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HRF classifies Armenia as democratic.
Armenia declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. For many years, its post-Soviet history was marked by the dominance of the Republican Party under Presidents Robert Kocharyan (1998–2008) and Serzh Sargsyan (2008–2018), whose rule relied on oligarchic networks and systematic electoral manipulation. A turning point came with the 2018 “Velvet Revolution,” a mass nonviolent protest movement led by current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. It resulted in the ouster of Serzh Sargsyan, who had sought to extend his hold on power, and ushered in a democratization process marked by the first free and competitive elections in decades, along with an anti-corruption campaign. Following the 2015 constitutional reform, the country completed its transition from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary system, in which executive power is concentrated in the hands of the prime minister. Armenia’s unicameral parliament, the National Assembly, has 107 seats elected through a proportional election system. 71 of its seats are currently held by Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party.
Armenia has traditionally had a close relationship with Moscow: it has been a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) since 2015 and is a founding member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, following CSTO’s inaction during Azerbaijan’s incursions into Armenia’s sovereign territory in 2021–2022 and Moscow’s reluctance to help Armenia during Baku’s military operation that reclaimed control over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in late 2023, Yerevan began pursuing a more diversified foreign policy, deepening cooperation with the European Union and the United States, an ongoing source of political tension in its relations with Moscow.
Armenian national elections are largely free and fair. The electoral process is open, allowing even the incumbent’s strongest rivals to run without interference. Strict anti-fraud measures and biometric technology have effectively stopped systemic cheating. This has led to genuine competition where the ruling party’s support has noticeably declined, and a strong parliamentary opposition is present.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. However, the state has launched a coordinated attack on the Armenian Apostolic Church, prosecuting religious leaders involved in politics. Additionally, police have increasingly used excessive force against protesters, while authorities now use administrative rules to block journalists from parliament and punish critical speech.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. The executive uses disciplinary bodies to dismiss judges who criticize reforms or assert independence, creating fear within the judiciary. As a result, courts often fail to check the government, automatically approving the detention of activists and Armenian Apostolic Church clergy without proper evidence.
In Armenia, national elections are largely free and fair. This adherence to pluralism is demonstrated by the unrestricted registration of political entities, including those led by the incumbent’s fiercest rivals, while electoral integrity is maintained through the implementation of robust anti-fraud technologies and the legislative criminalization of vote-buying. A relatively level playing field is characterized by the opposition’s unimpeded access to media resources and the absence of systemic coercion, and competitiveness is evidenced by the ruling party’s significant decline in electoral support and the presence of a robust parliamentary opposition capable of challenging executive decisions.
Yerevan has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. This adherence to pluralism is demonstrated by the unrestricted registration of political entities, including those led by the incumbent’s fiercest rivals and former heads of state, who are permitted to campaign and assume office despite facing severe criminal prosecutions. During the most recent parliamentary elections in 2021, the Central Electoral Commission registered a record 25 political organizations(21 parties and 4 alliances), rejecting virtually no applications on administrative grounds. Crucially, the electoral code allowed the participation of the “Armenia Alliance” (Hayastan Dashinq), led by former President Robert Kocharyan, who was facing criminal prosecution on charges of corruption and constitutional subversion initiated by the current government. Kocharyan was able to lead the opposition list and secure the second-largest faction in the National Assembly. Similarly, the “I Have Honor” alliance (Pativ Unem), associated with former President Serzh Sargsyan, also entered parliament unobstructed. As of 2025, despite extreme polarization and recurring opposition-led campaigns demanding Prime Minister Pashinyan’s resignation, such as the “Tavush for the Homeland” movement, the government has refrained from using administrative resources to dissolve these parliamentary factions or strip them of their legal status, maintaining a multi-party legislature where radical critics hold significant mandates.
The government has not engaged in significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. This integrity is maintained through the implementation of robust anti-fraud technologies and the legislative criminalization of vote-buying, which have collectively dismantled the systemic manipulation mechanisms of the pre-2018 era. Following the “Velvet Revolution,” the authorities eliminated the once-pervasive practices of “carousel voting” and ballot stuffing by introducing electronic Voter Authentication Devices (VADs). Used in the 2021 parliamentary elections, these devices scan voters’ identification documents and fingerprints, automatically cross-referencing them with a centralized database to prevent multiple voting. International observers from the OSCE/ODIHR assessed these elections as “competitive and generally well-managed,” highlighting that the vote count was transparent. The government strengthened the legal framework by adopting amendments in April 2021 that significantly increased criminal penalties for vote-buying and voter coercion. As a result, while isolated incidents of administrative resource abuse persist, the centralized, state-sponsored machinery of falsification that characterized previous regimes has been effectively dismantled, ensuring that official results accurately reflect the will of the electorate.
