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HRF classifies Argentina as democratic.
Argentina’s contemporary political system reflects a long process of democratic reconstruction following cycles of authoritarian rule in the 20th century. After early experiences with democracy in the first half of the century, Argentine politics became deeply shaped by Peronism, a broad and enduring political movement founded by Juan Domingo Perón, who first came to power through elections in 1946. Peronism combined labor mobilization, social welfare expansion, and strong executive authority, and it has remained a central axis of political competition ever since, alternately governing and fragmenting into competing factions across the ideological spectrum. Between 1976 and 1983, Argentina was ruled by a military dictatorship responsible for systematic repression, enforced disappearances, and widespread human rights violations. The democratic transition that followed, marked by the 1983 election of Raúl Alfonsín, reestablished civilian rule and constitutional governance, with a strong emphasis on human rights accountability that became a defining feature of Argentina’s post-authoritarian identity.
Since the restoration of democracy, Argentina has experienced uninterrupted electoral competition but recurrent economic crises, high inflation, and institutional volatility. The early 2000s crisis paved the way for a renewed cycle of Peronist governance under Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007). He was succeeded by his wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who served two consecutive presidential terms (2007–2015). After a period in opposition during the presidency of Mauricio Macri (2015–2019), she returned to national office as vice president alongside President Alberto Fernández (2019–2023). Persistent macroeconomic instability, corruption scandals, and declining trust in traditional parties contributed to growing political disaffection. In this context, Argentina elected Javier Milei in 2023, an outsider campaigning on an explicitly anti-establishment, libertarian platform that promised sharp reductions in the size of the state and a break with Peronist dominance.
National elections in Argentina are largely free and fair. Major political forces as well as newly formed parties have been able to register candidates and campaign nationwide, and recent presidential contests have been highly competitive, producing alternation in power in both 2019 and 2023. The 2023 election advanced to a runoff in which opposition candidate Javier Milei defeated the incumbent governing coalition and was peacefully inaugurated. Although concerns were raised about incumbency advantages, these practices did not prevent meaningful competition. Elections were administered without credible fraud allegations, results were accepted by losing parties, and the electoral judiciary supervised the process effectively.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Argentina maintains a pluralistic media and civic environment in which opposition actors regularly publish, organize, and mobilize, and no major outlets or organizations have been shut down. However, the allocation of state advertising, stigmatizing rhetoric by officials, and a growing number of verbal attacks and online harassment contribute to a polarized and sometimes hostile climate for journalists and critics. Protests occur frequently and are generally permitted, though new public-order regulations and several demonstrations in 2024 and 2025 involved contentious policing and credible allegations of excessive force. Overall, dissent remains visible and lawful, but unevenly protected and at times constrained by both official practices and confrontational protest dynamics.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts have continued to review and limit executive actions affecting protest, labor rights, and economic policy, including ordering the release of detainees after the 2025 pensioner protests and suspending decrees restricting the right to strike and seeking to privatize the National Bank. Political actors have at times attempted to pressure the judiciary, including impeachment efforts against Supreme Court justices and public accusations of bias, but no judges have been removed or sanctioned for adverse rulings. Judicial institutions have also pursued corruption cases against senior political figures, demonstrating the continued capacity to hold high-level officials accountable. Although structural weaknesses such as prolonged vacancies and interim appointments persist, institutional safeguards prevented political pressures from altering judicial independence.
National elections in Argentina are largely free and fair. Recent presidential races have been competitive and open to governing, opposition, and outsider candidates, culminating in a peaceful alternation of power in 2023 and 2019. While some campaign practices blurred the line between state resources and partisan messaging, there were no credible allegations of fraud, and electoral authorities were able to administer and certify results without executive interference.
