Hybrid Authoritarian
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HRF classifies Bangladesh as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Bangladesh has experienced recurring political turbulence since its independence in 1971. Following the assassination of founding leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975, the country endured years of direct military rule and military-backed civilian governance before gradually transitioning to parliamentary democracy in the 1990s. In recent decades, local politics has been dominated by intense rivalry between the Awami League party, led by Sheikh Hasina, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), whose longtime chairperson was the late former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. Hasina won national elections in 2009 by a landslide and subsequently ruled Bangladesh for another 15 continuous years. Her regime was marked by the rapid deterioration of the civic space and repeated crackdowns on political opposition. These tensions culminated in August 2024 with Hasina’s resignation and self-exile after weeks of mass protests and civil unrest that were met with deadly force. In the aftermath, an interim administration headed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was formed to restore stability and oversee preparations for new elections. The Hasina era was characterized by large-scale, state-led crackdowns that may have amounted to crimes against humanity. While these abuses have declined since August 2024, the interim administration has pursued an aggressive accountability initiative against the Awami League and affiliated individuals. The post-transition environment is also marred by clashes between rival party supporters and episodes of mob violence. Human rights monitors have documented hundreds of deaths linked to political violence following the transition, particularly in the lead-up to planned elections in February 2026, capturing the volatile and polarized landscape in Bangladesh that hinders a full democratic opening.
The interim administration has introduced reforms that improve electoral competition, which was largely absent under the Hasina regime. Under Sheikh Hasina, elections in 2014, 2018, and 2024 were marred by opposition boycotts, mass arrests of BNP members, the 2013 banning of the political party Jamaat-e-Islami, the 2011 abolition of the caretaker government system, and an Election Commission widely accused of bias. The Awami League routinely won over 60% of the vote and around 80% of seats, often unopposed. Since August 2024, the interim administration has established an Electoral Reform Commission and endorsed key electoral reform pledges in the historic July Charter. However, many key reforms require approval by the next parliament, and the ban on the Awami League – alongside Sheikh Hasina’s in absentia conviction – has raised new concerns about exclusion and political reprisal.
The interim administration has introduced reforms that help restore the ability of independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public to dissent. Compared with the Hasina era – when thousands of opposition figures were jailed, media outlets shuttered, internet shutdowns imposed, and critics were criminalized, intimidated, disappeared, and killed – the interim administration has released political prisoners, repealed draconian laws, and pledged far-reaching reforms. However, the interim administration has also used some repressive practices seen under its predecessors, including relying on anti-terrorism and criminal code provisions against those sympathetic to the previous regime, leaving the civic space more open than before but still precarious.
Despite significant reforms, institutions still frequently and unfairly side with the interim administration when reviewing challenges to its policies or interests. The government has introduced major judicial and constitutional reforms, including a new Supreme Judicial Appointments Council, a separate and unprecedented Supreme Court Secretariat, the expansion of the International Crimes Tribunal’s (ICT) jurisdiction, and proposals to curb executive appointment powers. Implementation, however, remains partial, and politicization concerns persist. Courts have restored the caretaker government system and paved the path for opposition parties to return to mainstream politics, but have also upheld harsh measures against Awami League figures and permitted ongoing prosecutions of journalists. Broader reforms to the legislative and executive branches are tied to a planned 2026 referendum, leaving the sustainability of institutional accountability uncertain.
The interim administration has introduced reforms that improve electoral competition, which was largely absent under the Hasina regime. 300 of the 350 seats in the National Parliament are directly elected, and the remaining 50 seats are reserved for women members of represented parties. The 2014, 2018, and 2024 polls were boycotted by the mainstream opposition, the BNP, due to widespread allegations of rigging and a lack of independent electoral oversight. During this time, the regime pursued criminal cases against opposition leaders widely deemed politically motivated and leveraged state resources and a skewed media landscape to boost its electoral campaigns. The interim government that took power in 2024 has taken steps to improve electoral competition ahead of the scheduled polls.
The Hasina regime barred the real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing. Prior to 2024, the regime banned Bangladesh’s largest Muslim party, Jamaat-e-Islami, and repeatedly cracked down on opposition activities, seriously weakening them. This was particularly evident with respect to the BNP. In the lead-up to the January 2024 polls, Bangladesh police arrested nearly 10,000 opposition figures affiliated with the BNP, including an estimated 162 top BNP officials, who had participated in major anti-government rallies that turned violent. Following the mass arrests, the few BNP leaders who had evaded arrest reportedly went into hiding, including Habibun Nabi Khan Sohel, the BNP’s joint secretary general, who had more than 450 cases filed against him by the regime. Sohel was ultimately sentenced to five years and six months’ imprisonment in absentia in March 2024, according to local media reports. Previously, in 2018, the regime had brought over 300,000 politically motivated cases against BNP members and supporters, and arrested many of them. In 2018, too, the late BNP leader Khaleda Zia was sentenced to a total of 17 years’ imprisonment in corruption cases perceived as politically motivated. She was imprisoned for more than two years before being put under restrictions akin to house arrest, including a prohibition from engaging in political activities. She was cleared of all charges in the wake of Hasina’s resignation.
