Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Burundi as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Burundi is a presidential republic led by Évariste Ndayishimiye of the ruling CNDD-FDD, who took power in June 2020 after a highly manipulated election. Since its independence in 1962, the country has experienced over ten coup attempts, with six successful, and a protracted bloody civil war. The instability has largely been driven by violent power struggles between the Hutu majority, which makes up 85% of the population, and the Tutsi minority, which has historically dominated political and military power. The first multiparty elections in 1993 brought the first Hutu leader, Melchior Ndadaye, to power, but he was assassinated by Tutsi army officers three months after he took office, sparking a twelve-year-long civil war in which the Hutu-dominated National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) rebel group prevailed. Since the first post-war elections in 2005, the CNDD-FDD has dominated the political landscape.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The former rebel group CNDD-FDD has held power since its late leader, Pierre Nkurunziza, was elected in an indirect election in 2005. The real, mainstream opposition boycotted the 2010 polls based on concerns of rigging, and the CNDD-FDD claimed victories in the 2015 and 2020 elections by 53 points and 46 points, respectively, amid repression and accusations of fraud and manipulation. The regime manipulates the electoral process and controls the institutions that should guarantee free and fair elections.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and ordinary citizens face open and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize the regime. The regime cultivates fear by banning media activities and silencing dissent through abductions, threats, persecution, arbitrary arrests, and killings.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. There is a significant lack of institutional accountability in Burundi, primarily due to the regime’s capture of judicial, legislative, and executive institutions. The judiciary is unable to hold the CNDD-FDD accountable or serve as a check to prevent its actions. Likewise, the regime, through the powers granted to the president, has the ability to intervene in legislative decisions, including through the exemption from constitutional amendments.
In Burundi, national elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime distorts the electoral landscape in its favor by blocking party participation, committing routine electoral irregularities, and dominating the institutions that oversee results, effectively preventing elections from serving as a path to political alternation.
The regime has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections. The regime-controlled Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) barred candidates from the main opposition parties, the Burundi Bwa Bose coalition, and the National Congress for Liberty (CNL) from running in the June 2025 parliamentary elections. First, the regime formally suspended the CNL in 2023 through the Ministry of the Interior, citing internal party irregularities. This suspension placed the party in an irregular legal status, preventing it from officially registering for the electoral process. Second, at the end of 2024, the regime introduced a complementary decree to the Electoral Code that imposed new eligibility requirements. The decree stipulated that politicians who left their parties could only run after a minimum of one year, and that party leaders needed two years of separation to become eligible. This measure directly targeted figures such as Agathon Rwasa, the historic leader of the CNL, who had been removed from party leadership under contested circumstances and was attempting to maintain his candidacy independently. Consequently, in the 2020 presidential election, the CENI barred the candidacies of Jacques Bigirimana of the National Liberation Front (FNL), a historic opposition party with a critical voice in the political landscape, and Domitien Ndayizeye, former interim president (2003–2005) and current leader of the Kira-Burundi coalition, who held significant political relevance. He reentered the race only after filing an appeal before the Constitutional Court.
The regime has systematically, unfairly, and significantly hindered real, mainstream opposition parties’ or candidates’ electoral campaigns. The regime’s tactics include seizure of campaign materials, blocking of rallies, and deployment of security forces to harass opposition supporters. On May 15, 2025, regime forces acting on the orders of Claudine Niyoyitunga, commune administrator of Musongati, blocked members of the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) for several hours to prevent them from campaigning. In Mpinga-Kayove, the district administrator immobilized a CDP convoy for allegedly lacking formal campaign authorization. In Tangara, Butanyerera Province, district officials close to the National Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) confiscated CDP campaign materials, claiming the candidates lacked authorization.
Non-state actors with ties to the regime have systematically contributed to the hindrance of real, mainstream opposition parties’ or candidates’ electoral campaigns. During the 2025 elections, the ruling party’s youth wing, the Imbonerakure, harassed, destroyed, and confiscated opposition posters and blocked rallies and meetings in certain districts, especially in Ngozi, Kirundo, Bururi, Gitega, and Bujumbura. As a result, the Imbonerakure forced CNL members to campaign discreetly to avoid reprisals.