The Argentine government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. In the 2023 general elections, candidates representing the country’s major political forces were able to register and campaign nationwide. The first presidential round produced a competitive and fragmented result. Economy Minister Sergio Massa of the governing Peronist coalition Union for the Homeland obtained 36.8% of the vote, followed by outsider Javier Milei of the newly formed Freedom Advances with 30%, and Patricia Bullrich of the opposition Together for Change coalition with 23.8%. As no candidate achieved a majority, a runoff was held between Massa and Milei, in which Milei prevailed with 55.7% of the vote against Massa’s 44.3%. The outcome marked the defeat of the incumbent governing coalition and a peaceful transfer of power to an opposition candidate. Similarly, in the 2019 election, Alberto Fernández of the Peronist opposition defeated the then-incumbent president Mauricio Macri, who was seeking reelection, demonstrating alternation in power across electoral cycles. Across recent elections, major parties and new political movements, including governing coalitions, traditional opposition alliances, and outsider candidates, have been able to organize, nominate candidates, and compete for national office, indicating that access to the ballot remains open and competitive.
The government has not enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages that fundamentally undermined electoral competition, although some instances of incumbency advantage were observed during the 2023 presidential race. During the campaign, messaging comparing the cost of public transportation under different presidential candidates appeared on digital displays in railway stations, warning that fares would increase substantially under opposition candidates Javier Milei and Patricia Bullrich. The advertisements were formally promoted by railway trade unions, which purchased advertising space on screens administered within the state-owned rail system. However, because Argentine campaign finance law prohibits unions and public-service concessionaires from making electoral contributions, observers argued that the use of state-linked infrastructure to disseminate campaign-related messaging blurred the boundary between public service communication and partisan advocacy. In addition, Sergio Massa, then Minister of Economy and presidential candidate for the governing Peronist coalition, was accused of violating electoral law by announcing public policy measures during legally restricted periods. While these practices raised concerns about uneven campaign conditions and the blurring of state and party resources, they did not prevent meaningful opposition competition or preclude an alternation in power. The opposition’s victory in the runoff indicates that incumbency advantages, even if present, did not decisively skew the electoral playing field.
The incumbent government in Argentina has not engaged in significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Both the 2023 presidential elections and the 2025 midterm legislative elections were conducted without credible allegations of ballot manipulation, vote tampering, or result falsification. Electoral results were accepted by competing political forces, including the losing parties, and reflected a genuine alternation in power in 2023. Notably, the 2025 legislative elections were the first to implement the single paper ballot system, under which the state provides a single, standardized ballot listing all candidates. Before the 2024 reform to introduce the single paper ballot system was passed, parties were responsible for printing and distributing their own ballots, a practice that often disadvantaged smaller or less-resourced parties.
The Argentine government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. Elections are administered by the National Electoral Chamber, an institution with a strong constitutional mandate, technical capacity, and a long-standing reputation for professionalism. All the recent presidential elections have been conducted under judicial supervision without credible interference from the executive or other political actors. Argentina does not routinely depend on international or independent domestic observation missions; instead, electoral transparency is ensured through a decentralized system in which political parties themselves monitor polling stations, review tally sheets, and can challenge results before electoral courts. The absence of major disputes over vote counting or certification indicates that electoral authorities were able to carry out their functions autonomously and effectively.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Media outlets and civil society actors operate openly and regularly contest government policies, and no major organizations have been closed. Nevertheless, stigmatizing rhetoric by officials, uneven distribution of state advertising, and contentious policing of some demonstrations create a polarized environment in which dissent is permitted but sometimes pressured.
Successive governments in Argentina have not heavily manipulated media coverage in their favor. Argentina maintains a pluralistic and highly competitive media environment in which private and independent newspapers, television networks, radio stations, and digital outlets regularly criticize public authorities across the political spectrum. Legal protections for freedom of expression remain in force, and no major outlets have been closed or placed under direct editorial control by the state. However, longstanding structural features of the media system create indirect advantages for incumbents. Media ownership is concentrated among large conglomerates with clear political alignments, while the allocation of official state advertising has historically favored outlets sympathetic to the government of the day. State-owned media also tends to adopt editorial lines supportive of incumbent governments. These practices can shape the information environment and contribute to partisan coverage, but opposition voices continue to access major media platforms and openly contest government narratives, indicating influence rather than systematic manipulation of media coverage.