The interim administration has pursued an aggressive accountability initiative against the Awami League that led to the exclusion of the party and its members from scheduled elections. As of December 2025, most of the Awami League’s senior figures and supporters are exiled or have been convicted on a wide range of charges. The party’s leader, Sheikh Hasina, was sentenced in absentia to death by hanging in November 2025 on charges of crimes against humanity related to her deadly crackdown on mass protests against her regime, dubbed the July Revolution, which killed over 1,400 people. As part of its aggressive effort to hold the Hasina regime accountable for its alleged crimes against humanity, the interim administration has also labelled the Awami League a terrorist organization and banned it from politics, meaning it would not be able to contest the scheduled elections. Critics have expressed concerns about political reprisal and disproportionate measures against the party and individuals linked to it.
Independent electoral oversight was largely absent under the Hasina regime. A 1996 constitutional amendment, referred to as the 13th Amendment, mandated the installation of a neutral caretaker government to oversee national elections, a mechanism intended to ensure the credibility and independence of election administration. The Hasina regime used its two-thirds majority in parliament to pass the 15th Amendment to abolish the caretaker system in 2011, thereby subjecting elections directly under the supervision of the ruling party. This shift was central to opposition concerns regarding the freedom and fairness of elections in 2013, 2018, and 2024. Additionally, the Election Commission, which has a maximum membership of five commissioners, was frequently accused of bias in favor of the Awami League during this time. A law passed in 2022 by the incumbent-controlled legislature drew opposition ire for enabling the Prime Minister to make the final decision on appointments to the Commission. Throughout the Hasina era, the Commission was known to be packed with individuals close to the regime, and its members have included a former high-ranking official from the Defense Ministry and a retired Army General. The Commission’s bias was most evident in the 2018 election, when it rejected the registration of 141 BNP candidates on unsubstantiated grounds, and allowed impunity for widespread reports of voting irregularities and violence against opposition supporters by security forces that left 17 people killed. Ahead of the 2024 election, the Election Commission also barred dozens of serious contenders to the Awami League from registering, while dubiously accepting the registration of minor parties widely seen as unviable challengers to the ruling party.
The Hasina regime enjoyed significant campaign advantages over the real, mainstream opposition. The regime sustained itself by leveraging close ties with the police, military, oligarchs, and volunteer networks across the country. The police and the military, specifically, played a key role in executing mass pre-election crackdowns on opposition activities that often led to opposition figures being arrested, charged, disappeared, or killed. Nearly all of Bangladesh’s prominent media outlets were controlled by business entities affiliated with the Awami League. The regime also frequently retaliated against critical or pro-opposition media through licensing denials, selective imposition of excise duties and government advertising, restrictions from government buildings or official programs, threats, harassment, or outright violence. The regime routinely shut down media outlets linked to the opposition, including the Dainik Dinkal, the BNP’s sole newspaper, in 2023.
The restrictive political environment and perceived electoral unfairness during the Hasina era led the mainstream opposition to boycott all three elections under her regime or their results. The opposition alliance comprising the BNP and its 17 smaller allies boycotted the 2014 election in protest of the regime’s decision not to hand over power to a caretaker government before conducting the elections. Although the BNP participated in the 2018 elections, the extremely skewed playing field resulted in the party winning only seven out of the 300 contested seats. It went on to boycott the swearing-in ceremony of elected lawmakers. The BNP again boycotted parliamentary elections in 2024 along with other influential opposition parties. These elections also saw low turnout, with fewer than half of eligible voters casting ballots in 2024. Across all three elections, the Awami League was able to win unopposed in hundreds of constituencies. The party’s vote share never dipped below 60% and it consistently controlled around 80% of the legislature.
The interim administration led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus has introduced key electoral reforms since receiving its mandate and has pledged to hold elections by early 2026. In August 2024, the interim administration established an Electoral Reform Commission tasked with drafting recommendations for institutional and electoral change. By October 2025, the interim administration, with support from two dozen political parties, signed the “July Charter,” a document that contains over 80 reform recommendations, many of which relate directly to the electoral system, including plans to update voter rolls, expand mechanisms for voter participation, introduce procedural safeguards around the voting process, and strengthen the Election Commission. A member of the Electoral Reform Commission stated that approximately 50 of the Commission’s 250 recommendations had been incorporated into the domestic legal framework by late 2025. Crucially, however, the most significant among the proposed reforms would require passage by the next national parliament after fresh elections and therefore have not materialized.
The interim administration has introduced reforms that help restore the ability of independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public to dissent. Some practices – such as the arbitrary shutdown of media outlets and civil society organizations; mass crackdowns on journalists, activists, and protesters; and habitual digital censorship during periods of political crises – have drastically reduced. Steps have been taken to release Hasina-era political prisoners. The interim administration has nevertheless been criticized for its piecemeal progress on other reforms, such as the repeal of draconian legislation it inherited from the Hasina regime. The interim administration has also faced allegations of disproportionately targeting political opponents, particularly members and supporters of the Awami League, using anti-terrorism and Criminal Code provisions. Independent media continue to operate in a precarious environment in which they face risks of intimidation, travel restrictions, and serious criminal cases.