The ruling party has not enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. This relatively level playing field is characterized by the opposition’s unimpeded access to media resources and the absence of systemic coercion of public sector employees, distinguishing the current environment from the state-captured electoral processes of the past. According to the OSCE/ODIHR final report on the 2021 snap parliamentary elections, contestants were able to campaign freely, and the “Civil Contract” party did not benefit from a monopoly on state resources that would render the race uncompetitive. While the ruling party leveraged the visibility of the Prime Minister’s office, opposition blocs possessed significant financial resources and dominated private media coverage, effectively counterbalancing the incumbent’s administrative reach. There were no credible reports of large-scale intimidation of public sector employees, such as teachers, doctors, or military personnel, to vote for the government, ensuring that the administrative resource abuse, while potentially present, was not the deciding factor in the election outcome.
The government has not skewed the electoral playing field so much so that it generally wins elections with a very high vote share. This competitiveness is evidenced by the ruling party’s significant decline in electoral support and the presence of a robust parliamentary opposition capable of challenging executive decisions. While Prime Minister Pashinyan swept to power with over 70% of the vote in 2018, the 2021 snap parliamentary elections resulted in the “Civil Contract” party securing only 53.9%. This sharp decrease reflects genuine voter fluctuation and the electoral system’s responsiveness to the government’s performance. The National Assembly functions as a pluralistic body; the opposition factions collectively hold 36 of the 107 seats, granting them significant leverage to scrutinize legislation and initiate parliamentary hearings. Independent polling data from 2024 and 2025 consistently shows the ruling party’s support dipping below 30%, indicating that the political landscape remains fluid and the incumbent’s hold on power is directly tied to fluctuating public approval.
In Armenia, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. This environment remains largely open, yet in 2025 it was marred by an unprecedented, state-coordinated campaign of repression targeting the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), characterized by the criminalization of political rhetoric and the weaponization of administrative resources; while mass protests continue to occur, the the 2024-2025 demonstrations has been defined by a marked escalation in police violence, the disproportionate use of сrowd control weapons, such as stun granades, and the ause of fines and detentions against protesters and rally organizers. The freedom of speech is increasingly challenged by a shift towards “administrative censorship,” where parliamentary regulations and “hooliganism” statutes are weaponized to imprison critical journalists and silence inconvenient reporting.
The government has not seriously intimidated the work of independent, dissenting political leaders or organizations. This environment remains largely open, yet in 2025 it was marred by an unprecedented, state-coordinated campaign of repression targeting the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) and its affiliates, characterized by the criminalization of political rhetoric and the weaponization of administrative resources. Authorities have systematically targeted clerics and their supporters who publicly demanded Prime Minister Pashinyan’s resignation, prosecuting them for their speech rather than any violent acts. This dynamic was illustrated by the arrest of Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan on charges of “public calls to seize power” following his speech defending the Church. The retaliatory nature of this prosecution became apparent when Pashinyan immediately moved to nationalize Karapetyan’s energy company, Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA). Simultaneously, the persecution of the clergy intensified. Authorities arrested Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, the leader of the 2024 protests, under the pretext of a “plan to seize power,” and sentenced Archbishop Mikael Ajapahyan, Pashinyan’s critic, to two years in prison for “calls to change power”, a stark departure from past judicial practices regarding political rhetoric. The crackdown expanded to include six other clergymen and the arrest of Archbishop Arshak Khachatryan on a revived, highly questionable 2018 charge of allegedly planting drugs on a protester. The officials imposed travel bans on the Church’s top leadership, including Catholicos Karekin II, preventing their attendance at a clergy council in Austria. The “unusually fast” pace of these procedural actions compared to standard practices supports accusations of selective justice.
