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HRF classifies Belgium as democratic.
Belgium is a federal parliamentary constitutional monarchy with a highly decentralized and consociational system of government, meaning that political power is deliberately shared among the country’s different linguistic and regional groups to ensure cooperation and prevent domination by any one group. The monarch (King Philippe) serves as head of state and performs largely ceremonial and symbolic functions, while formally appointing the prime minister and government. Legislative power is exercised by the bicameral Federal Parliament, consisting of the Chamber of Representatives, which is directly elected by proportional representation and controls confidence in the government, meaning the government can only remain in office as long as it has the support of a majority of elected representatives. The Senate primarily represents the federated entities. Executive power is held by the federal government, led by the prime minister and the Council of Ministers, which must command a majority in the Chamber of Representatives. Belgium’s political system is characterized by strong federalism and linguistic power-sharing (gewesten en gemeenschappen) through its Regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital) and Communities (Dutch-speaking, French-speaking, and German-speaking), each of which has constitutionally defined powers and institutions. Since February 2025, Belgium has been governed by a multi-party coalition government, led by Prime Minister Bart De Wever (N-VA).
In Belgium, national elections are largely free and fair, with no unfair exclusion of mainstream opposition parties or candidates, no significant government interference in campaigns or undue advantages, and competitive, fragmented electoral outcomes that require complex coalition-building. While independent electoral oversight has not been seriously undermined, Belgium’s highly decentralized supervisory system and weak dispute-resolution mechanism create some potential vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities, however, do not outweigh the overall fairness and freedom of the electoral process.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and ordinary citizens are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Legal safeguards and pluralistic oversight bodies ensure that public broadcasters generally operate independently and display little to no political bias, leading to a media environment free from government manipulation. Belgium likewise maintains a broadly open civic environment. The government has not systematically targeted independent or critical organizations, nor has it engaged in widespread or unjustified censorship of dissenting views, and it continues to foster a strong and diverse civil society. The judiciary has generally upheld freedom of expression, including investigative reporting, and public demonstrations are usually allowed to proceed without undue interference.
Belgian institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Despite challenges, including resource constraints, case backlogs, and weaknesses in the anti-corruption framework that limit overall efficiency, there have been no reforms or practices that seriously undermine judicial autonomy. Belgium’s judicial, legislative, and executive branches also largely succeed in holding public officials accountable, even amid ongoing criticisms regarding political influence and insufficient regulatory safeguards. Moreover, the courts consistently protect freedom of criticism by rejecting attempts to intimidate or silence dissent, as demonstrated by their regular dismissal of strategic lawsuits against public participation.
National elections are largely free and fair. The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections, nor has it hindered the electoral campaigns of such parties or candidates, or enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. The electoral outcomes are often competitive and fragmented, requiring complex coalition-building. Furthermore, the government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. However, Belgium’s highly decentralized system and the lack of strong dispute-resolution mechanisms create some potential weaknesses in how elections are supervised. That said, these shortcomings do not undermine the overall fairness and freedom of elections, as demonstrated by the highly competitive results.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Each of the three administrative regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels) elects federal parliamentary representatives in proportion to its population, and each region has its own parties. These unique dynamics contribute to highly competitive elections and fragmented parliaments requiring complex coalition-building. To illustrate, in the most recent June 2024 federal election, voters distributed seats in the Chamber of Representatives among a wide range of ideologically diverse parties across linguistic and regional lines. The New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) finished first with 16.7% of the national vote and 24 of 150 seats, followed closely by the far-right Flemish Interest with 13.8% and 20 seats, while centrist, liberal, socialist, green, and left-wing parties such as the Reformist Movement (10.3%, 20 seats), the Workers’ Party of Belgium (9.9%, 15 seats), the Socialist Party (8.0%, 16 seats), Onward (8.1%, 13 seats), and Christian Democratic and Flemish party (8.0%, 11 seats) all retained substantial representation. Smaller parties, including The Committed Ones, Different, and Green, also won seats. This fragmented outcome meant that no single party or ideological bloc could govern alone, and coalition negotiations were again required to assemble a parliamentary majority. After several months of coalition negotiations, a five-party federal government led by Bart De Wever’s N-VA took office in early February 2025 (the other four parties are the Reformist Movement, The Committed Ones, Onward, and Christian Democratic and Flemish).