The interim administration has somewhat obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, and civil society. Since the leadership change in August 2024, the interim administration has voiced ambitious plans to create a “new Bangladesh” that entails a democratic reset. Within days of assuming power, the interim administration released over 1,000 leaders of the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, as well as their activists, from prison following their detention by the Hasina regime over their involvement in the July Revolution. Those released included the late BNP leader Khaleda Zia. Despite this progress, the interim administration has mimicked some repressive practices of its predecessor, disproportionately targeting individuals considered close to the Awami League. Aside from banning the party, the regime has also targeted the few members of the party that have remained in Bangladesh, and affiliated activists, journalists, and academics, primarily by wielding the Criminal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Act.
Local rights groups have reported a surge in attacks from the interim administration against journalists since August 2024. Officials under the interim administration have filed serious criminal cases, mainly murder and terrorism charges, against at least 140 journalists by the end of 2025. Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus has admitted that these cases were brought “hurriedly …, following the old laws and practices” and vowed an independent investigation by a newly created Committee for Monitoring Harassment Cases against Journalists. However, the Committee is packed with senior officials from the interim administration, casting doubt on its independence. The interim administration has also arbitrarily cancelled the accreditation cards of 167 journalists deemed close to the previous regime, a move that the Chief Adviser claims would restrict their access to government buildings. Over 300 journalists viewed as sympathetic to the Hasina regime have also been prohibited from leaving the country, according to Reporters Without Borders. In August 2025, police detained 16 participants of a public meeting on the accusation that they were Awami League loyalists. Among them was Dhaka University professor Sheikh Hafizur Rahman and journalist Monjurul Alam Panna. Their cases, instituted based on the Anti-Terrorism Act, are ongoing as of the end of 2025. In November 2024, the interim administration established a Media Reform Commission to review media regulation and policies in the country. None of its recommendations, including those related to enhanced journalist protections and accountability, have been implemented.
The interim administration has somewhat repressed dissenting protests and gatherings and censored dissenting speech. While the brutal clampdown on protests seen under the Hasina regime is not observed under the current leadership, notable restrictions remain. As a result of the ban imposed on the Awami League, all public gatherings, publications, and political expressions on the party’s behalf are also prohibited. In January 2025, the interim administration announced that it would now allow the Awami League to hold protests, blockades, or “hartals” – the voluntary, mass shutdown of shops and public services to oppose the government – until the party “separates itself from its current leadership and … fascist ideology.”
Unlike the Hasina regime, the interim government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Digital censorship has loosened significantly, with past practices of complete internet shutdowns or social media blackouts during times of unrest, and the blocking of critical sites having ceased. However, the interim administration’s reform of draconian legislation passed by the Hasina regime that heavily aided in the censorship of online speech has been piecemeal. These include the Cyber Security Act 2023 (CSA), which replaced the Digital Security Act 2018 (DSA). An estimated 7,000 people were charged under the law during the Hasina era, of which 40% were regime critics. Following international pressure, the interim administration repealed the CSA in May 2025 and replaced it with the new Cyber Safety Ordinance 2025 in October. The Ordinance repealed or modified nine key sections of the CSA, including those related to defamation and offenses concerning national symbols, which were frequently used to charge critics. The Ordinance also nullifies any penalties already handed down by courts or tribunals under those sections. Nevertheless, concerns remain over the Ordinance’s broad provisions on cyber terrorism, content removal, and surveillance, as well as its implementation. Those charged under the DSA and CSA have also continued to face delays in the nullification of their cases, and many remain detained today.
Despite significant reforms, institutions still frequently and unfairly side with the interim administration when reviewing challenges to its policies or interests. Since August 2024, the interim administration has launched sweeping institutional reforms across the judiciary, legislature, and executive, aiming to reverse the executive dominance that characterized the Hasina regime. Broad judicial reforms have begun to see implementation, but concerns persist about the continued politicization of courts, particularly against Awami League-affiliated figures. Parallel reforms aiming to strengthen legislative independence and place constraints on executive power are enshrined in the July Charter, but implementation is contingent on a planned referendum.
