Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Benin as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Benin is a republic with a presidential system of government. The Head of State, Patrice Talon, was elected in 2016 and claimed re-election in a sham 2021 poll. In the first decade after gaining independence from France in 1960, the country experienced six military coups before Mathieu Kérékou imposed nearly two decades of one-party rule. The country has undergone a significant political transformation over the past decade, shifting from a democratic model to one characterized by authoritarian rule. This change has seen power become increasingly concentrated in the hands of President Talon, effectively sidelining any opposition. There has also been political instrumentalization of the judiciary, and elections have been systematically biased due to restrictive electoral reforms that have excluded opposition candidates. Additionally, popular demonstrations have been met with violent repression. This political landscape is compounded by a growing insecurity in the country, which includes a rise in terrorism in the northern regions and an attempted coup d’état by the military in December 2025.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The Talon regime has systematically barred opposition candidates from participating through judicial harassment and restrictive electoral laws. Additionally, it has taken control of independent electoral oversight through political appointments and direct executive interference and has engaged in electoral irregularities.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Talon regime has implemented measures that resulted in the shutdown of the country’s largest independent media organization. It has systematically targeted journalists and civil society organizations through restrictive regulations, violently responded to public demonstrations, and increasingly engaged in transnational repression by cooperating with other states.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The regime has placed loyalists in key judicial positions, established a special criminal court to silence dissent under the guise of combating corruption and terrorism, and implemented restrictive electoral laws that have effectively excluded the opposition, allowing it to fully dominate the parliament.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. By repeatedly barring high-profile opposition candidates from competing through prosecution and restrictive electoral laws, politically interfering in the electoral management body’s operations, and engaging in electoral fraud, the Talon regime has significantly reduced the competitiveness of elections in Benin.
The regime unfairly barred a legitimate, mainstream opposition party from competing in elections. Although President Talon came to power in 2016 through a peaceful democratic transition, he has actively pursued measures to marginalize significant opponents during various electoral cycles. In preparation for the 2026 national elections, the ruling party implemented stricter electoral reforms, including requiring presidential candidates to obtain at least 15% of endorsements from mayors and members of parliament across at least three-fifths of the country’s electoral districts. Specifically, political parties can only present a presidential candidate if they are sponsored in at least 28 constituencies. The major opposition party, the Democrats party, attempted to participate in the 2026 presidential election, but the National Autonomous Electoral Commission (CENA) rejected their bid due to insufficient sponsorships. The party managed to secure only 27 endorsements due to the last-minute withdrawal of support from one of its elected representatives, Michel Sodjinou. In the 2021 elections, the regime validated only three out of the 20 candidacies submitted for the presidential election. This limited participation was largely due to judicial harassment, stricter sponsorship rules that required at least 16 endorsements, and a significant increase in the election deposit, which rose from $9,000 to $90,000. As a result, almost all leading opposition figures were excluded. For example, Reckya Madougou, the Democrats’ designated candidate, was rejected for lack of sponsorships. She was also arrested just before the election and subsequently sentenced to 20 years in prison for politically motivated/trumped-up charges of “financing terrorism.” Another notable case is Joël Aïvo, an academic and opposition candidate, who was also excluded from the election due to a lack of sponsorships. He was arrested shortly after the elections and received a 10-year prison sentence for “conspiracy against state authority” and money laundering.
The regime unfairly and significantly hinders opposition parties’ electoral campaigns. This includes systematic rally denials. In February 2025, the opposition party, the Democrats, publicly condemned the banning of several of their political rallies, despite having obtained prior municipal authorization. They highlighted a specific incident in which the second deputy mayor approved an event, yet a regime official ordered the police to intervene and prevent the meeting from taking place, without providing any official documentation to justify the decision. When contacted, a government representative defended the ban by claiming that the opposition had not complied with the required administrative procedures. The opposition rejected this justification, arguing that they had fulfilled all legal requirements and that the ban was merely an excuse to undermine “democratic gains.” They believe these bans violate Articles 25, 26, and 35 of the Constitution, which guarantee freedom of assembly and equality before the law, and have decided to file a legal petition against the regime.
