Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Angola as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Angola is a unitary state, and the Head of State, João Lourenço, became president in 2017, succeeding José Eduardo dos Santos, who had ruled for 38 years. Lourenço and Dos Santos are both from the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which has ruled the country since independence in 1975. MPLA, along with the main opposition party, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), emerged as the principal politico-military force in Angola’s war of independence from Portugal. A power struggle between the two groups led to a 27-year civil war, which ended in 2002. Angola continues to face a separatist insurgency in Cabinda, a geographically distinct region in which the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) has sought independence since 1963.
Elections are a sham to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The country’s first multi-party elections took place in 1992 during a period of ceasefire in the Angolan civil war, but the main opposition party UNITA’s contestation of their results led to the resumption of fighting. Since then, MPLA has claimed victory in every poll amid accusations of intimidation and fraud and frequent court challenges by UNITA.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Private media outlets face closures and confiscations, and journalists are frequently targeted with charges. The regime seriously and unfairly repressed dissenting protests. In August 2024, the defense team for approximately 200 individuals convicted of rebellion in Angola’s Lunda Sul province argued that the proceedings were politically motivated, aiming to suppress the right to protest.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The Constitutional Court has consistently dismissed legal challenges filed by the political opposition over electoral fraud as well as other petitions brought by ordinary citizens, civil society organizations (CSOs), and political parties. Angola’s judicial institutions have repeatedly failed to deliver meaningful accountability for political officials.
Elections are a sham to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The ruling MPLA has claimed victory in every election since the country’s first multi-party elections in 1992, amid allegations of rigging of the electoral process and intimidation of the main opposition party, UNITA.
The regime has engaged in systematic, significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. Manipulation of vote count is a significant concern in Angola, and the 2022 election is viewed as one of the country’s most contested and least transparent in recent history. Amidst a tight race, the opposition UNITA alleged discrepancies between polling station tallies and national totals. Leader Adalberto Costa Junior claimed UNITA’s parallel vote tabulation revealed a different winner. Civil society organizations raised concerns about tabulation transparency and access to results sheets. In 2017, opposition leaders also appealed to the Constitutional Court, citing irregularities, but the Court dismissed their claim for lack of evidence.
The regime has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. With its parliamentary majority, the MPLA appoints a greater proportion of its members and sympathizers as commissioners in the National Electoral Commission (CNE). In 2022, the CNE hired European electoral technology companies that were accused of manipulating the elections by producing more ballots than necessary and manipulating the electoral roll to add more ghost voters, as well as denying audits of the electoral roll. Additionally, in 2022, the regime passed the Organic Law on Elections and the Law on Electoral Registration, which bars independent civil society organizations from monitoring elections.
Although UNITA increased its share of parliamentary seats in the 2022 elections, UNITA and an electoral coalition of political parties, known as Convergência Ampla de Salvação de Angola – Coligação Eleitoral or Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola – Electoral Coalition (CASA-CE), rejected and challenged in court the official results of the elections due to credible allegations raised by independent observers of electoral fraud and misuse of state resources to secure MPLA dominance. The Constitutional Court rejected the appeal, upholding the results announced by the National Electoral Commission (CNE).
Lourenço’s regime has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. The MPLA regime systematically leverages its control over state resources and institutions to skew elections in its favor by influencing decisions made by state bodies such as electoral courts and the CNE. For instance, in the 2022 election, the Constitutional Court ruled that issues such as forced voter abstention, polling stations located far from voters’ homes, inadequate accreditation of party agents, failure to disclose voter rolls, and discrepancies between the CNE’s count and the parties’ parallel counts either did not significantly impact the election results or were the responsibility of the parties or voters themselves. With this decision, the court confirmed the final election results, allowing João Lourenço to be sworn in as President of the Republic.
Additionally, the MPLA has persistently delayed local elections mandated by the 2010 constitution, which offers opportunities for the opposition to build competitive momentum for national elections. In 2024, the opposition and civil society criticized the regime’s contentious increase in the number of provinces and municipalities as a way to deliberately delay the holding of local elections.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Angola’s government has maintained tight control over the media through intimidation, suspensions, and restrictive legislation. Individuals and organizations critical of the regime are targeted through lawfare and violence, and the 2024 National Security Bill and Vandalism Law expand executive powers over expression and assembly.
