The Americas

Belize

Belmopan

Democracy

0.01%

World’s Population

428,644

Population

HRF classifies Belize as democratic.

The foundations of Belize’s parliamentary democracy emerged in the decades prior to the country’s full independence from the United Kingdom in 1981. Starting in the 1950s, protests against British rule sparked political transformations: universal adult suffrage was established in 1954, and then, in 1964, a new Constitution laid the groundwork for Belizean self-governance. After Belize attained full independence in 1981, the center-left People’s United Party (PUP) became one of the country’s mainstream parties, alongside the center-right United Democratic Party (UDP). Currently, Belize retains the British monarch as its head of state, but the role of the monarch is limited and does not interfere with the country’s democratic governance. Elections take place at least every five years, but can occur more frequently. Since 2020, the PUP has led Belize under the leadership of Prime Minister Johnny Briceño. Non-state actors, such as organized crime groups, are active in the country and present a threat to the public as well as to civil society actors and public servants.

National elections in Belize are largely free and fair. The two mainstream parties, the center-left People’s United Party (PUP) and the right-wing United Democratic Party (UDP), regularly compete for seats in the National Assembly. Belize’s primary electoral organism, the Elections and Boundaries Commission (EBC), effectively manages elections; however, the EBC’s oversight capacities are limited. There is room for improving Belize’s electoral framework, which would further empower the EBC and bolster its independence. Moreover, widespread clientelist practices and corruption undermine general trust in the electoral process. Independent electoral missions invited to observe elections in Belize have nonetheless found elections to be generally free and fair.

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people in Belize are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Media companies and civil society organizations (CSOs) operate freely and are able to act as government watchdogs. Occasional infringements upon the rights of dissidents have been reported, including police harassment of journalists at work. However, rights violations against dissidents are usually investigated, and perpetrators are sometimes held accountable. The right to peacefully assemble is guaranteed by the Belizean Constitution and generally upheld by the government.

Institutions are independent and serve as a check on the government. Oversight institutions and courts are able to act and issue decisions that are unfavorable to the party in power. Nonetheless, significant delays and a relative lack of transparency can weaken institutions’ abilities to serve as a check on the party in power. Necessary institutional reform has also faced significant delays. Recent reform undertaken by the incumbent party does not appear to have substantially addressed judicial weaknesses, but it has not undermined the judiciary’s independence or operational efficiency either.

National elections are largely free and fair. In Belize, the political system is dominated by two major parties, the incumbent PUP and the opposition UDP. Both are able to freely compete for representation in the legislature. Third parties and independent candidates have struggled to garner popular support, but regularly participate in national elections as well. Belizean electoral oversight institutions effectively manage elections; however, institutional weaknesses limit their oversight capacities and their independence. The government occasionally invites independent electoral observers to provide additional oversight of national elections.

In Belize, the government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. The two major parties are able to freely and fairly participate in legislative elections for seats in the National Assembly. The center-left PUP and the center-right UDP regularly compete for the legislative majority and the premiership. Since 2020, the PUP has led Belize under the leadership of Prime Minister Johnny Briceño. Prior to Briceño’s premiership, the UDP had been in power for 12 years under the leadership of Dean Barrow, who became prime minister in 2008. Just prior to the 2020 national elections, Barrow stepped down from UDP leadership due to constitutional term limits. A small number of third parties also exist and have competed in national elections, such as the Belize Justice Movement (BJM) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), but have not had electoral success.

The Belizean government has not engaged in voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Since the country’s independence in 1981, democratic governance in Belize has been characterized by peaceful exchanges of power between the PUP and the UDP. Recent and ongoing legal challenges to the national elections held in March 2025 concern outdated electoral districting rather than electoral fraud. While electoral observers have reiterated that updating Belize’s electoral districts must be prioritized in order to ensure a more accurate representation of the country’s electorate, the 2025 national elections were found to be nonetheless largely free and fair. On March 12, 2025, the PUP won a second landslide victory and maintained its majority status in the House of Representatives, winning 26 seats out of 31 seats. The opposition UDP party retained its minority status with just five seats. The PUP’s continued dominance of the legislature is due, in part, to internal issues that have weakened the UDP. In the weeks prior to the 2025 general elections, the UDP split into two factions, significantly hurting its electoral performance.