Moreover, CNDD-FDD’s regime has engaged in systematic, significant voting irregularities and electoral fraud. Tactics include the manipulation of ballot box logistics and barring citizens from voting. The regime also manipulated ballot box transport and vote counting, tampering with results throughout the process. During the 2020 presidential election, CNDD-FDD members ran illegal propaganda campaigns in all six districts of the opposition stronghold of Cibitoke Province, as voters waited to cast their ballots. In Rugombo and Murwi, six CNDD-FDD members were caught distributing ballots to inflate voter numbers. In the 2025 parliamentary elections, the National Congress for Liberty (CNL), the main opposition party, reported that CENI barred its members from voting after accusing them of voting multiple times. Similarly, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) denounced, with evidence, the illegal insertion of pre-filled ballots in favor of the regime.
The regime has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages derived from the abusive use of state resources and a coercive public financing scheme. In December 2017, the regime issued Joint Ministerial Order No. 530/540/1772, creating a system of contributions to “support” the 2020 elections, which ended up funding the CNDD-FDD campaign. The scheme required payments from every household and direct deductions from public employees’ salaries over two years, with mandatory receipts and deposits into a Burundian bank account. Collections continued from December 2017 to July 2019, when the Imbonerakure announced a suspension. In August 2019, a new order cancelled the collections but maintained “voluntary contributions,” which in practice enabled widespread extortion by Imbonerakure members and local administrators who collected money in markets and administrative offices for the regime’s campaign. During the May 2025 parliamentary elections, the regime again abused state resources by mobilizing administrative vehicles for rallies. It forced all heads of public service departments and district administrators to participate, and it compelled students to attend rallies, transporting them in vehicles with yellow license plates reserved for official missions. The CNDD-FDD also diverted public fuel stocks designated for administrative travel to power its campaign vehicles.
The regime has seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. Using the pretext of COVID-19 prevention, the regime blocked international observers from monitoring the 2020 elections. It imposed a mandatory 14-day quarantine on all foreigners just days before voting, which barred the East African Community (EAC) mission—previously authorized to observe—from arriving in time. Domestically, the CENI refused to accredit civil society groups such as Ligue Iteka and other independent organizations, leaving the field of observation nearly empty. CENI members distributed observer credentials selectively, favoring pro-regime groups while excluding independent or critical actors. They also expelled opposition delegates from polling stations under the pretext of arriving “late,” preventing them from monitoring the count. In districts such as Vugizo, where the opposition had strong support, only regime-affiliated observers monitored the tallying, while officials barred opposition representatives before the process began.
The regime has skewed the electoral playing field so much so that it generally claims victory in elections with a very high vote share. The CNDD-FDD has won successive presidential elections by large margins over the past decade. In 2010, Pierre Nkurunziza secured reelection with 91.62% of the vote in a highly controversial election with no challenger after major opposition candidates withdrew in protest over the regime’s manipulation. In 2015, Nkurunziza won again with 73.91% despite strong domestic and international objections to his constitutionally questionable third term. In 2020, CNDD-FDD candidate Évariste Ndayishimiye, who succeeded Nkurunziza, claimed 69% of the vote amid widespread irregularities. In the June 5, 2025, parliamentary elections, the CNDD-FDD reported 96.51% of valid votes and took all 100 seats in the National Assembly.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society figures, organizations, and ordinary citizens face open and systematic retaliation for criticizing or openly challenging the regime. The regime sustains repression by manipulating the media, abusing power, and silencing dissent through arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings of journalists, activists, and opposition members.