Moreover, the government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Journalists, opposition politicians, and advocacy groups continue to operate openly and regularly criticize authorities. According to the Argentine Journalism Forum (FOPEA), 278 incidents affecting press freedom were recorded in 2025, of which 139 involved stigmatizing discourse, and 119 were attributed to actors within the executive branch, primarily consisting of verbal attacks, discrediting statements, and online harassment. While this rhetoric has contributed to a hostile climate for the press, it has not generally translated into systematic legal or physical obstruction. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) notes that no journalist has been killed in Argentina since 1997, and there have been no sustained detentions of journalists, aside from isolated and short-lived arrests during public disturbances. Cases of intimidation or violence against journalists are more commonly linked to criminal organizations, local political actors, or police misconduct during large demonstrations rather than coordinated national government repression. Overall, dissenting actors remain able to publish, organize, and participate in public debate, indicating pressure and polarization but not systematic intimidation.
The Argentine government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Demonstrations remain frequent in Argentina, including large mobilizations and strikes against President Javier Milei’s economic reforms. Shortly after taking office in December 2023, the administration adopted a “protocol for the maintenance of public order” allowing federal security forces to intervene in road blockades without a judicial order, identify organizers, and potentially charge them for policing costs. United Nations special rapporteurs warned that the measure could discourage peaceful assembly. Similar protocols have existed under previous administrations — earlier rules under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner emphasized negotiation before police action, while the Mauricio Macri government also authorized intervention without a court order — though critics argue the current regulation expands enforcement and financial penalties. In practice, protests have generally been permitted, but policing responses have been increasingly contentious.
During demonstrations outside Congress in June 2024, opposing a government-backed reform bill aimed at deregulation and fiscal austerity, security forces used tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons. Some demonstrators also engaged in violence, including burning garbage containers and a vehicle. 33 people were detained but released shortly after. In March 2025, pensioners and supporters protested economic conditions, and Human Rights Watch documented evidence of reckless and indiscriminate use of force, including a tear-gas projectile that seriously injured a journalist. Authorities arrested over 100 demonstrators, but courts ordered their release, citing irregularities in the detentions. Monitoring by the Provincial Commission for Memory, a body within the National System for the Prevention of Torture, reported a significant increase in police repression during 2025, documenting incidents in roughly four out of ten observed protests and a rise in injuries and detentions. At the same time, numerous demonstrations proceeded without repression. For example, mass student mobilizations, drawing hundreds of thousands of people, in April 2024, occurred under police supervision but without the use of force, indicating episodic confrontation rather than a systematic prohibition of public assembly.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts continue to review executive actions and provide avenues for opposition and civil society challenges, including suspending government decrees and ordering the release of detained protesters. Political leaders have criticized and attempted to pressure the judiciary, but judges have not been removed for their rulings, and corruption cases against senior officials have proceeded. While vacancies, politicized rhetoric, and unsuccessful attempts to reshape the Supreme Court raise concerns, institutional safeguards remain intact and judicial oversight continues to function.
Courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Argentine courts have continued to review and limit executive actions affecting protest and opposition activity. Following demonstrations by pensioners and supporters in April 2025, security forces arrested 114 individuals, including elderly protesters. A Buenos Aires city judge ordered their release, finding that authorities had failed to properly document the arrests or justify the detentions. Although the Security Ministry subsequently filed criminal and disciplinary complaints against the judge, the detainees were released, and the judicial decision remained in force. Courts also intervened in broader policy disputes. In June 2025, the judiciary suspended portions of a presidential decree that restricted the right to strike and expanded mandatory services during labor stoppages, and in September, it extended the suspension of a separate decree seeking to privatize the National Bank. These rulings demonstrate that courts continue to act as a forum through which critics and opposition actors can challenge government measures, indicating pressure on the judiciary but not a systematic failure to check the executive.
Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to government interests or who are perceived as a threat to the governing authority, have not faced retaliation, although attempts and political pressure have occurred. Political actors have repeatedly criticized and sought to pressure the judiciary following adverse rulings. In January 2023, after a Supreme Court decision reallocating federal revenue to the opposition-led city of Buenos Aires, then-president Alberto Fernández requested that Congress initiate impeachment proceedings against all Supreme Court justices, and governing coalition lawmakers opened a congressional inquiry alleging poor performance and bias linked to corruption cases involving then-vice president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. The proceedings ultimately lapsed at the end of 2024 without removing any justice. Judges have also faced public accusations of ideological bias from political leaders across the spectrum. Despite such efforts, no Supreme Court justice has been removed, prosecuted, or formally sanctioned for their rulings, indicating political pressure rather than governing authority retaliation.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. To illustrate, Argentine judicial institutions have continued to pursue corruption investigations against high-ranking political actors across administrations. In 2022, then vice president and former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was convicted of fraud for directing public works contracts to a favored associate during her 2007–2015 presidency. She was sentenced to six years in prison and permanently barred from holding public office, with enforcement pending the appeals process. The case demonstrated the capacity of courts to investigate and sanction senior officials, including members of the governing coalition. Although political leaders have sharply criticized judicial rulings and accused courts of bias, such reactions have not prevented proceedings from moving forward. At the same time, concerns persist about corruption and political influence in some lower and provincial courts. Overall, however, accountability mechanisms remain active, and institutions continue to serve as a venue for legal action against powerful public officials.
The government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Political leaders across administrations have criticized the judiciary and, at times, proposed reforms that observers warned could affect judicial autonomy, but such initiatives have not been enacted. Structural weaknesses nevertheless persist, including numerous vacancies and interim appointments: two of the five Supreme Court seats remained vacant at the end of 2025, the national ombudsperson position has been unfilled for more than a decade, and the chief prosecutor has served in a temporary capacity since 2017. In February 2025, President Javier Milei attempted to appoint Supreme Court justices by decree during a congressional recess, bypassing the Senate’s constitutionally required approval. The proposal generated constitutional challenges and did not result in confirmed appointments. Although the episode raised concerns about executive efforts to reshape the Court’s composition, institutional safeguards remained in place, including Senate confirmation requirements and judicial review, and the judiciary’s structure and functioning were ultimately unchanged.
HRF classifies Argentina as democratic.
Argentina’s contemporary political system reflects a long process of democratic reconstruction following cycles of authoritarian rule in the 20th century. After early experiences with democracy in the first half of the century, Argentine politics became deeply shaped by Peronism, a broad and enduring political movement founded by Juan Domingo Perón, who first came to power through elections in 1946. Peronism combined labor mobilization, social welfare expansion, and strong executive authority, and it has remained a central axis of political competition ever since, alternately governing and fragmenting into competing factions across the ideological spectrum. Between 1976 and 1983, Argentina was ruled by a military dictatorship responsible for systematic repression, enforced disappearances, and widespread human rights violations. The democratic transition that followed, marked by the 1983 election of Raúl Alfonsín, reestablished civilian rule and constitutional governance, with a strong emphasis on human rights accountability that became a defining feature of Argentina’s post-authoritarian identity.
Since the restoration of democracy, Argentina has experienced uninterrupted electoral competition but recurrent economic crises, high inflation, and institutional volatility. The early 2000s crisis paved the way for a renewed cycle of Peronist governance under Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007). He was succeeded by his wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who served two consecutive presidential terms (2007–2015). After a period in opposition during the presidency of Mauricio Macri (2015–2019), she returned to national office as vice president alongside President Alberto Fernández (2019–2023). Persistent macroeconomic instability, corruption scandals, and declining trust in traditional parties contributed to growing political disaffection. In this context, Argentina elected Javier Milei in 2023, an outsider campaigning on an explicitly anti-establishment, libertarian platform that promised sharp reductions in the size of the state and a break with Peronist dominance.