Independent electoral oversight has not been seriously undermined by the government. Belize possesses two electoral oversight institutions that manage and oversee elections: the Elections and Boundaries Commission (EBC) and the Elections and Boundaries Department (EBD). While elections are usually well-organized, there exists significant room to improve the capacities of Belize’s national oversight institutions. International electoral observers are occasionally invited to oversee national elections in Belize; they regularly praise the work of Belize’s electoral officials, while continuing to underline the need to strengthen the country’s electoral framework. In March 2025, the EBC and the EBD successfully held snap elections after Prime Minister Johnny Briceño dissolved the legislature in February. According to observers from the Organization of American States (OAS), poll workers were properly trained, and the protocol in place effectively protected the secrecy of the vote—all of which contributed to a peaceful voting environment.

The OAS electoral mission nevertheless highlighted important institutional weaknesses that continue to limit the capacity and independence of national electoral oversight in Belize. For instance, the current appointment process for the EBC, which is Belize’s primary oversight institution, favors the party in power. The Prime Minister holds considerable influence over the selection of three out of the five EBC members, including the EBC’s Chairman. The Leader of the Opposition is consulted for the appointment of the remaining two members. Since 2011, the OAS has recommended enacting changes to the selection process to diminish the politicization of the EBC and EDC. Such reforms involve introducing technical criteria into the selection process of electoral officials as well as incorporating input from qualified civil society actors. Furthermore, the OAS has also repeatedly highlighted the absence of any form of legal recognition for political parties; they exist and operate without any official registration. The legal framework for regulating campaign financing is also largely absent and unenforceable. As a result, the EBC and EDC’s oversight capacities are limited. For example, they are largely unable to detect and sanction illicit campaign funding. Corruption and clientelist practices are perceived to be widespread by Belizeans, undermining the public’s trust in the electoral process.

It should be noted, however, that the EBC’s and EDC’s limitations are a product of weaknesses in institutional design and gaps in the law. These institutions have not been directly undermined by the party in power. At the same time, neither the incumbent PDP government nor the previous UDP government has been proactive in remedying these shortcomings, leaving Belize’s electoral oversight weakened and vulnerable to influence.

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are generally free to openly criticize or challenge the government in Belize. Media workers, activists, and civil society leaders work in a mostly favorable environment; however, occasional infringements on the rights of dissidents have been reported. Nonetheless, rights violations against dissidents are generally investigated, and perpetrators are sometimes held accountable. Individuals have the right to peacefully protest and assemble, which is constitutionally protected and generally upheld by the government.

The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. In Belize, CSOs, labor unions, and other entities are able to organize effectively to publicly voice collective concerns over a wide range of issues—including corruption and police violence. The Belize Network of NGOs (BNN) is a coalition of the country’s leading CSOs. Through the BNN, CSOs are able to effectively engage in policy advising and mobilize members of the general public. The country’s media landscape is primarily populated by a few privately-owned media companies, most notably Greater Belize Media, Amandala, and Breaking Belize News. The limitations faced by media companies in Belize are primarily due to the financial and logistical difficulties of operating in a smaller country; media companies are not seriously limited by the government.

Belizean government officials have not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Occasional infringements of the rights of dissidents have been reported; in these cases, victims are usually able to file complaints against government officials. Moreover, dissidents and journalists can effectively act as government watchdogs and publicly criticize the actions of the party in power. Since 2023, the BNN coalition has followed and advised the government’s efforts to draw up constitutional reforms through the People’s Constitution Commission (PCC). In particular, the BNN has raised concerns about a proposed Thirteenth Amendment, which would grant the government broad powers to fight criminal groups, but that may also undermine the civil liberties of Belizeans. At the same time, journalists have occasionally faced harassment and intimidation from government officials while covering police operations as well as other politically sensitive issues. On February 27, 2025, police threatened and harassed reporter Louis “Ljay” Wade in Belmopan while he was covering police activity at a scene of a drowning. Fearing that Wade’s reporting would expose the police’s lack of resources and proper protocol, members of the police pinned Wade down, ordered him to delete his footage, and confiscated his cell phone. In March 2025, Wade filed a complaint against the officers who assaulted him.