The regime seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. It has achieved this through various electoral reforms over the past few years. Between 2019 and 2021, the Talon regime gained control of the National Autonomous Electoral Commission (CENA) by having the legislative branch pass a sweeping overhaul that allowed for direct political appointments rather than a balanced selection from diverse political and civil society stakeholders. Previously, the CENA comprised members from diverse sectors, including civil society. However, a 2019 electoral reform restructured the CENA into two entities: an Electoral Council, which serves as the political decision-making body, and the General Directorate of Elections, which acts as the technical body. The Electoral Council, responsible for validating candidacies and announcing provisional results, consists of five members, three of whom are directly appointed by the presidential camp. Moreover, the CENA has become more reliant on the executive branch in candidate selection. The electoral body can only validate a candidate’s application if they present a certificate of conformity and a tax clearance certificate issued by the Ministry of the Interior and the Tax Department. This clause allows the regime to filter candidates even before the CENA makes its decision.
The regime largely engages in voting irregularities or electoral fraud, which includes practices such as ballot stuffing, intimidating local observers on voting day, and vote buying. During the 2021 presidential elections, reports indicated that over 564,674 deceased individuals were still listed on the newly updated electoral register, casting doubt on the electoral process’s credibility. On voting day, the Electoral Platform of Civil Society Organizations in Benin (PEOSC), a coalition of local networks and organizations dedicated to improving electoral processes in the country, reported over 718 irregularities. These irregularities included instances of individuals casting multiple votes, voting without proper identification, and acts of corruption and intimidation directed at polling station members or voters by various actors.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Talon regime has implemented measures to shut down the country’s largest independent media organization. It has systematically targeted journalists and civil society organizations with restrictive regulations, repressed demonstrations, and increasingly engaged in transnational repression against exiled dissidents in other African countries and even beyond the continent.
The regime has unfairly taken measures that led to the shutdown of a major independent, dissenting organization. This has been achieved by revoking the organizations’ licenses or freezing their bank accounts, imposing temporary license suspensions, and imposing strict regulatory laws. In March 2025, the news website Bénin Web TV was suspended, and its managing director’s press card was revoked. The High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication (HAAC) accused the outlet of publishing two articles with inaccurate information: one regarding alleged errors in the HAAC’s budget request to Parliament, and the other about the HAAC president’s request for an official vehicle. In January 2025, the newspaper Le Patriote and its website faced similar consequences after publishing an editorial that criticized the government’s strategy during an attack on a military position near the border between Burkina Faso and Niger. In February 2024, the largest independent media organization in Benin, La Gazette du Golfe, announced the layoff of its 200 employees after the Talon regime froze its bank accounts. Since August 2023, the media group—which owns a television channel, a radio station, and a biweekly newspaper—has been banned from broadcasting. The HAAC accused the organization of glorifying a coup after it commented on the situation in neighboring Niger, where a military regime ousted President Mohamed Bazoum. Despite this initial sanction, La Gazette du Golfe continued to pay part of its employees’ salaries. However, the regime’s decision in February 2024 to freeze the media organization’s bank accounts dealt the final blow to its entire operations. In January 2024, the news sites Crystal News, Reporter Médias Monde, Les Pharaons, and the TikTok news account Madame Actu were also suspended. The HAAC justified these decisions by citing “unauthorized websites” that had received “numerous complaints,” “baseless allegations,” and the dissemination of “media content without prior authorization from the HAAC.” However, the statement did not specify which content was considered problematic.
