for abdication of duty in the context of police violence during the 2019 and 2020 protest movement. While this indictment demonstrates that the judiciary can hold government officials accountable, civil society members and victims denounced the five-year delay. Similarly, in March 2025, ten state security agents went on trial for allegedly fabricating false accusations of arson against individuals from the Mapuche indigenous community. These events originally took place in 2017, during a government security operation known as Operación Huracán.
HRF classifies Chile as democratic.
In 1990, Chile initiated a transition to democracy after 17 years of military rule under General Augusto Pinochet. Prior to the military coup, the Chilean political system was characterized by stability and growing democratization. Pinochet rose to power in 1973 after the military led an assault on the presidential palace and deposed the democratically elected left-wing president, Salvador Allende, following a constitutional crisis. The military dictatorship, responsible for widespread human rights abuses, came to an end in 1990, after the historic 1988 plebiscite in which Chileans voted to restore elections. The country’s transition to democracy has proven to be largely successful, even as socioeconomic inequalities remain. These tensions contributed to the wave of social unrest that erupted in 2019 and to the subsequent constitutional process, which included two national referendums to replace the 1980 constitution, both of which were ultimately rejected by voters. Since 2022, the Macrozona Sur region, which Mapuche communities claim as their homeland, has been under a continuous state of emergency; confrontations between informal armed groups and state security forces take place occasionally. In November and December 2025, Chile held general elections in which 178 legislative seats were renewed, and a new president was elected in two rounds of voting. Republican Party (PRCh) member José Antonio Kast won the presidential race. President-elect Kast’s inauguration is scheduled for March 2026.
National elections in Chile are largely free and fair. Peaceful alternations of power between an increasingly broad range of parties and coalitions have shaped Chilean politics into a dynamic multiparty system. Many larger and more traditional parties often compete in general elections through formal coalitions, such as the right-wing Let’s Go Chile and successive center-left and left-wing alliances. Although established parties such as the Socialist Party (PS) and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) have remained key actors within their respective blocs, newer parties have gained prominence in recent years. The Electoral Service of Chile (Servel) is an independent electoral body that effectively manages elections, and the Election Certification Tribunal (Tricel) is the independent judicial body that resolves electoral disputes. Both the Servel and Tricel operate without any undue interference from the parties in power.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people in Chile are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Private media outlets are widespread, and civil society organizations (CSOs) operate freely and are able to organize effectively. While the right to peacefully assemble is protected by law, infringements upon the rights of protesters and dissidents do occur. The country’s national police, the “Carabineros,” has gendarmerie-style militarized structure and in recent years has been criticized for indiscriminate and excessive use of force as well as undue censorship of dissent. In response, the Chilean government has taken some steps to reform the Carabineros.
Institutions in Chile are independent and largely serve as a check on the government. The independence of the courts serves to mostly protect the rights of dissidents, even as the judicial harassment of dissidents continues to occur. The country’s institutions are also able to hold officials accountable for their actions; however, further room for improvement remains in holding state security agents accountable for human rights violations.
National elections in Chile are largely free and fair. The mainstream political parties and coalitions are able to compete fairly for the presidency and representation in the legislature. Elections are highly competitive, and presidential runoffs occur frequently. The country’s electoral landscape is characterized by dynamic multiparty politics in which political coalitions form and disband with relative ease. Chile’s electoral framework is robust, and its oversight institutions are independent, functional, and transparent.
The real, mainstream opposition party or candidate has not been unfairly barred from competing in elections by the Chilean government. Every four years, political parties and candidates are able to freely and fairly participate in presidential and legislative elections. Chile’s vibrant electoral landscape is populated by a large number of parties and political coalitions. The dynamic nature of coalition-building in Chile, linked to a broader reconfiguration of the party system, is illustrated in the last two electoral cycles. The left-wing coalition-turned-party Broad Front (founded in 2017) rose rapidly to prominence and won the presidency in 2021; meanwhile, the right-wing Republican Party (founded in 2019) won the presidency in 2025. In effect, the proliferation of political parties has also elicited some concerns of excessive political fragmentation. According to the Electoral Service of Chile’s (Servel) database, there were 25 political parties officially registered in the country in 2025—of these, 24 parties participated in the 2025 legislative race and 17 parties obtained representation in the National Congress. The 2025 general elections resulted in a political shift with the election of the Republican Party member José Antonio Kast to the presidency. The center-right and right-wing political coalitions also increased their presence in the legislature, while the former ruling left-wing coalition lost eleven seats.