Similarly, the government has not unfairly or significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign, nor has it enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. Factors ensuring robust competition include the country’s extensive party financing and campaign spending regulations, laws on balanced media coverage of political campaigns, and impartial, if highly decentralized, electoral oversight. The Law on the Limitation and Control of Electoral Expenses for Federal Elections and Accountability of Political Parties, first introduced in 2019, imposed a strict spending cap on electoral campaigns, banned parties from advertising on radio and television, and prohibited the distribution of gifts to potential voters, among other measures. On the other hand, public broadcasters have a legal obligation to provide impartial coverage and free airtime to contestants.
The Belgian government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. However, Belgium’s highly decentralized system and the lack of strong dispute-resolution mechanisms create some potential weaknesses in how elections are supervised. Oversight functions are divided among the Federal, Electoral Constituency, Electoral Canton, and Municipal institutions, with no overarching administrative body or court certifying overall results. As a result, citizens have limited legal recourse when disputes arise. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) noted these shortcomings in its 2020 judgment in the landmark Mugemangango v. Belgium case. The applicant, Germain Mugemangango, was a member of the Workers’ Party of Belgium and a leading party candidate in the Charleroi constituency. Having missed a seat in the local Walloon Parliament by a mere 14 votes, Mugemangango and the party filed a petition with the local electoral board (EB), seeking a recount of the 21,385 ballot papers declared blank, spoiled, or disputed in the constituency. The EB refused his request because they had no jurisdiction to take such action and referred the applicant to the Walloon Parliament, which also denied it. This exhausted available legal remedies. In its ruling, the ECtHR found that the system of appealing election results breached Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the right to an effective remedy”), as there had been no sufficient guarantees of the Walloon Parliament’s impartiality. Despite the ruling and repeated recommendations to introduce mechanisms for judicial review of such complaints by international observers, such as the OSCE, Belgium has yet to reform its electoral oversight framework.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and ordinary citizens are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The authorities have not engaged in systematic manipulation of media coverage, and public broadcasters and private outlets largely operate independently with minimal political bias. Likewise, the government has not unfairly closed independent or dissenting organizations, nor has it imposed serious or unjustified censorship on critical speech. Judicial institutions have typically upheld freedom of expression and investigative journalism, reinforcing safeguards against undue interference. While protests and public assemblies are generally permitted and not subject to systematic repression, isolated incidents of heavy-handed policing, such as the use of preemptive administrative detention in 2023, have raised concerns without amounting to a broader pattern of suppression..
The government has not unfairly shut down independent or dissenting organizations. Belgium has a thriving civil society, with over 100,000 civil society organizations (CSOs) operating in the country across fields such as social services, youth work, health, education, culture, environment, sports, and human rights. The state plays an active role in supporting this sector through substantial public funding: in 2024, approximately €3.2 billion (about $3.46 billion) was committed to official development assistance, including social, health, education, and integration projects, and €190 million (about $205 million) was allocated to international humanitarian aid, mainly to humanitarian organizations.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Belgium’s distinct French-speaking and Flemish media sectors are increasingly concentrated, with a small number of large media groups dominating print, broadcast, and digital news markets in each linguistic community. However, the overall legal framework and a strong tradition of editorial independence in Belgian journalism effectively circumscribe any potential political interference. For example, broadcasters operating at the regional level cannot have party affiliations, and international experts indicate that public broadcasters such as VRT and RTBF are effectively independent and display little to no political bias in their news reporting. Appointments to the French-language High Council for Broadcasting (CSA) and its Flemish counterpart, the VRM, are structured to include diverse stakeholders and are designed to safeguard pluralism and impartiality in the media system.