Protests or gatherings in Belize have not been seriously and unfairly repressed by the government. Individuals are largely free to peacefully assemble and protest. In February 2025, thousands of public workers gathered in front of the House of Representatives in Belmopan to protest unpaid wages and labor conditions. The protest was successfully led and organized by the Belize National Teachers’ Union (BNTU). Other government workers, represented by the Public Service Union and the Association of Public Service Senior Managers, also joined the teachers in protesting labor conditions in the public sector. Similarly, in July 2024, members of the Association of Beneficiary and Retired Public Officers (ABRPO) gathered in front of the Prime Minister’s office to protest delays in the disbursement of funds that the government has owed them since 1997.

Institutions in Belize are independent and serve as a check on the government. Courts and oversight institutions are able to issue decisions that are unfavorable to the party in power. However, institutions operate with significant delays and a relative lack of transparency that can sometimes hinder their ability to act as a check on the government. Reforms of the High Court system in 2022 undertaken by the incumbent PUP government do not appear to have significantly rectified the pre-existing inefficiencies that weaken the operational effectiveness of the judiciary. Nonetheless, the reforms do not appear to have further undermined the capacities or independence of the country’s top courts.

In Belize, the government has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. The country’s courts and oversight institutions have regularly issued decisions that act as a check on the government’s actions. For instance, in May 2025, Belize’s High Court declared the government’s two-month extension of a State of Emergency in July 2020 to have been unjustified. High Court Justice Nadine Nabie also found that the government failed to provide adequate judicial oversight for sixteen individuals who were detained during that extended State of Emergency, thereby breaching their constitutional rights. The Court ordered the Briceño administration to compensate the affected individuals and cover their legal fees. Given the rise of organized crime in Belize, the PUP-led government has attempted to bolster the state’s security apparatus. However, civil society organizations and members of the opposition have raised concerns about how expanded emergency powers can be abused by the party in power. Within the context of a broader regional security crisis, the High Court’s ruling sets an important precedent for safeguarding the constitutional rights of individuals in Belize.

Yet, Belize’s institutions often operate with significant delays. There is also a lack of transparency and access to information that can hinder individuals’ ability to raise issues that challenge the government. For example, a number of civil society actors, including the Belize Peace Movement (BPM) and the activist Jeremy Enriquez, have been urging the government to address Belize’s out-of-date electoral districts since at least 2022. Legal action undertaken by these civil society actors has only been occasionally successful. It has otherwise been dismissed on technicalities or, in the case of legal challenges to the 2025 elections, not heard by the courts within the pertinent time frame. Electoral observers from the OAS highlighted that the civil society actors who attempted to “promote and ensure timely redistricting” faced many challenges—including a lack of access to court documents and archival material that would have aided the development of a successful legal case. Greater transparency with regard to how courts and oversight institutions function, including greater access to an archive of court documents and decisions, would improve Belizeans’ ability to successfully raise their concerns about government actions.

Judicial institutions have not been subjected to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Reforms under the PUP have been aimed at improving the efficiency of the country’s top courts and clarifying the hierarchy of the judiciary. These reforms do not appear to have undermined the independence of the judiciary; however, the issues of judicial delay persist, and there is a continued lack of transparency on the full functioning of the courts. In 2022, the PUP-led National Assembly passed the Senior Courts Bill as well as the Belize Constitution Bill, which introduced a 12th amendment to the Belizean Constitution. The revised structure set up a High Court and a Court of Appeals, which is the highest national judicial instance. Nonetheless, Belizeans are able to appeal to the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), a regional supranational court that effectively acts as the country’s final court of review. While the new structure was designed to improve judicial efficiency and reduce delays, opposition leaders questioned the fact that the PUP’s legislation did not address the underfunding of the judiciary, which impacts its ability to operate. Moreover, during the 2025 electoral cycle, the OAS electoral mission highlighted the judiciary’s continued inability to hear electoral cases in a timely manner. For example, the split UDP sought to settle its leadership dispute via the judiciary, but the case was scheduled to be heard on March 31, 2025, several weeks after Election Day. Another electoral dispute regarding the transfer of more than 100 voters into the Cayo North electoral district was also not heard before the national elections.