Pashinyan’s administration has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. This is characterized by the regular occurrence of large-scale, unauthorized anti-government demonstrations that proceed without systemic bans, yet the period of 2024–2025 has been defined by a marked escalation in police violence, the disproportionate use of “special means”, such as water cannon and soviet Zarya-3 stun grenades, and the arbitrary fines and detentions against protesters. While the “Tavush for the Homeland” movement was initially able to stage weeks of continuous rallies in Yerevan over border delimitation with Azerbaijan, the state’s tolerance evaporated during critical confrontations. The crackdown culminated on June 12, 2024, when security forces deployed stun grenades against protesters outside the National Assembly. The operation resulted in severe injuries to 101 civilians and journalists, with the police detaining 98 individuals in a single evening. International watchdogs, including Amnesty International, explicitly called for an investigation into the “excessive use of force,” questioning the proportionality of the police response given the largely non-violent nature of the assembly. In 2025, the authorities shifted tactics from mass dispersal to the targeted “neutralization” of protest leadership. In a disturbing trend of ignoring parliamentary immunity, “Red Beret” special police units were filmed brutally beating opposition MP Ashot Simonyan during a May 2024 rally, signaling that even elected officials are not safe from physical retribution during assemblies. Authorities have shifted from administrative fines to mass criminal prosecution to deter participation. Following the June 12 events, the Investigative Committee initiated criminal proceedings against 28 individuals on charges of “mass riots.” These included Tigran Saribekyan, a 73-year-old man charged with hooliganism after throwing his cane in reaction to being wounded by a grenade blast, who is currently under house arrest, and Gor Melik-Sahakyan, an activist who spent over a year under prosecution before being acquitted in August 2025 (though many others remain free on bail pending trial). This strategy effectively raises the “cost of dissent,” transforming the right to assembly into a risk of prolonged imprisonment.
The government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Nevertheless, the 2024-2025 period witnessed an emerging pattern of “administrative censorship,” wherein authorities weaponized parliamentary regulations to suppress inconvenient reporting. While direct pre-publication censorship is absent, authorities have increasingly used administrative resources to physically exclude critical journalists from the political process. In December 2025, the parliamentary administration revoked the accreditation of Zhoghovurd daily reporters Knar Manukian and Sona Grigorian, as well as Mediahub.am correspondent Vahe Makaryan. Security forces forcibly removed them from the National Assembly building solely for attempting to interview pro-government MPs in “unauthorized areas,” a move condemned by press freedom groups as a calculated effort to shield the ruling party from scrutiny regarding corruption allegations. A defining case was the persecution of Narek Samsonyan and Vazgen Saghatelyan, hosts of the popular opposition podcast Imnemnimi. On November 13, 2025, heavily armed National Security Service (NSS) officers raided their studio and detained them on charges of “hooliganism.” The prosecution’s case rests entirely on their use of severe profanity and harsh insults directed at Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan and the Prime Minister during a broadcast. High-ranking officials systematically utilize the judiciary to exert financial pressure on independent outlets. Speaker Alen Simonyan and other ruling party members have filed dozens of defamation lawsuits against newspapers like Hraparak and Yerkir Media, seeking maximum compensation damages that threaten the financial viability of these newsrooms. While the courts often dismiss or significantly reduce these excessive financial claims, the prolonged litigation serves as a tool to drain the resources of independent outlets. Nevertheless, Armenia maintains a highly pluralistic and competitive media environment where dozens of independent and opposition-aligned outlets continue to operate freely, providing robust criticism of the government without systemic censorship.
In Armenia, institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. This constraint is characterized by the executive branch’s manipulation of judicial oversight bodies and reform agendas to structurally erode judicial autonomy. Rather than direct usurpation, the government leverages administrative tools and vetting mechanisms to sideline independent jurists, bypass tenure protections, and consolidate political control. Courts have frequently enabled government repression through a pattern of judicial acquiescence, defined by the systemic “rubber-stamping” of pre-trial detention motions in politically sensitive cases to neutralize protest momentum.
Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to government interests, or who are perceived as a threat to the governing authority, have faced retaliation. This systemic pressure is disguised as “disciplinary liability,” where the executive branch utilizes the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) to selectively purge jurists who publicly criticize judicial reforms or resist political influence. Despite the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) recommendation to remove the Minister of Justice from the disciplinary process to ensure separation of powers, the government has aggressively weaponized this mechanism. The Minister of Justice initiated proceedings that led to the termination of powers of Judge Davit Harutyunyan in July 2023, a punishment widely regarded by civil society as retribution for his vocal criticism of the SJC’s lack of independence and his description of the vetting process as “unconstitutional.” Similarly, the dismissal of Judge Anna Pilosyan for “significant disciplinary violations” was interpreted by independent monitors as a selective application of the law, targeting a judge known for her autonomy while ignoring similar disciplinary violations by pro-government peers. These high-profile dismissals have successfully instilled a “chilling effect” across the judiciary; faced with the threat of immediate career termination by an SJC dominated by political appointees, judges are increasingly reluctant to issue rulings that contradict the executive’s agenda or the prosecution’s demands in sensitive cases.
