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HRF classifies Brazil as democratic.
Brazil transitioned to democracy in 1985 after two decades of military rule, culminating in the adoption of the 1988 Constitution, which enshrined political pluralism, civil liberties, and the separation of powers. Since then, Brazil has experienced a competitive electoral environment and multiple peaceful transfers of power across different political parties. The impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, the imprisonment and later absolution of then-former President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, and the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro from 2019 to 2022 marked periods of intensified confrontation between branches of government. Brazil’s courts, electoral authorities, and civil society have resisted pressures from the executive branch, particularly during the Bolsonaro administration.
National elections in Brazil are largely free and fair. Major opposition candidates and parties continue to run and win offices at all levels of government. Independent electoral authorities such as the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) maintain operational integrity, and international observers have consistently reaffirmed the transparency of elections. Brazil’s highly fragmented party system requires coalition-building, resulting in government coalitions that frequently include ideologically diverse parties. Consequently, opposition forces often retain considerable influence over policymaking, despite not winning the presidency.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize and challenge the government. While Bolsonaro frequently used hostile rhetoric toward critics and disproportionately supported friendly media, these actions did not result in formal restrictions, and protests were generally allowed to take place. Investigations have since uncovered the use of intelligence resources for illegal surveillance of opponents during his term. Under Lula, the legal framework protecting dissent has remained stable, with continued space for public criticism and protest.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts, particularly the Supreme Federal Court (STF) and the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), have acted independently across administrations to uphold constitutional rights and protect electoral integrity. During Bolsonaro’s presidency, the judiciary intervened to block efforts to discredit the voting system, sanctioned disinformation campaigns, and ultimately barred Bolsonaro from running for office until 2030 for abuse of political power and misuse of public resources. Under previous governments, courts also pursued major corruption cases, notably through Operation Car Wash, which led to the prosecution of high-ranking authorities across the political spectrum. Lula, the leading presidential candidate in 2018, was imprisoned, although the conviction was annulled after the STF ruled that the court that convicted him lacked jurisdiction and impartiality.
National elections in Brazil are largely free and fair. Since the 1985 democratic transition, elections have remained competitive and inclusive, with no mainstream opposition party or candidate unfairly barred or significantly hindered. Parties across the ideological spectrum compete and retain meaningful legislative representation, while electoral courts and international observers have consistently affirmed the integrity of the voting process and countered disinformation. Although serious attempts were made to overturn the 2022 election, institutions upheld the results, prosecuted those involved, and ensured a lawful transfer of power.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Since Brazil’s democratic transition in 1985, following the end of the military dictatorship, the country has developed a pluralistic and competitive electoral system. Presidents in Brazil are elected by direct popular vote for a four-year term and can seek one immediate re-election. After sitting out at least one term, former presidents may run again, as Brazil does not impose lifetime term limits. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party (PT), who previously served two consecutive terms from 2003 to 2010, returned to office in 2023 following his victory in the 2022 election. Lula narrowly defeated incumbent Jair Bolsonaro of the Liberal Party (PL) in the second round with 50.90% of the vote against Bolsonaro’s 49.10%, marking the closest elections in Brazilian history.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. Major parties from across the ideological spectrum, including the right-wing Liberal Party (PL), the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), and the leftist Workers’ Party (PT), continue to compete at all levels of government. In 2022, although Bolsonaro lost the presidency, the PL secured the largest bloc in the Chamber of Deputies, demonstrating that opposition forces retain significant political strength. Moreover, Brazil’s highly fragmented party system has historically prevented any single party from governing alone, despite extended tenures such as PT’s for consecutive terms between 2003 and 2016. Presidents, including those from the PT, must form broad coalitions to secure a legislative majority, often appointing cabinet members from multiple political parties. In some cases, even vice presidents have come from parties on the opposite side of the political spectrum as part of coalition agreements to ensure broader political support. However, the extreme party fragmentation and constant need for coalition management also pose persistent challenges to democratic consolidation, as they incentivize clientelistic practices and encourage opportunistic, unstable alliances that undermine programmatic governance.
