Democracy
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Bhutan as democratic.
Bhutan transitioned into a constitutional monarchy in 2008, after over four centuries of ecclesiastical rule, where each administrative region was led by religious leaders and civilian rulers, and an absolute monarchy. It enacted its first constitution that same year, after nearly seven years of efforts by its fourth Druk Gyalpo, the official title for the monarch, to guide the advent of democracy in Bhutan. The constitution has provisions on Bhutan’s election system, human rights guarantees, and separation of powers. Bhutan’s democratic consolidation is widely regarded as one of the world’s most peaceful and successful.
National elections are largely free and fair. All three of Bhutan’s elections since 2008 were won by a different political party, with modest margins of victory. The Election Commission of Bhutan (ECB) is a constitutionally independent election management body, and the opposition is involved in the appointment of commissioners. However, the disqualification of new and minor parties on eligibility grounds raises concerns about their ability to compete with larger parties in Bhutan’s nascent democracy.
Independent media, civil society organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. While the government remains receptive to public criticism of its policies, it has created an unsustainable environment for independent media and skewed their competition with state-owned media, prompting multiple private, independent newspapers to shut down. It has put stringent limitations on the activities of civil society organizations (CSOs), keeping them from working on issues that defy government interests. Self-censorship is widespread.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Aside from enjoying constitutional safeguards of independence, the judiciary and government have created additional rules and guidelines to allay criticisms regarding their proper and independent functioning. Courts have acquitted or dismissed dissent-related cases, thereby curbing any government attempt to suppress critical views, and held high-ranking authorities accountable without being retaliated against. There is a single instance of the court barring a minor party from participating in an election, but for reasons consistent with the domestic election regulations.
National elections are largely free and fair. The inaugural election took place in March 2008 and was won by the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT), one of the major parties, with 67.04% of the popular vote. The EU Election Observation Mission described the polls as “generally free of irregularities” and other fraudulent activities. The subsequent two elections were won by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT), who were both the official opposition in their respective election years. Their margins of victory did not exceed 55%, indicating increased levels of competition. There were also no reports of fraud in these elections.
The government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The ECB is a constitutionally independent body responsible for enforcing Bhutan’s robust election laws. Its commissioners are appointed by the Druk Gyalpo on the joint recommendation of the Prime Minister, Chief Justice, Speaker of the Parliament, Chairperson of the upper house of Parliament, and Leader of the Opposition. Among others, the ECB has successfully carried out its mandate to ensure equal access of all parties to the media regardless of ownership and control.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. However, the ECB has repeatedly barred new and minor opposition parties from competing in elections. One such party was the Druk Kuenphem Tshogpa (DKT), which was refused registration ahead of the 2018 election for various issues pertaining to its membership, offices, charter, and financial statements. Among others, the ECB considered that DKT failed to secure members in 13 constituencies (demkhongs) and that it lacked “reliable leadership and readiness” to contest. Bhutan’s election laws set strict requirements for parties to participate in elections, including proof of broad-based membership, which many small parties struggle to fulfill. Along with DKT, the ECB denied the registration of two other parties, Druk Gaji Tshogpa (DGT) and Chheku Drukpa, on similar grounds of ineligibility. Although all disqualified parties were newly formed and, therefore, had not become mainstream, their cases hold special importance in the context of Bhutan’s nascent democracy, suggesting a restricted space for political participation.
Independent media, civil society organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Primarily, the government has taken measures that led to the shutdown of private media. Due to a small readership and limited commercial funding, private media in Bhutan are heavily dependent on state advertising, which accounts for more than 80% of their revenue. Thus, where the government chooses to direct its funding inadvertently determines the direction of the broader media environment. Between 2013 and 2019, five private papers – Bhutan Observer, Bhutan Youth, Druk Melong, Druk Yoedzer, and Druk Neytshuel – ceased operations due to the regime’s decision to redirect the vast majority of its advertisements to state-owned media and ministry websites. These closures brought down the number of private papers in Bhutan from 11 to six as of 2023.
