Hybrid Authoritarian
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HRF classifies Bolivia as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Bolivia operates as a presidential constitutional republic with increasingly competitive multiparty elections but a highly polarized environment. Since the rise of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) in 2006, national politics has been dominated by the political project associated with Evo Morales and its opposition. The 2009 Constitution re-founded the state as a “Plurinational State” and expanded social and political rights, but the same period was also characterized by the accumulation of authority in the executive branch. As the governing movement secured legislative majorities and extended influence over key state institutions, it gradually co-opted oversight institutions, lifted term limits for the president, and undermined the independence of electoral bodies The country experienced a major institutional rupture in 2019 following a contested presidential election marked by serious irregularities and the subsequent annulment of the vote, culminating in the resignation of Morales amid mass protests and political unrest. Although elections in 2020 were largely free and fair, leading MAS to a return to power, the crisis deepened mistrust between rival political camps and left lasting questions about the credibility of state institutions. In recent years, the MAS itself has fragmented, with tensions between factions aligned with Morales and those backing President Luis Arce weakening party cohesion and reshaping the political landscape. Political competition has continued through elections, including the competitive presidential contest that brought President Rodrigo Paz to power in late 2025, the first candidate outside the MAS to win the presidency since 2006. At the same time, confrontations related to the 2019 crisis have led to prosecutions and prolonged detention of prominent opposition figures. As a result, Bolivia’s political system combines active electoral competition with persistent polarization and contested institutional legitimacy.
National elections are largely free and fair. Bolivia’s most recent elections indicate a return to competitive electoral politics after a period in which the credibility of elections was seriously undermined. In the 2025 general election, multiple opposition candidates campaigned nationwide, and the governing Movement for Socialism (MAS) obtained a very limited vote share, producing the country’s first presidential runoff and an alternation in executive power. The victory of an opposition candidate marked the first time since 2006 that the presidency was won by a figure outside the MAS political movement. This competitive environment contrasts with the 2019 electoral crisis, when significant electoral irregularities led to the annulment of the national election and a broader institutional breakdown. A new election was held in 2020, and subsequent contests have been conducted with domestic and international observation and without a comparable disruption, though disputes over the independence and composition of electoral authorities persist. Electoral competition is therefore present but recent, emerging after a prior collapse in confidence in the electoral process.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Across successive administrations, authorities have exercised significant influence over media coverage through ownership changes, legal and administrative pressures, and the discriminatory allocation of state advertising, contributing to a constrained environment for independent journalism. Political participation in contentious activity has also entailed legal risks, as prominent opposition leaders have faced prosecution and prolonged detention in connection with the 2019 crisis, and journalists and activists have reported harassment and intimidation by both state actors and partisan groups. Demonstrations are frequent but have at times been dispersed through coercive policing, arrests, and excessive use of force, and protest-related violence has occurred under multiple governments. In addition, past investigations have documented cases of severe human rights abuses by security forces, including extrajudicial killings. Taken together, these patterns indicate that dissenting expression and mobilization remain possible in Bolivia but occur in a restrictive climate that discourages open opposition.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Courts have played a decisive role in shaping electoral competition. For example, the same Constitutional Tribunal that enabled then-President Evo Morales to run in the 2019 election for what would have been a fourth term, despite a national referendum rejecting indefinite reelection, later reinterpreted constitutional term limits as restricting presidents to two terms, effectively disqualifying his candidacy ahead of the 2025 election. At the same time, criminal proceedings have repeatedly targeted prominent opposition figures, while accountability for governing authorities has been inconsistent and selective. Structural features of the judicial system, including politically mediated judicial nominations, a high proportion of provisional judges, and delays and disputes surrounding judicial elections, have weakened institutional autonomy. Although oversight bodies continue to function and elections have been administered with improved procedural credibility since 2020, the judiciary remains politicized and only partially able to constrain governing authorities.
National elections are largely free and fair. Bolivia’s recent elections have been competitive, with multiple opposition candidates participating and the governing party suffering a decisive defeat in the 2025 presidential runoff. This represents a marked improvement from the 2019 electoral crisis, when a large-scale fraud led to the annulment of the election. Subsequent elections have been conducted with observation and without significant electoral irregularities, though lingering disputes over the independence of electoral authorities indicate that confidence in the electoral process remains fragile.