The Brazilian government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. Brazil allows independent and international observers, including missions from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU), to monitor its electoral processes. These missions have consistently reaffirmed the technical integrity and transparency of Brazil’s elections. In addition, the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) and regional electoral courts have administered elections professionally despite facing unprecedented political pressure during Bolsonaro’s presidency. The TSE, for example, played a key role in safeguarding the electoral process against disinformation campaigns and politically motivated rhetorical attacks on the integrity of Brazil’s electronic voting system by implementing fast-track enforcement mechanisms and ordering the removal of false content.
A democratically elected government in Brazil has not been overthrown through a coup d’état. However, federal prosecutors identified serious attempts to subvert the constitutional transfer of power following the 2022 elections. In September 2025, former President Jair Bolsonaro was sentenced to 27 years in prison for crimes including an attempted coup d’etat and violent abolition of the democratic rule of law. The case formed part of a broader criminal proceeding in which federal prosecutors also indicted former government officials, close advisers, and military officers accused of coordinating efforts to prevent the inauguration of the president-elect. According to federal prosecutors, investigators uncovered discussions among conspirators that included contingency plans to detain senior officials and, in some instances, proposals to assassinate President-elect Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Vice-President-elect Geraldo Alckmin, and Supreme Federal Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes. Evidence presented in court also included a meeting between Bolsonaro and the heads of the Armed Forces in which he sought support to overturn the election results. On January 8, 2023, supporters of former President Bolsonaro had stormed federal government buildings in Brasília in an effort to overturn the 2022 vote. Despite these efforts, the election results were upheld, and those involved were prosecuted, ensuring a regular and peaceful transfer of power. The incident occurred in a highly polarized political environment marked by sporadic political violence, which has been on the rise for several years. For example, during the 2018 presidential campaign, Bolsonaro, who was then a federal deputy and the main opposition candidate, was stabbed at a rally in Minas Gerais by an individual who had previously posted online criticism of his proposed policies.
In Brazil, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize and challenge the government. Protests by both government supporters and opponents regularly take place without systematic repression. Government officials have not broadly obstructed dissent, and media coverage is largely pluralistic. Courts have recently taken a more active role in combating electoral disinformation, ordering content removals, penalizing outlets, and even temporarily suspending the social media platform X for noncompliance, which preserved legal oversight but sparked debates about potential judicial overreach and its implications for freedom of expression.
The government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Civil society is free to oppose the government, and protests are common and have been conducted without serious or coordinated attempts at suppression. For instance, mass pro- and anti-government protests took place peacefully across the country on Brazil’s Independence Day in 2021 and 2022, although in 2021, some Bolsonaro supporters in Brasilia, the capital, broke through police barriers and attempted to approach the Supreme Court building before being pushed back with tear gas. Political opponents and civil society leaders have regularly organized demonstrations without being banned or obstructed by federal authorities. Under Lula, large pro-Bolsonaro demonstrations have also taken place without repression.
However, non-state actors aligned with the Bolsonaro administration played a meaningful role in undermining dissent through coordinated online intimidation, especially targeting journalists, civil society leaders, and members of the judiciary. The so-called “Hate Cabinet,” a network of Bolsonaro-affiliated digital operatives, helped disseminate disinformation and organize targeted harassment campaigns, particularly against journalists and political opponents. In parallel, federal investigations have revealed that elements within the Bolsonaro administration used state intelligence resources to conduct unauthorized surveillance on judges, journalists, and political rivals, a case now known as “Parallel ABIN.” These activities are currently under judicial review, with former officials, including Bolsonaro and his son Carlos, formally accused. A Lula-appointed ABIN director has also been formally accused of obstructing the investigation, though the administration has publicly expressed support for the inquiry.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. However, Bolsonaro’s aggressive stance against journalists, opposition politicians, the judiciary, and civil society organizations created a more hostile and polarized environment for dissent. Moreover, an audit by the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) found that, in 2020, the Bolsonaro administration distributed government advertising funds without clear technical criteria, disproportionately favoring pro-government media. RecordTV received 29% of federal TV advertising spending and SBT 22%, while TV Globo — Brazil’s largest network by audience share — received only 15%. Under Lula, federal advertising practices have not returned to the levels of imbalance seen under Bolsonaro, and there have been no known attempts to restrict access to public information or withdraw government subscriptions in response to criticism. Similarly, Lula has criticized the press on various occasions throughout his political career, but these interventions have tended to be issue-specific rather than part of a broader strategy to discredit or pressure the media.