The interim administration has introduced sweeping reforms to the judicial branch to improve its independence and operational effectiveness, but concerns over the politicization of courts remain. The interim administration inherited a judiciary that was widely regarded as seriously beholden to the executive, particularly with respect to judicial postings, transfers, promotions, discipline, and budgeting. Under the previous system, for example, the President appoints Supreme Court judges by consulting the Chief Justice, yet in practice the Prime Minister had significant influence over such appointments. In January 2025, the interim administration published the Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court Ordinance 2025, which creates a seven-member Supreme Judicial Appointments Council led by the Chief Justice to make recommendations to the bench. The interim administration also established a separate Supreme Court Secretariat through another ordinance issued in November 2025, which, for the first time in Bangladesh’s history, allows the court system administrative and financial autonomy. Critics have highlighted gaps in the ordinances, particularly with regard to the appointment of the Chief Justice, which remains within the power of the executive branch. The Supreme Court Secretariat is also not entirely independent in financial decision-making, as budget decisions for higher courts require government approval. The interim administration has also undertaken a massive restructuring involving the promotion and transfer of more than 800 judicial officers as part of its broader reform efforts. Another key reform is the expansion of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), a tribunal initially established in 1973 and revived by the Hasina regime in 2010 to prosecute individuals accused of committing genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, particularly those committed during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War against Pakistan. The interim administration has introduced successive amendments to the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 to broaden the tribunal’s jurisdiction and update its procedures. These amendments allow the ICT to prosecute crimes against humanity linked to recent crimes committed by military, intelligence, and political leaders, and introduce provisions barring individuals formally charged with such crimes from contesting elections while proceedings are ongoing. The ICT has delivered key verdicts against Awami League leaders, including the in absentia death sentence against Sheikh Hasina and former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan on charges of crimes against humanity.
While the abovementioned reforms have assisted courts in reclaiming their role in preserving the freedom and fairness of elections since August 2024, serious concerns remain. In a significant ruling on November 20, 2025, the Supreme Court restored the 13th Amendment of the 1972 Constitution, which enshrines the nonpartisan caretaker government system to oversee national elections, previously abolished by the same Court under Hasina. However, the Court explicitly held that the system will not be applied to the planned 2026 elections, raising concerns as to its authority to order such a delay and the ruling’s compatibility with the July Charter. In June 2025, the Supreme Court lifted the ban imposed on Jamaat-e-Islami, one of Bangladesh’s mainstream opposition parties, imposed by the Hasina regime in the wake of the July Revolution. The Court also overturned the conviction of Jamaat leader ATM Azharul Islam and his death sentence, previously handed down by the ICT. While the underlying crimes implicating Jamaat were historically documented, critics – including international rights groups – have raised serious concerns about the procedural fairness of ICT trials and noted that prosecutions were politically weaponized against the Islamist opposition. Further, as previously stated, since the interim administration took office, detained members of the BNP have been released en masse by the judiciary. While this has remedied the political repression under Hasina, the disproportionate targeting of Awami League members through harsh sentences handed to its leaders and supporters signals that the judiciary remains deeply politicized. In April 2025, for example, a Dhaka court sentenced 70 pro-Awami League lawyers on charges of assault, vandalism, and attempted murder. Those convicted were part of 144 pro-Awami League lawyers accused of physically attacking participants of the July Revolution. The outcome has been criticized as toeing the line between accountability pursuit and political retribution.
While there has been notable progress in judicial patterns with respect to dissidents, under the interim administration, courts have continued to falter in checking attempts to retaliate against critics. As of December 2025, at least seven journalists remain detained based on court orders. They include Monjurul Alam Panna, whose 2025 charges stemmed from his participation in a public meeting in Dhaka where they allegedly claimed that Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus was maligning the constitution. Panna’s initial request for bail was rejected before being granted in November 2025. Farzana Rupa and her husband Shakil Ahmad, both work for Ekattor TV, have been detained since August 21, 2024, and had their bail order stayed by the Supreme Court in January 2025. All detained journalists have been accused of maintaining links to the Awami League and face terrorism charges.
The interim administration has proposed reforms to strengthen legislative independence and operational effectiveness, but progress has been slowed by party infighting. The Constitution Reform Commission (CRC) established post-August 2024 has recommended a bicameral parliament, with an upper house allocated proportionally based on parties’ vote shares in the lower house, a construct intended to allow more inclusivity in the legislature, particularly for smaller parties. The BNP has rejected the proposed selection method and the scope of the upper house’s powers. Additional reforms include gradually expanding reserved seats for women lawmakers to 100 and introducing a 10% youth quota to enhance gender parity and representativeness, and amending the Constitution’s strict anti-defection clause so sitting lawmakers could vote against their party except on financial bills and no-confidence votes. Relaxing the anti-defection rule would strengthen legislative deliberations and oversight by reducing party leadership’s tight control over members. The implementation of these reforms hinges on a referendum planned to be held on the same day as elections in 2026.
The interim administration has also proposed reforms aimed at enhancing restraints on executive power, which under the previous regime was extensively abused. Recommendations in the July Charter include introducing a 10-year limit on the prime ministership. The Charter also bars the prime minister from becoming Leader of the House simultaneously. These reforms are narrower than those recommended by the CRC, as a result of political concessions. The Prime Minister’s powers in selecting members of key bodies such as the Ombudsman, Public Service Commission, Comptroller, Auditor General, Election Commission, and the Anti-Corruption Commission are envisioned to be significantly reduced by transferring such powers to selection committees, and crystallizing this in the Constitution. The BNP has objected to a constitutional incorporation of such a procedure, preferring it to be established by legislation instead. These reforms are also contingent on the 2026 referendum.