In Bolivia, the regime has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. In the 2025 general elections, a broad range of political forces and presidential tickets were able to register and campaign nationwide, including candidates aligned with the governing Movement for Socialism (MAS), traditional opposition parties, and newly formed coalitions. The first round took place in August and produced a fragmented and competitive result in which the three leading candidates were opposition figures. Rodrigo Paz received 32.06% of the vote, Jorge Quiroga 26.70%, and Samuel Doria Medina 19.69%, while the incumbent MAS-aligned candidacy, led by then-interior minister Eduardo Del Castillo, obtained only 3.17% amid internal fragmentation within the governing movement. Because no candidate achieved the constitutional threshold for outright victory, the election proceeded to a second round, which took place in October, marking the first presidential runoff in Bolivia. In the runoff, Paz won with approximately 55% of the vote against Quiroga’s 45%. Authorities also applied candidacy eligibility requirements. In late 2024, the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the constitution prohibits a former president from seeking an additional term, whether consecutive or non-consecutive, rendering former president Evo Morales ineligible to stand as a candidate. Morales publicly urged supporters to cast null or blank ballots, which rose to nearly 20% in the first round, which was well above the roughly 4% typical in previous elections. The legislative results further underscored open competition. The MAS obtained only two seats in the lower chamber and no representation in the Senate of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly.
The Bolivian regime has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. In the two most recent elections, Bolivia has not experienced a comparable breakdown in the conduct of voting or tabulation, and electoral outcomes have been determined through the ordinary counting and certification of ballots. However, the country underwent a major electoral integrity crisis during the October 2019 general election. On election night, the preliminary quick-count system (TREP), which had been reporting results publicly, was abruptly suspended for nearly 24 hours while early returns indicated a margin consistent with a runoff between Morales and mainstream opposition candidate Carlos Mesa. When reporting resumed, Morales’s lead had widened sufficiently to surpass the constitutional threshold required to avoid a second round. The interruption generated widespread protests and concern among observers regarding the transparency of the tabulation process. An audit conducted by the Organization of American States (OAS) identified “overwhelming evidence” of serious irregularities in the management and integrity of the vote count, due to “intentional manipulation” of the vote abetted by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). The electoral authorities subsequently annulled the election and called a new vote. Amid escalating nationwide protests and after losing the support of the police and the armed forces, Morales resigned from office and left the country. Opposition Senator Jeanine Áñez, the highest-ranking official in the constitutional line of succession who had not yet resigned, assumed the presidency on an interim basis. A rerun election was organized in 2020, and the 2025 electoral process was conducted without a similar interruption of the vote count.
Moreover, under Arce, the regime has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. In the 2025 electoral cycle, Bolivia’s electoral authorities have been able to administer national elections and certify results through ordinary procedures, and subsequent contests were conducted with both domestic and international observation, including missions from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU), as well as monitoring initiatives by civil society groups such as Cuidemos el Voto. However, the credibility of electoral oversight was significantly affected by the political and institutional disputes surrounding the 2019 electoral period. Prior to the crisis, the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal held that term limits could not restrict a candidate’s political rights, a ruling that enabled then-incumbent president Evo Morales to seek another term, which would have been his fourth in office. In December 2018, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) authorized his candidacy despite prior term limits and a referendum rejecting re-election. The decision was highly contentious and generated doubts among political actors and segments of the public regarding the neutrality of the bodies responsible for administering elections. After the 2019 electoral process and the OAS audit, members of the TSE left office, and several electoral officials were detained or prosecuted in connection with their administration of the vote. The tribunal was subsequently reconstituted through new appointments in a polarized political environment. Although later elections were administered with observation and greater procedural stability, political disputes over the composition and impartiality of the electoral authority have persisted, and public confidence has only gradually recovered. Taken together, the eligibility controversy preceding the crisis and the subsequent replacement of electoral authorities indicate a weakened but still functioning system of electoral oversight rather than its systematic dismantling.
The regime has not skewed the electoral playing field so much so that it generally wins elections with a very high vote share. The 2025 electoral cycle displayed a level of competition not seen in Bolivia for many years. For the first time since the adoption of the 2009 Constitution, no presidential candidate secured an outright majority in the first round of the 2025 election, resulting in a runoff and the defeat of the long-governing Movement for Socialism (MAS). This contrasts with earlier electoral cycles, in which MAS candidates repeatedly won the presidency in the first round with large vote shares, aided in part by a fragmented opposition and the party’s entrenched political position. The shift from consistent first-round victories to a competitive runoff indicates that electoral outcomes now contain genuine uncertainty and that the governing movement no longer retains a structural monopoly over electoral competition.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Across successive administrations, authorities have exerted pressure on independent media through legal, economic, and political means, while opposition figures and activists have faced prosecution and detention connected to contentious political activity. Protests occur frequently but have at times been met with arrests, forceful dispersal, and excessive use of force. As a result, dissent persists but takes place in a polarized environment where public criticism and political mobilization can carry significant legal and personal risks.