The Brazilian government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech, but courts have become more active in policing disinformation in recent years. In response to disinformation during the 2022 election cycle, the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) adopted more assertive regulatory measures, ordering the removal of false electoral claims from social and traditional media and penalizing right-wing outlets in particular, such as Jovem Pan. In November 2025, a court in São Paulo sentenced Jovem Pan to pay almost $300,000 for collective damages inflicted for promoting disinformation and inciting the events of the January 8, 2023, uprising to overturn the results. In this context, the Supreme Federal Court (STF) ordered the temporary suspension of the social media platform X in 2024 after the platform failed to comply with court orders to block accounts accused of spreading disinformation and refused to appoint a legal representative in Brazil as required by law. This affected 21 million X users in Brazil. Although the Court justified the suspension as necessary to uphold judicial authority and enforce legal compliance, the move prompted a debate over judicial overreach and the balance between combating disinformation and protecting freedom of expression.
Institutions in Brazil are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts have played a central role in addressing attempts to overturn the 2022 election, investigating and prosecuting those involved, sanctioning disinformation campaigns, and convicting former President Jair Bolsonaro, though these actions have also prompted a debate about judicial authority and proportionality. Other oversight bodies, including Congress, the Federal Court of Accounts, and the Federal Police, have constrained executives by modifying decrees, auditing government practices, and pursuing investigations involving both previous and current administrations.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition. In the aftermath of the attacks on January 8, 2023, the judiciary assumed a prominent role in adjudicating cases related to attempts to overturn the election results. The Supreme Federal Court (STF) oversaw investigations and trials, leading to the conviction of hundreds of individuals, with additional proceedings ongoing. In September 2025, Brazil’s Supreme Tribunal sentenced Bolsonaro himself to 27 years in prison for his role in the attempt to overturn the election. In November 2025, he was arrested after being deemed a “flight risk” while under house arrest. The arrest and the broader proceedings against the former President prompted debate about the STF’s authority. Some political actors and legal commentators questioned the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction and the proportionality of the conviction and subsequent precautionary measures, while others maintain that it was grounded in due process guarantees and a lawful exercise of authority in response to attempts to undermine democracy. Previously, in the runup to the 2022 elections, the TSE and STF intervened decisively when Bolsonaro and his allies sought to discredit the electoral process by attacking the electronic voting system and spreading disinformation. They sanctioned disinformation campaigns and ultimately barred Bolsonaro from running for office until 2030. This decision stemmed from his unfounded allegations against the voting system during an official event with foreign diplomats, which the TSE determined constituted abuse of political power and misuse of media channels.
The government has not subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational independence. In fact, institutions have acted as checks on the government. During Bolsonaro’s presidency, the National Congress exercised oversight by blocking or modifying several executive decrees, especially those related to access to public information. The Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) produced critical audits on media spending and procurement practices. Despite Bolsonaro’s attempts to interfere in Federal Police investigations, several inquiries into members of his administration and family continued. Under Lula, these institutions have remained independent and have continued investigations into misconduct from the previous government, including the “Parallel ABIN” case, as well as into current administration figures, such as the corruption and fraud investigations involving Lula’s Communications and Social Security Ministers, who resigned in April and May 2025, respectively.
However, under previous administrations, courts similarly maintained their oversight role but became increasingly politicized. During the Workers’ Party (PT) governments, the judiciary led major investigations into corruption scandals, most notably the so-called Operation Car Wash. While initially praised for its efforts to combat systemic corruption, Operation Car Wash led to the criminal investigation and prosecution of high-ranking politicians and business leaders across the political spectrum, including the imprisonment of then-former President Lula. Lula was the leading candidate in the 2018 presidential race at the time of his imprisonment and disqualification. However, the operation also revealed deep flaws: leaked communications between prosecutors and the presiding judge, Sérgio Moro, raised concerns about judicial partiality and political motivations behind certain prosecutions. These concerns intensified after Moro was appointed Minister of Justice and Public Security in Bolsonaro’s cabinet in 2019, shortly after Bolsonaro’s electoral victory. Moro later resigned in 2020, accusing Bolsonaro of attempting to interfere in Federal Police investigations, several of which involved members of Bolsonaro’s own family. Lula’s convictions were later annulled by the STF, which ruled that the court that tried him lacked proper jurisdiction and that Moro had demonstrated bias.