The government’s advertising policy has somewhat manipulated media coverage in its favor. The private outlet The Bhutanese reported that the government gives the lion’s share of advertisements to Kuensel, a private publication in which the government has a 51% stake, in addition to privileges such as free government land and high-tech printing facilities. This signals to private media that only government-friendly outlets can receive government support and, therefore, survive, which encourages them to self-censor on politically sensitive topics and potentially skews their reporting. In addition, in 2015, the government announced its plan to give advertisements to the media with the highest circulation and reach. The move gives an unfair advantage to state-owned media Kuensel and the Bhutanese Broadcasting Service as they are the two largest and longest-running media organizations in the country.
The government has somewhat obstructed the work of CSOs. CSOs may not work on issues related to the Nepali-speaking Lhotshampa communities, who have long been discriminated against in Bhutan. Additionally, CSOs may not threaten “the peace and unity of the country” and must register with the government. As of 2023, there are 54 registered organizations in Bhutan, and none of them engage in direct criticism of the government. Those who fail to register risk being disbanded. In September 2023, the registration authority ordered the Bhutan Civil Society Network (BCSN), an association of several registered civil society organizations, to shut down on the basis of its non-registered status.
The government has somewhat censored dissenting speech, often by invoking the national tradition and culture as a justification. In 2013, the Bhutan Infocomm and Media Authority (BICMA) – whose members are directly appointed by the executive – ordered the sole local ISP at the time to block access to Bhutanomics, an anonymous satirical website, and refused to disclose its reason. In 2016, BICMA also banned the film “Hema Hema: Sing Me A Song While I Wait” by a local filmmaker for depicting Bhutanese religious masks in a fictional ritual.
Despite the above, the Bhutanese media are still able to publish criticism of the government in a relatively safe environment. The government has not seriously abused vague laws that impinge on the freedom of dissent, including its criminal defamation and libel provisions. It has shown a willingness to consider public opinions about its policies. For instance, in response to repeated public calls to establish an independent media watchdog to replace BICMA, the government created a Media Council in 2018, whose members include journalists and media proprietors. There has been no notable instance of the government repressing dissenting protests, although they remain extremely rare in practice.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Bhutan’s Constitution provides guarantees of an independent judiciary. Over the years, the government and the judiciary itself have taken steps to improve judicial independence and transparency. In November 2022, for instance, the government enacted the Civil Service Reform Act to unlink all judicial personnel from the civil service, thereby strengthening the separation of powers between the judiciary and other branches of government.
Courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In June 2021, the Thimphu District Court acquitted businessman Penjore of sedition charges filed by the government. The defendant had called Bhutan a “lawless nation” on Facebook and accused the Attorney General’s Office and Bhutan National Bank of official misconduct. Following the acquittal, the government filed additional defamation charges against him, which were likewise dismissed by the High Court in May 2022.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. Courts hold government authorities accountable and have been able to do so without facing retaliation. In October 2020, the High Court upheld a lower court’s conviction of Home Minister Sherub Gyeltshen to two months over a false vehicle insurance claim worth BTN 226,546 (approximately $2,744). The Supreme Court also affirmed the conviction the following year.
In July 2018, the High Court also rejected a suit by DGT’s leader against the ECB’s decision to disqualify the party from running in the general election that year. In its decision, the Court concurred with the ECB’s observation that DGT failed to satisfy the broad-based membership requirement under the election law, which entails that all parties have one member from each “dzongkhag” or district, as it lacked members from two districts. As previously stated, the existence of these registration rules, as well as their strict enforcement by the ECB and endorsement by the judiciary, prevents minor and emerging parties from competing on an equal footing with Bhutan’s larger and more mainstream parties. While the court’s verdict does not amount to unfairness, it presents unique hurdles to electoral competition in Bhutan’s budding democracy.
