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HRF classifies Bosnia and Herzegovina as democratic.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a parliamentary representative democratic state with a highly decentralized and consociational system established under the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the Bosnian war of 1992–1995. Executive authority is exercised jointly by a directly elected, three-member presidency representing Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, which rotates its chair every eight months, and by the Council of Ministers, whose chair serves as head of government. The country is composed of two largely autonomous entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) alongside the self-governing Brčko District, resulting in a complex, multi-layered governance structure that remains subject to extensive international oversight, most notably through the Office of the High Representative and election monitoring by organizations such as the OSCE.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, national elections are largely free and fair, with mainstream opposition parties and candidates able to participate and campaign freely. Although allegations of electoral irregularities periodically arise, they have not been shown to affect election outcomes, and elections remain pluralistic and competitive overall.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society actors, and the general public in Bosnia and Herzegovina are largely free to criticize or challenge the government, and civil society organizations operate without being shut down. Media coverage and protests are largely allowed, but growing journalist intimidation and uneven legal protections for freedom of assembly have weakened the overall environment.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the governing authority through political influence, particularly within the judiciary. Direct obstruction of the Constitutional Court and weak enforcement of accountability have contributed to a broader failure to hold government officials responsible, despite a rare high-level conviction in 2023.
National elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina are largely free and fair, with mainstream opposition parties and candidates able to participate freely. Similarly, opposition parties and candidates have generally been able to campaign freely and compete in pluralistic and competitive elections. Although allegations of electoral irregularities periodically arise, there is no evidence that they have altered election outcomes.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. National elections are generally competitive, and the legal framework allows candidates to run either via political parties and coalitions or as independents. Since 1996, there have been general elections every four years (the 2002 elections were the first administered by the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and they have been overseen by the OSCE to ensure fairness and the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. In 2001, the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established to oversee the electoral process, enforce the country’s electoral laws, and handle potential violations. The government has generally not obstructed the electoral process or obstructed any opposition candidates. For example, during the 2022 general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, voters elected the three-member state presidency from a range of candidates through plurality voting: opposition-backed Denis Bećirović won the Bosniak seat with 57.37% over Bakir Izetbegović (37.25%), Željko Komšić won the Croat seat with 55.80% over Borjana Krišto (44.20%), and Željka Cvijanović won the Serb seat with 51.65% over Mirko Šarović (35.45%).
In the concurrent legislative election for the 42-seat House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina (22 needed for a majority), no party came close to governing alone: the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) finished first with 17.23% and 9 seats, followed by the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) with 16.34% and 6 seats, the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP BiH) with 8.15% and 5 seats, and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) with 8.75% and 4 seats. Because no party approached a governing majority, post-election bargaining determined the executive: although SDA held the largest bloc, it did not form a workable coalition, and an agreement among SNSD, HDZ BiH, and the “Troika” (an alliance of SDP BiH, NiP, and Our Party) produced a new Council of Ministers, with Krišto confirmed as chairwoman in late December 2022 and her cabinet formed in January 2023.
However, one persistent concern with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s electoral system has been its ethnicity and residency-based limitations, which pose significant issues for political participation by citizens from other communities. Under the country’s current system, only self-declared Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs can stand for the state and entity presidencies, which limits political participation for citizens who identify as “others,” simply as “Bosnian,” and many minorities. In the 2022 election, international Office of the High Representative, led by Christian Schmidt, used the “Bonn Powers” under the Dayton Peace Agreement framework to impose amendments to the election law (including integrity and campaign-rule changes) and, after polls closed on election day, changes affecting the Federation’s institutional arrangements (including expanding House of Peoples seats and guaranteeing representation for “others”). The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) noted that the late timing and lack of foreseeability of these election-day changes undermined legal certainty for voters and contestants, and that they did not resolve the underlying discriminatory eligibility rules. Despite these shortcomings, the OSCE concluded that the 2022 elections “were overall well organized and competitive.”