Similarly, the Belgian government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Belgian media regulators and courts have generally defended journalists’ freedom to cover sensitive topics from political or business elites looking to arbitrarily restrict reporting that impacts their special interests. To illustrate, in 2024, a Court of the First Instance rejected a request by the Minister of the Interior, Annelies Verlinden, to remove articles related to the Belgian federal prosecutor’s investigation into the Qatargate affair from the Sudinfo Media Group’s web archive. The investigation looked into influence peddling by foreign officials and corruption within the European Parliament. In some limited instances, however, the courts have sanctioned the preemptive censorship of content, sparking international criticism. Between 2023 and 2024, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) reported several such cases, notably a Court of Liege decision to suspend the publication of an article in the Le Soir daily newspaper. The censored material outlined the ongoing investigation into suspected tax offenses committed by Maxime Degey, a local politician running for mayor of Verviers. Degey claimed it was an invasion of privacy, and the court, citing Degey’s “right to honor, reputation, and respect for private life,” issued a stay. It prohibited the outlet from disclosing details from the ongoing investigation into the candidate or risk incurring a €50,000 fine (about $58,500) for non-compliance. Watchdogs, such as the RSF and the International Press Institute, criticized the decision, pointing out that it was arguably inconsistent with EU free speech case law and the established principle that public officials should tolerate a higher threshold of scrutiny. While the financial penalties attached to the court’s injunction in the Degey case were exceptionally severe, there is no evidence of a broader practice of preventive-censorship rulings in Belgium that would create a systemic chilling effect on the media sector.
The Belgian government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Authorities generally respect the freedom of assembly, notwithstanding the police’s sporadic use of some excessive measures, such as “preventive detention.” In 2023, the killing of an unarmed 17-year-old by French police sparked mass solidarity protests in Belgium denouncing racially motivated police brutality, some of which turned violent. During this period, Brussels police repeatedly used “administrative detention” as a preventive measure, detaining more than 190 people over several days, including at least 80 minors, even when no major incidents were reported. Police justified the arrests as “preventive,” stating that some demonstrators had brought equipment that could be used to cause damage, and that other arrests were carried out for identification purposes. Those detained were held only briefly and released without charges. At the same time, lawmakers briefly debated an “anti-riots” bill that would have temporarily suspended the freedom of assembly rights of individuals previously convicted for behaving violently during protests. Due to strong public opposition, however, parliament eventually abandoned the proposal. Despite these instances and proposals, protests in Belgium remain largely unobstructed and frequent.
Belgian institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the governing authorities. Despite challenges, including resource constraints, case backlogs, and weaknesses in the anti-corruption framework that limit overall efficiency, there have been no reforms or practices that seriously undermine judicial autonomy. Belgium’s judicial, legislative, and executive branches also largely succeed in holding public officials accountable, even amid ongoing criticisms regarding political influence and insufficient regulatory safeguards. Moreover, the courts consistently protect freedom of criticism by rejecting attempts to intimidate or silence dissent, as demonstrated by their regular dismissal of strategic lawsuits against public participation.
The Belgian government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Like most other EU member-states, Belgium has an independent judicial oversight organ, the High Council of Justice (HRJ/CSJ), which plays a central role in selection and nomination processes for magistrates, contributes to appointments and career management, conducts audits of courts, and handles complaints. It is composed of 44 members split evenly between magistrates elected by their peers and non-magistrate members appointed by the Senate, ensuring the judiciary’s independence from political control. However, recent reports point to long-standing shortages of resources and staff, and persistent backlogs as factors negatively affecting the operational efficiency of Belgium’s courts. The government has reiterated its intention to transfer key budget-management powers for the administration of justice from the executive to the judiciary, increasing judicial independence and overall operational efficiency, though, as of December 2025, particular measures are yet to be implemented. That said, these factors do not seriously undermine judicial independence, and Belgium’s courts continue to function with a high degree of effectiveness.