HRF classifies Bangladesh as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Bangladesh has experienced recurring political turbulence since its independence in 1971. Following the assassination of founding leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975, the country endured years of direct military rule and military-backed civilian governance before gradually transitioning to parliamentary democracy in the 1990s. In recent decades, local politics has been dominated by intense rivalry between the Awami League party, led by Sheikh Hasina, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), whose longtime chairperson was the late former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. Hasina won national elections in 2009 by a landslide and subsequently ruled Bangladesh for another 15 continuous years. Her regime was marked by the rapid deterioration of the civic space and repeated crackdowns on political opposition. These tensions culminated in August 2024 with Hasina’s resignation and self-exile after weeks of mass protests and civil unrest that were met with deadly force. In the aftermath, an interim administration headed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was formed to restore stability and oversee preparations for new elections. The Hasina era was characterized by large-scale, state-led crackdowns that may have amounted to crimes against humanity. While these abuses have declined since August 2024, the interim administration has pursued an aggressive accountability initiative against the Awami League and affiliated individuals. The post-transition environment is also marred by clashes between rival party supporters and episodes of mob violence. Human rights monitors have documented hundreds of deaths linked to political violence following the transition, particularly in the lead-up to planned elections in February 2026, capturing the volatile and polarized landscape in Bangladesh that hinders a full democratic opening.
The interim administration has introduced reforms that improve electoral competition, which was largely absent under the Hasina regime. Under Sheikh Hasina, elections in 2014, 2018, and 2024 were marred by opposition boycotts, mass arrests of BNP members, the 2013 banning of the political party Jamaat-e-Islami, the 2011 abolition of the caretaker government system, and an Election Commission widely accused of bias. The Awami League routinely won over 60% of the vote and around 80% of seats, often unopposed. Since August 2024, the interim administration has established an Electoral Reform Commission and endorsed key electoral reform pledges in the historic July Charter. However, many key reforms require approval by the next parliament, and the ban on the Awami League – alongside Sheikh Hasina’s in absentia conviction – has raised new concerns about exclusion and political reprisal.
The interim administration has introduced reforms that help restore the ability of independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public to dissent. Compared with the Hasina era – when thousands of opposition figures were jailed, media outlets shuttered, internet shutdowns imposed, and critics were criminalized, intimidated, disappeared, and killed – the interim administration has released political prisoners, repealed draconian laws, and pledged far-reaching reforms. However, the interim administration has also used some repressive practices seen under its predecessors, including relying on anti-terrorism and criminal code provisions against those sympathetic to the previous regime, leaving the civic space more open than before but still precarious.
Despite significant reforms, institutions still frequently and unfairly side with the interim administration when reviewing challenges to its policies or interests. The government has introduced major judicial and constitutional reforms, including a new Supreme Judicial Appointments Council, a separate and unprecedented Supreme Court Secretariat, the expansion of the International Crimes Tribunal’s (ICT) jurisdiction, and proposals to curb executive appointment powers. Implementation, however, remains partial, and politicization concerns persist. Courts have restored the caretaker government system and paved the path for opposition parties to return to mainstream politics, but have also upheld harsh measures against Awami League figures and permitted ongoing prosecutions of journalists. Broader reforms to the legislative and executive branches are tied to a planned 2026 referendum, leaving the sustainability of institutional accountability uncertain.
The interim administration has introduced reforms that improve electoral competition, which was largely absent under the Hasina regime. 300 of the 350 seats in the National Parliament are directly elected, and the remaining 50 seats are reserved for women members of represented parties. The 2014, 2018, and 2024 polls were boycotted by the mainstream opposition, the BNP, due to widespread allegations of rigging and a lack of independent electoral oversight. During this time, the regime pursued criminal cases against opposition leaders widely deemed politically motivated and leveraged state resources and a skewed media landscape to boost its electoral campaigns. The interim government that took power in 2024 has taken steps to improve electoral competition ahead of the scheduled polls.
The Hasina regime barred the real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing. Prior to 2024, the regime banned Bangladesh’s largest Muslim party, Jamaat-e-Islami, and repeatedly cracked down on opposition activities, seriously weakening them. This was particularly evident with respect to the BNP. In the lead-up to the January 2024 polls, Bangladesh police arrested nearly 10,000 opposition figures affiliated with the BNP, including an estimated 162 top BNP officials, who had participated in major anti-government rallies that turned violent. Following the mass arrests, the few BNP leaders who had evaded arrest reportedly went into hiding, including Habibun Nabi Khan Sohel, the BNP’s joint secretary general, who had more than 450 cases filed against him by the regime. Sohel was ultimately sentenced to five years and six months’ imprisonment in absentia in March 2024, according to local media reports. Previously, in 2018, the regime had brought over 300,000 politically motivated cases against BNP members and supporters, and arrested many of them. In 2018, too, the late BNP leader Khaleda Zia was sentenced to a total of 17 years’ imprisonment in corruption cases perceived as politically motivated. She was imprisoned for more than two years before being put under restrictions akin to house arrest, including a prohibition from engaging in political activities. She was cleared of all charges in the wake of Hasina’s resignation.