The Bolivian regime has heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Successive administrations have taken steps that affected the independence and economic viability of critical media outlets. During the presidency of Evo Morales (2006–2019), the governing Movement for Socialism (MAS) oversaw the transfer of ownership of major media companies, including the newspaper La Razón and the television networks ATB and PAT, into the hands of business groups widely perceived as aligned with the government, contributing to more favorable coverage of official policies. Authorities also initiated legal and administrative actions against outlets critical of the government, including lawsuits, tax and regulatory audits, and other proceedings that journalists described as harassment. Government advertising has likewise been a significant lever of influence. Although public advertising is formally required to be allocated without discrimination, independent outlets have reported that those critical of the government were frequently excluded from receiving state advertising revenue, an important source of funding in the Bolivian media market. Similar pressures were reported during the 2019–2020 interim administration and continued under the presidency of Luis Arce (2020–2025). In August 2022, citing intimidation, legal pressures, and political harassment against journalists, the National Association of Bolivian Journalists declared a “state of emergency” for the press. Taken together, ownership changes, legal pressures, and discriminatory allocation of state advertising indicate substantial government influence over media coverage in its favor.
The MAS regime has seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Political actors and media outlets in Bolivia have operated in a climate in which participation in contentious politics can entail significant legal and personal risk. Authorities pursued criminal proceedings and detained prominent opposition leaders in the years following the 2019 political crisis, including the arrest of former interim president Jeanine Áñez in 2021, civic leader Marco Antonio Pumari in 2021, and Santa Cruz governor Luis Fernando Camacho in 2022, all of whom have faced prosecution and extended periods of detention on charges related to their alleged roles in the 2019 events. In the case of Camacho, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) determined that his detention was arbitrary and called for remedial measures. Following the MAS defeat in the 2025 elections, some of these detention measures were later modified or lifted, but the prosecutions and extended deprivation of liberty contributed to a chilling effect on political organizing and protest leadership, and it remains unclear whether these developments reflect a lasting change in state practice.
Independent media have also faced pressure affecting their ability to operate. For example, in 2023, the national newspaper Página Siete, a prominent independent outlet that frequently published criticism of MAS policies, ceased publication after declaring bankruptcy. Its former executives alleged that successive MAS administrations had economically constrained the paper by withdrawing state advertising and imposing questionable tax penalties. Journalists have reported harassment, public discrediting by political actors, and threats from partisan groups during the Morales, Añez, and Arce administrations. Taken together, the prosecution and detention of opposition leaders, combined with pressures on independent media, indicate that dissenting political activity and expression remain possible but are subject to significant intimidation and obstruction.
The regime has seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Bolivia has experienced recurrent protest activity in recent years, and several episodes have involved forceful responses by security forces and serious violence under successive administrations. Instances of coercive policing predated the 2019 crisis. During the presidency of Evo Morales, demonstrations were often dispersed with force, including the 2016 marches by disability rights activists seeking increased stipends, when protesters traveling to the capital to meet with officials were confronted by security forces, and police reportedly used irritant spray against similar protests in April and June of that year. In August 2016, at least two demonstrators were killed amid clashes between striking miners and police. The unrest surrounding the 2019 elections further intensified these dynamics. Protests and counter-protests during the final days of Morales’s government were followed by additional confrontations after his resignation and the installation of the interim administration of Jeanine Áñez. In November 2019, demonstrations by Morales supporters in Cochabamba and El Alto were dispersed by combined police and military operations, resulting in at least 30 deaths and numerous injuries. A 2021 report by the Interdisciplinary Group of Experts (GIEI) concluded that non-state actors aligned with Morales committed human rights violations against opposition actors during the earlier protests, while after his resignation, the armed forces carried out serious human rights violations, particularly against Morales’ supporters.
Later mobilizations also encountered coercive measures. In August 2020, during the interim government of Áñez, nationwide blockades and demonstrations following repeated election delays prompted security deployments and investigations connected to protest activity. Under President Luis Arce, further protests were met with policing operations and clashes. Demonstrations in 2022 in the Santa Cruz region over the postponement of the national census involved confrontations between police and protesters, and unrest intensified after the arrest of opposition leader Luis Fernando Camacho. Protests by coca growers in the Yungas region were also met with heavy policing, and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported violence and excessive use of force against demonstrators. Although some protest actions, including Indigenous marches in 2021, occurred with lower levels of violence, recurring confrontations, detentions, and allegations of disproportionate force across multiple administrations indicate that the right to peaceful assembly has at times been restricted in practice during periods of political contention.