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. Opposition parties and candidates were generally able to register, campaign openly, and contest elections at all levels in both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The elections were competitive, and a pluralistic party landscape existed, with several major parties and numerous smaller parties actively campaigning across the country. At the same time, the OSCE identified a few shortcomings that affected the level playing field, including instances of pressure on public sector employees, misuse of administrative resources by incumbents, and ethnically divisive rhetoric. For instance, public sector employees were reportedly pressured to attend campaign events of incumbent parties, while authorities announced social welfare benefits and promoted public infrastructure projects during the campaign period.
The government has not engaged in significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities occasionally surface throughout elections, but they are addressed by the CEC and have not amounted to the level of changing the outcome of elections. For instance, in 2022, a Bosnian Serb opposition leader from the PDP called for a recount of ballots, calling the elections “rigged,” but after the recount of the votes, the CEC confirmed that Bosnian Serb political leader Milorad Dodik had been declared the winner of the presidency of Republika Srpska.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Civil society organizations generally operate freely and are not shut down by the government. Similarly, media operate in a formally pluralistic and constitutionally protected environment without systematic government manipulation, even though growing intimidation of journalists and weak law enforcement responses have contributed to a deteriorating climate for media freedom. Protests and demonstrations are common and generally allowed, but the right to peaceful assembly is unevenly protected due to a fragmented legal framework and restrictive local regulations.
Under Borjana Krišto, the government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. Civil-society organizations (CSOs) incorporate freely in the country and have grown in terms of capacity, viability, and confidence since the Dayton Agreement. At the same time, chronic funding shortages and the absence of clear, harmonised rules for transparent domestic funding leave many CSOs exposed to political influence. In March 2023, Milorad Dodik, Russia-backed president of Republika Srpska, led an effort to draft a law labeling organizations that receive foreign funding as “foreign agents.” The law was finally adopted in February 2025 and drew substantial criticism from various international organizations. Civic groups argued that the bill was modeled on a 2012 Russian law used extensively in Russia to crack down on civil society and independent media. Despite these shortcomings, the government has generally refrained from shutting down dissenting organizations.
Similarly, the incumbent government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media. Freedom of expression and assembly are constitutionally protected rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Multiple media outlets operate in the country, and citizens are free to voice dissent. However, the overall environment for media freedom has deteriorated in recent years. While journalists working for non-governmental media organizations report that they can work freely and choose their topics, there have been reports of intimidation and attacks on journalists and activists, mostly by politicians, who use pressure and intimidation as a tactic to silence criticism. Between 2019 and 2021, 36 cases of threats, verbal and physical attacks against journalists were reported to the System for Automatic Case Management in Courts and Prosecutors’ Offices (CMS), and only 3 perpetrators were found guilty and convicted. While there may be no conclusive link between the harassment of journalists and the actions of the government in many cases, journalists report that law enforcement is ineffective in the prosecution of such cases and often fails to initiate proceedings or dismisses the cases. Thus, due to the lack of trust in the police and judicial institutions, such pressure, violations, and threats often remain underreported.
Furthermore, in July 2023, the Republika Srpska adopted broad amendments to the criminal code, re-criminalizing defamation and imposing fines. Milorad Dodik championed the enactment of these amendments under the pretense of establishing accountability for the misuse of information. However, international and local media organizations have deemed the passage of such legislation to be a major setback to the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression.