 

 

 

Country Context

HRF classifies Belize as democratic.

The foundations of Belize’s parliamentary democracy emerged in the decades prior to the country’s full independence from the United Kingdom in 1981. Starting in the 1950s, protests against British rule sparked political transformations: universal adult suffrage was established in 1954, and then, in 1964, a new Constitution laid the groundwork for Belizean self-governance. After Belize attained full independence in 1981, the center-left People’s United Party (PUP) became one of the country’s mainstream parties, alongside the center-right United Democratic Party (UDP). Currently, Belize retains the British monarch as its head of state, but the role of the monarch is limited and does not interfere with the country’s democratic governance. Elections take place at least every five years, but can occur more frequently. Since 2020, the PUP has led Belize under the leadership of Prime Minister Johnny Briceño. Non-state actors, such as organized crime groups, are active in the country and present a threat to the public as well as to civil society actors and public servants.

Key Highlights

National elections in Belize are largely free and fair. The two mainstream parties, the center-left People’s United Party (PUP) and the right-wing United Democratic Party (UDP), regularly compete for seats in the National Assembly. Belize’s primary electoral organism, the Elections and Boundaries Commission (EBC), effectively manages elections; however, the EBC’s oversight capacities are limited. There is room for improving Belize’s electoral framework, which would further empower the EBC and bolster its independence. Moreover, widespread clientelist practices and corruption undermine general trust in the electoral process. Independent electoral missions invited to observe elections in Belize have nonetheless found elections to be generally free and fair.

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people in Belize are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Media companies and civil society organizations (CSOs) operate freely and are able to act as government watchdogs. Occasional infringements upon the rights of dissidents have been reported, including police harassment of journalists at work. However, rights violations against dissidents are usually investigated, and perpetrators are sometimes held accountable. The right to peacefully assemble is guaranteed by the Belizean Constitution and generally upheld by the government.

Institutions are independent and serve as a check on the government. Oversight institutions and courts are able to act and issue decisions that are unfavorable to the party in power. Nonetheless, significant delays and a relative lack of transparency can weaken institutions’ abilities to serve as a check on the party in power. Necessary institutional reform has also faced significant delays. Recent reform undertaken by the incumbent party does not appear to have substantially addressed judicial weaknesses, but it has not undermined the judiciary’s independence or operational efficiency either.

Electoral Competition

National elections are largely free and fair. In Belize, the political system is dominated by two major parties, the incumbent PUP and the opposition UDP. Both are able to freely compete for representation in the legislature. Third parties and independent candidates have struggled to garner popular support, but regularly participate in national elections as well. Belizean electoral oversight institutions effectively manage elections; however, institutional weaknesses limit their oversight capacities and their independence. The government occasionally invites independent electoral observers to provide additional oversight of national elections.

In Belize, the government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. The two major parties are able to freely and fairly participate in legislative elections for seats in the National Assembly. The center-left PUP and the center-right UDP regularly compete for the legislative majority and the premiership. Since 2020, the PUP has led Belize under the leadership of Prime Minister Johnny Briceño. Prior to Briceño’s premiership, the UDP had been in power for 12 years under the leadership of Dean Barrow, who became prime minister in 2008. Just prior to the 2020 national elections, Barrow stepped down from UDP leadership due to constitutional term limits. A small number of third parties also exist and have competed in national elections, such as the Belize Justice Movement (BJM) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), but have not had electoral success.

The Belizean government has not engaged in voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Since the country’s independence in 1981, democratic governance in Belize has been characterized by peaceful exchanges of power between the PUP and the UDP. Recent and ongoing legal challenges to the national elections held in March 2025 concern outdated electoral districting rather than electoral fraud. While electoral observers have reiterated that updating Belize’s electoral districts must be prioritized in order to ensure a more accurate representation of the country’s electorate, the 2025 national elections were found to be nonetheless largely free and fair. On March 12, 2025, the PUP won a second landslide victory and maintained its majority status in the House of Representatives, winning 26 seats out of 31 seats. The opposition UDP party retained its minority status with just five seats. The PUP’s continued dominance of the legislature is due, in part, to internal issues that have weakened the UDP. In the weeks prior to the 2025 general elections, the UDP split into two factions, significantly hurting its electoral performance.