The party in power has not engaged in voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Elections are highly competitive, and democratic rule in Chile is characterized by smooth and peaceful political transitions. Since 1999, no single presidential candidate has won an absolute majority, resulting in competitive presidential runoff races. Moreover, since 2009, presidential power has alternated between the major coalitions after each election. In 2025, Kast was elected to the presidency with 58.17 % of the vote, and his PRCh party gained 17 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 4 seats in the Senate. President-elect Kast had previously lost the presidential race against President Gabriel Boric, who was elected with 55.87% of the vote in 2021.
Independent electoral oversight has not been seriously undermined by the Chilean government. The country’s two electoral entities, the Election Certification Tribunal (Tricel) and Servel, operate with real autonomy. Tricel is the independent judicial body responsible for ensuring that electoral law is respected and announcing final election results, while Servel is the independent electoral body that effectively hosts elections and manages party registration and other logistics. Since the country’s transition to democracy, the Chilean government has taken steps to strengthen Servel, so as to ensure its independence from the executive as well as improve electoral transparency. For instance, in 2015, Servel’s autonomy was enshrined in the Constitution. Independent electoral observers from international organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and Transparencia Electoral, have also highlighted the efficiency and professionalism with which Servel and Tricel operate.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Media workers, activists, and civil society leaders work in a largely free and favorable environment, but some dissidents have faced harassment when investigating government officials implicated in wrongdoing. Individuals have the right to peacefully protest and assemble, which is constitutionally protected. However, state security forces have also been known to use excessive force against protesters. Rights violations against dissidents are generally investigated, and some reform has been introduced to alter police practices.
Independent, dissenting organizations have not been unfairly shut down by the Chilean government. A wide variety of international and national civil society organizations (CSOs) operate freely in Chile. According to data from 2023, approximately 403,159 CSOs were officially registered in the country. Moreover, between 2005 and 2023, the average growth rate for the total number of CSOs in Chile was approximately 10.8%. The government provides clear and accessible procedures for creating and maintaining CSOs, which fosters a diverse and active civic space. Furthermore, media companies are also able to operate without undue interference from the government; large private entities, such as El Mercurio and La Tercera, dominate the media landscape. Some smaller media outlets, such as the investigative online journal CIPER, also operate in Chile.
Government officials have not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. While dissidents are generally able to operate in a free and favorable environment, they occasionally face harassment from officials. In Chile, the lack of safeguards around defamation law, such as the vague legal definitions of slander or libel, makes the law vulnerable to abuse by government officials who seek retaliation for negative media coverage. For example, in January 2023, Felipe Soto, an independent journalist and director of the digital media company Resumen, was found guilty of criminal defamation after publishing an article investigating corruption allegations implicating a government official from the Bío Bío region. Soto was condemned to 61 days in prison and fined 680,000 Chilean pesos ($850). Similarly, on May 22, 2023, a criminal court convicted Victor Herrero, journalist and editor of digital media outlet Interferencia, on a defamation charge leveled by a former police official. Herrero was fined 126.000 pesos ($157) for his investigative coverage of alleged corruption within regional police forces. While this practice is not systematic, press rights groups such as the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) and the Committee to Protect Journalists have raised concerns about the undue criminalization of critical press coverage in Chile.
Furthermore, there exists credible evidence that, during the second presidency of Sebastian Piñera, Chilean military intelligence officers led an illicit espionage operation targeting at least six investigative journalists between 2019 and 2021. At the time of surveillance, all six journalists were investigating allegations of corruption, wrongdoing, and human rights violations linked to members of the military. The journalists also reported having been victims of break-ins, thefts, and threats dating back to at least 2012, during the first Piñera administration. In response, the Chilean government launched investigations that resulted in a criminal trial of former intelligence chief Schafik Nazal, which is still ongoing as of 2025. The government also called together a team of journalists, experts, and CSOs to create a new legal protection mechanism for journalists, which had been partially approved by the legislature but is still pending full adoption as of 2025.
Protests or gatherings in Chile have not been seriously and unfairly repressed by the government. CSOs, labor unions, other civil entities, and members of the public are able to organize effectively to publicly voice collective concerns. For instance, in April 2022, truck drivers successfully organized a nationwide protest linked to the price of fuel and the growing prevalence of crime. Generally, protests have been less frequent during the Boric administration compared to the previous Piñera administration. While the right to protest is generally upheld by the government, police units have been criticized for employing excessive use of force against protesters. This issue gained greater visibility during the Piñera administration, when protests against socioeconomic inequality erupted nationwide in 2019. Known as the “Estallido Social,” the protest movement successfully mobilized diverse segments of Chilean society. While some violent rioting did take place, many marches and gatherings that were peaceful were nonetheless subject to excessive and indiscriminate force. In the aftermath of the Estallido Social, hundreds of protesters reported experiencing violence at the hands of state security agents, including incidents involving serious injury, arbitrary arrest, sexual assault, and torture. Journalists who cover protests are also sometimes unfairly harassed by police. For instance, in 2021, reporter Daniel Labbé Yáñez was covering a protest denouncing detentions that took place during the Estallido Social when he was arbitrarily detained and beaten by police officers. Labbé, who was wearing a press badge, was then charged with causing public disorder. In July 2024, an appeals court called for a new trial after inconsistencies in the police account emerged and witnesses testified to Labbé’s work as a journalist on the day of his arrest.