National elections in Argentina are largely free and fair. Major political forces as well as newly formed parties have been able to register candidates and campaign nationwide, and recent presidential contests have been highly competitive, producing alternation in power in both 2019 and 2023. The 2023 election advanced to a runoff in which opposition candidate Javier Milei defeated the incumbent governing coalition and was peacefully inaugurated. Although concerns were raised about incumbency advantages, these practices did not prevent meaningful competition. Elections were administered without credible fraud allegations, results were accepted by losing parties, and the electoral judiciary supervised the process effectively.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Argentina maintains a pluralistic media and civic environment in which opposition actors regularly publish, organize, and mobilize, and no major outlets or organizations have been shut down. However, the allocation of state advertising, stigmatizing rhetoric by officials, and a growing number of verbal attacks and online harassment contribute to a polarized and sometimes hostile climate for journalists and critics. Protests occur frequently and are generally permitted, though new public-order regulations and several demonstrations in 2024 and 2025 involved contentious policing and credible allegations of excessive force. Overall, dissent remains visible and lawful, but unevenly protected and at times constrained by both official practices and confrontational protest dynamics.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts have continued to review and limit executive actions affecting protest, labor rights, and economic policy, including ordering the release of detainees after the 2025 pensioner protests and suspending decrees restricting the right to strike and seeking to privatize the National Bank. Political actors have at times attempted to pressure the judiciary, including impeachment efforts against Supreme Court justices and public accusations of bias, but no judges have been removed or sanctioned for adverse rulings. Judicial institutions have also pursued corruption cases against senior political figures, demonstrating the continued capacity to hold high-level officials accountable. Although structural weaknesses such as prolonged vacancies and interim appointments persist, institutional safeguards prevented political pressures from altering judicial independence.
National elections in Argentina are largely free and fair. Recent presidential races have been competitive and open to governing, opposition, and outsider candidates, culminating in a peaceful alternation of power in 2023 and 2019. While some campaign practices blurred the line between state resources and partisan messaging, there were no credible allegations of fraud, and electoral authorities were able to administer and certify results without executive interference.
The Argentine government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. In the 2023 general elections, candidates representing the country’s major political forces were able to register and campaign nationwide. The first presidential round produced a competitive and fragmented result. Economy Minister Sergio Massa of the governing Peronist coalition Union for the Homeland obtained 36.8% of the vote, followed by outsider Javier Milei of the newly formed Freedom Advances with 30%, and Patricia Bullrich of the opposition Together for Change coalition with 23.8%. As no candidate achieved a majority, a runoff was held between Massa and Milei, in which Milei prevailed with 55.7% of the vote against Massa’s 44.3%. The outcome marked the defeat of the incumbent governing coalition and a peaceful transfer of power to an opposition candidate. Similarly, in the 2019 election, Alberto Fernández of the Peronist opposition defeated the then-incumbent president Mauricio Macri, who was seeking reelection, demonstrating alternation in power across electoral cycles. Across recent elections, major parties and new political movements, including governing coalitions, traditional opposition alliances, and outsider candidates, have been able to organize, nominate candidates, and compete for national office, indicating that access to the ballot remains open and competitive.
The government has not enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages that fundamentally undermined electoral competition, although some instances of incumbency advantage were observed during the 2023 presidential race. During the campaign, messaging comparing the cost of public transportation under different presidential candidates appeared on digital displays in railway stations, warning that fares would increase substantially under opposition candidates Javier Milei and Patricia Bullrich. The advertisements were formally promoted by railway trade unions, which purchased advertising space on screens administered within the state-owned rail system. However, because Argentine campaign finance law prohibits unions and public-service concessionaires from making electoral contributions, observers argued that the use of state-linked infrastructure to disseminate campaign-related messaging blurred the boundary between public service communication and partisan advocacy. In addition, Sergio Massa, then Minister of Economy and presidential candidate for the governing Peronist coalition, was accused of violating electoral law by announcing public policy measures during legally restricted periods. While these practices raised concerns about uneven campaign conditions and the blurring of state and party resources, they did not prevent meaningful opposition competition or preclude an alternation in power. The opposition’s victory in the runoff indicates that incumbency advantages, even if present, did not decisively skew the electoral playing field.
