Fully Authoritarian
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HRF classifies Chad as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Chad is a semi-presidential republic. Head of State, Field Marshal Mahamat Idriss Déby, first seized power in a military coup in 2021 upon the sudden death of his father, Idriss Déby, and legitimized his rule by claiming victory in unfair and untransparent May 2024 elections. The father-to-son succession extends the Déby family’s three decades of dynastic rule and the dominance of the ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) with the backing of the military, which plays a crucial role in Chadian politics. Since gaining independence from France in 1960, Chad has experienced continuous authoritarian rule and violent struggles for power in the form of armed rebellions, military coups, and a civil war. The country has never experienced a peaceful handover of power between elected heads of state, and all of Chad’s leaders have historically either been assassinated, overthrown, or forced to resign. Although a multiparty system was introduced in 1991, Chad’s democratization process completely stalled under the late former dictator Idriss Déby, who extended his rule for three decades by repeatedly amending the constitution to increase his powers and organizing unfree and unfair elections.
National elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete or possibly win. Since the country’s first multi-party polls in 1996, the ruling MPS has claimed victory in each of the national elections by an average margin of over 50 points from the nearest opposition party. More than three decades of MPS control over all public institutions and branches of government and repression against the real, mainstream opposition have given the party absolute and unfair supremacy in electioneering.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly challenge the regime. This includes arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, summary suspensions, threats, and extrajudicial killings. The regime systematically employs excessive force to crack down on dissenting protests.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. There is a significant lack of institutional accountability in Chad, primarily due to the state’s capture of judicial, legislative, and executive institutions. This translated into national institutions making decisions that favored the regime’s interests.
National elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete or possibly win. After the 2021 coup, the regime organized presidential elections and the first parliamentary polls in 14 years in 2024. The polls were preceded by repression, marred by blatant unfairness, lack of transparency, and a boycott by the main opposition party.
The regime has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. In the run-up to the 2024 elections, the ruling MPS benefited from significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermined the main opposition party, Transformers’, ability to compete. Field Marshal Mahamat Déby has fully captured the control of state institutions through the long-standing dominance of the MPS and the backing of the military. The regime has also unilaterally determined the composition of the election oversight institutions, the National Elections Management Agency (ANGE) and the Constitutional Council. The regime also significantly hindered the electoral campaign presidential candidate, Succès Masra. Transformers party members faced arbitrary arrests, violence, and intimidation by the regime.
The regime has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight by completely controlling the ANGE and systematically refusing to allow independent observers, both national and international, to participate at polling stations. Supporters of the Transformers party also faced difficulties in accessing polling stations. The electoral code adopted by the regime lacked transparency, as it did not require results to be posted outside polling stations after the vote count. Even after the election, ANGE refused to share the results file from the polling stations, which the opposition requested to compare with the data they claimed to have gathered.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly challenge the regime. The regime intimidates journalists, media, and civil society organizations. It has also killed protestors and assassinated political opponents.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. The regime obstructs the work of independent media through arbitrary arrests and the imposition of censorship measures through its control of the media regulatory agency, the High Authority for Media and Audiovisual (HAMA). For example, in October 2024, HAMA banned two managers of the private newspaper Le Visionnaire from practicing journalism for not having press cards and suspended the paper for three months in retaliation for a report into government mismanagement. In March 2025, journalists Olivier Mbaindiguim Monodji and Ndilyam Guekidata were arrested and charged with conspiracy with a foreign power for publishing information related to the activities of Russian mercenaries in the Sahel. In July 2024, journalists Saleh Hassane Adoum and Ibrahim Hassan Mouhadjir of Tribune Echos and Tchad Infos were detained for reporting on the police killing of a public transportation driver.
The regime also systematically targets dissenting organizations. It has repeatedly undermined the work of Wakit Tama, a leading civil society organization in Chad. From October 2022 to January 2023, Wakit Tama’s activities were suspended under the pretext of public order and state security. This suspension followed a march organized by the organization, in collaboration with opposition parties, in October 2022 to protest the regime’s two-year extension of the transition period.