The regime has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. The regime tightly controls the state-owned media by appointing editors and dictating content. Private media outlets face closures and confiscations, either under the pretext of anti-corruption measures or due to administrative issues related to their media registrations. Between 2020 and 2021, the regime tightened its grip on the media: first by seizing the leading private outlets and their equipment, including TV Zimbo, Radio Mais, and O País, under the guise of “asset recovery” in 2020, and then by suspending three additional TV channels in 2021 for alleged registration irregularities. Digital platforms operate under restrictive legislation. For example, private news outlet Camunda News, which broadcast via Facebook and YouTube, suspended operations in 2023 after enduring prolonged regime harassment, such as threats of criminal charges against journalists for holding political debates and for allegedly not having a license to broadcast on YouTube.
Lourenço’s regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Journalists are frequently targeted by the regime. For instance, in 2023, journalist Liberato Furtado Pereira faced defamation charges brought by public prosecutor Elizabete Francisco after exposing a corruption case in which she allegedly received $25,000 in suspected bribes. That same month, Carlos Alberto, editor of A Gazeta do Bengo, was arrested by 15 officers and forced to serve a three-year sentence on charges of criminal defamation and “injurious denunciation.” Individuals who express dissent on social media are also frequently criminally prosecuted under Article 333 of the Angolan Penal Code, which refers to crimes of outrage against the state, its symbols, and organs.
The regime also targets civil society organizations and actors. In 2023, Angolan security forces arrested dozens at a human rights workshop in Cabinda, charging several organizers and participants with rebellion and criminal association, with penalties of up to eight years in prison. In 2021, ahead of the national elections, Angolan police prevented two CSOs from holding a peacebuilding conference. Without a court order, the police blocked the entrance to the conference venue to prevent participants from entering, claiming they were following orders from their superiors. On June 20, 2015, Angolan police arrested 13 activists for participating in a discussion about Gene Sharp’s book From Dictatorship to Democracy, which explores peaceful protest methods. Two more activists were arrested two days later, and charges were also filed against two women—Laurinda Gouveia and Rosa Conde—though they were not detained. The group was known as 15+2. On March 28, 2016, the Luanda Provincial Court sentenced all 17 activists to prison terms ranging from two years and three months to eight years and six months for crimes of preparing rebellion and criminal association.
Opposition figures and members of the UNITA party have also faced severe intimidation and violence. On April 28, 2025, UNITA secretary Enoque Sapalo MBangu was executed at point-blank range inside his home in Luanda. It is believed that the assassination was targeted and politically motivated. Although there is no direct evidence of state involvement, the attack had the hallmarks of an organized operation: nine armed individuals broke into his home, and one explicitly told him it would be his last day alive, and his execution followed two prior attempts on his life, suggesting targeted intimidation rather than a random crime. In May 2025, a UNITA delegation was brutally assaulted by self-identified MPLA supporters. The assault took place meters away from the National Police Municipal Command, which failed to intervene to protect the opposition delegation. There has been no state investigation or accountability toward the attackers in either case, perpetuating the pattern of impunity for violence against opposition figures.
In August 2024, the National Assembly passed the National Security Bill, a law that extends executive power into the civil society and media sectors. It grants authorities increased surveillance powers, reduces judicial oversight, allows the government to shut down the internet under situations of “exceptional circumstance,” and generally limits freedom of speech and assembly.
The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Between November 2020 and June 2023, at least 17 protesters, including a 12-year-old boy, were killed by security forces during demonstrations such as the 2023 fuel-hike protests. In 2023, roughly 200 protesters linked to the Manifesto Jurídico Sociológico do Povo Lundês, led by Jota Malakito, were arrested in Lunda Sul. Fuel price hikes sparked more protests in 2025, leading to deadly unrest and at least 22 deaths. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned Angolan authorities for using live ammunition, tear gas, and disproportionate force against protesters. In 2020, a march in the capital of Luanda calling for job creation and municipal elections was met by live ammunition, tear gas, and dogs from the police. State force was also used against protesters in Cafunfo, a mining town, in January 2021, when citizens demonstrated against the high cost of living. Protesters were chased into surrounding neighborhoods and forests, with dead bodies later found dumped in the Cuango River.