The regime has seriously and unjustly repressed protests or gatherings. It has achieved this by limiting access to permits, making arbitrary arrests, and using force against demonstrators. In April 2024, state security forces fired tear gas to disperse a demonstration against the rising cost of living, organized by trade unions in Cotonou, the economic capital of Benin. The Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Benin (CSA Benin), one of the largest labor movements in the country, reported that its leader, Anselme Amoussou, was arrested by the police. Additional union sources indicated that a dozen protesters were also detained. Moreover, prior to and following the 2019 legislative elections, the regime used excessive force against peaceful protests. In February 2019, security forces dispersed demonstrators with tear gas and batons, leading to the arrest of opposition leaders and, tragically, at least one death during clashes between protesters and security forces. These actions followed the Electoral Commission’s decision to allow only two political parties affiliated with the presidential camp to field candidates in the elections, effectively excluding all opposition lists. In May 2019, state security forces violently suppressed demonstrations in Cotonou that erupted after the announcement of the legislative election results. This crackdown included the use of live ammunition against hundreds of demonstrators gathered outside the residence of opposition leader and former President Thomas Boni Yayi to show their support. This violence reportedly resulted in the deaths of at least two individuals.
The regime primarily engages in transnational repression against dissidents living abroad. Since taking power in 2016, the Talon regime has increasingly adopted a transnational authoritarian approach, which includes the harassment, intimidation, and even arrest of its citizens outside the country. This strategy often involves collaboration with other authoritarian regimes, as well as requests to democratic governments for the extradition of political opponents. In December 2025, the regime abducted cyberactivist and government critic Steve Amoussou from his residence in Lomé, Togo, where he had sought refuge since 2019. He was sentenced to two years in prison and fined two million CFA francs (approximately $3,300). The Beninese authorities accused Amoussou of being the author of the cyberactivist account “Frère Hounvi,” known for its outspoken, widely followed social media posts that openly criticize the Talon regime. He was prosecuted for online harassment, spreading false information, and inciting rebellion. In July 2025, the Talon regime collaborated with Ivorian authorities to arrest Beninese journalist Hugues Comlan Sossoukpè while he attended a conference in Abidjan. Sossoukpè had been living in exile in Togo for seven years as a refugee. At the request of the Talon regime, he was arrested without a judicial mandate and subsequently extradited to Cotonou, the capital of Benin. The regime filed various charges against him, including online harassment, rebellion, and glorifying terrorism. Sossoukpè’s lawyers claim that he is subjected to strict isolation and is denied visits from family, under conditions they describe as “inhumane.” In April 2019, a Spanish court denied the Talon regime’s request to extradite Komi Koutche, the former Minister of Finance under the previous administration. The court cited several reasons for its decision, including a lack of evidence supporting the extradition request, concerns about potential political motivations, and doubts about Beninese courts’ ability to ensure a fair trial given their lack of independence from the executive. In the same month, the regime tried Koutche in absentia, sentencing him to 20 years in prison and imposing fines totaling 500 million FCFA (approximately $849,000) for embezzling public funds and abusing his office while serving as the head of the National Fund for Microcredit.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Since taking office in 2016, President Talon has gradually gained control over state institutions by appointing loyalists, withdrawing the country’s membership from regional judicial bodies that oversee human rights cases, establishing special courts to systematically silence the opposition, and enacting restrictive electoral laws that enable him to dominate the legislative institutions.
Courts frequently and unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The regime has achieved this by withdrawing from regional human rights courts and appointing loyalists to key judicial positions to carry out political reforms and issue rulings that align with its interests. Furthermore, the courts have occasionally declared themselves incompetent to rule on cases involving the regime’s controversial policies. In June 2018, President Talon appointed his former personal lawyer, Joseph Fifamin Djogbenou, as the president of the country’s Constitutional Court. Djogbenou had previously served as Talon’s minister of justice and was appointed despite his lack of expertise in constitutional and public law. This political appointment has led the Constitutional Court to consistently issue rulings in favor of the regime. In January 2021, the Court stated that it lacked the authority to rule on two highly controversial policies. The first was the sponsorship system, which requires candidates to collect a specific number of signatures to qualify for elections. The second was a 45-day extension of President Talon’s first term, shifting the end date from April 6 to May 23, 2021. This extension, in particular, enabled the regime to modify the electoral calendar for 2026, allowing nearly all general elections to take place that year. This strategy benefits the ruling coalition, which has the resources to run multiple campaigns at once, while imposing a sponsorship system that allows current elected officials to determine who may run for president. Furthermore, between 2019 and 2021, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) issued several rulings against the Talon regime in Benin, which the Constitutional Court consistently chose to ignore. The Court disregarded the AfCHPR’s call to suspend the 2019 constitutional amendment to CENA, which was deemed to lack national consensus. It also overlooked recommendations to remove the sponsorship rule for the 2021 presidential election, as this rule violates citizens’ right to participate freely in public affairs by arbitrarily eliminating candidates. Additionally, the Court ignored calls to annul the convictions of opposition candidates and allow them to participate in elections. Most importantly, it failed to take necessary measures to “remove obstacles” preventing all political parties from participating in the 2021 elections. In response to these rulings, the Patrice Talon regime made a drastic move in April 2020 by withdrawing the country from the AfCHPR, thereby preventing Beninese citizens and civil society organizations (CSOs) from bringing cases directly before the continental body. The Constitutional Court supported the regime’s position, declaring that the African Court’s decisions could not supersede the country’s internal constitutional order.