Similarly, members of indigenous Mapuche communities have also reported facing arbitrary detainment and abuse from state security forces, particularly during protests over land rights. It is important to note that there are some armed indigenous groups that engage in violent acts against state officials. However, anti-terrorist initiatives have also been abused to unfairly target peaceful dissidents. The Boric administration has taken some measures to improve the ethical standards of the police force and reduce the lethality of weapons. Top officials from the Carabineros police force were also removed and are subject to ongoing trials.
Institutions in Chile are independent and largely serve as a check on the government. The real independence of the judiciary serves to mostly protect the rights of dissidents; however, journalists continue to face the risk of being charged with criminal defamation in retaliation for critical coverage. Chilean institutions generally hold officials accountable for their actions. Still, human rights abuses committed by state security forces are not always investigated in a timely manner.
Chilean courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In Chile, the constitutional right to honor, along with the criminalization of insult and slander, has occasionally been leveraged to judicially harass journalists, activists, and critics. However, the judiciary has tended to support an interpretation of the law that broadly protects freedom of dissent. For example, in 2021, the judiciary acted to protect the freedom of dissent when a Valparaiso court dismissed criminal charges raised against the artist collective LasTesis by the Carabineros. Police officials claimed that LasTesis threatened and undermined the authority of the Carabineros with an online performance video that criticized the police. However, the judiciary found no proof that LasTesis incited acts of violence and, therefore, acted to protect the collective’s right to express criticism. Similarly, in 2018, Judge Alicia Rosend acquitted the journalist Javier Rebolledo, who was facing charges of criminal defamation. Former military official Raúl Quintana Salazar and his daughter had raised the charges against Rebolledo after he published a book about the Pinochet dictatorship that implicated Quintana Salazar in serious human rights violations.
Yet, the judiciary has sometimes issued decisions that do not align with free expression standards, which creates unstable ground for media companies and independent journalists to operate in. For example, in 2023, independent journalists Victor Herrero and Felipe Soto Cortés were found guilty and fined 126.000 pesos ($157) and 680,000 Chilean pesos ($850), respectively, for investigative reporting into corruption allegations. In 2020, the Supreme Court ordered Radio Bío Bío to take down an audio recording implicating political campaign worker John Campos in the improper influencing of judicial appointments and disciplinary hearings. Campos argued that the publication of that phone call violated his constitutional right to honor. However, free expression advocates contend that the Supreme Court’s decision in favor of Campos undermined journalists’ ability to publish information of public interest.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. Chilean institutions have demonstrated their capacity to investigate wrongdoing by top officials. In November 2023, a judicial corruption scandal emerged involving Supreme Court justices. Private messages between former Supreme Court justice Ángela Vivanco and the influential lawyer Luis Hermosilla revealed serious and recurring influence peddling, which compromised Vivanco’s own nomination to the Supreme Court along with the appointment of other members of the judiciary. Investigations into Hermosilla’s web of judicial influence are ongoing as of 2025, implicating at least two more Supreme Court justices, Antonio Ulloa and Verónica Sabaj, who were removed from their posts along with Vivanco and barred from holding office for five years. Despite the damage done to public trust in the judiciary, the government has demonstrated its ability to mostly hold the officials involved accountable. The government has also acted to initiate reform of the judicial nomination process, which is an initiative that has received support across party lines and began to advance through the legislature in 2025. Similarly, the Public Ministry and the judiciary have also demonstrated their ability to investigate and hold accountable officials with ties to the government in the context of another corruption scandal, known as the “Convenios” case, which also came to light in 2023. Members of President Boric’s political coalition, in particular officials working in regional governments, were implicated in large-scale fraud involving public funds. As of 2025, multiple trials related to the Convenios corruption scandal are still ongoing.
Nonetheless, Chilean institutions’ abilities to hold officials accountable have also come under scrutiny due to delays that can foster impunity. In October 2024, three high-ranking police officials, including the former head of the Carabineros, General Ricardo Yáñez, were indicted for failing in their responsibilities as police leadership and face criminal liability for abdication of duty in the context of police violence during the 2019 and 2020 protest movement. While this indictment demonstrates that the judiciary can hold government officials accountable, civil society members and victims denounced the five-year delay. Similarly, in March 2025, ten state security agents went on trial for allegedly fabricating false accusations of arson against individuals from the Mapuche indigenous community. These events originally took place in 2017, during a government security operation known as Operación Huracán.