Finally, the government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Street demonstrations and protests are common, tackling issues ranging from political corruption to socio-economic challenges. At the same time, public authorities regulate assemblies through a fragmented framework of 12 separate laws (one in Republika Srpska, one in Brčko District, and one in each of the ten cantons of the Federation), resulting in uneven protection of the right to peaceful assembly depending on location. Some of these laws impose restrictive and burdensome requirements; for example, in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska, assemblies are generally allowed only in designated locations. Also, observers note instances of discriminatory enforcement depending on the subject of the protest and the organizers’ relationship with authorities. To illustrate, in March 2023, in Banja Luka, authorities banned a Pride-related film screening on safety grounds and directed the organizers to move assemblies to isolated areas, while other large gatherings that day were allowed to proceed. That said, despite these concerns, public protests continue to take place frequently. Following the 2022 general elections, opposition parties organized multiple demonstrations in both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, alleging electoral fraud and irregularities. These protests were generally permitted to proceed unobstructed.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the governing authority. Despite formal constitutional guarantees and a complex power-sharing judicial structure, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s judiciary is weakened in practice by political influence. Beyond indirect pressures on the ordinary judiciary, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has faced direct political obstruction, including open non-compliance with its rulings and a sustained boycott by Republika Srpska authorities. Accordingly, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutions have largely failed to hold government officials accountable, despite a rare high-level conviction in 2023.
The government has undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Despite formal guarantees of judicial independence, political influence over judicial governance institutions and direct obstruction of the Constitutional Court have undermined institutional autonomy in practice. The legal framework provides formal constitutional and statutory guarantees of judicial independence. Central to judicial self-governance is the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC), established by the Law on the HJPC in 2004. The HJPC functions as a single, centralized body responsible for judicial and prosecutorial appointments, promotions, evaluations, and disciplinary proceedings across all four judicial systems, with disciplinary functions supported by the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel. However, while this framework complies with formal standards of judicial independence, its operation in practice has been widely assessed as problematic. Persistent concerns have been raised regarding conflicts of interest within the HJPC, insufficient transparency, and weak disciplinary accountability. The concentration of governance powers within a single institution has limited effective checks and balances. This means that, especially in politically sensitive cases, judges and prosecutors may feel that their careers depend on decisions made by a body that could be influenced by political interests.
In addition to indirect pressures affecting the ordinary judiciary, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose judges are appointed through a separate constitutional mechanism, has been subject to direct political pressure through deliberate non-compliance and institutional obstruction by authorities, especially the National Assembly of Republika Srpska and its senior leadership. Since January 2024, the Court has operated without judges appointed from Republika Srpska, following the refusal of Republika Srpska authorities to fill vacant positions. This boycott occurred in the aftermath of several decisions adverse to the Republika Srpska political leadership, including rulings concerning state property and the declaration of the Republika Srpska “statehood day” as unconstitutional. Earlier, in June 2023, the National Assembly of Republika Srpska adopted legislation purporting to render decisions of the Constitutional Court inapplicable within the entity. This legislative defiance directly undermined the authority of the Court by denying legal effect to its judgments at the entity level.
Over the years, there have been various attempts to reform and streamline the judiciary, often with the support and guidance of international bodies, but political blockages have stalled their adoption. For example, the Parliament has multiple times rejected the rule of law reforms aimed at adopting procedural safeguards on impartiality and independence of the judiciary. As a result, this lack of transparency and harmonization of the legislation seriously hinders the efforts of combating corruption.
Judicial, legislative, and executive institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. While the judiciary has taken steps against political figures and organized crime, there have been concerns about selectivity and inconsistency in prosecution, in addition to susceptibility to political influence, especially concerning corruption. This is reflected in the conviction rate in corruption cases, which decreased from 80% in 2017 to 57% in 2019 for medium-level cases, and from 100% in 2017 to 12% in 2019 for high-level cases. Nevertheless, in April 2023, Fadil Novalić, the prime minister of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was sentenced to four years in prison over embezzlement charges that resulted from the procurement of medical equipment at highly inflated prices. Novalic was charged with using public funds with the aim of making a profit that would be divided between him and his two accomplices. Novalic denied the wrongdoing and stated he would appeal the verdict. The conviction was upheld on appeal in January 2024, and he began serving the sentence in March 2024. Accordingly, this is the first time a senior official has been sentenced to a prison term for embezzlement in Bosnia. Notwithstanding this high-level indictment, the overall track record of preventing and repressing corruption (including at high levels) remains weak due to operational inefficiency and political influence.
