Africa

Burkina Faso

Ouagadougou

Fully Authoritarian

0.29%

World’s Population

24,601,700

Population

HRF classifies Burkina Faso as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.

Burkina Faso is a presidential republic. The Head of State, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, seized power in a September 2022 military coup, following a January 2022 coup that deposed the last elected leader, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. Since gaining independence in 1960, the country formerly known as Upper Volta has never known a transfer of power between elected leaders. It has experienced civil uprisings toppling governments and multiple military coups, including the bloody 1987 coup that brought dictator Blaise Compaoré, the longest-serving ruler, to power. Since a civil uprising ousted Compaoré in 2014, the country has experienced three successful military coups and other foiled coup attempts, with an interlude of democratic rule. The inability of Kaboré’s government and French troops present in the country to stem worsening insecurity from a terrorist insurgency, which has claimed control over parts of the territory since 2015, led to the latest coups, the expulsion of French troops, and a new alliance between the junta and the Kremlin, with a tradeoff between Burkinabe gold and Russian arms and private mercenaries.

National elections have been absent in Burkina Faso since the January 2022 military coup brought a junta, the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR), to power, rendering moot assessment of electoral competition. The junta, first led by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba and then Traoré, first called for elections within 36 months, and then postponed polls until 2029. Traoré, who overthrew Damiba in a September 2022 coup, decreed an indefinite ban on political parties’ activities.

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, political leaders and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize the regime. Since Traoré’s coup, the military has prohibited the activities of civil society organizations, suspended media outlets, and silenced dissidents through abductions or forced military conscription.

Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Since July 2023, the junta has directly interfered in judicial proceedings, defied court rulings, retaliated against dissenting judges, and rolled back historic 2015 judicial reforms, which had previously given the judiciary institutional independence from the executive. The Constitutional Council has systematically sided with the junta’s most controversial policies, including changing the constitution without a referendum or subordinating the judiciary under the authority of the Minister of Justice.

National-level elections have been absent in Burkina Faso since a January 2022 coup, rendering moot assessment of electoral competition. The last elected leader, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, was serving a second term following his election in 2015 and re-election in 2020. The 2022 coup was carried out by the MPSR junta, led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba.

Shortly after taking power in September 2022, Traoré’s regime banned the activities of all political parties. In February 2023, the junta enforced this ban by blocking the Union for Progress and Change (UPC), one of Burkina Faso’s main opposition parties, from holding its meeting. Furthermore, in December 2023, the police anti-crime squad detained 21 members of the former ruling party, the People’s Movement for Progress (MPP), including the former Minister of National Education, Stanislas Ouaro.

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, political leaders and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize the regime. The junta invokes national security, nationalism, and the war against terrorist groups to systematically suppress dissent.

The regime unfairly took measures that led to the shutdown of independent and dissenting organizations, including civil society organizations (CSOs) and media outlets. Since seizing power in September 2022, Traoré’s regime has enforced a ban on the activities of all dissenting, pro-democracy CSOs. In April 2024, the CSC banned several international media outlets, including DW, TV5 Monde, Le Monde, the BBC, and Voice of Africa, from the national airwaves for coverage of a Human Rights Watch report implicating the military in the execution of at least 223 civilians by the regime. In June 2024, the CSC suspended the leading newspaper L’Évènement for one month after it published a story about an embezzlement scheme linked to the head of state and others. From August to September 2023, the regime suspended Radio Oméga, one of the most popular radio stations in the country, after it aired an interview with the spokesman of the opposition movement, the Resistance Council for the Republic (CRR), which opposes the military regime in Niger.

The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. The junta censors and retaliates against media outlets that attempt to independently report on the war or highlight military setbacks or war crimes. In March 2023, the junta expelled French journalists Agnès Faivre and Sophie Douce after they published an investigation in Libération that implicated the Burkinabé army in the killing of children in the northern part of the country. It has also silenced dissidents by forcing them into military service at the frontlines of the war against the terrorist groups. In April 2023, the junta invoked a general mobilization decree to abduct a number of its critics into forced military conscription. This has been used to abduct and conscript leading human rights activist Daouda Diallo and journalists Serge Oulon, Adama Bayala, and Kalifara Séré.