Independent electoral oversight has not been seriously undermined by the government. Belize possesses two electoral oversight institutions that manage and oversee elections: the Elections and Boundaries Commission (EBC) and the Elections and Boundaries Department (EBD). While elections are usually well-organized, there exists significant room to improve the capacities of Belize’s national oversight institutions. International electoral observers are occasionally invited to oversee national elections in Belize; they regularly praise the work of Belize’s electoral officials, while continuing to underline the need to strengthen the country’s electoral framework. In March 2025, the EBC and the EBD successfully held snap elections after Prime Minister Johnny Briceño dissolved the legislature in February. According to observers from the Organization of American States (OAS), poll workers were properly trained, and the protocol in place effectively protected the secrecy of the vote—all of which contributed to a peaceful voting environment.

The OAS electoral mission nevertheless highlighted important institutional weaknesses that continue to limit the capacity and independence of national electoral oversight in Belize. For instance, the current appointment process for the EBC, which is Belize’s primary oversight institution, favors the party in power. The Prime Minister holds considerable influence over the selection of three out of the five EBC members, including the EBC’s Chairman. The Leader of the Opposition is consulted for the appointment of the remaining two members. Since 2011, the OAS has recommended enacting changes to the selection process to diminish the politicization of the EBC and EDC. Such reforms involve introducing technical criteria into the selection process of electoral officials as well as incorporating input from qualified civil society actors. Furthermore, the OAS has also repeatedly highlighted the absence of any form of legal recognition for political parties; they exist and operate without any official registration. The legal framework for regulating campaign financing is also largely absent and unenforceable. As a result, the EBC and EDC’s oversight capacities are limited. For example, they are largely unable to detect and sanction illicit campaign funding. Corruption and clientelist practices are perceived to be widespread by Belizeans, undermining the public’s trust in the electoral process.

It should be noted, however, that the EBC’s and EDC’s limitations are a product of weaknesses in institutional design and gaps in the law. These institutions have not been directly undermined by the party in power. At the same time, neither the incumbent PDP government nor the previous UDP government has been proactive in remedying these shortcomings, leaving Belize’s electoral oversight weakened and vulnerable to influence.

Freedom of Dissent

Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are generally free to openly criticize or challenge the government in Belize. Media workers, activists, and civil society leaders work in a mostly favorable environment; however, occasional infringements on the rights of dissidents have been reported. Nonetheless, rights violations against dissidents are generally investigated, and perpetrators are sometimes held accountable. Individuals have the right to peacefully protest and assemble, which is constitutionally protected and generally upheld by the government.

The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. In Belize, CSOs, labor unions, and other entities are able to organize effectively to publicly voice collective concerns over a wide range of issues—including corruption and police violence. The Belize Network of NGOs (BNN) is a coalition of the country’s leading CSOs. Through the BNN, CSOs are able to effectively engage in policy advising and mobilize members of the general public. The country’s media landscape is primarily populated by a few privately-owned media companies, most notably Greater Belize Media, Amandala, and Breaking Belize News. The limitations faced by media companies in Belize are primarily due to the financial and logistical difficulties of operating in a smaller country; media companies are not seriously limited by the government.

Belizean government officials have not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Occasional infringements of the rights of dissidents have been reported; in these cases, victims are usually able to file complaints against government officials. Moreover, dissidents and journalists can effectively act as government watchdogs and publicly criticize the actions of the party in power. Since 2023, the BNN coalition has followed and advised the government’s efforts to draw up constitutional reforms through the People’s Constitution Commission (PCC). In particular, the BNN has raised concerns about a proposed Thirteenth Amendment, which would grant the government broad powers to fight criminal groups, but that may also undermine the civil liberties of Belizeans. At the same time, journalists have occasionally faced harassment and intimidation from government officials while covering police operations as well as other politically sensitive issues. On February 27, 2025, police threatened and harassed reporter Louis “Ljay” Wade in Belmopan while he was covering police activity at a scene of a drowning. Fearing that Wade’s reporting would expose the police’s lack of resources and proper protocol, members of the police pinned Wade down, ordered him to delete his footage, and confiscated his cell phone. In March 2025, Wade filed a complaint against the officers who assaulted him.