The incumbent government in Argentina has not engaged in significant voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Both the 2023 presidential elections and the 2025 midterm legislative elections were conducted without credible allegations of ballot manipulation, vote tampering, or result falsification. Electoral results were accepted by competing political forces, including the losing parties, and reflected a genuine alternation in power in 2023. Notably, the 2025 legislative elections were the first to implement the single paper ballot system, under which the state provides a single, standardized ballot listing all candidates. Before the 2024 reform to introduce the single paper ballot system was passed, parties were responsible for printing and distributing their own ballots, a practice that often disadvantaged smaller or less-resourced parties.
The Argentine government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. Elections are administered by the National Electoral Chamber, an institution with a strong constitutional mandate, technical capacity, and a long-standing reputation for professionalism. All the recent presidential elections have been conducted under judicial supervision without credible interference from the executive or other political actors. Argentina does not routinely depend on international or independent domestic observation missions; instead, electoral transparency is ensured through a decentralized system in which political parties themselves monitor polling stations, review tally sheets, and can challenge results before electoral courts. The absence of major disputes over vote counting or certification indicates that electoral authorities were able to carry out their functions autonomously and effectively.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Media outlets and civil society actors operate openly and regularly contest government policies, and no major organizations have been closed. Nevertheless, stigmatizing rhetoric by officials, uneven distribution of state advertising, and contentious policing of some demonstrations create a polarized environment in which dissent is permitted but sometimes pressured.
Successive governments in Argentina have not heavily manipulated media coverage in their favor. Argentina maintains a pluralistic and highly competitive media environment in which private and independent newspapers, television networks, radio stations, and digital outlets regularly criticize public authorities across the political spectrum. Legal protections for freedom of expression remain in force, and no major outlets have been closed or placed under direct editorial control by the state. However, longstanding structural features of the media system create indirect advantages for incumbents. Media ownership is concentrated among large conglomerates with clear political alignments, while the allocation of official state advertising has historically favored outlets sympathetic to the government of the day. State-owned media also tends to adopt editorial lines supportive of incumbent governments. These practices can shape the information environment and contribute to partisan coverage, but opposition voices continue to access major media platforms and openly contest government narratives, indicating influence rather than systematic manipulation of media coverage.
Moreover, the government has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Journalists, opposition politicians, and advocacy groups continue to operate openly and regularly criticize authorities. According to the Argentine Journalism Forum (FOPEA), 278 incidents affecting press freedom were recorded in 2025, of which 139 involved stigmatizing discourse, and 119 were attributed to actors within the executive branch, primarily consisting of verbal attacks, discrediting statements, and online harassment. While this rhetoric has contributed to a hostile climate for the press, it has not generally translated into systematic legal or physical obstruction. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) notes that no journalist has been killed in Argentina since 1997, and there have been no sustained detentions of journalists, aside from isolated and short-lived arrests during public disturbances. Cases of intimidation or violence against journalists are more commonly linked to criminal organizations, local political actors, or police misconduct during large demonstrations rather than coordinated national government repression. Overall, dissenting actors remain able to publish, organize, and participate in public debate, indicating pressure and polarization but not systematic intimidation.
The Argentine government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Demonstrations remain frequent in Argentina, including large mobilizations and strikes against President Javier Milei’s economic reforms. Shortly after taking office in December 2023, the administration adopted a “protocol for the maintenance of public order” allowing federal security forces to intervene in road blockades without a judicial order, identify organizers, and potentially charge them for policing costs. United Nations special rapporteurs warned that the measure could discourage peaceful assembly. Similar protocols have existed under previous administrations — earlier rules under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner emphasized negotiation before police action, while the Mauricio Macri government also authorized intervention without a court order — though critics argue the current regulation expands enforcement and financial penalties. In practice, protests have generally been permitted, but policing responses have been increasingly contentious.