Finally, the regime has killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. There have been serious allegations of lethal human rights abuses by state agents. A preliminary report issued in 2022 by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that, in 2009, during the presidency of Evo Morales, Bolivian security forces detained, tortured, and extrajudicially executed at least three individuals accused of belonging to a separatist group in the Santa Cruz region. The report held the Bolivian state responsible for these violations and also noted that other suspects were subjected to prolonged preventive detention lasting up to ten years. Although this incident occurred in a specific security context, it represents a documented case in which state agents carried out killings and severe abuses against individuals identified as political opponents, indicating that the use of lethal force against alleged dissidents has occurred.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Formal oversight bodies continue to operate, but their autonomy is limited by political influence over appointments, prosecutions, and institutional procedures. Courts play a significant role in resolving political conflicts, yet their decisions are often perceived as aligned with shifting political interests, and accountability for governing authorities remains inconsistent. Structural weaknesses in the judicial system further reduce its capacity to act as an impartial check on power. As a result, institutional constraints on the executive and other political actors exist but function unevenly and do not reliably prevent the politicization of state authority.
Courts have unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. In 2017, for example, after voters rejected removing presidential term limits in a national referendum, legislators from the governing Movement for Socialism (MAS) petitioned the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP) to review the constitutional provisions restricting reelection. The TCP ruled that term limits violated political rights protections and permitted then-president Evo Morales to seek another term, enabling him to run again in the 2019 election. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal subsequently authorized his candidacy, a decision that contributed directly to the political crisis surrounding the 2019 vote, in which the Organization of American States later found the results unverifiable due to manipulation of the tabulation process. In later years, the judiciary again shaped electoral competition: in late 2023, the TCP reversed its earlier interpretation and imposed a two-term limit, effectively barring Morales from running in the 2025 election. Although the 2020 and 2025 elections were administered with greater procedural credibility, these rulings illustrate that judicial decisions have repeatedly determined who may compete for power, demonstrating the judiciary’s influential and contested role in structuring electoral competition.
Courts have frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Criminal proceedings have repeatedly been brought against prominent political opponents following periods of political conflict. After the 2019 crisis, authorities prosecuted opposition leaders and protest figures for their alleged roles in the unrest. Former interim president Jeanine Áñez was arrested in March 2021 and tried in ordinary criminal proceedings rather than through the constitutionally required special proceeding for former heads of state (“juicio de responsabilidades”). She was convicted of the crimes of breach of duties and resolutions contrary to the constitution and laws for actions related to her assumption of the presidency and sentenced to ten years in prison. Civic leader Marco Antonio Pumari was detained in December 2021 and charged with terrorism, sedition, and conspiracy in connection with the 2019 protests. Santa Cruz governor Luis Fernando Camacho was arrested in December 2022 on similar charges and transferred from Santa Cruz to a maximum-security prison in La Paz while still serving as an elected governor. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention subsequently determined that Camacho’s detention was arbitrary and called for remedial measures. These prosecutions followed earlier criminal cases pursued under the interim government against figures associated with the Morales administration, indicating a recurring pattern in which criminal law has been applied to major political rivals rather than functioning solely as a neutral accountability mechanism.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Bolivia’s justice system has struggled to impose consistent accountability on governing authorities while aggressively pursuing opponents. For example, an arrest warrant issued for Morales in 2019 was annulled after his political movement returned to power in 2020, while prosecutions against officials from the interim government proceeded. A 2021 report by the Interdisciplinary Group of Experts concluded that a lack of independence, transparency, and objectivity in criminal prosecutions constitutes a structural problem within the Bolivian judiciary. The pattern of successive governments prosecuting predecessors but rarely securing comparable accountability for sitting authorities has reinforced perceptions of selective justice and weakened confidence in oversight institutions.
The regime has subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Bolivia’s judicial structure has long been vulnerable to political influence. The popular election of high court judges was introduced by the 2009 Constitution, promoted under President Evo Morales as part of a broader judicial reform. Although judges are elected by popular vote, candidates must first be nominated by a two-thirds legislative majority, allowing governing coalitions to shape the candidate pool. For years, MAS legislative dominance enabled it to influence appointments to the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP). Additional reforms affected judicial tenure: in 2010, a law retroactively classified judges appointed before the 2009 Constitution as temporary despite previously holding tenure, and a 2011 law authorized the Council of Magistrates to appoint provisional judges pending the creation of a judicial training school. As of 2022, approximately 47% of Bolivia’s judges held temporary appointments, a condition that international observers, including the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, noted could further undermine judicial independence. The appointment process has also generated corruption concerns. In October 2022, the head of the Council of Magistrates resigned after acknowledging collaboration with ruling-party legislators in confirming judicial nominees. After MAS lost its supermajority in 2020, judicial appointments stalled, and authorities failed to organize timely judicial elections, leading the TCP in late 2023 to extend the mandates of senior judicial authorities, as well as their own, beyond their constitutional term. Judicial elections were eventually held in 2024 after prolonged political disputes over candidate selection, but the delays and legislative deadlock highlighted the dependence of judicial renewal on political bargaining. These developments indicate an institutional framework in which judicial independence remains structurally weak and susceptible to political negotiation.