The governing authority directed certain cases, such as politically-sensitive cases, to separate, governing authority-controlled courts, such as governing authority-controlled military courts or a governing authority-controlled constitutional tribunal. The regime established a special criminal court as a political weapon to suppress high-profile opponents. In 2018, the Talon regime created the Court for the Suppression of Economic Crimes and Terrorism (CRIET). Following the failed coup attempt in December 2025, the regime utilized the CRIET to silence opposition members suspected of involvement in the takeover. In January 2026, opposition lawmaker Soumaila Sounon Boké from the Democrats party appeared before the CRIET, facing charges of “apology for crimes against state security” and “incitement to rebellion” for a social media post that said, “It’s a day of celebration” while the coup attempt was ongoing. Although Boké claimed that his post referred to a gathering of friends, the court denied the provisional release requested by his lawyers and adjourned the case until February 24, 2026. Additionally, Alassane Tigri, a former minister and vice president of the main opposition party, The Democrats, was arrested at his home in Cotonou as part of the investigation into the coup. He has been remanded in custody on charges of “treason, collusion with a foreign power, complicity in murder, and undermining state security.” In December 2021, the CRIET sentenced Joël Aïvo—whose presidential candidacy was rejected—to 10 years in prison for “money laundering and undermining state security.” In the same month, Rékiatou Madougou, a member of the opposition party The Democrats, also had her candidacy rejected and was sentenced by the CRIET to 20 years in prison for “complicity in terrorist acts.” In response to this judicial repression of the opposition, Essowé Batamoussi, a sitting magistrate of the CRIET, resigned from his position and fled the country for fear of reprisals. He argued that the court received “instructions” from political authorities to target opponents and therefore lacked independence from the executive.
The regime subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Over several years, it has implemented increasingly restrictive electoral measures that prevent opposition candidates from running, thus ensuring total control of the parliament through its own representatives. In 2019, the Talon regime imposed a “certificate of conformity” requirement for political parties wishing to participate in elections, despite this provision not existing in the country’s electoral law. Consequently, the electoral management body approved only two political parties, both aligned with President Talon, for the April 2019 legislative elections. As a result, the parliament was entirely composed of regime representatives. Once in place, the new Assembly unanimously approved a new electoral law that required candidates to be sponsored by incumbent elected officials. This requirement effectively gave the ruling party veto power over any candidate running for office. Although the opposition party, the Democrats, entered parliament in 2023 with 28 out of 109 seats, the presidential camp retained a comfortable majority with 81 seats, allowing it to continue dictating the legislative agenda. For example, in March 2024, the regime-dominated parliament tightened electoral laws to further ensure the exclusion of opposition candidates from the 2026 national elections. Under the new electoral reforms, parties seeking to participate in local elections must now secure 20% of the votes in each of the country’s 24 constituencies to qualify for seat allocation. Despite receiving 16.16% of the national vote in the 2026 legislative elections, the main opposition party, the Democrats, did not meet the 20% threshold in several key constituencies, resulting in their exclusion from parliament. Consequently, the parliament will be completely controlled by regime representatives for the next seven years, with no opposition lawmakers.