The government has subjected judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence and operational effectiveness. This structural erosion is driven by the executive’s attempts to utilize legislative amendments to bypass tenure protections and consolidate political control over the judiciary. Ignoring the separation of powers, the administration adopted controversial amendments to the Judicial Code that significantly expanded the disciplinary authority of the SJC and empowered the Minister of Justice, a direct political appointee, to initiate proceedings against judges. International bodies, including the Venice Commission and GRECO, warned that granting the executive branch such direct leverage over judicial discipline creates a structural conflict of interest. Yet, the government persisted, using these “integrity reforms” to staff the SJC with ruling party loyalists and arm them with the legal authority to purge non-compliant judges. Consequently, the reform process, originally framed as an anti-corruption measure, has been instrumentalized to hollow out judicial independence from within, creating a system where judges are technically independent but operationally vulnerable to political removal.
Courts have frequently and unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. This pattern of judicial acquiescence is characterized by the systemic “rubber-stamping” of pre-trial detention motions in politically sensitive cases, where judges prioritize executive stability over evidentiary standards to neutralize protest momentum. Judiciary in 2024–2026 routinely abdicated its responsibility to check the executive during the crackdown on the “Tavush for the Homeland” movement. Judges systematically satisfied prosecution requests to detain activists solely based on police testimony. This judicial complicity extended to the persecution of religious leaders, as courts validated the detention of high-ranking clerics involved in the protests, treating their political rhetoric as sufficient grounds for criminal incarceration. A defining example is the case of the Imnemnimi podcast hosts, where the court sanctioned prolonged pre-trial detention for “hooliganism” charges stemming entirely from non-violent political speech. Defense attorneys consistently reported that in cases involving “insults” against government officials or participation in anti-government rallies, the judiciary functioned as an extension of the prosecution, refusing bail and validating the “criminalization of dissent” strategy initiated by the executive branch.
HRF classifies Armenia as democratic.
Armenia declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. For many years, its post-Soviet history was marked by the dominance of the Republican Party under Presidents Robert Kocharyan (1998–2008) and Serzh Sargsyan (2008–2018), whose rule relied on oligarchic networks and systematic electoral manipulation. A turning point came with the 2018 “Velvet Revolution,” a mass nonviolent protest movement led by current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. It resulted in the ouster of Serzh Sargsyan, who had sought to extend his hold on power, and ushered in a democratization process marked by the first free and competitive elections in decades, along with an anti-corruption campaign. Following the 2015 constitutional reform, the country completed its transition from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary system, in which executive power is concentrated in the hands of the prime minister. Armenia’s unicameral parliament, the National Assembly, has 107 seats elected through a proportional election system. 71 of its seats are currently held by Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party.
Armenia has traditionally had a close relationship with Moscow: it has been a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) since 2015 and is a founding member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, following CSTO’s inaction during Azerbaijan’s incursions into Armenia’s sovereign territory in 2021–2022 and Moscow’s reluctance to help Armenia during Baku’s military operation that reclaimed control over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in late 2023, Yerevan began pursuing a more diversified foreign policy, deepening cooperation with the European Union and the United States, an ongoing source of political tension in its relations with Moscow.
Armenian national elections are largely free and fair. The electoral process is open, allowing even the incumbent’s strongest rivals to run without interference. Strict anti-fraud measures and biometric technology have effectively stopped systemic cheating. This has led to genuine competition where the ruling party’s support has noticeably declined, and a strong parliamentary opposition is present.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. However, the state has launched a coordinated attack on the Armenian Apostolic Church, prosecuting religious leaders involved in politics. Additionally, police have increasingly used excessive force against protesters, while authorities now use administrative rules to block journalists from parliament and punish critical speech.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. The executive uses disciplinary bodies to dismiss judges who criticize reforms or assert independence, creating fear within the judiciary. As a result, courts often fail to check the government, automatically approving the detention of activists and Armenian Apostolic Church clergy without proper evidence.