HRF classifies Brazil as democratic.
Brazil transitioned to democracy in 1985 after two decades of military rule, culminating in the adoption of the 1988 Constitution, which enshrined political pluralism, civil liberties, and the separation of powers. Since then, Brazil has experienced a competitive electoral environment and multiple peaceful transfers of power across different political parties. The impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, the imprisonment and later absolution of then-former President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, and the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro from 2019 to 2022 marked periods of intensified confrontation between branches of government. Brazil’s courts, electoral authorities, and civil society have resisted pressures from the executive branch, particularly during the Bolsonaro administration.
National elections in Brazil are largely free and fair. Major opposition candidates and parties continue to run and win offices at all levels of government. Independent electoral authorities such as the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) maintain operational integrity, and international observers have consistently reaffirmed the transparency of elections. Brazil’s highly fragmented party system requires coalition-building, resulting in government coalitions that frequently include ideologically diverse parties. Consequently, opposition forces often retain considerable influence over policymaking, despite not winning the presidency.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and regular people are largely free to openly criticize and challenge the government. While Bolsonaro frequently used hostile rhetoric toward critics and disproportionately supported friendly media, these actions did not result in formal restrictions, and protests were generally allowed to take place. Investigations have since uncovered the use of intelligence resources for illegal surveillance of opponents during his term. Under Lula, the legal framework protecting dissent has remained stable, with continued space for public criticism and protest.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts, particularly the Supreme Federal Court (STF) and the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), have acted independently across administrations to uphold constitutional rights and protect electoral integrity. During Bolsonaro’s presidency, the judiciary intervened to block efforts to discredit the voting system, sanctioned disinformation campaigns, and ultimately barred Bolsonaro from running for office until 2030 for abuse of political power and misuse of public resources. Under previous governments, courts also pursued major corruption cases, notably through Operation Car Wash, which led to the prosecution of high-ranking authorities across the political spectrum. Lula, the leading presidential candidate in 2018, was imprisoned, although the conviction was annulled after the STF ruled that the court that convicted him lacked jurisdiction and impartiality.
National elections in Brazil are largely free and fair. Since the 1985 democratic transition, elections have remained competitive and inclusive, with no mainstream opposition party or candidate unfairly barred or significantly hindered. Parties across the ideological spectrum compete and retain meaningful legislative representation, while electoral courts and international observers have consistently affirmed the integrity of the voting process and countered disinformation. Although serious attempts were made to overturn the 2022 election, institutions upheld the results, prosecuted those involved, and ensured a lawful transfer of power.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Since Brazil’s democratic transition in 1985, following the end of the military dictatorship, the country has developed a pluralistic and competitive electoral system. Presidents in Brazil are elected by direct popular vote for a four-year term and can seek one immediate re-election. After sitting out at least one term, former presidents may run again, as Brazil does not impose lifetime term limits. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party (PT), who previously served two consecutive terms from 2003 to 2010, returned to office in 2023 following his victory in the 2022 election. Lula narrowly defeated incumbent Jair Bolsonaro of the Liberal Party (PL) in the second round with 50.90% of the vote against Bolsonaro’s 49.10%, marking the closest elections in Brazilian history.
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. Major parties from across the ideological spectrum, including the right-wing Liberal Party (PL), the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), and the leftist Workers’ Party (PT), continue to compete at all levels of government. In 2022, although Bolsonaro lost the presidency, the PL secured the largest bloc in the Chamber of Deputies, demonstrating that opposition forces retain significant political strength. Moreover, Brazil’s highly fragmented party system has historically prevented any single party from governing alone, despite extended tenures such as PT’s for consecutive terms between 2003 and 2016. Presidents, including those from the PT, must form broad coalitions to secure a legislative majority, often appointing cabinet members from multiple political parties. In some cases, even vice presidents have come from parties on the opposite side of the political spectrum as part of coalition agreements to ensure broader political support. However, the extreme party fragmentation and constant need for coalition management also pose persistent challenges to democratic consolidation, as they incentivize clientelistic practices and encourage opportunistic, unstable alliances that undermine programmatic governance.