HRF classifies Bolivia as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Bolivia operates as a presidential constitutional republic with increasingly competitive multiparty elections but a highly polarized environment. Since the rise of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) in 2006, national politics has been dominated by the political project associated with Evo Morales and its opposition. The 2009 Constitution re-founded the state as a “Plurinational State” and expanded social and political rights, but the same period was also characterized by the accumulation of authority in the executive branch. As the governing movement secured legislative majorities and extended influence over key state institutions, it gradually co-opted oversight institutions, lifted term limits for the president, and undermined the independence of electoral bodies The country experienced a major institutional rupture in 2019 following a contested presidential election marked by serious irregularities and the subsequent annulment of the vote, culminating in the resignation of Morales amid mass protests and political unrest. Although elections in 2020 were largely free and fair, leading MAS to a return to power, the crisis deepened mistrust between rival political camps and left lasting questions about the credibility of state institutions. In recent years, the MAS itself has fragmented, with tensions between factions aligned with Morales and those backing President Luis Arce weakening party cohesion and reshaping the political landscape. Political competition has continued through elections, including the competitive presidential contest that brought President Rodrigo Paz to power in late 2025, the first candidate outside the MAS to win the presidency since 2006. At the same time, confrontations related to the 2019 crisis have led to prosecutions and prolonged detention of prominent opposition figures. As a result, Bolivia’s political system combines active electoral competition with persistent polarization and contested institutional legitimacy.
National elections are largely free and fair. Bolivia’s most recent elections indicate a return to competitive electoral politics after a period in which the credibility of elections was seriously undermined. In the 2025 general election, multiple opposition candidates campaigned nationwide, and the governing Movement for Socialism (MAS) obtained a very limited vote share, producing the country’s first presidential runoff and an alternation in executive power. The victory of an opposition candidate marked the first time since 2006 that the presidency was won by a figure outside the MAS political movement. This competitive environment contrasts with the 2019 electoral crisis, when significant electoral irregularities led to the annulment of the national election and a broader institutional breakdown. A new election was held in 2020, and subsequent contests have been conducted with domestic and international observation and without a comparable disruption, though disputes over the independence and composition of electoral authorities persist. Electoral competition is therefore present but recent, emerging after a prior collapse in confidence in the electoral process.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Across successive administrations, authorities have exercised significant influence over media coverage through ownership changes, legal and administrative pressures, and the discriminatory allocation of state advertising, contributing to a constrained environment for independent journalism. Political participation in contentious activity has also entailed legal risks, as prominent opposition leaders have faced prosecution and prolonged detention in connection with the 2019 crisis, and journalists and activists have reported harassment and intimidation by both state actors and partisan groups. Demonstrations are frequent but have at times been dispersed through coercive policing, arrests, and excessive use of force, and protest-related violence has occurred under multiple governments. In addition, past investigations have documented cases of severe human rights abuses by security forces, including extrajudicial killings. Taken together, these patterns indicate that dissenting expression and mobilization remain possible in Bolivia but occur in a restrictive climate that discourages open opposition.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Courts have played a decisive role in shaping electoral competition. For example, the same Constitutional Tribunal that enabled then-President Evo Morales to run in the 2019 election for what would have been a fourth term, despite a national referendum rejecting indefinite reelection, later reinterpreted constitutional term limits as restricting presidents to two terms, effectively disqualifying his candidacy ahead of the 2025 election. At the same time, criminal proceedings have repeatedly targeted prominent opposition figures, while accountability for governing authorities has been inconsistent and selective. Structural features of the judicial system, including politically mediated judicial nominations, a high proportion of provisional judges, and delays and disputes surrounding judicial elections, have weakened institutional autonomy. Although oversight bodies continue to function and elections have been administered with improved procedural credibility since 2020, the judiciary remains politicized and only partially able to constrain governing authorities.
National elections are largely free and fair. Bolivia’s recent elections have been competitive, with multiple opposition candidates participating and the governing party suffering a decisive defeat in the 2025 presidential runoff. This represents a marked improvement from the 2019 electoral crisis, when a large-scale fraud led to the annulment of the election. Subsequent elections have been conducted with observation and without significant electoral irregularities, though lingering disputes over the independence of electoral authorities indicate that confidence in the electoral process remains fragile.