The regime has systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. In May 2018, the regime-controlled National Communication Council (CNC) suspended the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) after it released a documentary exposing secret detention and torture centers in Burundi. The regime partially lifted the suspension in 2021, but only under strict CNC supervision. In May 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expelled the World Health Organization (WHO) representatives after the agency pressed the regime to adopt stronger public health measures. In May 2018, the regime also suspended Voice of America (VOA) for six months, allegedly for breaching journalistic rules by employing exiled Burundian journalists prosecuted by local courts. In 2015, the regime shut down Radio Publique Africaine (RPA) and interrupted broadcasts of Isanganiro and Bonesha FM during protests against Nkurunziza’s third term, accusing them of inciting violence.
The regime has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. The regime imposes laws and a code of conduct on the state media to propagate regime messages and block information from independent sources, using the CNC, whose members the president appoints and fully subordinates to the regime. Under CNC control, it imposed laws that blocked the production and circulation of news without prior approval. In 2019, it pushed through a new press law and created a Code of Conduct for Media and Journalists. On June 6, 2024, the CNC blocked a joint program by six independent outlets—Bonesha FM, Radio-Télévision Isanganiro, Shima FM, Rema FM, Jimbere magazine, and the Iwacu Press Group—on the proposed press law. The council claimed the law, which obliges journalists to disclose their sources in some circumstances and bans articles deemed harmful to national security, had not yet been enacted. The regime also exerts control over independent media outlets by closely monitoring their work; in some cases, independent journalists must obtain special authorization or work under the supervision of state media reporters to cover certain topics. Additionally, the Ministry of Communication, Information Technology, and Media funded electoral coverage by a state-sanctioned coalition of radio, television, print, and online outlets, which was required to submit all content to a central editorial team that altered reports to favor the regime.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media and political leaders. Through intimidation, threats, and vague laws, Burundian journalists live in constant fear of being threatened, attacked, or imprisoned. In December 2024, authorities arrested Sandra Muhoza, a journalist at La Nova Burundi, for sharing information on the regime’s arms distribution via WhatsApp; a court sentenced her to 21 months in prison for “attacking the integrity of the national territory” and “racial aversion.” In August 2022, officials arrested Floriane Irangabiye, a journalist and co-founder of a Rwanda-based news outlet run by Burundian exiles. She faced charges of compromising the integrity of the national territory after working as a commentator and host for Radio Igicaniro, an online diaspora channel broadcasting critical debates on Burundian politics and culture. In January 2023, a court sentenced her to 10 years in prison and fined her 1 million Burundian francs ( $480). In February 2023, intelligence agents arrested five human rights defenders: Sonia Ndikumasabo and Marie Emerusabe of the Association of Women Lawyers of Burundi (AFJB); activists Audace Havyarimana and Sylvana Inamahoro; and Prosper Runyange of the Association for Peace and the Promotion of Human Rights (APDH). Prosecutors charged them with rebellion, compromising internal security, and undermining the functioning of public finances, allegedly because of their ties to international civil society organizations (CSOs).
Moreover, the regime has systematically killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. The regime carried out killings and abductions of dissidents through its agents. On April 6, 2024, agents abducted Djuma Ndayishimiye, an activist affiliated with the opposition party National Congress for Liberty (CNL), from his home in Bujumbura; he remains missing. Between January and September 2024, regime agents killed 210 people, most identified as CNL members. Of these, 31 deaths were directly attributed to state agents, including 10 summary executions. The remaining victims were found dead across the country, with administrative officials hastily burying their bodies without investigation.
Non-state actors with ties to the regime have systematically contributed to the killing or enforced disappearance of dissidents. On March 16, 2020, unidentified people, suspected to be members of Imbonerakure, shot and killed Methuselah Nahishakiye, a local CNL candidate in Migera Hill, Kabezi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province, after he had previously received threats. On March 29, 2020, Imbonerakure killed Jean Bosco Ngabirano, a member of the National Congress for Liberty (CNL), on the orders of a ruling party district administrator.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The regime has expanded control over the judicial and legislative branches. The courts favor rulings that allow the CNDD-FDD to unfairly win elections and target critics. Judges who do not align with the regime are arrested.