HRF classifies Benin as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Benin is a republic with a presidential system of government. The Head of State, Patrice Talon, was elected in 2016 and claimed re-election in a sham 2021 poll. In the first decade after gaining independence from France in 1960, the country experienced six military coups before Mathieu Kérékou imposed nearly two decades of one-party rule. The country has undergone a significant political transformation over the past decade, shifting from a democratic model to one characterized by authoritarian rule. This change has seen power become increasingly concentrated in the hands of President Talon, effectively sidelining any opposition. There has also been political instrumentalization of the judiciary, and elections have been systematically biased due to restrictive electoral reforms that have excluded opposition candidates. Additionally, popular demonstrations have been met with violent repression. This political landscape is compounded by a growing insecurity in the country, which includes a rise in terrorism in the northern regions and an attempted coup d’état by the military in December 2025.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The Talon regime has systematically barred opposition candidates from participating through judicial harassment and restrictive electoral laws. Additionally, it has taken control of independent electoral oversight through political appointments and direct executive interference and has engaged in electoral irregularities.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Talon regime has implemented measures that resulted in the shutdown of the country’s largest independent media organization. It has systematically targeted journalists and civil society organizations through restrictive regulations, violently responded to public demonstrations, and increasingly engaged in transnational repression by cooperating with other states.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The regime has placed loyalists in key judicial positions, established a special criminal court to silence dissent under the guise of combating corruption and terrorism, and implemented restrictive electoral laws that have effectively excluded the opposition, allowing it to fully dominate the parliament.
Elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. By repeatedly barring high-profile opposition candidates from competing through prosecution and restrictive electoral laws, politically interfering in the electoral management body’s operations, and engaging in electoral fraud, the Talon regime has significantly reduced the competitiveness of elections in Benin.
The regime unfairly barred a legitimate, mainstream opposition party from competing in elections. Although President Talon came to power in 2016 through a peaceful democratic transition, he has actively pursued measures to marginalize significant opponents during various electoral cycles. In preparation for the 2026 national elections, the ruling party implemented stricter electoral reforms, including requiring presidential candidates to obtain at least 15% of endorsements from mayors and members of parliament across at least three-fifths of the country’s electoral districts. Specifically, political parties can only present a presidential candidate if they are sponsored in at least 28 constituencies. The major opposition party, the Democrats party, attempted to participate in the 2026 presidential election, but the National Autonomous Electoral Commission (CENA) rejected their bid due to insufficient sponsorships. The party managed to secure only 27 endorsements due to the last-minute withdrawal of support from one of its elected representatives, Michel Sodjinou. In the 2021 elections, the regime validated only three out of the 20 candidacies submitted for the presidential election. This limited participation was largely due to judicial harassment, stricter sponsorship rules that required at least 16 endorsements, and a significant increase in the election deposit, which rose from $9,000 to $90,000. As a result, almost all leading opposition figures were excluded. For example, Reckya Madougou, the Democrats’ designated candidate, was rejected for lack of sponsorships. She was also arrested just before the election and subsequently sentenced to 20 years in prison for politically motivated/trumped-up charges of “financing terrorism.” Another notable case is Joël Aïvo, an academic and opposition candidate, who was also excluded from the election due to a lack of sponsorships. He was arrested shortly after the elections and received a 10-year prison sentence for “conspiracy against state authority” and money laundering.
The regime unfairly and significantly hinders opposition parties’ electoral campaigns. This includes systematic rally denials. In February 2025, the opposition party, the Democrats, publicly condemned the banning of several of their political rallies, despite having obtained prior municipal authorization. They highlighted a specific incident in which the second deputy mayor approved an event, yet a regime official ordered the police to intervene and prevent the meeting from taking place, without providing any official documentation to justify the decision. When contacted, a government representative defended the ban by claiming that the opposition had not complied with the required administrative procedures. The opposition rejected this justification, arguing that they had fulfilled all legal requirements and that the ban was merely an excuse to undermine “democratic gains.” They believe these bans violate Articles 25, 26, and 35 of the Constitution, which guarantee freedom of assembly and equality before the law, and have decided to file a legal petition against the regime.