In Armenia, national elections are largely free and fair. This adherence to pluralism is demonstrated by the unrestricted registration of political entities, including those led by the incumbent’s fiercest rivals, while electoral integrity is maintained through the implementation of robust anti-fraud technologies and the legislative criminalization of vote-buying. A relatively level playing field is characterized by the opposition’s unimpeded access to media resources and the absence of systemic coercion, and competitiveness is evidenced by the ruling party’s significant decline in electoral support and the presence of a robust parliamentary opposition capable of challenging executive decisions.
Yerevan has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. This adherence to pluralism is demonstrated by the unrestricted registration of political entities, including those led by the incumbent’s fiercest rivals and former heads of state, who are permitted to campaign and assume office despite facing severe criminal prosecutions. During the most recent parliamentary elections in 2021, the Central Electoral Commission registered a record 25 political organizations(21 parties and 4 alliances), rejecting virtually no applications on administrative grounds. Crucially, the electoral code allowed the participation of the “Armenia Alliance” (Hayastan Dashinq), led by former President Robert Kocharyan, who was facing criminal prosecution on charges of corruption and constitutional subversion initiated by the current government. Kocharyan was able to lead the opposition list and secure the second-largest faction in the National Assembly. Similarly, the “I Have Honor” alliance (Pativ Unem), associated with former President Serzh Sargsyan, also entered parliament unobstructed. As of 2025, despite extreme polarization and recurring opposition-led campaigns demanding Prime Minister Pashinyan’s resignation, such as the “Tavush for the Homeland” movement, the government has refrained from using administrative resources to dissolve these parliamentary factions or strip them of their legal status, maintaining a multi-party legislature where radical critics hold significant mandates.
The government has not engaged in significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. This integrity is maintained through the implementation of robust anti-fraud technologies and the legislative criminalization of vote-buying, which have collectively dismantled the systemic manipulation mechanisms of the pre-2018 era. Following the “Velvet Revolution,” the authorities eliminated the once-pervasive practices of “carousel voting” and ballot stuffing by introducing electronic Voter Authentication Devices (VADs). Used in the 2021 parliamentary elections, these devices scan voters’ identification documents and fingerprints, automatically cross-referencing them with a centralized database to prevent multiple voting. International observers from the OSCE/ODIHR assessed these elections as “competitive and generally well-managed,” highlighting that the vote count was transparent. The government strengthened the legal framework by adopting amendments in April 2021 that significantly increased criminal penalties for vote-buying and voter coercion. As a result, while isolated incidents of administrative resource abuse persist, the centralized, state-sponsored machinery of falsification that characterized previous regimes has been effectively dismantled, ensuring that official results accurately reflect the will of the electorate.
The ruling party has not enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. This relatively level playing field is characterized by the opposition’s unimpeded access to media resources and the absence of systemic coercion of public sector employees, distinguishing the current environment from the state-captured electoral processes of the past. According to the OSCE/ODIHR final report on the 2021 snap parliamentary elections, contestants were able to campaign freely, and the “Civil Contract” party did not benefit from a monopoly on state resources that would render the race uncompetitive. While the ruling party leveraged the visibility of the Prime Minister’s office, opposition blocs possessed significant financial resources and dominated private media coverage, effectively counterbalancing the incumbent’s administrative reach. There were no credible reports of large-scale intimidation of public sector employees, such as teachers, doctors, or military personnel, to vote for the government, ensuring that the administrative resource abuse, while potentially present, was not the deciding factor in the election outcome.
The government has not skewed the electoral playing field so much so that it generally wins elections with a very high vote share. This competitiveness is evidenced by the ruling party’s significant decline in electoral support and the presence of a robust parliamentary opposition capable of challenging executive decisions. While Prime Minister Pashinyan swept to power with over 70% of the vote in 2018, the 2021 snap parliamentary elections resulted in the “Civil Contract” party securing only 53.9%. This sharp decrease reflects genuine voter fluctuation and the electoral system’s responsiveness to the government’s performance. The National Assembly functions as a pluralistic body; the opposition factions collectively hold 36 of the 107 seats, granting them significant leverage to scrutinize legislation and initiate parliamentary hearings. Independent polling data from 2024 and 2025 consistently shows the ruling party’s support dipping below 30%, indicating that the political landscape remains fluid and the incumbent’s hold on power is directly tied to fluctuating public approval.