HRF classifies Bosnia and Herzegovina as democratic.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a parliamentary representative democratic state with a highly decentralized and consociational system established under the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the Bosnian war of 1992–1995. Executive authority is exercised jointly by a directly elected, three-member presidency representing Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, which rotates its chair every eight months, and by the Council of Ministers, whose chair serves as head of government. The country is composed of two largely autonomous entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) alongside the self-governing Brčko District, resulting in a complex, multi-layered governance structure that remains subject to extensive international oversight, most notably through the Office of the High Representative and election monitoring by organizations such as the OSCE.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, national elections are largely free and fair, with mainstream opposition parties and candidates able to participate and campaign freely. Although allegations of electoral irregularities periodically arise, they have not been shown to affect election outcomes, and elections remain pluralistic and competitive overall.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society actors, and the general public in Bosnia and Herzegovina are largely free to criticize or challenge the government, and civil society organizations operate without being shut down. Media coverage and protests are largely allowed, but growing journalist intimidation and uneven legal protections for freedom of assembly have weakened the overall environment.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the governing authority through political influence, particularly within the judiciary. Direct obstruction of the Constitutional Court and weak enforcement of accountability have contributed to a broader failure to hold government officials responsible, despite a rare high-level conviction in 2023.
National elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina are largely free and fair, with mainstream opposition parties and candidates able to participate freely. Similarly, opposition parties and candidates have generally been able to campaign freely and compete in pluralistic and competitive elections. Although allegations of electoral irregularities periodically arise, there is no evidence that they have altered election outcomes.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. National elections are generally competitive, and the legal framework allows candidates to run either via political parties and coalitions or as independents. Since 1996, there have been general elections every four years (the 2002 elections were the first administered by the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and they have been overseen by the OSCE to ensure fairness and the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. In 2001, the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established to oversee the electoral process, enforce the country’s electoral laws, and handle potential violations. The government has generally not obstructed the electoral process or obstructed any opposition candidates. For example, during the 2022 general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, voters elected the three-member state presidency from a range of candidates through plurality voting: opposition-backed Denis Bećirović won the Bosniak seat with 57.37% over Bakir Izetbegović (37.25%), Željko Komšić won the Croat seat with 55.80% over Borjana Krišto (44.20%), and Željka Cvijanović won the Serb seat with 51.65% over Mirko Šarović (35.45%).
In the concurrent legislative election for the 42-seat House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina (22 needed for a majority), no party came close to governing alone: the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) finished first with 17.23% and 9 seats, followed by the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) with 16.34% and 6 seats, the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP BiH) with 8.15% and 5 seats, and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) with 8.75% and 4 seats. Because no party approached a governing majority, post-election bargaining determined the executive: although SDA held the largest bloc, it did not form a workable coalition, and an agreement among SNSD, HDZ BiH, and the “Troika” (an alliance of SDP BiH, NiP, and Our Party) produced a new Council of Ministers, with Krišto confirmed as chairwoman in late December 2022 and her cabinet formed in January 2023.
However, one persistent concern with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s electoral system has been its ethnicity and residency-based limitations, which pose significant issues for political participation by citizens from other communities. Under the country’s current system, only self-declared Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs can stand for the state and entity presidencies, which limits political participation for citizens who identify as “others,” simply as “Bosnian,” and many minorities. In the 2022 election, international Office of the High Representative, led by Christian Schmidt, used the “Bonn Powers” under the Dayton Peace Agreement framework to impose amendments to the election law (including integrity and campaign-rule changes) and, after polls closed on election day, changes affecting the Federation’s institutional arrangements (including expanding House of Peoples seats and guaranteeing representation for “others”). The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) noted that the late timing and lack of foreseeability of these election-day changes undermined legal certainty for voters and contestants, and that they did not resolve the underlying discriminatory eligibility rules. Despite these shortcomings, the OSCE concluded that the 2022 elections “were overall well organized and competitive.”