HRF classifies Bhutan as democratic.
Bhutan transitioned into a constitutional monarchy in 2008, after over four centuries of ecclesiastical rule, where each administrative region was led by religious leaders and civilian rulers, and an absolute monarchy. It enacted its first constitution that same year, after nearly seven years of efforts by its fourth Druk Gyalpo, the official title for the monarch, to guide the advent of democracy in Bhutan. The constitution has provisions on Bhutan’s election system, human rights guarantees, and separation of powers. Bhutan’s democratic consolidation is widely regarded as one of the world’s most peaceful and successful.
National elections are largely free and fair. All three of Bhutan’s elections since 2008 were won by a different political party, with modest margins of victory. The Election Commission of Bhutan (ECB) is a constitutionally independent election management body, and the opposition is involved in the appointment of commissioners. However, the disqualification of new and minor parties on eligibility grounds raises concerns about their ability to compete with larger parties in Bhutan’s nascent democracy.
Independent media, civil society organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. While the government remains receptive to public criticism of its policies, it has created an unsustainable environment for independent media and skewed their competition with state-owned media, prompting multiple private, independent newspapers to shut down. It has put stringent limitations on the activities of civil society organizations (CSOs), keeping them from working on issues that defy government interests. Self-censorship is widespread.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Aside from enjoying constitutional safeguards of independence, the judiciary and government have created additional rules and guidelines to allay criticisms regarding their proper and independent functioning. Courts have acquitted or dismissed dissent-related cases, thereby curbing any government attempt to suppress critical views, and held high-ranking authorities accountable without being retaliated against. There is a single instance of the court barring a minor party from participating in an election, but for reasons consistent with the domestic election regulations.
National elections are largely free and fair. The inaugural election took place in March 2008 and was won by the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT), one of the major parties, with 67.04% of the popular vote. The EU Election Observation Mission described the polls as “generally free of irregularities” and other fraudulent activities. The subsequent two elections were won by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT), who were both the official opposition in their respective election years. Their margins of victory did not exceed 55%, indicating increased levels of competition. There were also no reports of fraud in these elections.
The government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. The ECB is a constitutionally independent body responsible for enforcing Bhutan’s robust election laws. Its commissioners are appointed by the Druk Gyalpo on the joint recommendation of the Prime Minister, Chief Justice, Speaker of the Parliament, Chairperson of the upper house of Parliament, and Leader of the Opposition. Among others, the ECB has successfully carried out its mandate to ensure equal access of all parties to the media regardless of ownership and control.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. However, the ECB has repeatedly barred new and minor opposition parties from competing in elections. One such party was the Druk Kuenphem Tshogpa (DKT), which was refused registration ahead of the 2018 election for various issues pertaining to its membership, offices, charter, and financial statements. Among others, the ECB considered that DKT failed to secure members in 13 constituencies (demkhongs) and that it lacked “reliable leadership and readiness” to contest. Bhutan’s election laws set strict requirements for parties to participate in elections, including proof of broad-based membership, which many small parties struggle to fulfill. Along with DKT, the ECB denied the registration of two other parties, Druk Gaji Tshogpa (DGT) and Chheku Drukpa, on similar grounds of ineligibility. Although all disqualified parties were newly formed and, therefore, had not become mainstream, their cases hold special importance in the context of Bhutan’s nascent democracy, suggesting a restricted space for political participation.
Independent media, civil society organizations, and regular people are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Primarily, the government has taken measures that led to the shutdown of private media. Due to a small readership and limited commercial funding, private media in Bhutan are heavily dependent on state advertising, which accounts for more than 80% of their revenue. Thus, where the government chooses to direct its funding inadvertently determines the direction of the broader media environment. Between 2013 and 2019, five private papers – Bhutan Observer, Bhutan Youth, Druk Melong, Druk Yoedzer, and Druk Neytshuel – ceased operations due to the regime’s decision to redirect the vast majority of its advertisements to state-owned media and ministry websites. These closures brought down the number of private papers in Bhutan from 11 to six as of 2023.