In Armenia, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. This environment remains largely open, yet in 2025 it was marred by an unprecedented, state-coordinated campaign of repression targeting the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), characterized by the criminalization of political rhetoric and the weaponization of administrative resources; while mass protests continue to occur, the the 2024-2025 demonstrations has been defined by a marked escalation in police violence, the disproportionate use of сrowd control weapons, such as stun granades, and the ause of fines and detentions against protesters and rally organizers. The freedom of speech is increasingly challenged by a shift towards “administrative censorship,” where parliamentary regulations and “hooliganism” statutes are weaponized to imprison critical journalists and silence inconvenient reporting.
The government has not seriously intimidated the work of independent, dissenting political leaders or organizations. This environment remains largely open, yet in 2025 it was marred by an unprecedented, state-coordinated campaign of repression targeting the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) and its affiliates, characterized by the criminalization of political rhetoric and the weaponization of administrative resources. Authorities have systematically targeted clerics and their supporters who publicly demanded Prime Minister Pashinyan’s resignation, prosecuting them for their speech rather than any violent acts. This dynamic was illustrated by the arrest of Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan on charges of “public calls to seize power” following his speech defending the Church. The retaliatory nature of this prosecution became apparent when Pashinyan immediately moved to nationalize Karapetyan’s energy company, Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA). Simultaneously, the persecution of the clergy intensified. Authorities arrested Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, the leader of the 2024 protests, under the pretext of a “plan to seize power,” and sentenced Archbishop Mikael Ajapahyan, Pashinyan’s critic, to two years in prison for “calls to change power”, a stark departure from past judicial practices regarding political rhetoric. The crackdown expanded to include six other clergymen and the arrest of Archbishop Arshak Khachatryan on a revived, highly questionable 2018 charge of allegedly planting drugs on a protester. The officials imposed travel bans on the Church’s top leadership, including Catholicos Karekin II, preventing their attendance at a clergy council in Austria. The “unusually fast” pace of these procedural actions compared to standard practices supports accusations of selective justice.
Pashinyan’s administration has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. This is characterized by the regular occurrence of large-scale, unauthorized anti-government demonstrations that proceed without systemic bans, yet the period of 2024–2025 has been defined by a marked escalation in police violence, the disproportionate use of “special means”, such as water cannon and soviet Zarya-3 stun grenades, and the arbitrary fines and detentions against protesters. While the “Tavush for the Homeland” movement was initially able to stage weeks of continuous rallies in Yerevan over border delimitation with Azerbaijan, the state’s tolerance evaporated during critical confrontations. The crackdown culminated on June 12, 2024, when security forces deployed stun grenades against protesters outside the National Assembly. The operation resulted in severe injuries to 101 civilians and journalists, with the police detaining 98 individuals in a single evening. International watchdogs, including Amnesty International, explicitly called for an investigation into the “excessive use of force,” questioning the proportionality of the police response given the largely non-violent nature of the assembly. In 2025, the authorities shifted tactics from mass dispersal to the targeted “neutralization” of protest leadership. In a disturbing trend of ignoring parliamentary immunity, “Red Beret” special police units were filmed brutally beating opposition MP Ashot Simonyan during a May 2024 rally, signaling that even elected officials are not safe from physical retribution during assemblies. Authorities have shifted from administrative fines to mass criminal prosecution to deter participation. Following the June 12 events, the Investigative Committee initiated criminal proceedings against 28 individuals on charges of “mass riots.” These included Tigran Saribekyan, a 73-year-old man charged with hooliganism after throwing his cane in reaction to being wounded by a grenade blast, who is currently under house arrest, and Gor Melik-Sahakyan, an activist who spent over a year under prosecution before being acquitted in August 2025 (though many others remain free on bail pending trial). This strategy effectively raises the “cost of dissent,” transforming the right to assembly into a risk of prolonged imprisonment.