Courts have systematically and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. Burundi’s courts routinely refuse to restrain abuses of power by the regime and instead favor rulings that weaken fair competition. In the June 2025 parliamentary elections, the Constitutional Court validated results that awarded all National Assembly seats to the CNDD-FDD and dismissed appeals from UPRONA, CNL, CDP, and the Burundi Bwa Bose coalition, claiming insufficient evidence of irregularities. Opposition parties and observers documented intimidation, the expulsion of monitors, and manipulation through ballot stuffing, selective distribution of voter cards, and multiple voting, but the judiciary refused to order any review. Ahead of the 2020 elections, the Constitutional Court validated Évariste Ndayishimiye’s candidacy despite irregularities, while barring opposition candidates Valentin Kavakure (FPN–Imboneza), Jacques Bigirimana (FNL), and Anicet Niyonkuru (CDP). Also, during the 2020 presidential elections, the Constitutional Court received multiple complaints of irregularities, fraud, and intimidation against opposition members. The main complaint, led by opposition leader Agathon Rwasa, alleged coercion and fraud during voting, but the Court dismissed the case outright, citing insufficient evidence and procedural deadlines without reviewing the substance of the allegations. Earlier, in 2015, the Constitutional Court validated President Pierre Nkurunziza’s candidacy for a third term, even though the decision violated both the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and the Constitution of Burundi.
Furthermore, courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, or enable, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The regime directs the judiciary to deliver rulings marked by irregularities, lack of due process, and political motivations. As a result, it has consolidated control over the courts and systematically targeted those it labels as “enemies” of the state. On January 2, 2022, the Mukaza High Court in Bujumbura sentenced journalist Floriane Irangabiye to 10 years in prison and fined her 1 million Burundian francs (about $482) for allegedly endangering the integrity of the national territory. Prosecutors presented no credible evidence and based the charges solely on comments she and other guests made during a radio program criticizing the regime.
Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the regime, face systematic retaliation. The regime targets judges with death threats, illegal arrests, and physical assaults. In 2015, Constitutional Court judges faced threats from the CNDD-FDD to validate Pierre Nkurunziza’s candidacy for a third presidential term. The Court’s Vice President, Sylvere Nimpagaritse, fled the country after refusing to endorse the candidacy, citing “death threats” and “extreme pressure” from the CNDD-FDD to align with the ruling. Similarly, on August 16, 2023, officials arrested three Bururi High Court judges—Antoine Ngendakumana, Léonard Nizigiyimana, and Irène Mukeshimana—on charges of “complicity in an attack on the internal security of the state” after they provisionally released eight detainees accused of machete killings in Bururi Province for lack of evidence. On October 22, 2024, the Supreme Court dropped the charges and released the judges.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. It altered laws and regulations to expand presidential powers over the judiciary. In 2018, the regime amended the Constitution to strengthen presidential powers over the judiciary, violating key principles of the Arusha Agreements, including judicial term limits and separation of powers. By replacing the oversight mechanisms established in the 2005 Constitution with a centralized, presidentialist model, the regime undermined judicial independence and stripped courts of their supervisory role. This reform weakened the rule of law and reduced the judiciary to a subordinate function of the ruling power, incapable of ensuring justice or safeguarding institutional legality.
Additionally, the regime directly controls the judiciary through the Judicial Services Commission and the Ministry of Justice, interfering in the appointment, promotion, reassignment, and funding of magistrates to ensure loyalty and suppress opponents. Under the 2018 Constitution, the President appoints Supreme Court judges on the proposal of the Minister of Justice, following an opinion from the High Council of the Judiciary and approval by the Senate; the same process applies to members of the Constitutional Court.
The regime has systematically subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Through the 2018 constitutional reform, approved in a referendum on May 17 and promulgated on June 7, the regime eliminated Parliament’s veto power over Executive decisions, stripping it of a key tool to limit regime actions. The same reform established that any bill passed by Parliament automatically becomes null if the president does not assent within 30 days, subjecting legislative activity to the Executive’s discretion and making Parliament dependent on presidential will. By also allowing the regime to formulate policies without parliamentary approval, the reform hollowed out Parliament’s role as a forum for democratic debate and oversight of public policies.