The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. In October 2022, the regime violently suppressed pro-democracy demonstrations led by the main opposition party, Les Transformateurs, against the regime’s arbitrary extension of the military transition period. Security forces killed more than 200 people, detained over 1,300, tortured dozens of individuals, and forcefully disappeared six protesters. Between February and October 2021, Chadian security forces used excessive violence against pro-democracy demonstrators, resulting in at least 20 deaths, 152 injuries, and 849 arrests. From February 2021 to May 2022, the regime suppressed at least 18 demonstrations.
The regime has systematically killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. The regime frequently cracks down on its most serious political opponents. In 2024, regime security forces assassinated Yaya Dillo Djérou Bétchi, head of the opposition Socialist Party Without Borders, who was considered one of Deby’s most serious opponents. The October 2022 repression against the Transformers party leader, Succès Masra, into exile. He was only allowed to return following the October 2023 Kinshasa Accord.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Both Mahamat Deby and his father, Idriss Deby, have, over decades, repeatedly amended the constitution to concentrate and amass powers in the presidency, weaken or remove checks on their power, and subordinate the legislative and judiciary branches.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. In June 2023, a new junta-backed constitution, drafted by an unelected, junta-appointed Transitional National Council, gave the president extensive powers, including unchecked power to appoint by decree all magistrates, Constitutional Council members, and the Supreme Court Chief Justice. Subsequently, the Supreme Court validated the results of the controversial December 2023 referendum, officially recognizing the adoption of the new constitution and dismissing an appeal from the opposition, despite allegations of voting irregularities.
Judicial and legislative institutions have failed to hold the regime accountable, even when major crimes were involved. The Chadian justice system has not prosecuted any official or member of the security forces for the October 2022 massacre of pro-democracy protests, known as Black Thursday, in which security forces killed over 200 people. Aside from the dismissal of five police officers, there has been no effort to hold members of the security forces criminally accountable, nor any measures undertaken to provide compensation to the victims. In November 2023, the National Transitional Council (CNT) passed a general amnesty law to end all prosecutions against the security forces involved in the massacre.
The regime has systematically undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. For example, in November 2022, opposition leader Masra requested that the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) initiate an investigation into regime officials regarding alleged crimes against humanity committed during the crackdown on the demonstration that took place on October 20. Another instance is the case brought to the French justice system in February 2025 by the family of Dillo, the assassinated Chadian opposition leader. The family justified their decision to pursue international courts rather than Chadian courts on the basis that the regime had not adequately addressed the case and had failed to take the necessary steps for an independent judicial inquiry.
In Chad, the regime has systematically subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. When the junta took power in 2021, it suspended the National Assembly and replaced it with the CNT. The regime handpicked all 93 of its initial members, excluded independent civil society groups and major opposition parties from it, and by January 2024, expanded it to 203 members. The CNT supported various policies that favored the regime during the electoral process in 2024. These policies included the adoption of a draft constitution in June 2023, establishing a new constitutional council in January 2024, and adopting an electoral code in February 2024. In the December 2024 elections, which were boycotted by the main opposition party Les Transformateurs, the ruling MPS completely took control of the new post-transitional National Assembly by winning two-thirds of the available seats.
The regime has systematically subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. For example, the Chadian media regulatory body, HAMA, is intended to function as an independent public institution. Still, its composition is determined by the regime, which often leads to the suppression of critical media coverage. Furthermore, the regime appointed all fifteen members of ANGE, the elections agency, and selected Ahmed Bartchiret, a close ally and former president of the Supreme Court, as its chairman. In April 2022, the regime undermined the independence of the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) by enacting Decree N°0898/PR/2022, which appointed new members in violation of existing Law No. 028, which previously granted the organization its autonomy.