The regime seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. It has achieved this through various electoral reforms over the past few years. Between 2019 and 2021, the Talon regime gained control of the National Autonomous Electoral Commission (CENA) by having the legislative branch pass a sweeping overhaul that allowed for direct political appointments rather than a balanced selection from diverse political and civil society stakeholders. Previously, the CENA comprised members from diverse sectors, including civil society. However, a 2019 electoral reform restructured the CENA into two entities: an Electoral Council, which serves as the political decision-making body, and the General Directorate of Elections, which acts as the technical body. The Electoral Council, responsible for validating candidacies and announcing provisional results, consists of five members, three of whom are directly appointed by the presidential camp. Moreover, the CENA has become more reliant on the executive branch in candidate selection. The electoral body can only validate a candidate’s application if they present a certificate of conformity and a tax clearance certificate issued by the Ministry of the Interior and the Tax Department. This clause allows the regime to filter candidates even before the CENA makes its decision.
The regime largely engages in voting irregularities or electoral fraud, which includes practices such as ballot stuffing, intimidating local observers on voting day, and vote buying. During the 2021 presidential elections, reports indicated that over 564,674 deceased individuals were still listed on the newly updated electoral register, casting doubt on the electoral process’s credibility. On voting day, the Electoral Platform of Civil Society Organizations in Benin (PEOSC), a coalition of local networks and organizations dedicated to improving electoral processes in the country, reported over 718 irregularities. These irregularities included instances of individuals casting multiple votes, voting without proper identification, and acts of corruption and intimidation directed at polling station members or voters by various actors.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Talon regime has implemented measures to shut down the country’s largest independent media organization. It has systematically targeted journalists and civil society organizations with restrictive regulations, repressed demonstrations, and increasingly engaged in transnational repression against exiled dissidents in other African countries and even beyond the continent.
The regime has unfairly taken measures that led to the shutdown of a major independent, dissenting organization. This has been achieved by revoking the organizations’ licenses or freezing their bank accounts, imposing temporary license suspensions, and imposing strict regulatory laws. In March 2025, the news website Bénin Web TV was suspended, and its managing director’s press card was revoked. The High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication (HAAC) accused the outlet of publishing two articles with inaccurate information: one regarding alleged errors in the HAAC’s budget request to Parliament, and the other about the HAAC president’s request for an official vehicle. In January 2025, the newspaper Le Patriote and its website faced similar consequences after publishing an editorial that criticized the government’s strategy during an attack on a military position near the border between Burkina Faso and Niger. In February 2024, the largest independent media organization in Benin, La Gazette du Golfe, announced the layoff of its 200 employees after the Talon regime froze its bank accounts. Since August 2023, the media group—which owns a television channel, a radio station, and a biweekly newspaper—has been banned from broadcasting. The HAAC accused the organization of glorifying a coup after it commented on the situation in neighboring Niger, where a military regime ousted President Mohamed Bazoum. Despite this initial sanction, La Gazette du Golfe continued to pay part of its employees’ salaries. However, the regime’s decision in February 2024 to freeze the media organization’s bank accounts dealt the final blow to its entire operations. In January 2024, the news sites Crystal News, Reporter Médias Monde, Les Pharaons, and the TikTok news account Madame Actu were also suspended. The HAAC justified these decisions by citing “unauthorized websites” that had received “numerous complaints,” “baseless allegations,” and the dissemination of “media content without prior authorization from the HAAC.” However, the statement did not specify which content was considered problematic.