The government has not seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Nevertheless, the 2024-2025 period witnessed an emerging pattern of “administrative censorship,” wherein authorities weaponized parliamentary regulations to suppress inconvenient reporting. While direct pre-publication censorship is absent, authorities have increasingly used administrative resources to physically exclude critical journalists from the political process. In December 2025, the parliamentary administration revoked the accreditation of Zhoghovurd daily reporters Knar Manukian and Sona Grigorian, as well as Mediahub.am correspondent Vahe Makaryan. Security forces forcibly removed them from the National Assembly building solely for attempting to interview pro-government MPs in “unauthorized areas,” a move condemned by press freedom groups as a calculated effort to shield the ruling party from scrutiny regarding corruption allegations. A defining case was the persecution of Narek Samsonyan and Vazgen Saghatelyan, hosts of the popular opposition podcast Imnemnimi. On November 13, 2025, heavily armed National Security Service (NSS) officers raided their studio and detained them on charges of “hooliganism.” The prosecution’s case rests entirely on their use of severe profanity and harsh insults directed at Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan and the Prime Minister during a broadcast. High-ranking officials systematically utilize the judiciary to exert financial pressure on independent outlets. Speaker Alen Simonyan and other ruling party members have filed dozens of defamation lawsuits against newspapers like Hraparak and Yerkir Media, seeking maximum compensation damages that threaten the financial viability of these newsrooms. While the courts often dismiss or significantly reduce these excessive financial claims, the prolonged litigation serves as a tool to drain the resources of independent outlets. Nevertheless, Armenia maintains a highly pluralistic and competitive media environment where dozens of independent and opposition-aligned outlets continue to operate freely, providing robust criticism of the government without systemic censorship.
In Armenia, institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. This constraint is characterized by the executive branch’s manipulation of judicial oversight bodies and reform agendas to structurally erode judicial autonomy. Rather than direct usurpation, the government leverages administrative tools and vetting mechanisms to sideline independent jurists, bypass tenure protections, and consolidate political control. Courts have frequently enabled government repression through a pattern of judicial acquiescence, defined by the systemic “rubber-stamping” of pre-trial detention motions in politically sensitive cases to neutralize protest momentum.
Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to government interests, or who are perceived as a threat to the governing authority, have faced retaliation. This systemic pressure is disguised as “disciplinary liability,” where the executive branch utilizes the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) to selectively purge jurists who publicly criticize judicial reforms or resist political influence. Despite the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) recommendation to remove the Minister of Justice from the disciplinary process to ensure separation of powers, the government has aggressively weaponized this mechanism. The Minister of Justice initiated proceedings that led to the termination of powers of Judge Davit Harutyunyan in July 2023, a punishment widely regarded by civil society as retribution for his vocal criticism of the SJC’s lack of independence and his description of the vetting process as “unconstitutional.” Similarly, the dismissal of Judge Anna Pilosyan for “significant disciplinary violations” was interpreted by independent monitors as a selective application of the law, targeting a judge known for her autonomy while ignoring similar disciplinary violations by pro-government peers. These high-profile dismissals have successfully instilled a “chilling effect” across the judiciary; faced with the threat of immediate career termination by an SJC dominated by political appointees, judges are increasingly reluctant to issue rulings that contradict the executive’s agenda or the prosecution’s demands in sensitive cases.
The government has subjected judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence and operational effectiveness. This structural erosion is driven by the executive’s attempts to utilize legislative amendments to bypass tenure protections and consolidate political control over the judiciary. Ignoring the separation of powers, the administration adopted controversial amendments to the Judicial Code that significantly expanded the disciplinary authority of the SJC and empowered the Minister of Justice, a direct political appointee, to initiate proceedings against judges. International bodies, including the Venice Commission and GRECO, warned that granting the executive branch such direct leverage over judicial discipline creates a structural conflict of interest. Yet, the government persisted, using these “integrity reforms” to staff the SJC with ruling party loyalists and arm them with the legal authority to purge non-compliant judges. Consequently, the reform process, originally framed as an anti-corruption measure, has been instrumentalized to hollow out judicial independence from within, creating a system where judges are technically independent but operationally vulnerable to political removal.
Courts have frequently and unfairly failed to check, and enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. This pattern of judicial acquiescence is characterized by the systemic “rubber-stamping” of pre-trial detention motions in politically sensitive cases, where judges prioritize executive stability over evidentiary standards to neutralize protest momentum. Judiciary in 2024–2026 routinely abdicated its responsibility to check the executive during the crackdown on the “Tavush for the Homeland” movement. Judges systematically satisfied prosecution requests to detain activists solely based on police testimony. This judicial complicity extended to the persecution of religious leaders, as courts validated the detention of high-ranking clerics involved in the protests, treating their political rhetoric as sufficient grounds for criminal incarceration. A defining example is the case of the Imnemnimi podcast hosts, where the court sanctioned prolonged pre-trial detention for “hooliganism” charges stemming entirely from non-violent political speech. Defense attorneys consistently reported that in cases involving “insults” against government officials or participation in anti-government rallies, the judiciary functioned as an extension of the prosecution, refusing bail and validating the “criminalization of dissent” strategy initiated by the executive branch.