The government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. Opposition parties and candidates were generally able to register, campaign openly, and contest elections at all levels in both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The elections were competitive, and a pluralistic party landscape existed, with several major parties and numerous smaller parties actively campaigning across the country. At the same time, the OSCE identified a few shortcomings that affected the level playing field, including instances of pressure on public sector employees, misuse of administrative resources by incumbents, and ethnically divisive rhetoric. For instance, public sector employees were reportedly pressured to attend campaign events of incumbent parties, while authorities announced social welfare benefits and promoted public infrastructure projects during the campaign period.
The government has not engaged in significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities occasionally surface throughout elections, but they are addressed by the CEC and have not amounted to the level of changing the outcome of elections. For instance, in 2022, a Bosnian Serb opposition leader from the PDP called for a recount of ballots, calling the elections “rigged,” but after the recount of the votes, the CEC confirmed that Bosnian Serb political leader Milorad Dodik had been declared the winner of the presidency of Republika Srpska.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Civil society organizations generally operate freely and are not shut down by the government. Similarly, media operate in a formally pluralistic and constitutionally protected environment without systematic government manipulation, even though growing intimidation of journalists and weak law enforcement responses have contributed to a deteriorating climate for media freedom. Protests and demonstrations are common and generally allowed, but the right to peaceful assembly is unevenly protected due to a fragmented legal framework and restrictive local regulations.
Under Borjana Krišto, the government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. Civil-society organizations (CSOs) incorporate freely in the country and have grown in terms of capacity, viability, and confidence since the Dayton Agreement. At the same time, chronic funding shortages and the absence of clear, harmonised rules for transparent domestic funding leave many CSOs exposed to political influence. In March 2023, Milorad Dodik, Russia-backed president of Republika Srpska, led an effort to draft a law labeling organizations that receive foreign funding as “foreign agents.” The law was finally adopted in February 2025 and drew substantial criticism from various international organizations. Civic groups argued that the bill was modeled on a 2012 Russian law used extensively in Russia to crack down on civil society and independent media. Despite these shortcomings, the government has generally refrained from shutting down dissenting organizations.
Similarly, the incumbent government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media. Freedom of expression and assembly are constitutionally protected rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Multiple media outlets operate in the country, and citizens are free to voice dissent. However, the overall environment for media freedom has deteriorated in recent years. While journalists working for non-governmental media organizations report that they can work freely and choose their topics, there have been reports of intimidation and attacks on journalists and activists, mostly by politicians, who use pressure and intimidation as a tactic to silence criticism. Between 2019 and 2021, 36 cases of threats, verbal and physical attacks against journalists were reported to the System for Automatic Case Management in Courts and Prosecutors’ Offices (CMS), and only 3 perpetrators were found guilty and convicted. While there may be no conclusive link between the harassment of journalists and the actions of the government in many cases, journalists report that law enforcement is ineffective in the prosecution of such cases and often fails to initiate proceedings or dismisses the cases. Thus, due to the lack of trust in the police and judicial institutions, such pressure, violations, and threats often remain underreported.
Furthermore, in July 2023, the Republika Srpska adopted broad amendments to the criminal code, re-criminalizing defamation and imposing fines. Milorad Dodik championed the enactment of these amendments under the pretense of establishing accountability for the misuse of information. However, international and local media organizations have deemed the passage of such legislation to be a major setback to the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression.