Protests or gatherings in Belize have not been seriously and unfairly repressed by the government. Individuals are largely free to peacefully assemble and protest. In February 2025, thousands of public workers gathered in front of the House of Representatives in Belmopan to protest unpaid wages and labor conditions. The protest was successfully led and organized by the Belize National Teachers’ Union (BNTU). Other government workers, represented by the Public Service Union and the Association of Public Service Senior Managers, also joined the teachers in protesting labor conditions in the public sector. Similarly, in July 2024, members of the Association of Beneficiary and Retired Public Officers (ABRPO) gathered in front of the Prime Minister’s office to protest delays in the disbursement of funds that the government has owed them since 1997.

Institutional Accountability

Institutions in Belize are independent and serve as a check on the government. Courts and oversight institutions are able to issue decisions that are unfavorable to the party in power. However, institutions operate with significant delays and a relative lack of transparency that can sometimes hinder their ability to act as a check on the government. Reforms of the High Court system in 2022 undertaken by the incumbent PUP government do not appear to have significantly rectified the pre-existing inefficiencies that weaken the operational effectiveness of the judiciary. Nonetheless, the reforms do not appear to have further undermined the capacities or independence of the country’s top courts.

In Belize, the government has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. The country’s courts and oversight institutions have regularly issued decisions that act as a check on the government’s actions. For instance, in May 2025, Belize’s High Court declared the government’s two-month extension of a State of Emergency in July 2020 to have been unjustified. High Court Justice Nadine Nabie also found that the government failed to provide adequate judicial oversight for sixteen individuals who were detained during that extended State of Emergency, thereby breaching their constitutional rights. The Court ordered the Briceño administration to compensate the affected individuals and cover their legal fees. Given the rise of organized crime in Belize, the PUP-led government has attempted to bolster the state’s security apparatus. However, civil society organizations and members of the opposition have raised concerns about how expanded emergency powers can be abused by the party in power. Within the context of a broader regional security crisis, the High Court’s ruling sets an important precedent for safeguarding the constitutional rights of individuals in Belize.

Yet, Belize’s institutions often operate with significant delays. There is also a lack of transparency and access to information that can hinder individuals’ ability to raise issues that challenge the government. For example, a number of civil society actors, including the Belize Peace Movement (BPM) and the activist Jeremy Enriquez, have been urging the government to address Belize’s out-of-date electoral districts since at least 2022. Legal action undertaken by these civil society actors has only been occasionally successful. It has otherwise been dismissed on technicalities or, in the case of legal challenges to the 2025 elections, not heard by the courts within the pertinent time frame. Electoral observers from the OAS highlighted that the civil society actors who attempted to “promote and ensure timely redistricting” faced many challenges—including a lack of access to court documents and archival material that would have aided the development of a successful legal case. Greater transparency with regard to how courts and oversight institutions function, including greater access to an archive of court documents and decisions, would improve Belizeans’ ability to successfully raise their concerns about government actions.

Judicial institutions have not been subjected to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Reforms under the PUP have been aimed at improving the efficiency of the country’s top courts and clarifying the hierarchy of the judiciary. These reforms do not appear to have undermined the independence of the judiciary; however, the issues of judicial delay persist, and there is a continued lack of transparency on the full functioning of the courts. In 2022, the PUP-led National Assembly passed the Senior Courts Bill as well as the Belize Constitution Bill, which introduced a 12th amendment to the Belizean Constitution. The revised structure set up a High Court and a Court of Appeals, which is the highest national judicial instance. Nonetheless, Belizeans are able to appeal to the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), a regional supranational court that effectively acts as the country’s final court of review. While the new structure was designed to improve judicial efficiency and reduce delays, opposition leaders questioned the fact that the PUP’s legislation did not address the underfunding of the judiciary, which impacts its ability to operate. Moreover, during the 2025 electoral cycle, the OAS electoral mission highlighted the judiciary’s continued inability to hear electoral cases in a timely manner. For example, the split UDP sought to settle its leadership dispute via the judiciary, but the case was scheduled to be heard on March 31, 2025, several weeks after Election Day. Another electoral dispute regarding the transfer of more than 100 voters into the Cayo North electoral district was also not heard before the national elections.