The government’s advertising policy has somewhat manipulated media coverage in its favor. The private outlet The Bhutanese reported that the government gives the lion’s share of advertisements to Kuensel, a private publication in which the government has a 51% stake, in addition to privileges such as free government land and high-tech printing facilities. This signals to private media that only government-friendly outlets can receive government support and, therefore, survive, which encourages them to self-censor on politically sensitive topics and potentially skews their reporting. In addition, in 2015, the government announced its plan to give advertisements to the media with the highest circulation and reach. The move gives an unfair advantage to state-owned media Kuensel and the Bhutanese Broadcasting Service as they are the two largest and longest-running media organizations in the country.
The government has somewhat obstructed the work of CSOs. CSOs may not work on issues related to the Nepali-speaking Lhotshampa communities, who have long been discriminated against in Bhutan. Additionally, CSOs may not threaten “the peace and unity of the country” and must register with the government. As of 2023, there are 54 registered organizations in Bhutan, and none of them engage in direct criticism of the government. Those who fail to register risk being disbanded. In September 2023, the registration authority ordered the Bhutan Civil Society Network (BCSN), an association of several registered civil society organizations, to shut down on the basis of its non-registered status.
The government has somewhat censored dissenting speech, often by invoking the national tradition and culture as a justification. In 2013, the Bhutan Infocomm and Media Authority (BICMA) – whose members are directly appointed by the executive – ordered the sole local ISP at the time to block access to Bhutanomics, an anonymous satirical website, and refused to disclose its reason. In 2016, BICMA also banned the film “Hema Hema: Sing Me A Song While I Wait” by a local filmmaker for depicting Bhutanese religious masks in a fictional ritual.
Despite the above, the Bhutanese media are still able to publish criticism of the government in a relatively safe environment. The government has not seriously abused vague laws that impinge on the freedom of dissent, including its criminal defamation and libel provisions. It has shown a willingness to consider public opinions about its policies. For instance, in response to repeated public calls to establish an independent media watchdog to replace BICMA, the government created a Media Council in 2018, whose members include journalists and media proprietors. There has been no notable instance of the government repressing dissenting protests, although they remain extremely rare in practice.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Bhutan’s Constitution provides guarantees of an independent judiciary. Over the years, the government and the judiciary itself have taken steps to improve judicial independence and transparency. In November 2022, for instance, the government enacted the Civil Service Reform Act to unlink all judicial personnel from the civil service, thereby strengthening the separation of powers between the judiciary and other branches of government.
Courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In June 2021, the Thimphu District Court acquitted businessman Penjore of sedition charges filed by the government. The defendant had called Bhutan a “lawless nation” on Facebook and accused the Attorney General’s Office and Bhutan National Bank of official misconduct. Following the acquittal, the government filed additional defamation charges against him, which were likewise dismissed by the High Court in May 2022.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. Courts hold government authorities accountable and have been able to do so without facing retaliation. In October 2020, the High Court upheld a lower court’s conviction of Home Minister Sherub Gyeltshen to two months over a false vehicle insurance claim worth BTN 226,546 (approximately $2,744). The Supreme Court also affirmed the conviction the following year.
In July 2018, the High Court also rejected a suit by DGT’s leader against the ECB’s decision to disqualify the party from running in the general election that year. In its decision, the Court concurred with the ECB’s observation that DGT failed to satisfy the broad-based membership requirement under the election law, which entails that all parties have one member from each “dzongkhag” or district, as it lacked members from two districts. As previously stated, the existence of these registration rules, as well as their strict enforcement by the ECB and endorsement by the judiciary, prevents minor and emerging parties from competing on an equal footing with Bhutan’s larger and more mainstream parties. While the court’s verdict does not amount to unfairness, it presents unique hurdles to electoral competition in Bhutan’s budding democracy.