Belgium’s judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. The government implements active anti-corruption enforcement efforts (e.g., continued cooperation between the Central Office for the Repression of Corruption (CDBC-OCRC) and prosecutors). This has produced concrete results: in 2025, former Deputy Prime Minister and EU Justice Commissioner Didier Reynders was charged with money laundering. However, observers note that Belgium’s anti-corruption legal and institutional framework remains insufficient. For example, Belgium still lacks binding rules on lobbying, gifts, asset declarations, and post-employment conflicts of interest for ministers, MPs, and senior civil servants, and there are no systematic asset or interest declarations for high-risk police positions. Enforcement is also weak and vulnerable to political interference. For example, an internal survey of 1,776 federal judicial police officers found that nearly one-third had witnessed corruption or undue interference, and 45.3% reported frequent improper influence over investigations in the past five years. The risks became concrete in the Qatargate investigation, a major European bribery scandal involving alleged attempts by several states, including Qatar, to buy political influence in European institutions. The investigation was undermined by internal leaks: Hugues Tasiaux, the former head of Belgium’s OCRC, was charged, and Philippe Noppe, head of the federal police’s organised-crime office, was suspended for leaking confidential information about the investigation.
Belgium’s courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition. Despite the courts occasionally enabling preventive censorship, judges typically rule in favor of the defendants when reviewing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), including in cases initiated by political or business elites. Moreover, there has been a precedent of imposing monetary sanctions on the initiators of such suits for abusing legal remedies, under Article 780 of the Criminal Code. For instance, in 2021, the courts dismissed a suit by former Mayor of Sint-Truiden Veerle Heeren against the investigative journalist Dirk Selis, who had demonstrated that Heerle and her family benefited from her political influence to access the COVID vaccination before the government-mandated period for their respective age groups. The court rejected the former mayor’s claim that Selis’s reporting was a breach of her medical privacy, arguing instead that such disclosures were of legitimate public interest.
HRF classifies Belgium as democratic.
Belgium is a federal parliamentary constitutional monarchy with a highly decentralized and consociational system of government, meaning that political power is deliberately shared among the country’s different linguistic and regional groups to ensure cooperation and prevent domination by any one group. The monarch (King Philippe) serves as head of state and performs largely ceremonial and symbolic functions, while formally appointing the prime minister and government. Legislative power is exercised by the bicameral Federal Parliament, consisting of the Chamber of Representatives, which is directly elected by proportional representation and controls confidence in the government, meaning the government can only remain in office as long as it has the support of a majority of elected representatives. The Senate primarily represents the federated entities. Executive power is held by the federal government, led by the prime minister and the Council of Ministers, which must command a majority in the Chamber of Representatives. Belgium’s political system is characterized by strong federalism and linguistic power-sharing (gewesten en gemeenschappen) through its Regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital) and Communities (Dutch-speaking, French-speaking, and German-speaking), each of which has constitutionally defined powers and institutions. Since February 2025, Belgium has been governed by a multi-party coalition government, led by Prime Minister Bart De Wever (N-VA).
In Belgium, national elections are largely free and fair, with no unfair exclusion of mainstream opposition parties or candidates, no significant government interference in campaigns or undue advantages, and competitive, fragmented electoral outcomes that require complex coalition-building. While independent electoral oversight has not been seriously undermined, Belgium’s highly decentralized supervisory system and weak dispute-resolution mechanism create some potential vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities, however, do not outweigh the overall fairness and freedom of the electoral process.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and ordinary citizens are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Legal safeguards and pluralistic oversight bodies ensure that public broadcasters generally operate independently and display little to no political bias, leading to a media environment free from government manipulation. Belgium likewise maintains a broadly open civic environment. The government has not systematically targeted independent or critical organizations, nor has it engaged in widespread or unjustified censorship of dissenting views, and it continues to foster a strong and diverse civil society. The judiciary has generally upheld freedom of expression, including investigative reporting, and public demonstrations are usually allowed to proceed without undue interference.