The regime seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. In November 2023, the junta increased its control over the state-run media regulator, the Superior Council of Communication (CSC), with a decree appointing its chair and increasing its powers to police social media accounts with a minimum of 5,000 followers. In 2024, the junta announced there would be severe penalties for publishing and disseminating “inappropriate” content and that those caught at fault risk up to two years’ imprisonment and a fine.

Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The Constitutional Council acts as a rubber stamp for the junta’s laws. Beyond that, judges who don’t align with the regime are retaliated against, and the junta uses separate courts to go after dissidents.

The Constitutional Council has systematically approved the junta’s extra-constitutional decrees and laws. For example, in December 2023, it affirmed the constitutionality of a controversial law passed by the junta-controlled Transitional Legislative Assembly, which allowed the regime to implement a new constitution without holding a referendum. In May 2024, the Council affirmed the constitutionality of provisions under this new constitution, which placed the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, the governing body of the judiciary, under the authority of the Minister of Justice. Another provision allowed non-magistrates to serve on the governing body.

These reforms rolled back democratic constitutional safeguards—secured in historic judicial reforms in 2015–which had previously given the judiciary institutional independence from the executive, by, for instance, excluding the head of state from presiding over the Supreme Council of the Judiciary. In July 2024, Traoré appointed new Council members for three-year terms through a presidential decree.

Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the junta, have faced systematic retaliation. In August 2024, the ruling MPSR informed seven magistrates who had previously ruled against regime supporters in various cases that they were conscripted to participate in a military operation for at least three months. Although the Bobo-Dioulasso Administrative Court ruled that the conscription orders were illegal, the regime continued to hold at least five of these magistrates captive without providing any information about their whereabouts.

The regime has systematically directed cases to separate, junta-controlled courts. The MPSR typically refers cases involving allegations of destabilization or coup attempts to military courts. While it is expected that military personnel accused of conspiracy would be tried in military tribunals, the regime also uses these courts to target non-military individuals, particularly political dissidents and activists. A notable example is the case of Guy Hervé Kam, a prominent lawyer and civil society leader. In August 2024, he was arrested and interrogated by a military prosecutor on charges of conspiracy against the state. He was subsequently placed in a military jail.

Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. In April 2024, Human Rights Watch reported that the Burkinabe army executed 223 civilians, including women and children. Despite these accusations of atrocities against civilians, the military has not been held accountable by the justice system.

Country Context

HRF classifies Burkina Faso as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.

Burkina Faso is a presidential republic. The Head of State, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, seized power in a September 2022 military coup, following a January 2022 coup that deposed the last elected leader, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. Since gaining independence in 1960, the country formerly known as Upper Volta has never known a transfer of power between elected leaders. It has experienced civil uprisings toppling governments and multiple military coups, including the bloody 1987 coup that brought dictator Blaise Compaoré, the longest-serving ruler, to power. Since a civil uprising ousted Compaoré in 2014, the country has experienced three successful military coups and other foiled coup attempts, with an interlude of democratic rule. The inability of Kaboré’s government and French troops present in the country to stem worsening insecurity from a terrorist insurgency, which has claimed control over parts of the territory since 2015, led to the latest coups, the expulsion of French troops, and a new alliance between the junta and the Kremlin, with a tradeoff between Burkinabe gold and Russian arms and private mercenaries.

Key Highlights

National elections have been absent in Burkina Faso since the January 2022 military coup brought a junta, the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR), to power, rendering moot assessment of electoral competition. The junta, first led by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba and then Traoré, first called for elections within 36 months, and then postponed polls until 2029. Traoré, who overthrew Damiba in a September 2022 coup, decreed an indefinite ban on political parties’ activities.

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, political leaders and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize the regime. Since Traoré’s coup, the military has prohibited the activities of civil society organizations, suspended media outlets, and silenced dissidents through abductions or forced military conscription.

Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Since July 2023, the junta has directly interfered in judicial proceedings, defied court rulings, retaliated against dissenting judges, and rolled back historic 2015 judicial reforms, which had previously given the judiciary institutional independence from the executive. The Constitutional Council has systematically sided with the junta’s most controversial policies, including changing the constitution without a referendum or subordinating the judiciary under the authority of the Minister of Justice.

Electoral Competition

National-level elections have been absent in Burkina Faso since a January 2022 coup, rendering moot assessment of electoral competition. The last elected leader, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, was serving a second term following his election in 2015 and re-election in 2020. The 2022 coup was carried out by the MPSR junta, led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba.