HRF classifies Burundi as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Burundi is a presidential republic led by Évariste Ndayishimiye of the ruling CNDD-FDD, who took power in June 2020 after a highly manipulated election. Since its independence in 1962, the country has experienced over ten coup attempts, with six successful, and a protracted bloody civil war. The instability has largely been driven by violent power struggles between the Hutu majority, which makes up 85% of the population, and the Tutsi minority, which has historically dominated political and military power. The first multiparty elections in 1993 brought the first Hutu leader, Melchior Ndadaye, to power, but he was assassinated by Tutsi army officers three months after he took office, sparking a twelve-year-long civil war in which the Hutu-dominated National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) rebel group prevailed. Since the first post-war elections in 2005, the CNDD-FDD has dominated the political landscape.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The former rebel group CNDD-FDD has held power since its late leader, Pierre Nkurunziza, was elected in an indirect election in 2005. The real, mainstream opposition boycotted the 2010 polls based on concerns of rigging, and the CNDD-FDD claimed victories in the 2015 and 2020 elections by 53 points and 46 points, respectively, amid repression and accusations of fraud and manipulation. The regime manipulates the electoral process and controls the institutions that should guarantee free and fair elections.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and ordinary citizens face open and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize the regime. The regime cultivates fear by banning media activities and silencing dissent through abductions, threats, persecution, arbitrary arrests, and killings.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. There is a significant lack of institutional accountability in Burundi, primarily due to the regime’s capture of judicial, legislative, and executive institutions. The judiciary is unable to hold the CNDD-FDD accountable or serve as a check to prevent its actions. Likewise, the regime, through the powers granted to the president, has the ability to intervene in legislative decisions, including through the exemption from constitutional amendments.
In Burundi, national elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime distorts the electoral landscape in its favor by blocking party participation, committing routine electoral irregularities, and dominating the institutions that oversee results, effectively preventing elections from serving as a path to political alternation.
The regime has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates from competing in elections. The regime-controlled Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) barred candidates from the main opposition parties, the Burundi Bwa Bose coalition, and the National Congress for Liberty (CNL) from running in the June 2025 parliamentary elections. First, the regime formally suspended the CNL in 2023 through the Ministry of the Interior, citing internal party irregularities. This suspension placed the party in an irregular legal status, preventing it from officially registering for the electoral process. Second, at the end of 2024, the regime introduced a complementary decree to the Electoral Code that imposed new eligibility requirements. The decree stipulated that politicians who left their parties could only run after a minimum of one year, and that party leaders needed two years of separation to become eligible. This measure directly targeted figures such as Agathon Rwasa, the historic leader of the CNL, who had been removed from party leadership under contested circumstances and was attempting to maintain his candidacy independently. Consequently, in the 2020 presidential election, the CENI barred the candidacies of Jacques Bigirimana of the National Liberation Front (FNL), a historic opposition party with a critical voice in the political landscape, and Domitien Ndayizeye, former interim president (2003–2005) and current leader of the Kira-Burundi coalition, who held significant political relevance. He reentered the race only after filing an appeal before the Constitutional Court.
The regime has systematically, unfairly, and significantly hindered real, mainstream opposition parties’ or candidates’ electoral campaigns. The regime’s tactics include seizure of campaign materials, blocking of rallies, and deployment of security forces to harass opposition supporters. On May 15, 2025, regime forces acting on the orders of Claudine Niyoyitunga, commune administrator of Musongati, blocked members of the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) for several hours to prevent them from campaigning. In Mpinga-Kayove, the district administrator immobilized a CDP convoy for allegedly lacking formal campaign authorization. In Tangara, Butanyerera Province, district officials close to the National Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) confiscated CDP campaign materials, claiming the candidates lacked authorization.
Non-state actors with ties to the regime have systematically contributed to the hindrance of real, mainstream opposition parties’ or candidates’ electoral campaigns. During the 2025 elections, the ruling party’s youth wing, the Imbonerakure, harassed, destroyed, and confiscated opposition posters and blocked rallies and meetings in certain districts, especially in Ngozi, Kirundo, Bururi, Gitega, and Bujumbura. As a result, the Imbonerakure forced CNL members to campaign discreetly to avoid reprisals.