In Bolivia, the regime has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. In the 2025 general elections, a broad range of political forces and presidential tickets were able to register and campaign nationwide, including candidates aligned with the governing Movement for Socialism (MAS), traditional opposition parties, and newly formed coalitions. The first round took place in August and produced a fragmented and competitive result in which the three leading candidates were opposition figures. Rodrigo Paz received 32.06% of the vote, Jorge Quiroga 26.70%, and Samuel Doria Medina 19.69%, while the incumbent MAS-aligned candidacy, led by then-interior minister Eduardo Del Castillo, obtained only 3.17% amid internal fragmentation within the governing movement. Because no candidate achieved the constitutional threshold for outright victory, the election proceeded to a second round, which took place in October, marking the first presidential runoff in Bolivia. In the runoff, Paz won with approximately 55% of the vote against Quiroga’s 45%. Authorities also applied candidacy eligibility requirements. In late 2024, the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the constitution prohibits a former president from seeking an additional term, whether consecutive or non-consecutive, rendering former president Evo Morales ineligible to stand as a candidate. Morales publicly urged supporters to cast null or blank ballots, which rose to nearly 20% in the first round, which was well above the roughly 4% typical in previous elections. The legislative results further underscored open competition. The MAS obtained only two seats in the lower chamber and no representation in the Senate of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly.
The Bolivian regime has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. In the two most recent elections, Bolivia has not experienced a comparable breakdown in the conduct of voting or tabulation, and electoral outcomes have been determined through the ordinary counting and certification of ballots. However, the country underwent a major electoral integrity crisis during the October 2019 general election. On election night, the preliminary quick-count system (TREP), which had been reporting results publicly, was abruptly suspended for nearly 24 hours while early returns indicated a margin consistent with a runoff between Morales and mainstream opposition candidate Carlos Mesa. When reporting resumed, Morales’s lead had widened sufficiently to surpass the constitutional threshold required to avoid a second round. The interruption generated widespread protests and concern among observers regarding the transparency of the tabulation process. An audit conducted by the Organization of American States (OAS) identified “overwhelming evidence” of serious irregularities in the management and integrity of the vote count, due to “intentional manipulation” of the vote abetted by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). The electoral authorities subsequently annulled the election and called a new vote. Amid escalating nationwide protests and after losing the support of the police and the armed forces, Morales resigned from office and left the country. Opposition Senator Jeanine Áñez, the highest-ranking official in the constitutional line of succession who had not yet resigned, assumed the presidency on an interim basis. A rerun election was organized in 2020, and the 2025 electoral process was conducted without a similar interruption of the vote count.
Moreover, under Arce, the regime has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. In the 2025 electoral cycle, Bolivia’s electoral authorities have been able to administer national elections and certify results through ordinary procedures, and subsequent contests were conducted with both domestic and international observation, including missions from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU), as well as monitoring initiatives by civil society groups such as Cuidemos el Voto. However, the credibility of electoral oversight was significantly affected by the political and institutional disputes surrounding the 2019 electoral period. Prior to the crisis, the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal held that term limits could not restrict a candidate’s political rights, a ruling that enabled then-incumbent president Evo Morales to seek another term, which would have been his fourth in office. In December 2018, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) authorized his candidacy despite prior term limits and a referendum rejecting re-election. The decision was highly contentious and generated doubts among political actors and segments of the public regarding the neutrality of the bodies responsible for administering elections. After the 2019 electoral process and the OAS audit, members of the TSE left office, and several electoral officials were detained or prosecuted in connection with their administration of the vote. The tribunal was subsequently reconstituted through new appointments in a polarized political environment. Although later elections were administered with observation and greater procedural stability, political disputes over the composition and impartiality of the electoral authority have persisted, and public confidence has only gradually recovered. Taken together, the eligibility controversy preceding the crisis and the subsequent replacement of electoral authorities indicate a weakened but still functioning system of electoral oversight rather than its systematic dismantling.
The regime has not skewed the electoral playing field so much so that it generally wins elections with a very high vote share. The 2025 electoral cycle displayed a level of competition not seen in Bolivia for many years. For the first time since the adoption of the 2009 Constitution, no presidential candidate secured an outright majority in the first round of the 2025 election, resulting in a runoff and the defeat of the long-governing Movement for Socialism (MAS). This contrasts with earlier electoral cycles, in which MAS candidates repeatedly won the presidency in the first round with large vote shares, aided in part by a fragmented opposition and the party’s entrenched political position. The shift from consistent first-round victories to a competitive runoff indicates that electoral outcomes now contain genuine uncertainty and that the governing movement no longer retains a structural monopoly over electoral competition.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Across successive administrations, authorities have exerted pressure on independent media through legal, economic, and political means, while opposition figures and activists have faced prosecution and detention connected to contentious political activity. Protests occur frequently but have at times been met with arrests, forceful dispersal, and excessive use of force. As a result, dissent persists but takes place in a polarized environment where public criticism and political mobilization can carry significant legal and personal risks.