HRF classifies Chad as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Chad is a semi-presidential republic. Head of State, Field Marshal Mahamat Idriss Déby, first seized power in a military coup in 2021 upon the sudden death of his father, Idriss Déby, and legitimized his rule by claiming victory in unfair and untransparent May 2024 elections. The father-to-son succession extends the Déby family’s three decades of dynastic rule and the dominance of the ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) with the backing of the military, which plays a crucial role in Chadian politics. Since gaining independence from France in 1960, Chad has experienced continuous authoritarian rule and violent struggles for power in the form of armed rebellions, military coups, and a civil war. The country has never experienced a peaceful handover of power between elected heads of state, and all of Chad’s leaders have historically either been assassinated, overthrown, or forced to resign. Although a multiparty system was introduced in 1991, Chad’s democratization process completely stalled under the late former dictator Idriss Déby, who extended his rule for three decades by repeatedly amending the constitution to increase his powers and organizing unfree and unfair elections.
National elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete or possibly win. Since the country’s first multi-party polls in 1996, the ruling MPS has claimed victory in each of the national elections by an average margin of over 50 points from the nearest opposition party. More than three decades of MPS control over all public institutions and branches of government and repression against the real, mainstream opposition have given the party absolute and unfair supremacy in electioneering.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly challenge the regime. This includes arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, summary suspensions, threats, and extrajudicial killings. The regime systematically employs excessive force to crack down on dissenting protests.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. There is a significant lack of institutional accountability in Chad, primarily due to the state’s capture of judicial, legislative, and executive institutions. This translated into national institutions making decisions that favored the regime’s interests.
National elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete or possibly win. After the 2021 coup, the regime organized presidential elections and the first parliamentary polls in 14 years in 2024. The polls were preceded by repression, marred by blatant unfairness, lack of transparency, and a boycott by the main opposition party.
The regime has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. In the run-up to the 2024 elections, the ruling MPS benefited from significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermined the main opposition party, Transformers’, ability to compete. Field Marshal Mahamat Déby has fully captured the control of state institutions through the long-standing dominance of the MPS and the backing of the military. The regime has also unilaterally determined the composition of the election oversight institutions, the National Elections Management Agency (ANGE) and the Constitutional Council. The regime also significantly hindered the electoral campaign presidential candidate, Succès Masra. Transformers party members faced arbitrary arrests, violence, and intimidation by the regime.
The regime has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight by completely controlling the ANGE and systematically refusing to allow independent observers, both national and international, to participate at polling stations. Supporters of the Transformers party also faced difficulties in accessing polling stations. The electoral code adopted by the regime lacked transparency, as it did not require results to be posted outside polling stations after the vote count. Even after the election, ANGE refused to share the results file from the polling stations, which the opposition requested to compare with the data they claimed to have gathered.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly challenge the regime. The regime intimidates journalists, media, and civil society organizations. It has also killed protestors and assassinated political opponents.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. The regime obstructs the work of independent media through arbitrary arrests and the imposition of censorship measures through its control of the media regulatory agency, the High Authority for Media and Audiovisual (HAMA). For example, in October 2024, HAMA banned two managers of the private newspaper Le Visionnaire from practicing journalism for not having press cards and suspended the paper for three months in retaliation for a report into government mismanagement. In March 2025, journalists Olivier Mbaindiguim Monodji and Ndilyam Guekidata were arrested and charged with conspiracy with a foreign power for publishing information related to the activities of Russian mercenaries in the Sahel. In July 2024, journalists Saleh Hassane Adoum and Ibrahim Hassan Mouhadjir of Tribune Echos and Tchad Infos were detained for reporting on the police killing of a public transportation driver.
The regime also systematically targets dissenting organizations. It has repeatedly undermined the work of Wakit Tama, a leading civil society organization in Chad. From October 2022 to January 2023, Wakit Tama’s activities were suspended under the pretext of public order and state security. This suspension followed a march organized by the organization, in collaboration with opposition parties, in October 2022 to protest the regime’s two-year extension of the transition period.