Moreover, CNDD-FDD’s regime has engaged in systematic, significant voting irregularities and electoral fraud. Tactics include the manipulation of ballot box logistics and barring citizens from voting. The regime also manipulated ballot box transport and vote counting, tampering with results throughout the process. During the 2020 presidential election, CNDD-FDD members ran illegal propaganda campaigns in all six districts of the opposition stronghold of Cibitoke Province, as voters waited to cast their ballots. In Rugombo and Murwi, six CNDD-FDD members were caught distributing ballots to inflate voter numbers. In the 2025 parliamentary elections, the National Congress for Liberty (CNL), the main opposition party, reported that CENI barred its members from voting after accusing them of voting multiple times. Similarly, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) denounced, with evidence, the illegal insertion of pre-filled ballots in favor of the regime.
The regime has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages derived from the abusive use of state resources and a coercive public financing scheme. In December 2017, the regime issued Joint Ministerial Order No. 530/540/1772, creating a system of contributions to “support” the 2020 elections, which ended up funding the CNDD-FDD campaign. The scheme required payments from every household and direct deductions from public employees’ salaries over two years, with mandatory receipts and deposits into a Burundian bank account. Collections continued from December 2017 to July 2019, when the Imbonerakure announced a suspension. In August 2019, a new order cancelled the collections but maintained “voluntary contributions,” which in practice enabled widespread extortion by Imbonerakure members and local administrators who collected money in markets and administrative offices for the regime’s campaign. During the May 2025 parliamentary elections, the regime again abused state resources by mobilizing administrative vehicles for rallies. It forced all heads of public service departments and district administrators to participate, and it compelled students to attend rallies, transporting them in vehicles with yellow license plates reserved for official missions. The CNDD-FDD also diverted public fuel stocks designated for administrative travel to power its campaign vehicles.
The regime has seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. Using the pretext of COVID-19 prevention, the regime blocked international observers from monitoring the 2020 elections. It imposed a mandatory 14-day quarantine on all foreigners just days before voting, which barred the East African Community (EAC) mission—previously authorized to observe—from arriving in time. Domestically, the CENI refused to accredit civil society groups such as Ligue Iteka and other independent organizations, leaving the field of observation nearly empty. CENI members distributed observer credentials selectively, favoring pro-regime groups while excluding independent or critical actors. They also expelled opposition delegates from polling stations under the pretext of arriving “late,” preventing them from monitoring the count. In districts such as Vugizo, where the opposition had strong support, only regime-affiliated observers monitored the tallying, while officials barred opposition representatives before the process began.
The regime has skewed the electoral playing field so much so that it generally claims victory in elections with a very high vote share. The CNDD-FDD has won successive presidential elections by large margins over the past decade. In 2010, Pierre Nkurunziza secured reelection with 91.62% of the vote in a highly controversial election with no challenger after major opposition candidates withdrew in protest over the regime’s manipulation. In 2015, Nkurunziza won again with 73.91% despite strong domestic and international objections to his constitutionally questionable third term. In 2020, CNDD-FDD candidate Évariste Ndayishimiye, who succeeded Nkurunziza, claimed 69% of the vote amid widespread irregularities. In the June 5, 2025, parliamentary elections, the CNDD-FDD reported 96.51% of valid votes and took all 100 seats in the National Assembly.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society figures, organizations, and ordinary citizens face open and systematic retaliation for criticizing or openly challenging the regime. The regime sustains repression by manipulating the media, abusing power, and silencing dissent through arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings of journalists, activists, and opposition members.