In August 2024, President Lourenco signed the Law on Crimes of Vandalism of Public Goods and Services. This law imposes prison sentences of up to 25 years on citizens who participate in protests that result in vandalism or disrupt services. Although intended to prevent damage to infrastructure, critics argue that it could be misused to target protesters and further restrict civil liberties. Activist Serrote Jose de Oliveira was targeted in 2025 through this law when he was arrested and charged under Articles 4 and 10 and subsequently held for months in pretrial detention. Oliveira had been livestreaming during a taxi driver’s strike in Luanda, and his family claimed no actual protest or vandalism had occurred where he was.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The Angolan judiciary operates as an extension of the regime, lacking the autonomy necessary to check regime overreach or ensure accountability. High-profile corruption probes have resulted in some resignations and temporary restrictions; however, they rarely result in criminal convictions. The courts have similarly upheld the electoral status quo by dismissing opposition challenges and delaying legalization of parties such as PRA-JA Servir Angola, resulting in perceived alignment with the ruling MPLA.
Judicial institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. The President has constitutional authority to appoint the entire Supreme Court bench, the country’s highest court. As a result, the Supreme Court consistently rules in favor of the regime. In June 2024, the Supreme Court rejected a popular action filed by a group of lawyers seeking disciplinary action against then-Supreme Court President Joel Leonardo. Leonardo was accused of embezzlement, extortion, mismanagement of court resources, and favoritism toward family businesses. The court dismissed the petition on procedural grounds. The Attorney General’s Office had separately opened a criminal investigation into Leonardo for similar corruption-related offenses, but it faced procedural delays and ultimately resulted in no public conviction.
Former president of the Court of Auditors, Exalgina Gambôa, was constituted as a suspect by the Attorney General’s office in 2023 on allegations of corruption and embezzlement, yet as of 2025, she has not faced any criminal conviction or trial. The criminal case against her was dismissed by a judge in June 2024 on the grounds of a lack of competence and procedural nullities. In September 2025, the Constitutional Court also ruled in Gambôa’s favor, lifting her travel ban and ordering the return of her passports.
Courts have systematically failed to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. There has been a systematic dismissal of post-election challenges. Following the 2017 elections, the Constitutional Court dismissed the opposition’s claim of grave irregularities at the CNE, citing a lack of evidence. In 2022, the court made a similar ruling rejecting UNITA’s petition to annul the general election results, upholding the victory of the ruling MPLA despite substantial claims of irregularities. The court took just two weeks to consider the case without requesting verification of the results.
The Constitutional Court has also hindered the formation of opposition parties. In August 2020, it rejected the legalization of the new opposition party, PRA-JA Servir Angola, due to doubts about the validity of the signatures collected. Led by opposition figure Abel Chivukuvuku, the party was then forced to wait four more years before reapplying. It was officially legalized in October 2024. Critics argue that PRA-JA was obstructed by the court because it “posed a threat to the MPLA.”
Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In July 2024, a mass trial took place for the roughly 200 Manifesto Jurídico Sociológico do Povo Lundês protesters. The trial took place in a prison facility and was closed to the public and journalists, and ultimately, the court sentenced the group to prison on charges including rebellion, criminal association, rioting, and damage to public property. The defense team argued that the proceedings were politically motivated, aiming to suppress the right to protest. Guilherme Neves, president of the Association Mãos Livres, contended that the court failed to substantiate many of the charges, emphasizing that peaceful demonstrations should not result in imprisonment. The court convicted the defendants by determining that they had defied police orders to disperse and had engaged in violent actions near the provincial government’s palace. In another example, on March 28, 2016, the Luanda Provincial Court sentenced all 17 of the “15+2” activists to prison terms ranging from two years and three months to eight years and six months for crimes of preparing rebellion and criminal association.
HRF classifies Angola as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Angola is a unitary state, and the Head of State, João Lourenço, became president in 2017, succeeding José Eduardo dos Santos, who had ruled for 38 years. Lourenço and Dos Santos are both from the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which has ruled the country since independence in 1975. MPLA, along with the main opposition party, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), emerged as the principal politico-military force in Angola’s war of independence from Portugal. A power struggle between the two groups led to a 27-year civil war, which ended in 2002. Angola continues to face a separatist insurgency in Cabinda, a geographically distinct region in which the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) has sought independence since 1963.