The regime has seriously and unjustly repressed protests or gatherings. It has achieved this by limiting access to permits, making arbitrary arrests, and using force against demonstrators. In April 2024, state security forces fired tear gas to disperse a demonstration against the rising cost of living, organized by trade unions in Cotonou, the economic capital of Benin. The Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Benin (CSA Benin), one of the largest labor movements in the country, reported that its leader, Anselme Amoussou, was arrested by the police. Additional union sources indicated that a dozen protesters were also detained. Moreover, prior to and following the 2019 legislative elections, the regime used excessive force against peaceful protests. In February 2019, security forces dispersed demonstrators with tear gas and batons, leading to the arrest of opposition leaders and, tragically, at least one death during clashes between protesters and security forces. These actions followed the Electoral Commission’s decision to allow only two political parties affiliated with the presidential camp to field candidates in the elections, effectively excluding all opposition lists. In May 2019, state security forces violently suppressed demonstrations in Cotonou that erupted after the announcement of the legislative election results. This crackdown included the use of live ammunition against hundreds of demonstrators gathered outside the residence of opposition leader and former President Thomas Boni Yayi to show their support. This violence reportedly resulted in the deaths of at least two individuals.
The regime primarily engages in transnational repression against dissidents living abroad. Since taking power in 2016, the Talon regime has increasingly adopted a transnational authoritarian approach, which includes the harassment, intimidation, and even arrest of its citizens outside the country. This strategy often involves collaboration with other authoritarian regimes, as well as requests to democratic governments for the extradition of political opponents. In December 2025, the regime abducted cyberactivist and government critic Steve Amoussou from his residence in Lomé, Togo, where he had sought refuge since 2019. He was sentenced to two years in prison and fined two million CFA francs (approximately $3,300). The Beninese authorities accused Amoussou of being the author of the cyberactivist account “Frère Hounvi,” known for its outspoken, widely followed social media posts that openly criticize the Talon regime. He was prosecuted for online harassment, spreading false information, and inciting rebellion. In July 2025, the Talon regime collaborated with Ivorian authorities to arrest Beninese journalist Hugues Comlan Sossoukpè while he attended a conference in Abidjan. Sossoukpè had been living in exile in Togo for seven years as a refugee. At the request of the Talon regime, he was arrested without a judicial mandate and subsequently extradited to Cotonou, the capital of Benin. The regime filed various charges against him, including online harassment, rebellion, and glorifying terrorism. Sossoukpè’s lawyers claim that he is subjected to strict isolation and is denied visits from family, under conditions they describe as “inhumane.” In April 2019, a Spanish court denied the Talon regime’s request to extradite Komi Koutche, the former Minister of Finance under the previous administration. The court cited several reasons for its decision, including a lack of evidence supporting the extradition request, concerns about potential political motivations, and doubts about Beninese courts’ ability to ensure a fair trial given their lack of independence from the executive. In the same month, the regime tried Koutche in absentia, sentencing him to 20 years in prison and imposing fines totaling 500 million FCFA (approximately $849,000) for embezzling public funds and abusing his office while serving as the head of the National Fund for Microcredit.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Since taking office in 2016, President Talon has gradually gained control over state institutions by appointing loyalists, withdrawing the country’s membership from regional judicial bodies that oversee human rights cases, establishing special courts to systematically silence the opposition, and enacting restrictive electoral laws that enable him to dominate the legislative institutions.
Courts frequently and unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The regime has achieved this by withdrawing from regional human rights courts and appointing loyalists to key judicial positions to carry out political reforms and issue rulings that align with its interests. Furthermore, the courts have occasionally declared themselves incompetent to rule on cases involving the regime’s controversial policies. In June 2018, President Talon appointed his former personal lawyer, Joseph Fifamin Djogbenou, as the president of the country’s Constitutional Court. Djogbenou had previously served as Talon’s minister of justice and was appointed despite his lack of expertise in constitutional and public law. This political appointment has led the Constitutional Court to consistently issue rulings in favor of the regime. In January 2021, the Court stated that it lacked the authority to rule on two highly controversial policies. The first was the sponsorship system, which requires candidates to collect a specific number of signatures to qualify for elections. The second was a 45-day extension of President Talon’s first term, shifting the end date from April 6 to May 23, 2021. This extension, in particular, enabled the regime to modify the electoral calendar for 2026, allowing nearly all general elections to take place that year. This strategy benefits the ruling coalition, which has the resources to run multiple campaigns at once, while imposing a sponsorship system that allows current elected officials to determine who may run for president. Furthermore, between 2019 and 2021, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) issued several rulings against the Talon regime in Benin, which the Constitutional Court consistently chose to ignore. The Court disregarded the AfCHPR’s call to suspend the 2019 constitutional amendment to CENA, which was deemed to lack national consensus. It also overlooked recommendations to remove the sponsorship rule for the 2021 presidential election, as this rule violates citizens’ right to participate freely in public affairs by arbitrarily eliminating candidates. Additionally, the Court ignored calls to annul the convictions of opposition candidates and allow them to participate in elections. Most importantly, it failed to take necessary measures to “remove obstacles” preventing all political parties from participating in the 2021 elections. In response to these rulings, the Patrice Talon regime made a drastic move in April 2020 by withdrawing the country from the AfCHPR, thereby preventing Beninese citizens and civil society organizations (CSOs) from bringing cases directly before the continental body. The Constitutional Court supported the regime’s position, declaring that the African Court’s decisions could not supersede the country’s internal constitutional order.