The Brazilian government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. Brazil allows independent and international observers, including missions from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU), to monitor its electoral processes. These missions have consistently reaffirmed the technical integrity and transparency of Brazil’s elections. In addition, the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) and regional electoral courts have administered elections professionally despite facing unprecedented political pressure during Bolsonaro’s presidency. The TSE, for example, played a key role in safeguarding the electoral process against disinformation campaigns and politically motivated rhetorical attacks on the integrity of Brazil’s electronic voting system by implementing fast-track enforcement mechanisms and ordering the removal of false content.
A democratically elected government in Brazil has not been overthrown through a coup d’état. However, federal prosecutors identified serious attempts to subvert the constitutional transfer of power following the 2022 elections. In September 2025, former President Jair Bolsonaro was sentenced to 27 years in prison for crimes including an attempted coup d’etat and violent abolition of the democratic rule of law. The case formed part of a broader criminal proceeding in which federal prosecutors also indicted former government officials, close advisers, and military officers accused of coordinating efforts to prevent the inauguration of the president-elect. According to federal prosecutors, investigators uncovered discussions among conspirators that included contingency plans to detain senior officials and, in some instances, proposals to assassinate President-elect Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Vice-President-elect Geraldo Alckmin, and Supreme Federal Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes. Evidence presented in court also included a meeting between Bolsonaro and the heads of the Armed Forces in which he sought support to overturn the election results. On January 8, 2023, supporters of former President Bolsonaro had stormed federal government buildings in Brasília in an effort to overturn the 2022 vote. Despite these efforts, the election results were upheld, and those involved were prosecuted, ensuring a regular and peaceful transfer of power. The incident occurred in a highly polarized political environment marked by sporadic political violence, which has been on the rise for several years. For example, during the 2018 presidential campaign, Bolsonaro, who was then a federal deputy and the main opposition candidate, was stabbed at a rally in Minas Gerais by an individual who had previously posted online criticism of his proposed policies.
In Brazil, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize and challenge the government. Protests by both government supporters and opponents regularly take place without systematic repression. Government officials have not broadly obstructed dissent, and media coverage is largely pluralistic. Courts have recently taken a more active role in combating electoral disinformation, ordering content removals, penalizing outlets, and even temporarily suspending the social media platform X for noncompliance, which preserved legal oversight but sparked debates about potential judicial overreach and its implications for freedom of expression.
The government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Civil society is free to oppose the government, and protests are common and have been conducted without serious or coordinated attempts at suppression. For instance, mass pro- and anti-government protests took place peacefully across the country on Brazil’s Independence Day in 2021 and 2022, although in 2021, some Bolsonaro supporters in Brasilia, the capital, broke through police barriers and attempted to approach the Supreme Court building before being pushed back with tear gas. Political opponents and civil society leaders have regularly organized demonstrations without being banned or obstructed by federal authorities. Under Lula, large pro-Bolsonaro demonstrations have also taken place without repression.
However, non-state actors aligned with the Bolsonaro administration played a meaningful role in undermining dissent through coordinated online intimidation, especially targeting journalists, civil society leaders, and members of the judiciary. The so-called “Hate Cabinet,” a network of Bolsonaro-affiliated digital operatives, helped disseminate disinformation and organize targeted harassment campaigns, particularly against journalists and political opponents. In parallel, federal investigations have revealed that elements within the Bolsonaro administration used state intelligence resources to conduct unauthorized surveillance on judges, journalists, and political rivals, a case now known as “Parallel ABIN.” These activities are currently under judicial review, with former officials, including Bolsonaro and his son Carlos, formally accused. A Lula-appointed ABIN director has also been formally accused of obstructing the investigation, though the administration has publicly expressed support for the inquiry.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. However, Bolsonaro’s aggressive stance against journalists, opposition politicians, the judiciary, and civil society organizations created a more hostile and polarized environment for dissent. Moreover, an audit by the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) found that, in 2020, the Bolsonaro administration distributed government advertising funds without clear technical criteria, disproportionately favoring pro-government media. RecordTV received 29% of federal TV advertising spending and SBT 22%, while TV Globo — Brazil’s largest network by audience share — received only 15%. Under Lula, federal advertising practices have not returned to the levels of imbalance seen under Bolsonaro, and there have been no known attempts to restrict access to public information or withdraw government subscriptions in response to criticism. Similarly, Lula has criticized the press on various occasions throughout his political career, but these interventions have tended to be issue-specific rather than part of a broader strategy to discredit or pressure the media.