The interim administration has pursued an aggressive accountability initiative against the Awami League that led to the exclusion of the party and its members from scheduled elections. As of December 2025, most of the Awami League’s senior figures and supporters are exiled or have been convicted on a wide range of charges. The party’s leader, Sheikh Hasina, was sentenced in absentia to death by hanging in November 2025 on charges of crimes against humanity related to her deadly crackdown on mass protests against her regime, dubbed the July Revolution, which killed over 1,400 people. As part of its aggressive effort to hold the Hasina regime accountable for its alleged crimes against humanity, the interim administration has also labelled the Awami League a terrorist organization and banned it from politics, meaning it would not be able to contest the scheduled elections. Critics have expressed concerns about political reprisal and disproportionate measures against the party and individuals linked to it.
Independent electoral oversight was largely absent under the Hasina regime. A 1996 constitutional amendment, referred to as the 13th Amendment, mandated the installation of a neutral caretaker government to oversee national elections, a mechanism intended to ensure the credibility and independence of election administration. The Hasina regime used its two-thirds majority in parliament to pass the 15th Amendment to abolish the caretaker system in 2011, thereby subjecting elections directly under the supervision of the ruling party. This shift was central to opposition concerns regarding the freedom and fairness of elections in 2013, 2018, and 2024. Additionally, the Election Commission, which has a maximum membership of five commissioners, was frequently accused of bias in favor of the Awami League during this time. A law passed in 2022 by the incumbent-controlled legislature drew opposition ire for enabling the Prime Minister to make the final decision on appointments to the Commission. Throughout the Hasina era, the Commission was known to be packed with individuals close to the regime, and its members have included a former high-ranking official from the Defense Ministry and a retired Army General. The Commission’s bias was most evident in the 2018 election, when it rejected the registration of 141 BNP candidates on unsubstantiated grounds, and allowed impunity for widespread reports of voting irregularities and violence against opposition supporters by security forces that left 17 people killed. Ahead of the 2024 election, the Election Commission also barred dozens of serious contenders to the Awami League from registering, while dubiously accepting the registration of minor parties widely seen as unviable challengers to the ruling party.
The Hasina regime enjoyed significant campaign advantages over the real, mainstream opposition. The regime sustained itself by leveraging close ties with the police, military, oligarchs, and volunteer networks across the country. The police and the military, specifically, played a key role in executing mass pre-election crackdowns on opposition activities that often led to opposition figures being arrested, charged, disappeared, or killed. Nearly all of Bangladesh’s prominent media outlets were controlled by business entities affiliated with the Awami League. The regime also frequently retaliated against critical or pro-opposition media through licensing denials, selective imposition of excise duties and government advertising, restrictions from government buildings or official programs, threats, harassment, or outright violence. The regime routinely shut down media outlets linked to the opposition, including the Dainik Dinkal, the BNP’s sole newspaper, in 2023.
The restrictive political environment and perceived electoral unfairness during the Hasina era led the mainstream opposition to boycott all three elections under her regime or their results. The opposition alliance comprising the BNP and its 17 smaller allies boycotted the 2014 election in protest of the regime’s decision not to hand over power to a caretaker government before conducting the elections. Although the BNP participated in the 2018 elections, the extremely skewed playing field resulted in the party winning only seven out of the 300 contested seats. It went on to boycott the swearing-in ceremony of elected lawmakers. The BNP again boycotted parliamentary elections in 2024 along with other influential opposition parties. These elections also saw low turnout, with fewer than half of eligible voters casting ballots in 2024. Across all three elections, the Awami League was able to win unopposed in hundreds of constituencies. The party’s vote share never dipped below 60% and it consistently controlled around 80% of the legislature.
The interim administration led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus has introduced key electoral reforms since receiving its mandate and has pledged to hold elections by early 2026. In August 2024, the interim administration established an Electoral Reform Commission tasked with drafting recommendations for institutional and electoral change. By October 2025, the interim administration, with support from two dozen political parties, signed the “July Charter,” a document that contains over 80 reform recommendations, many of which relate directly to the electoral system, including plans to update voter rolls, expand mechanisms for voter participation, introduce procedural safeguards around the voting process, and strengthen the Election Commission. A member of the Electoral Reform Commission stated that approximately 50 of the Commission’s 250 recommendations had been incorporated into the domestic legal framework by late 2025. Crucially, however, the most significant among the proposed reforms would require passage by the next national parliament after fresh elections and therefore have not materialized.
The interim administration has introduced reforms that help restore the ability of independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public to dissent. Some practices – such as the arbitrary shutdown of media outlets and civil society organizations; mass crackdowns on journalists, activists, and protesters; and habitual digital censorship during periods of political crises – have drastically reduced. Steps have been taken to release Hasina-era political prisoners. The interim administration has nevertheless been criticized for its piecemeal progress on other reforms, such as the repeal of draconian legislation it inherited from the Hasina regime. The interim administration has also faced allegations of disproportionately targeting political opponents, particularly members and supporters of the Awami League, using anti-terrorism and Criminal Code provisions. Independent media continue to operate in a precarious environment in which they face risks of intimidation, travel restrictions, and serious criminal cases.