The governing authority directed certain cases, such as politically-sensitive cases, to separate, governing authority-controlled courts, such as governing authority-controlled military courts or a governing authority-controlled constitutional tribunal. The regime established a special criminal court as a political weapon to suppress high-profile opponents. In 2018, the Talon regime created the Court for the Suppression of Economic Crimes and Terrorism (CRIET). Following the failed coup attempt in December 2025, the regime utilized the CRIET to silence opposition members suspected of involvement in the takeover. In January 2026, opposition lawmaker Soumaila Sounon Boké from the Democrats party appeared before the CRIET, facing charges of “apology for crimes against state security” and “incitement to rebellion” for a social media post that said, “It’s a day of celebration” while the coup attempt was ongoing. Although Boké claimed that his post referred to a gathering of friends, the court denied the provisional release requested by his lawyers and adjourned the case until February 24, 2026. Additionally, Alassane Tigri, a former minister and vice president of the main opposition party, The Democrats, was arrested at his home in Cotonou as part of the investigation into the coup. He has been remanded in custody on charges of “treason, collusion with a foreign power, complicity in murder, and undermining state security.” In December 2021, the CRIET sentenced Joël Aïvo—whose presidential candidacy was rejected—to 10 years in prison for “money laundering and undermining state security.” In the same month, Rékiatou Madougou, a member of the opposition party The Democrats, also had her candidacy rejected and was sentenced by the CRIET to 20 years in prison for “complicity in terrorist acts.” In response to this judicial repression of the opposition, Essowé Batamoussi, a sitting magistrate of the CRIET, resigned from his position and fled the country for fear of reprisals. He argued that the court received “instructions” from political authorities to target opponents and therefore lacked independence from the executive.
The regime subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Over several years, it has implemented increasingly restrictive electoral measures that prevent opposition candidates from running, thus ensuring total control of the parliament through its own representatives. In 2019, the Talon regime imposed a “certificate of conformity” requirement for political parties wishing to participate in elections, despite this provision not existing in the country’s electoral law. Consequently, the electoral management body approved only two political parties, both aligned with President Talon, for the April 2019 legislative elections. As a result, the parliament was entirely composed of regime representatives. Once in place, the new Assembly unanimously approved a new electoral law that required candidates to be sponsored by incumbent elected officials. This requirement effectively gave the ruling party veto power over any candidate running for office. Although the opposition party, the Democrats, entered parliament in 2023 with 28 out of 109 seats, the presidential camp retained a comfortable majority with 81 seats, allowing it to continue dictating the legislative agenda. For example, in March 2024, the regime-dominated parliament tightened electoral laws to further ensure the exclusion of opposition candidates from the 2026 national elections. Under the new electoral reforms, parties seeking to participate in local elections must now secure 20% of the votes in each of the country’s 24 constituencies to qualify for seat allocation. Despite receiving 16.16% of the national vote in the 2026 legislative elections, the main opposition party, the Democrats, did not meet the 20% threshold in several key constituencies, resulting in their exclusion from parliament. Consequently, the parliament will be completely controlled by regime representatives for the next seven years, with no opposition lawmakers.