The regime has systematically and unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. In May 2018, the regime-controlled National Communication Council (CNC) suspended the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) after it released a documentary exposing secret detention and torture centers in Burundi. The regime partially lifted the suspension in 2021, but only under strict CNC supervision. In May 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expelled the World Health Organization (WHO) representatives after the agency pressed the regime to adopt stronger public health measures. In May 2018, the regime also suspended Voice of America (VOA) for six months, allegedly for breaching journalistic rules by employing exiled Burundian journalists prosecuted by local courts. In 2015, the regime shut down Radio Publique Africaine (RPA) and interrupted broadcasts of Isanganiro and Bonesha FM during protests against Nkurunziza’s third term, accusing them of inciting violence.
The regime has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. The regime imposes laws and a code of conduct on the state media to propagate regime messages and block information from independent sources, using the CNC, whose members the president appoints and fully subordinates to the regime. Under CNC control, it imposed laws that blocked the production and circulation of news without prior approval. In 2019, it pushed through a new press law and created a Code of Conduct for Media and Journalists. On June 6, 2024, the CNC blocked a joint program by six independent outlets—Bonesha FM, Radio-Télévision Isanganiro, Shima FM, Rema FM, Jimbere magazine, and the Iwacu Press Group—on the proposed press law. The council claimed the law, which obliges journalists to disclose their sources in some circumstances and bans articles deemed harmful to national security, had not yet been enacted. The regime also exerts control over independent media outlets by closely monitoring their work; in some cases, independent journalists must obtain special authorization or work under the supervision of state media reporters to cover certain topics. Additionally, the Ministry of Communication, Information Technology, and Media funded electoral coverage by a state-sanctioned coalition of radio, television, print, and online outlets, which was required to submit all content to a central editorial team that altered reports to favor the regime.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media and political leaders. Through intimidation, threats, and vague laws, Burundian journalists live in constant fear of being threatened, attacked, or imprisoned. In December 2024, authorities arrested Sandra Muhoza, a journalist at La Nova Burundi, for sharing information on the regime’s arms distribution via WhatsApp; a court sentenced her to 21 months in prison for “attacking the integrity of the national territory” and “racial aversion.” In August 2022, officials arrested Floriane Irangabiye, a journalist and co-founder of a Rwanda-based news outlet run by Burundian exiles. She faced charges of compromising the integrity of the national territory after working as a commentator and host for Radio Igicaniro, an online diaspora channel broadcasting critical debates on Burundian politics and culture. In January 2023, a court sentenced her to 10 years in prison and fined her 1 million Burundian francs ( $480). In February 2023, intelligence agents arrested five human rights defenders: Sonia Ndikumasabo and Marie Emerusabe of the Association of Women Lawyers of Burundi (AFJB); activists Audace Havyarimana and Sylvana Inamahoro; and Prosper Runyange of the Association for Peace and the Promotion of Human Rights (APDH). Prosecutors charged them with rebellion, compromising internal security, and undermining the functioning of public finances, allegedly because of their ties to international civil society organizations (CSOs).
Moreover, the regime has systematically killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. The regime carried out killings and abductions of dissidents through its agents. On April 6, 2024, agents abducted Djuma Ndayishimiye, an activist affiliated with the opposition party National Congress for Liberty (CNL), from his home in Bujumbura; he remains missing. Between January and September 2024, regime agents killed 210 people, most identified as CNL members. Of these, 31 deaths were directly attributed to state agents, including 10 summary executions. The remaining victims were found dead across the country, with administrative officials hastily burying their bodies without investigation.
Non-state actors with ties to the regime have systematically contributed to the killing or enforced disappearance of dissidents. On March 16, 2020, unidentified people, suspected to be members of Imbonerakure, shot and killed Methuselah Nahishakiye, a local CNL candidate in Migera Hill, Kabezi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province, after he had previously received threats. On March 29, 2020, Imbonerakure killed Jean Bosco Ngabirano, a member of the National Congress for Liberty (CNL), on the orders of a ruling party district administrator.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The regime has expanded control over the judicial and legislative branches. The courts favor rulings that allow the CNDD-FDD to unfairly win elections and target critics. Judges who do not align with the regime are arrested.