Belgian institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Despite challenges, including resource constraints, case backlogs, and weaknesses in the anti-corruption framework that limit overall efficiency, there have been no reforms or practices that seriously undermine judicial autonomy. Belgium’s judicial, legislative, and executive branches also largely succeed in holding public officials accountable, even amid ongoing criticisms regarding political influence and insufficient regulatory safeguards. Moreover, the courts consistently protect freedom of criticism by rejecting attempts to intimidate or silence dissent, as demonstrated by their regular dismissal of strategic lawsuits against public participation.
National elections are largely free and fair. The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections, nor has it hindered the electoral campaigns of such parties or candidates, or enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. The electoral outcomes are often competitive and fragmented, requiring complex coalition-building. Furthermore, the government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. However, Belgium’s highly decentralized system and the lack of strong dispute-resolution mechanisms create some potential weaknesses in how elections are supervised. That said, these shortcomings do not undermine the overall fairness and freedom of elections, as demonstrated by the highly competitive results.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Each of the three administrative regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels) elects federal parliamentary representatives in proportion to its population, and each region has its own parties. These unique dynamics contribute to highly competitive elections and fragmented parliaments requiring complex coalition-building. To illustrate, in the most recent June 2024 federal election, voters distributed seats in the Chamber of Representatives among a wide range of ideologically diverse parties across linguistic and regional lines. The New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) finished first with 16.7% of the national vote and 24 of 150 seats, followed closely by the far-right Flemish Interest with 13.8% and 20 seats, while centrist, liberal, socialist, green, and left-wing parties such as the Reformist Movement (10.3%, 20 seats), the Workers’ Party of Belgium (9.9%, 15 seats), the Socialist Party (8.0%, 16 seats), Onward (8.1%, 13 seats), and Christian Democratic and Flemish party (8.0%, 11 seats) all retained substantial representation. Smaller parties, including The Committed Ones, Different, and Green, also won seats. This fragmented outcome meant that no single party or ideological bloc could govern alone, and coalition negotiations were again required to assemble a parliamentary majority. After several months of coalition negotiations, a five-party federal government led by Bart De Wever’s N-VA took office in early February 2025 (the other four parties are the Reformist Movement, The Committed Ones, Onward, and Christian Democratic and Flemish).
Similarly, the government has not unfairly or significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign, nor has it enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. Factors ensuring robust competition include the country’s extensive party financing and campaign spending regulations, laws on balanced media coverage of political campaigns, and impartial, if highly decentralized, electoral oversight. The Law on the Limitation and Control of Electoral Expenses for Federal Elections and Accountability of Political Parties, first introduced in 2019, imposed a strict spending cap on electoral campaigns, banned parties from advertising on radio and television, and prohibited the distribution of gifts to potential voters, among other measures. On the other hand, public broadcasters have a legal obligation to provide impartial coverage and free airtime to contestants.
The Belgian government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. However, Belgium’s highly decentralized system and the lack of strong dispute-resolution mechanisms create some potential weaknesses in how elections are supervised. Oversight functions are divided among the Federal, Electoral Constituency, Electoral Canton, and Municipal institutions, with no overarching administrative body or court certifying overall results. As a result, citizens have limited legal recourse when disputes arise. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) noted these shortcomings in its 2020 judgment in the landmark Mugemangango v. Belgium case. The applicant, Germain Mugemangango, was a member of the Workers’ Party of Belgium and a leading party candidate in the Charleroi constituency. Having missed a seat in the local Walloon Parliament by a mere 14 votes, Mugemangango and the party filed a petition with the local electoral board (EB), seeking a recount of the 21,385 ballot papers declared blank, spoiled, or disputed in the constituency. The EB refused his request because they had no jurisdiction to take such action and referred the applicant to the Walloon Parliament, which also denied it. This exhausted available legal remedies. In its ruling, the ECtHR found that the system of appealing election results breached Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the right to an effective remedy”), as there had been no sufficient guarantees of the Walloon Parliament’s impartiality. Despite the ruling and repeated recommendations to introduce mechanisms for judicial review of such complaints by international observers, such as the OSCE, Belgium has yet to reform its electoral oversight framework.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and ordinary citizens are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The authorities have not engaged in systematic manipulation of media coverage, and public broadcasters and private outlets largely operate independently with minimal political bias. Likewise, the government has not unfairly closed independent or dissenting organizations, nor has it imposed serious or unjustified censorship on critical speech. Judicial institutions have typically upheld freedom of expression and investigative journalism, reinforcing safeguards against undue interference. While protests and public assemblies are generally permitted and not subject to systematic repression, isolated incidents of heavy-handed policing, such as the use of preemptive administrative detention in 2023, have raised concerns without amounting to a broader pattern of suppression..