Shortly after taking power in September 2022, Traoré’s regime banned the activities of all political parties. In February 2023, the junta enforced this ban by blocking the Union for Progress and Change (UPC), one of Burkina Faso’s main opposition parties, from holding its meeting. Furthermore, in December 2023, the police anti-crime squad detained 21 members of the former ruling party, the People’s Movement for Progress (MPP), including the former Minister of National Education, Stanislas Ouaro.

Freedom of Dissent

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, political leaders and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize the regime. The junta invokes national security, nationalism, and the war against terrorist groups to systematically suppress dissent.

The regime unfairly took measures that led to the shutdown of independent and dissenting organizations, including civil society organizations (CSOs) and media outlets. Since seizing power in September 2022, Traoré’s regime has enforced a ban on the activities of all dissenting, pro-democracy CSOs. In April 2024, the CSC banned several international media outlets, including DW, TV5 Monde, Le Monde, the BBC, and Voice of Africa, from the national airwaves for coverage of a Human Rights Watch report implicating the military in the execution of at least 223 civilians by the regime. In June 2024, the CSC suspended the leading newspaper L’Évènement for one month after it published a story about an embezzlement scheme linked to the head of state and others. From August to September 2023, the regime suspended Radio Oméga, one of the most popular radio stations in the country, after it aired an interview with the spokesman of the opposition movement, the Resistance Council for the Republic (CRR), which opposes the military regime in Niger.

The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. The junta censors and retaliates against media outlets that attempt to independently report on the war or highlight military setbacks or war crimes. In March 2023, the junta expelled French journalists Agnès Faivre and Sophie Douce after they published an investigation in Libération that implicated the Burkinabé army in the killing of children in the northern part of the country. It has also silenced dissidents by forcing them into military service at the frontlines of the war against the terrorist groups. In April 2023, the junta invoked a general mobilization decree to abduct a number of its critics into forced military conscription. This has been used to abduct and conscript leading human rights activist Daouda Diallo and journalists Serge Oulon, Adama Bayala, and Kalifara Séré.

The regime seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. In November 2023, the junta increased its control over the state-run media regulator, the Superior Council of Communication (CSC), with a decree appointing its chair and increasing its powers to police social media accounts with a minimum of 5,000 followers. In 2024, the junta announced there would be severe penalties for publishing and disseminating “inappropriate” content and that those caught at fault risk up to two years’ imprisonment and a fine.

Institutional Accountability

Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The Constitutional Council acts as a rubber stamp for the junta’s laws. Beyond that, judges who don’t align with the regime are retaliated against, and the junta uses separate courts to go after dissidents.

The Constitutional Council has systematically approved the junta’s extra-constitutional decrees and laws. For example, in December 2023, it affirmed the constitutionality of a controversial law passed by the junta-controlled Transitional Legislative Assembly, which allowed the regime to implement a new constitution without holding a referendum. In May 2024, the Council affirmed the constitutionality of provisions under this new constitution, which placed the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, the governing body of the judiciary, under the authority of the Minister of Justice. Another provision allowed non-magistrates to serve on the governing body.

These reforms rolled back democratic constitutional safeguards—secured in historic judicial reforms in 2015–which had previously given the judiciary institutional independence from the executive, by, for instance, excluding the head of state from presiding over the Supreme Council of the Judiciary. In July 2024, Traoré appointed new Council members for three-year terms through a presidential decree.

Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the junta, have faced systematic retaliation. In August 2024, the ruling MPSR informed seven magistrates who had previously ruled against regime supporters in various cases that they were conscripted to participate in a military operation for at least three months. Although the Bobo-Dioulasso Administrative Court ruled that the conscription orders were illegal, the regime continued to hold at least five of these magistrates captive without providing any information about their whereabouts.

The regime has systematically directed cases to separate, junta-controlled courts. The MPSR typically refers cases involving allegations of destabilization or coup attempts to military courts. While it is expected that military personnel accused of conspiracy would be tried in military tribunals, the regime also uses these courts to target non-military individuals, particularly political dissidents and activists. A notable example is the case of Guy Hervé Kam, a prominent lawyer and civil society leader. In August 2024, he was arrested and interrogated by a military prosecutor on charges of conspiracy against the state. He was subsequently placed in a military jail.

Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. In April 2024, Human Rights Watch reported that the Burkinabe army executed 223 civilians, including women and children. Despite these accusations of atrocities against civilians, the military has not been held accountable by the justice system.