The Brazilian government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech, but courts have become more active in policing disinformation in recent years. In response to disinformation during the 2022 election cycle, the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) adopted more assertive regulatory measures, ordering the removal of false electoral claims from social and traditional media and penalizing right-wing outlets in particular, such as Jovem Pan. In November 2025, a court in São Paulo sentenced Jovem Pan to pay almost $300,000 for collective damages inflicted for promoting disinformation and inciting the events of the January 8, 2023, uprising to overturn the results. In this context, the Supreme Federal Court (STF) ordered the temporary suspension of the social media platform X in 2024 after the platform failed to comply with court orders to block accounts accused of spreading disinformation and refused to appoint a legal representative in Brazil as required by law. This affected 21 million X users in Brazil. Although the Court justified the suspension as necessary to uphold judicial authority and enforce legal compliance, the move prompted a debate over judicial overreach and the balance between combating disinformation and protecting freedom of expression.
Institutions in Brazil are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts have played a central role in addressing attempts to overturn the 2022 election, investigating and prosecuting those involved, sanctioning disinformation campaigns, and convicting former President Jair Bolsonaro, though these actions have also prompted a debate about judicial authority and proportionality. Other oversight bodies, including Congress, the Federal Court of Accounts, and the Federal Police, have constrained executives by modifying decrees, auditing government practices, and pursuing investigations involving both previous and current administrations.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition. In the aftermath of the attacks on January 8, 2023, the judiciary assumed a prominent role in adjudicating cases related to attempts to overturn the election results. The Supreme Federal Court (STF) oversaw investigations and trials, leading to the conviction of hundreds of individuals, with additional proceedings ongoing. In September 2025, Brazil’s Supreme Tribunal sentenced Bolsonaro himself to 27 years in prison for his role in the attempt to overturn the election. In November 2025, he was arrested after being deemed a “flight risk” while under house arrest. The arrest and the broader proceedings against the former President prompted debate about the STF’s authority. Some political actors and legal commentators questioned the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction and the proportionality of the conviction and subsequent precautionary measures, while others maintain that it was grounded in due process guarantees and a lawful exercise of authority in response to attempts to undermine democracy. Previously, in the runup to the 2022 elections, the TSE and STF intervened decisively when Bolsonaro and his allies sought to discredit the electoral process by attacking the electronic voting system and spreading disinformation. They sanctioned disinformation campaigns and ultimately barred Bolsonaro from running for office until 2030. This decision stemmed from his unfounded allegations against the voting system during an official event with foreign diplomats, which the TSE determined constituted abuse of political power and misuse of media channels.
The government has not subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational independence. In fact, institutions have acted as checks on the government. During Bolsonaro’s presidency, the National Congress exercised oversight by blocking or modifying several executive decrees, especially those related to access to public information. The Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) produced critical audits on media spending and procurement practices. Despite Bolsonaro’s attempts to interfere in Federal Police investigations, several inquiries into members of his administration and family continued. Under Lula, these institutions have remained independent and have continued investigations into misconduct from the previous government, including the “Parallel ABIN” case, as well as into current administration figures, such as the corruption and fraud investigations involving Lula’s Communications and Social Security Ministers, who resigned in April and May 2025, respectively.
However, under previous administrations, courts similarly maintained their oversight role but became increasingly politicized. During the Workers’ Party (PT) governments, the judiciary led major investigations into corruption scandals, most notably the so-called Operation Car Wash. While initially praised for its efforts to combat systemic corruption, Operation Car Wash led to the criminal investigation and prosecution of high-ranking politicians and business leaders across the political spectrum, including the imprisonment of then-former President Lula. Lula was the leading candidate in the 2018 presidential race at the time of his imprisonment and disqualification. However, the operation also revealed deep flaws: leaked communications between prosecutors and the presiding judge, Sérgio Moro, raised concerns about judicial partiality and political motivations behind certain prosecutions. These concerns intensified after Moro was appointed Minister of Justice and Public Security in Bolsonaro’s cabinet in 2019, shortly after Bolsonaro’s electoral victory. Moro later resigned in 2020, accusing Bolsonaro of attempting to interfere in Federal Police investigations, several of which involved members of Bolsonaro’s own family. Lula’s convictions were later annulled by the STF, which ruled that the court that tried him lacked proper jurisdiction and that Moro had demonstrated bias.