The interim administration has somewhat obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, and civil society. Since the leadership change in August 2024, the interim administration has voiced ambitious plans to create a “new Bangladesh” that entails a democratic reset. Within days of assuming power, the interim administration released over 1,000 leaders of the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, as well as their activists, from prison following their detention by the Hasina regime over their involvement in the July Revolution. Those released included the late BNP leader Khaleda Zia. Despite this progress, the interim administration has mimicked some repressive practices of its predecessor, disproportionately targeting individuals considered close to the Awami League. Aside from banning the party, the regime has also targeted the few members of the party that have remained in Bangladesh, and affiliated activists, journalists, and academics, primarily by wielding the Criminal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Act.
Local rights groups have reported a surge in attacks from the interim administration against journalists since August 2024. Officials under the interim administration have filed serious criminal cases, mainly murder and terrorism charges, against at least 140 journalists by the end of 2025. Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus has admitted that these cases were brought “hurriedly …, following the old laws and practices” and vowed an independent investigation by a newly created Committee for Monitoring Harassment Cases against Journalists. However, the Committee is packed with senior officials from the interim administration, casting doubt on its independence. The interim administration has also arbitrarily cancelled the accreditation cards of 167 journalists deemed close to the previous regime, a move that the Chief Adviser claims would restrict their access to government buildings. Over 300 journalists viewed as sympathetic to the Hasina regime have also been prohibited from leaving the country, according to Reporters Without Borders. In August 2025, police detained 16 participants of a public meeting on the accusation that they were Awami League loyalists. Among them was Dhaka University professor Sheikh Hafizur Rahman and journalist Monjurul Alam Panna. Their cases, instituted based on the Anti-Terrorism Act, are ongoing as of the end of 2025. In November 2024, the interim administration established a Media Reform Commission to review media regulation and policies in the country. None of its recommendations, including those related to enhanced journalist protections and accountability, have been implemented.
The interim administration has somewhat repressed dissenting protests and gatherings and censored dissenting speech. While the brutal clampdown on protests seen under the Hasina regime is not observed under the current leadership, notable restrictions remain. As a result of the ban imposed on the Awami League, all public gatherings, publications, and political expressions on the party’s behalf are also prohibited. In January 2025, the interim administration announced that it would now allow the Awami League to hold protests, blockades, or “hartals” – the voluntary, mass shutdown of shops and public services to oppose the government – until the party “separates itself from its current leadership and … fascist ideology.”
Unlike the Hasina regime, the interim government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Digital censorship has loosened significantly, with past practices of complete internet shutdowns or social media blackouts during times of unrest, and the blocking of critical sites having ceased. However, the interim administration’s reform of draconian legislation passed by the Hasina regime that heavily aided in the censorship of online speech has been piecemeal. These include the Cyber Security Act 2023 (CSA), which replaced the Digital Security Act 2018 (DSA). An estimated 7,000 people were charged under the law during the Hasina era, of which 40% were regime critics. Following international pressure, the interim administration repealed the CSA in May 2025 and replaced it with the new Cyber Safety Ordinance 2025 in October. The Ordinance repealed or modified nine key sections of the CSA, including those related to defamation and offenses concerning national symbols, which were frequently used to charge critics. The Ordinance also nullifies any penalties already handed down by courts or tribunals under those sections. Nevertheless, concerns remain over the Ordinance’s broad provisions on cyber terrorism, content removal, and surveillance, as well as its implementation. Those charged under the DSA and CSA have also continued to face delays in the nullification of their cases, and many remain detained today.
Despite significant reforms, institutions still frequently and unfairly side with the interim administration when reviewing challenges to its policies or interests. Since August 2024, the interim administration has launched sweeping institutional reforms across the judiciary, legislature, and executive, aiming to reverse the executive dominance that characterized the Hasina regime. Broad judicial reforms have begun to see implementation, but concerns persist about the continued politicization of courts, particularly against Awami League-affiliated figures. Parallel reforms aiming to strengthen legislative independence and place constraints on executive power are enshrined in the July Charter, but implementation is contingent on a planned referendum.