During demonstrations outside Congress in June 2024, opposing a government-backed reform bill aimed at deregulation and fiscal austerity, security forces used tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons. Some demonstrators also engaged in violence, including burning garbage containers and a vehicle. 33 people were detained but released shortly after. In March 2025, pensioners and supporters protested economic conditions, and Human Rights Watch documented evidence of reckless and indiscriminate use of force, including a tear-gas projectile that seriously injured a journalist. Authorities arrested over 100 demonstrators, but courts ordered their release, citing irregularities in the detentions. Monitoring by the Provincial Commission for Memory, a body within the National System for the Prevention of Torture, reported a significant increase in police repression during 2025, documenting incidents in roughly four out of ten observed protests and a rise in injuries and detentions. At the same time, numerous demonstrations proceeded without repression. For example, mass student mobilizations, drawing hundreds of thousands of people, in April 2024, occurred under police supervision but without the use of force, indicating episodic confrontation rather than a systematic prohibition of public assembly.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts continue to review executive actions and provide avenues for opposition and civil society challenges, including suspending government decrees and ordering the release of detained protesters. Political leaders have criticized and attempted to pressure the judiciary, but judges have not been removed for their rulings, and corruption cases against senior officials have proceeded. While vacancies, politicized rhetoric, and unsuccessful attempts to reshape the Supreme Court raise concerns, institutional safeguards remain intact and judicial oversight continues to function.
Courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. Argentine courts have continued to review and limit executive actions affecting protest and opposition activity. Following demonstrations by pensioners and supporters in April 2025, security forces arrested 114 individuals, including elderly protesters. A Buenos Aires city judge ordered their release, finding that authorities had failed to properly document the arrests or justify the detentions. Although the Security Ministry subsequently filed criminal and disciplinary complaints against the judge, the detainees were released, and the judicial decision remained in force. Courts also intervened in broader policy disputes. In June 2025, the judiciary suspended portions of a presidential decree that restricted the right to strike and expanded mandatory services during labor stoppages, and in September, it extended the suspension of a separate decree seeking to privatize the National Bank. These rulings demonstrate that courts continue to act as a forum through which critics and opposition actors can challenge government measures, indicating pressure on the judiciary but not a systematic failure to check the executive.
Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to government interests or who are perceived as a threat to the governing authority, have not faced retaliation, although attempts and political pressure have occurred. Political actors have repeatedly criticized and sought to pressure the judiciary following adverse rulings. In January 2023, after a Supreme Court decision reallocating federal revenue to the opposition-led city of Buenos Aires, then-president Alberto Fernández requested that Congress initiate impeachment proceedings against all Supreme Court justices, and governing coalition lawmakers opened a congressional inquiry alleging poor performance and bias linked to corruption cases involving then-vice president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. The proceedings ultimately lapsed at the end of 2024 without removing any justice. Judges have also faced public accusations of ideological bias from political leaders across the spectrum. Despite such efforts, no Supreme Court justice has been removed, prosecuted, or formally sanctioned for their rulings, indicating political pressure rather than governing authority retaliation.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government officials accountable. To illustrate, Argentine judicial institutions have continued to pursue corruption investigations against high-ranking political actors across administrations. In 2022, then vice president and former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was convicted of fraud for directing public works contracts to a favored associate during her 2007–2015 presidency. She was sentenced to six years in prison and permanently barred from holding public office, with enforcement pending the appeals process. The case demonstrated the capacity of courts to investigate and sanction senior officials, including members of the governing coalition. Although political leaders have sharply criticized judicial rulings and accused courts of bias, such reactions have not prevented proceedings from moving forward. At the same time, concerns persist about corruption and political influence in some lower and provincial courts. Overall, however, accountability mechanisms remain active, and institutions continue to serve as a venue for legal action against powerful public officials.
The government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Political leaders across administrations have criticized the judiciary and, at times, proposed reforms that observers warned could affect judicial autonomy, but such initiatives have not been enacted. Structural weaknesses nevertheless persist, including numerous vacancies and interim appointments: two of the five Supreme Court seats remained vacant at the end of 2025, the national ombudsperson position has been unfilled for more than a decade, and the chief prosecutor has served in a temporary capacity since 2017. In February 2025, President Javier Milei attempted to appoint Supreme Court justices by decree during a congressional recess, bypassing the Senate’s constitutionally required approval. The proposal generated constitutional challenges and did not result in confirmed appointments. Although the episode raised concerns about executive efforts to reshape the Court’s composition, institutional safeguards remained in place, including Senate confirmation requirements and judicial review, and the judiciary’s structure and functioning were ultimately unchanged.