Finally, the government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Street demonstrations and protests are common, tackling issues ranging from political corruption to socio-economic challenges. At the same time, public authorities regulate assemblies through a fragmented framework of 12 separate laws (one in Republika Srpska, one in Brčko District, and one in each of the ten cantons of the Federation), resulting in uneven protection of the right to peaceful assembly depending on location. Some of these laws impose restrictive and burdensome requirements; for example, in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska, assemblies are generally allowed only in designated locations. Also, observers note instances of discriminatory enforcement depending on the subject of the protest and the organizers’ relationship with authorities. To illustrate, in March 2023, in Banja Luka, authorities banned a Pride-related film screening on safety grounds and directed the organizers to move assemblies to isolated areas, while other large gatherings that day were allowed to proceed. That said, despite these concerns, public protests continue to take place frequently. Following the 2022 general elections, opposition parties organized multiple demonstrations in both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, alleging electoral fraud and irregularities. These protests were generally permitted to proceed unobstructed.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the governing authority. Despite formal constitutional guarantees and a complex power-sharing judicial structure, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s judiciary is weakened in practice by political influence. Beyond indirect pressures on the ordinary judiciary, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has faced direct political obstruction, including open non-compliance with its rulings and a sustained boycott by Republika Srpska authorities. Accordingly, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutions have largely failed to hold government officials accountable, despite a rare high-level conviction in 2023.
The government has undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Despite formal guarantees of judicial independence, political influence over judicial governance institutions and direct obstruction of the Constitutional Court have undermined institutional autonomy in practice. The legal framework provides formal constitutional and statutory guarantees of judicial independence. Central to judicial self-governance is the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC), established by the Law on the HJPC in 2004. The HJPC functions as a single, centralized body responsible for judicial and prosecutorial appointments, promotions, evaluations, and disciplinary proceedings across all four judicial systems, with disciplinary functions supported by the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel. However, while this framework complies with formal standards of judicial independence, its operation in practice has been widely assessed as problematic. Persistent concerns have been raised regarding conflicts of interest within the HJPC, insufficient transparency, and weak disciplinary accountability. The concentration of governance powers within a single institution has limited effective checks and balances. This means that, especially in politically sensitive cases, judges and prosecutors may feel that their careers depend on decisions made by a body that could be influenced by political interests.
In addition to indirect pressures affecting the ordinary judiciary, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose judges are appointed through a separate constitutional mechanism, has been subject to direct political pressure through deliberate non-compliance and institutional obstruction by authorities, especially the National Assembly of Republika Srpska and its senior leadership. Since January 2024, the Court has operated without judges appointed from Republika Srpska, following the refusal of Republika Srpska authorities to fill vacant positions. This boycott occurred in the aftermath of several decisions adverse to the Republika Srpska political leadership, including rulings concerning state property and the declaration of the Republika Srpska “statehood day” as unconstitutional. Earlier, in June 2023, the National Assembly of Republika Srpska adopted legislation purporting to render decisions of the Constitutional Court inapplicable within the entity. This legislative defiance directly undermined the authority of the Court by denying legal effect to its judgments at the entity level.
Over the years, there have been various attempts to reform and streamline the judiciary, often with the support and guidance of international bodies, but political blockages have stalled their adoption. For example, the Parliament has multiple times rejected the rule of law reforms aimed at adopting procedural safeguards on impartiality and independence of the judiciary. As a result, this lack of transparency and harmonization of the legislation seriously hinders the efforts of combating corruption.
Judicial, legislative, and executive institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. While the judiciary has taken steps against political figures and organized crime, there have been concerns about selectivity and inconsistency in prosecution, in addition to susceptibility to political influence, especially concerning corruption. This is reflected in the conviction rate in corruption cases, which decreased from 80% in 2017 to 57% in 2019 for medium-level cases, and from 100% in 2017 to 12% in 2019 for high-level cases. Nevertheless, in April 2023, Fadil Novalić, the prime minister of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was sentenced to four years in prison over embezzlement charges that resulted from the procurement of medical equipment at highly inflated prices. Novalic was charged with using public funds with the aim of making a profit that would be divided between him and his two accomplices. Novalic denied the wrongdoing and stated he would appeal the verdict. The conviction was upheld on appeal in January 2024, and he began serving the sentence in March 2024. Accordingly, this is the first time a senior official has been sentenced to a prison term for embezzlement in Bosnia. Notwithstanding this high-level indictment, the overall track record of preventing and repressing corruption (including at high levels) remains weak due to operational inefficiency and political influence.