The government has not unfairly shut down independent or dissenting organizations. Belgium has a thriving civil society, with over 100,000 civil society organizations (CSOs) operating in the country across fields such as social services, youth work, health, education, culture, environment, sports, and human rights. The state plays an active role in supporting this sector through substantial public funding: in 2024, approximately €3.2 billion (about $3.46 billion) was committed to official development assistance, including social, health, education, and integration projects, and €190 million (about $205 million) was allocated to international humanitarian aid, mainly to humanitarian organizations.
The government has not heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. Belgium’s distinct French-speaking and Flemish media sectors are increasingly concentrated, with a small number of large media groups dominating print, broadcast, and digital news markets in each linguistic community. However, the overall legal framework and a strong tradition of editorial independence in Belgian journalism effectively circumscribe any potential political interference. For example, broadcasters operating at the regional level cannot have party affiliations, and international experts indicate that public broadcasters such as VRT and RTBF are effectively independent and display little to no political bias in their news reporting. Appointments to the French-language High Council for Broadcasting (CSA) and its Flemish counterpart, the VRM, are structured to include diverse stakeholders and are designed to safeguard pluralism and impartiality in the media system.
Similarly, the Belgian government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Belgian media regulators and courts have generally defended journalists’ freedom to cover sensitive topics from political or business elites looking to arbitrarily restrict reporting that impacts their special interests. To illustrate, in 2024, a Court of the First Instance rejected a request by the Minister of the Interior, Annelies Verlinden, to remove articles related to the Belgian federal prosecutor’s investigation into the Qatargate affair from the Sudinfo Media Group’s web archive. The investigation looked into influence peddling by foreign officials and corruption within the European Parliament. In some limited instances, however, the courts have sanctioned the preemptive censorship of content, sparking international criticism. Between 2023 and 2024, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) reported several such cases, notably a Court of Liege decision to suspend the publication of an article in the Le Soir daily newspaper. The censored material outlined the ongoing investigation into suspected tax offenses committed by Maxime Degey, a local politician running for mayor of Verviers. Degey claimed it was an invasion of privacy, and the court, citing Degey’s “right to honor, reputation, and respect for private life,” issued a stay. It prohibited the outlet from disclosing details from the ongoing investigation into the candidate or risk incurring a €50,000 fine (about $58,500) for non-compliance. Watchdogs, such as the RSF and the International Press Institute, criticized the decision, pointing out that it was arguably inconsistent with EU free speech case law and the established principle that public officials should tolerate a higher threshold of scrutiny. While the financial penalties attached to the court’s injunction in the Degey case were exceptionally severe, there is no evidence of a broader practice of preventive-censorship rulings in Belgium that would create a systemic chilling effect on the media sector.