The interim administration has introduced sweeping reforms to the judicial branch to improve its independence and operational effectiveness, but concerns over the politicization of courts remain. The interim administration inherited a judiciary that was widely regarded as seriously beholden to the executive, particularly with respect to judicial postings, transfers, promotions, discipline, and budgeting. Under the previous system, for example, the President appoints Supreme Court judges by consulting the Chief Justice, yet in practice the Prime Minister had significant influence over such appointments. In January 2025, the interim administration published the Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court Ordinance 2025, which creates a seven-member Supreme Judicial Appointments Council led by the Chief Justice to make recommendations to the bench. The interim administration also established a separate Supreme Court Secretariat through another ordinance issued in November 2025, which, for the first time in Bangladesh’s history, allows the court system administrative and financial autonomy. Critics have highlighted gaps in the ordinances, particularly with regard to the appointment of the Chief Justice, which remains within the power of the executive branch. The Supreme Court Secretariat is also not entirely independent in financial decision-making, as budget decisions for higher courts require government approval. The interim administration has also undertaken a massive restructuring involving the promotion and transfer of more than 800 judicial officers as part of its broader reform efforts. Another key reform is the expansion of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), a tribunal initially established in 1973 and revived by the Hasina regime in 2010 to prosecute individuals accused of committing genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, particularly those committed during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War against Pakistan. The interim administration has introduced successive amendments to the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 to broaden the tribunal’s jurisdiction and update its procedures. These amendments allow the ICT to prosecute crimes against humanity linked to recent crimes committed by military, intelligence, and political leaders, and introduce provisions barring individuals formally charged with such crimes from contesting elections while proceedings are ongoing. The ICT has delivered key verdicts against Awami League leaders, including the in absentia death sentence against Sheikh Hasina and former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan on charges of crimes against humanity.
While the abovementioned reforms have assisted courts in reclaiming their role in preserving the freedom and fairness of elections since August 2024, serious concerns remain. In a significant ruling on November 20, 2025, the Supreme Court restored the 13th Amendment of the 1972 Constitution, which enshrines the nonpartisan caretaker government system to oversee national elections, previously abolished by the same Court under Hasina. However, the Court explicitly held that the system will not be applied to the planned 2026 elections, raising concerns as to its authority to order such a delay and the ruling’s compatibility with the July Charter. In June 2025, the Supreme Court lifted the ban imposed on Jamaat-e-Islami, one of Bangladesh’s mainstream opposition parties, imposed by the Hasina regime in the wake of the July Revolution. The Court also overturned the conviction of Jamaat leader ATM Azharul Islam and his death sentence, previously handed down by the ICT. While the underlying crimes implicating Jamaat were historically documented, critics – including international rights groups – have raised serious concerns about the procedural fairness of ICT trials and noted that prosecutions were politically weaponized against the Islamist opposition. Further, as previously stated, since the interim administration took office, detained members of the BNP have been released en masse by the judiciary. While this has remedied the political repression under Hasina, the disproportionate targeting of Awami League members through harsh sentences handed to its leaders and supporters signals that the judiciary remains deeply politicized. In April 2025, for example, a Dhaka court sentenced 70 pro-Awami League lawyers on charges of assault, vandalism, and attempted murder. Those convicted were part of 144 pro-Awami League lawyers accused of physically attacking participants of the July Revolution. The outcome has been criticized as toeing the line between accountability pursuit and political retribution.
While there has been notable progress in judicial patterns with respect to dissidents, under the interim administration, courts have continued to falter in checking attempts to retaliate against critics. As of December 2025, at least seven journalists remain detained based on court orders. They include Monjurul Alam Panna, whose 2025 charges stemmed from his participation in a public meeting in Dhaka where they allegedly claimed that Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus was maligning the constitution. Panna’s initial request for bail was rejected before being granted in November 2025. Farzana Rupa and her husband Shakil Ahmad, both work for Ekattor TV, have been detained since August 21, 2024, and had their bail order stayed by the Supreme Court in January 2025. All detained journalists have been accused of maintaining links to the Awami League and face terrorism charges.
The interim administration has proposed reforms to strengthen legislative independence and operational effectiveness, but progress has been slowed by party infighting. The Constitution Reform Commission (CRC) established post-August 2024 has recommended a bicameral parliament, with an upper house allocated proportionally based on parties’ vote shares in the lower house, a construct intended to allow more inclusivity in the legislature, particularly for smaller parties. The BNP has rejected the proposed selection method and the scope of the upper house’s powers. Additional reforms include gradually expanding reserved seats for women lawmakers to 100 and introducing a 10% youth quota to enhance gender parity and representativeness, and amending the Constitution’s strict anti-defection clause so sitting lawmakers could vote against their party except on financial bills and no-confidence votes. Relaxing the anti-defection rule would strengthen legislative deliberations and oversight by reducing party leadership’s tight control over members. The implementation of these reforms hinges on a referendum planned to be held on the same day as elections in 2026.
The interim administration has also proposed reforms aimed at enhancing restraints on executive power, which under the previous regime was extensively abused. Recommendations in the July Charter include introducing a 10-year limit on the prime ministership. The Charter also bars the prime minister from becoming Leader of the House simultaneously. These reforms are narrower than those recommended by the CRC, as a result of political concessions. The Prime Minister’s powers in selecting members of key bodies such as the Ombudsman, Public Service Commission, Comptroller, Auditor General, Election Commission, and the Anti-Corruption Commission are envisioned to be significantly reduced by transferring such powers to selection committees, and crystallizing this in the Constitution. The BNP has objected to a constitutional incorporation of such a procedure, preferring it to be established by legislation instead. These reforms are also contingent on the 2026 referendum.