Courts have systematically and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. Burundi’s courts routinely refuse to restrain abuses of power by the regime and instead favor rulings that weaken fair competition. In the June 2025 parliamentary elections, the Constitutional Court validated results that awarded all National Assembly seats to the CNDD-FDD and dismissed appeals from UPRONA, CNL, CDP, and the Burundi Bwa Bose coalition, claiming insufficient evidence of irregularities. Opposition parties and observers documented intimidation, the expulsion of monitors, and manipulation through ballot stuffing, selective distribution of voter cards, and multiple voting, but the judiciary refused to order any review. Ahead of the 2020 elections, the Constitutional Court validated Évariste Ndayishimiye’s candidacy despite irregularities, while barring opposition candidates Valentin Kavakure (FPN–Imboneza), Jacques Bigirimana (FNL), and Anicet Niyonkuru (CDP). Also, during the 2020 presidential elections, the Constitutional Court received multiple complaints of irregularities, fraud, and intimidation against opposition members. The main complaint, led by opposition leader Agathon Rwasa, alleged coercion and fraud during voting, but the Court dismissed the case outright, citing insufficient evidence and procedural deadlines without reviewing the substance of the allegations. Earlier, in 2015, the Constitutional Court validated President Pierre Nkurunziza’s candidacy for a third term, even though the decision violated both the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and the Constitution of Burundi.
Furthermore, courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check, or enable, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The regime directs the judiciary to deliver rulings marked by irregularities, lack of due process, and political motivations. As a result, it has consolidated control over the courts and systematically targeted those it labels as “enemies” of the state. On January 2, 2022, the Mukaza High Court in Bujumbura sentenced journalist Floriane Irangabiye to 10 years in prison and fined her 1 million Burundian francs (about $482) for allegedly endangering the integrity of the national territory. Prosecutors presented no credible evidence and based the charges solely on comments she and other guests made during a radio program criticizing the regime.
Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the regime, face systematic retaliation. The regime targets judges with death threats, illegal arrests, and physical assaults. In 2015, Constitutional Court judges faced threats from the CNDD-FDD to validate Pierre Nkurunziza’s candidacy for a third presidential term. The Court’s Vice President, Sylvere Nimpagaritse, fled the country after refusing to endorse the candidacy, citing “death threats” and “extreme pressure” from the CNDD-FDD to align with the ruling. Similarly, on August 16, 2023, officials arrested three Bururi High Court judges—Antoine Ngendakumana, Léonard Nizigiyimana, and Irène Mukeshimana—on charges of “complicity in an attack on the internal security of the state” after they provisionally released eight detainees accused of machete killings in Bururi Province for lack of evidence. On October 22, 2024, the Supreme Court dropped the charges and released the judges.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. It altered laws and regulations to expand presidential powers over the judiciary. In 2018, the regime amended the Constitution to strengthen presidential powers over the judiciary, violating key principles of the Arusha Agreements, including judicial term limits and separation of powers. By replacing the oversight mechanisms established in the 2005 Constitution with a centralized, presidentialist model, the regime undermined judicial independence and stripped courts of their supervisory role. This reform weakened the rule of law and reduced the judiciary to a subordinate function of the ruling power, incapable of ensuring justice or safeguarding institutional legality.
Additionally, the regime directly controls the judiciary through the Judicial Services Commission and the Ministry of Justice, interfering in the appointment, promotion, reassignment, and funding of magistrates to ensure loyalty and suppress opponents. Under the 2018 Constitution, the President appoints Supreme Court judges on the proposal of the Minister of Justice, following an opinion from the High Council of the Judiciary and approval by the Senate; the same process applies to members of the Constitutional Court.
The regime has systematically subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Through the 2018 constitutional reform, approved in a referendum on May 17 and promulgated on June 7, the regime eliminated Parliament’s veto power over Executive decisions, stripping it of a key tool to limit regime actions. The same reform established that any bill passed by Parliament automatically becomes null if the president does not assent within 30 days, subjecting legislative activity to the Executive’s discretion and making Parliament dependent on presidential will. By also allowing the regime to formulate policies without parliamentary approval, the reform hollowed out Parliament’s role as a forum for democratic debate and oversight of public policies.