The Belgian government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Authorities generally respect the freedom of assembly, notwithstanding the police’s sporadic use of some excessive measures, such as “preventive detention.” In 2023, the killing of an unarmed 17-year-old by French police sparked mass solidarity protests in Belgium denouncing racially motivated police brutality, some of which turned violent. During this period, Brussels police repeatedly used “administrative detention” as a preventive measure, detaining more than 190 people over several days, including at least 80 minors, even when no major incidents were reported. Police justified the arrests as “preventive,” stating that some demonstrators had brought equipment that could be used to cause damage, and that other arrests were carried out for identification purposes. Those detained were held only briefly and released without charges. At the same time, lawmakers briefly debated an “anti-riots” bill that would have temporarily suspended the freedom of assembly rights of individuals previously convicted for behaving violently during protests. Due to strong public opposition, however, parliament eventually abandoned the proposal. Despite these instances and proposals, protests in Belgium remain largely unobstructed and frequent.
Belgian institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the governing authorities. Despite challenges, including resource constraints, case backlogs, and weaknesses in the anti-corruption framework that limit overall efficiency, there have been no reforms or practices that seriously undermine judicial autonomy. Belgium’s judicial, legislative, and executive branches also largely succeed in holding public officials accountable, even amid ongoing criticisms regarding political influence and insufficient regulatory safeguards. Moreover, the courts consistently protect freedom of criticism by rejecting attempts to intimidate or silence dissent, as demonstrated by their regular dismissal of strategic lawsuits against public participation.
The Belgian government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Like most other EU member-states, Belgium has an independent judicial oversight organ, the High Council of Justice (HRJ/CSJ), which plays a central role in selection and nomination processes for magistrates, contributes to appointments and career management, conducts audits of courts, and handles complaints. It is composed of 44 members split evenly between magistrates elected by their peers and non-magistrate members appointed by the Senate, ensuring the judiciary’s independence from political control. However, recent reports point to long-standing shortages of resources and staff, and persistent backlogs as factors negatively affecting the operational efficiency of Belgium’s courts. The government has reiterated its intention to transfer key budget-management powers for the administration of justice from the executive to the judiciary, increasing judicial independence and overall operational efficiency, though, as of December 2025, particular measures are yet to be implemented. That said, these factors do not seriously undermine judicial independence, and Belgium’s courts continue to function with a high degree of effectiveness.
Belgium’s judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. The government implements active anti-corruption enforcement efforts (e.g., continued cooperation between the Central Office for the Repression of Corruption (CDBC-OCRC) and prosecutors). This has produced concrete results: in 2025, former Deputy Prime Minister and EU Justice Commissioner Didier Reynders was charged with money laundering. However, observers note that Belgium’s anti-corruption legal and institutional framework remains insufficient. For example, Belgium still lacks binding rules on lobbying, gifts, asset declarations, and post-employment conflicts of interest for ministers, MPs, and senior civil servants, and there are no systematic asset or interest declarations for high-risk police positions. Enforcement is also weak and vulnerable to political interference. For example, an internal survey of 1,776 federal judicial police officers found that nearly one-third had witnessed corruption or undue interference, and 45.3% reported frequent improper influence over investigations in the past five years. The risks became concrete in the Qatargate investigation, a major European bribery scandal involving alleged attempts by several states, including Qatar, to buy political influence in European institutions. The investigation was undermined by internal leaks: Hugues Tasiaux, the former head of Belgium’s OCRC, was charged, and Philippe Noppe, head of the federal police’s organised-crime office, was suspended for leaking confidential information about the investigation.
Belgium’s courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition. Despite the courts occasionally enabling preventive censorship, judges typically rule in favor of the defendants when reviewing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), including in cases initiated by political or business elites. Moreover, there has been a precedent of imposing monetary sanctions on the initiators of such suits for abusing legal remedies, under Article 780 of the Criminal Code. For instance, in 2021, the courts dismissed a suit by former Mayor of Sint-Truiden Veerle Heeren against the investigative journalist Dirk Selis, who had demonstrated that Heerle and her family benefited from her political influence to access the COVID vaccination before the government-mandated period for their respective age groups. The court rejected the former mayor’s claim that Selis’s reporting was a breach of her medical privacy, arguing instead that such disclosures were of legitimate public interest.