The Bolivian regime has heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Successive administrations have taken steps that affected the independence and economic viability of critical media outlets. During the presidency of Evo Morales (2006–2019), the governing Movement for Socialism (MAS) oversaw the transfer of ownership of major media companies, including the newspaper La Razón and the television networks ATB and PAT, into the hands of business groups widely perceived as aligned with the government, contributing to more favorable coverage of official policies. Authorities also initiated legal and administrative actions against outlets critical of the government, including lawsuits, tax and regulatory audits, and other proceedings that journalists described as harassment. Government advertising has likewise been a significant lever of influence. Although public advertising is formally required to be allocated without discrimination, independent outlets have reported that those critical of the government were frequently excluded from receiving state advertising revenue, an important source of funding in the Bolivian media market. Similar pressures were reported during the 2019–2020 interim administration and continued under the presidency of Luis Arce (2020–2025). In August 2022, citing intimidation, legal pressures, and political harassment against journalists, the National Association of Bolivian Journalists declared a “state of emergency” for the press. Taken together, ownership changes, legal pressures, and discriminatory allocation of state advertising indicate substantial government influence over media coverage in its favor.
The MAS regime has seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Political actors and media outlets in Bolivia have operated in a climate in which participation in contentious politics can entail significant legal and personal risk. Authorities pursued criminal proceedings and detained prominent opposition leaders in the years following the 2019 political crisis, including the arrest of former interim president Jeanine Áñez in 2021, civic leader Marco Antonio Pumari in 2021, and Santa Cruz governor Luis Fernando Camacho in 2022, all of whom have faced prosecution and extended periods of detention on charges related to their alleged roles in the 2019 events. In the case of Camacho, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) determined that his detention was arbitrary and called for remedial measures. Following the MAS defeat in the 2025 elections, some of these detention measures were later modified or lifted, but the prosecutions and extended deprivation of liberty contributed to a chilling effect on political organizing and protest leadership, and it remains unclear whether these developments reflect a lasting change in state practice.
Independent media have also faced pressure affecting their ability to operate. For example, in 2023, the national newspaper Página Siete, a prominent independent outlet that frequently published criticism of MAS policies, ceased publication after declaring bankruptcy. Its former executives alleged that successive MAS administrations had economically constrained the paper by withdrawing state advertising and imposing questionable tax penalties. Journalists have reported harassment, public discrediting by political actors, and threats from partisan groups during the Morales, Añez, and Arce administrations. Taken together, the prosecution and detention of opposition leaders, combined with pressures on independent media, indicate that dissenting political activity and expression remain possible but are subject to significant intimidation and obstruction.
The regime has seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Bolivia has experienced recurrent protest activity in recent years, and several episodes have involved forceful responses by security forces and serious violence under successive administrations. Instances of coercive policing predated the 2019 crisis. During the presidency of Evo Morales, demonstrations were often dispersed with force, including the 2016 marches by disability rights activists seeking increased stipends, when protesters traveling to the capital to meet with officials were confronted by security forces, and police reportedly used irritant spray against similar protests in April and June of that year. In August 2016, at least two demonstrators were killed amid clashes between striking miners and police. The unrest surrounding the 2019 elections further intensified these dynamics. Protests and counter-protests during the final days of Morales’s government were followed by additional confrontations after his resignation and the installation of the interim administration of Jeanine Áñez. In November 2019, demonstrations by Morales supporters in Cochabamba and El Alto were dispersed by combined police and military operations, resulting in at least 30 deaths and numerous injuries. A 2021 report by the Interdisciplinary Group of Experts (GIEI) concluded that non-state actors aligned with Morales committed human rights violations against opposition actors during the earlier protests, while after his resignation, the armed forces carried out serious human rights violations, particularly against Morales’ supporters.
Later mobilizations also encountered coercive measures. In August 2020, during the interim government of Áñez, nationwide blockades and demonstrations following repeated election delays prompted security deployments and investigations connected to protest activity. Under President Luis Arce, further protests were met with policing operations and clashes. Demonstrations in 2022 in the Santa Cruz region over the postponement of the national census involved confrontations between police and protesters, and unrest intensified after the arrest of opposition leader Luis Fernando Camacho. Protests by coca growers in the Yungas region were also met with heavy policing, and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported violence and excessive use of force against demonstrators. Although some protest actions, including Indigenous marches in 2021, occurred with lower levels of violence, recurring confrontations, detentions, and allegations of disproportionate force across multiple administrations indicate that the right to peaceful assembly has at times been restricted in practice during periods of political contention.