The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. In October 2022, the regime violently suppressed pro-democracy demonstrations led by the main opposition party, Les Transformateurs, against the regime’s arbitrary extension of the military transition period. Security forces killed more than 200 people, detained over 1,300, tortured dozens of individuals, and forcefully disappeared six protesters. Between February and October 2021, Chadian security forces used excessive violence against pro-democracy demonstrators, resulting in at least 20 deaths, 152 injuries, and 849 arrests. From February 2021 to May 2022, the regime suppressed at least 18 demonstrations.
The regime has systematically killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. The regime frequently cracks down on its most serious political opponents. In 2024, regime security forces assassinated Yaya Dillo Djérou Bétchi, head of the opposition Socialist Party Without Borders, who was considered one of Deby’s most serious opponents. The October 2022 repression against the Transformers party leader, Succès Masra, into exile. He was only allowed to return following the October 2023 Kinshasa Accord.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Both Mahamat Deby and his father, Idriss Deby, have, over decades, repeatedly amended the constitution to concentrate and amass powers in the presidency, weaken or remove checks on their power, and subordinate the legislative and judiciary branches.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. In June 2023, a new junta-backed constitution, drafted by an unelected, junta-appointed Transitional National Council, gave the president extensive powers, including unchecked power to appoint by decree all magistrates, Constitutional Council members, and the Supreme Court Chief Justice. Subsequently, the Supreme Court validated the results of the controversial December 2023 referendum, officially recognizing the adoption of the new constitution and dismissing an appeal from the opposition, despite allegations of voting irregularities.
Judicial and legislative institutions have failed to hold the regime accountable, even when major crimes were involved. The Chadian justice system has not prosecuted any official or member of the security forces for the October 2022 massacre of pro-democracy protests, known as Black Thursday, in which security forces killed over 200 people. Aside from the dismissal of five police officers, there has been no effort to hold members of the security forces criminally accountable, nor any measures undertaken to provide compensation to the victims. In November 2023, the National Transitional Council (CNT) passed a general amnesty law to end all prosecutions against the security forces involved in the massacre.
The regime has systematically undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. For example, in November 2022, opposition leader Masra requested that the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) initiate an investigation into regime officials regarding alleged crimes against humanity committed during the crackdown on the demonstration that took place on October 20. Another instance is the case brought to the French justice system in February 2025 by the family of Dillo, the assassinated Chadian opposition leader. The family justified their decision to pursue international courts rather than Chadian courts on the basis that the regime had not adequately addressed the case and had failed to take the necessary steps for an independent judicial inquiry.
In Chad, the regime has systematically subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. When the junta took power in 2021, it suspended the National Assembly and replaced it with the CNT. The regime handpicked all 93 of its initial members, excluded independent civil society groups and major opposition parties from it, and by January 2024, expanded it to 203 members. The CNT supported various policies that favored the regime during the electoral process in 2024. These policies included the adoption of a draft constitution in June 2023, establishing a new constitutional council in January 2024, and adopting an electoral code in February 2024. In the December 2024 elections, which were boycotted by the main opposition party Les Transformateurs, the ruling MPS completely took control of the new post-transitional National Assembly by winning two-thirds of the available seats.
The regime has systematically subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. For example, the Chadian media regulatory body, HAMA, is intended to function as an independent public institution. Still, its composition is determined by the regime, which often leads to the suppression of critical media coverage. Furthermore, the regime appointed all fifteen members of ANGE, the elections agency, and selected Ahmed Bartchiret, a close ally and former president of the Supreme Court, as its chairman. In April 2022, the regime undermined the independence of the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) by enacting Decree N°0898/PR/2022, which appointed new members in violation of existing Law No. 028, which previously granted the organization its autonomy.