Finally, the regime has killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes. There have been serious allegations of lethal human rights abuses by state agents. A preliminary report issued in 2022 by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that, in 2009, during the presidency of Evo Morales, Bolivian security forces detained, tortured, and extrajudicially executed at least three individuals accused of belonging to a separatist group in the Santa Cruz region. The report held the Bolivian state responsible for these violations and also noted that other suspects were subjected to prolonged preventive detention lasting up to ten years. Although this incident occurred in a specific security context, it represents a documented case in which state agents carried out killings and severe abuses against individuals identified as political opponents, indicating that the use of lethal force against alleged dissidents has occurred.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Formal oversight bodies continue to operate, but their autonomy is limited by political influence over appointments, prosecutions, and institutional procedures. Courts play a significant role in resolving political conflicts, yet their decisions are often perceived as aligned with shifting political interests, and accountability for governing authorities remains inconsistent. Structural weaknesses in the judicial system further reduce its capacity to act as an impartial check on power. As a result, institutional constraints on the executive and other political actors exist but function unevenly and do not reliably prevent the politicization of state authority.
Courts have unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. In 2017, for example, after voters rejected removing presidential term limits in a national referendum, legislators from the governing Movement for Socialism (MAS) petitioned the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP) to review the constitutional provisions restricting reelection. The TCP ruled that term limits violated political rights protections and permitted then-president Evo Morales to seek another term, enabling him to run again in the 2019 election. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal subsequently authorized his candidacy, a decision that contributed directly to the political crisis surrounding the 2019 vote, in which the Organization of American States later found the results unverifiable due to manipulation of the tabulation process. In later years, the judiciary again shaped electoral competition: in late 2023, the TCP reversed its earlier interpretation and imposed a two-term limit, effectively barring Morales from running in the 2025 election. Although the 2020 and 2025 elections were administered with greater procedural credibility, these rulings illustrate that judicial decisions have repeatedly determined who may compete for power, demonstrating the judiciary’s influential and contested role in structuring electoral competition.
Courts have frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Criminal proceedings have repeatedly been brought against prominent political opponents following periods of political conflict. After the 2019 crisis, authorities prosecuted opposition leaders and protest figures for their alleged roles in the unrest. Former interim president Jeanine Áñez was arrested in March 2021 and tried in ordinary criminal proceedings rather than through the constitutionally required special proceeding for former heads of state (“juicio de responsabilidades”). She was convicted of the crimes of breach of duties and resolutions contrary to the constitution and laws for actions related to her assumption of the presidency and sentenced to ten years in prison. Civic leader Marco Antonio Pumari was detained in December 2021 and charged with terrorism, sedition, and conspiracy in connection with the 2019 protests. Santa Cruz governor Luis Fernando Camacho was arrested in December 2022 on similar charges and transferred from Santa Cruz to a maximum-security prison in La Paz while still serving as an elected governor. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention subsequently determined that Camacho’s detention was arbitrary and called for remedial measures. These prosecutions followed earlier criminal cases pursued under the interim government against figures associated with the Morales administration, indicating a recurring pattern in which criminal law has been applied to major political rivals rather than functioning solely as a neutral accountability mechanism.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Bolivia’s justice system has struggled to impose consistent accountability on governing authorities while aggressively pursuing opponents. For example, an arrest warrant issued for Morales in 2019 was annulled after his political movement returned to power in 2020, while prosecutions against officials from the interim government proceeded. A 2021 report by the Interdisciplinary Group of Experts concluded that a lack of independence, transparency, and objectivity in criminal prosecutions constitutes a structural problem within the Bolivian judiciary. The pattern of successive governments prosecuting predecessors but rarely securing comparable accountability for sitting authorities has reinforced perceptions of selective justice and weakened confidence in oversight institutions.
The regime has subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Bolivia’s judicial structure has long been vulnerable to political influence. The popular election of high court judges was introduced by the 2009 Constitution, promoted under President Evo Morales as part of a broader judicial reform. Although judges are elected by popular vote, candidates must first be nominated by a two-thirds legislative majority, allowing governing coalitions to shape the candidate pool. For years, MAS legislative dominance enabled it to influence appointments to the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP). Additional reforms affected judicial tenure: in 2010, a law retroactively classified judges appointed before the 2009 Constitution as temporary despite previously holding tenure, and a 2011 law authorized the Council of Magistrates to appoint provisional judges pending the creation of a judicial training school. As of 2022, approximately 47% of Bolivia’s judges held temporary appointments, a condition that international observers, including the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, noted could further undermine judicial independence. The appointment process has also generated corruption concerns. In October 2022, the head of the Council of Magistrates resigned after acknowledging collaboration with ruling-party legislators in confirming judicial nominees. After MAS lost its supermajority in 2020, judicial appointments stalled, and authorities failed to organize timely judicial elections, leading the TCP in late 2023 to extend the mandates of senior judicial authorities, as well as their own, beyond their constitutional term. Judicial elections were eventually held in 2024 after prolonged political disputes over candidate selection, but the delays and legislative deadlock highlighted the dependence of judicial renewal on political bargaining. These developments indicate an institutional framework in which judicial independence remains structurally weak and susceptible to political negotiation.