Elections are a sham to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The country’s first multi-party elections took place in 1992 during a period of ceasefire in the Angolan civil war, but the main opposition party UNITA’s contestation of their results led to the resumption of fighting. Since then, MPLA has claimed victory in every poll amid accusations of intimidation and fraud and frequent court challenges by UNITA.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Private media outlets face closures and confiscations, and journalists are frequently targeted with charges. The regime seriously and unfairly repressed dissenting protests. In August 2024, the defense team for approximately 200 individuals convicted of rebellion in Angola’s Lunda Sul province argued that the proceedings were politically motivated, aiming to suppress the right to protest.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The Constitutional Court has consistently dismissed legal challenges filed by the political opposition over electoral fraud as well as other petitions brought by ordinary citizens, civil society organizations (CSOs), and political parties. Angola’s judicial institutions have repeatedly failed to deliver meaningful accountability for political officials.
Elections are a sham to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The ruling MPLA has claimed victory in every election since the country’s first multi-party elections in 1992, amid allegations of rigging of the electoral process and intimidation of the main opposition party, UNITA.
The regime has engaged in systematic, significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. Manipulation of vote count is a significant concern in Angola, and the 2022 election is viewed as one of the country’s most contested and least transparent in recent history. Amidst a tight race, the opposition UNITA alleged discrepancies between polling station tallies and national totals. Leader Adalberto Costa Junior claimed UNITA’s parallel vote tabulation revealed a different winner. Civil society organizations raised concerns about tabulation transparency and access to results sheets. In 2017, opposition leaders also appealed to the Constitutional Court, citing irregularities, but the Court dismissed their claim for lack of evidence.
The regime has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. With its parliamentary majority, the MPLA appoints a greater proportion of its members and sympathizers as commissioners in the National Electoral Commission (CNE). In 2022, the CNE hired European electoral technology companies that were accused of manipulating the elections by producing more ballots than necessary and manipulating the electoral roll to add more ghost voters, as well as denying audits of the electoral roll. Additionally, in 2022, the regime passed the Organic Law on Elections and the Law on Electoral Registration, which bars independent civil society organizations from monitoring elections.
Although UNITA increased its share of parliamentary seats in the 2022 elections, UNITA and an electoral coalition of political parties, known as Convergência Ampla de Salvação de Angola – Coligação Eleitoral or Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola – Electoral Coalition (CASA-CE), rejected and challenged in court the official results of the elections due to credible allegations raised by independent observers of electoral fraud and misuse of state resources to secure MPLA dominance. The Constitutional Court rejected the appeal, upholding the results announced by the National Electoral Commission (CNE).
Lourenço’s regime has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. The MPLA regime systematically leverages its control over state resources and institutions to skew elections in its favor by influencing decisions made by state bodies such as electoral courts and the CNE. For instance, in the 2022 election, the Constitutional Court ruled that issues such as forced voter abstention, polling stations located far from voters’ homes, inadequate accreditation of party agents, failure to disclose voter rolls, and discrepancies between the CNE’s count and the parties’ parallel counts either did not significantly impact the election results or were the responsibility of the parties or voters themselves. With this decision, the court confirmed the final election results, allowing João Lourenço to be sworn in as President of the Republic.
Additionally, the MPLA has persistently delayed local elections mandated by the 2010 constitution, which offers opportunities for the opposition to build competitive momentum for national elections. In 2024, the opposition and civil society criticized the regime’s contentious increase in the number of provinces and municipalities as a way to deliberately delay the holding of local elections.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Angola’s government has maintained tight control over the media through intimidation, suspensions, and restrictive legislation. Individuals and organizations critical of the regime are targeted through lawfare and violence, and the 2024 National Security Bill and Vandalism Law expand executive powers over expression and assembly.
The regime has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. The regime tightly controls the state-owned media by appointing editors and dictating content. Private media outlets face closures and confiscations, either under the pretext of anti-corruption measures or due to administrative issues related to their media registrations. Between 2020 and 2021, the regime tightened its grip on the media: first by seizing the leading private outlets and their equipment, including TV Zimbo, Radio Mais, and O País, under the guise of “asset recovery” in 2020, and then by suspending three additional TV channels in 2021 for alleged registration irregularities. Digital platforms operate under restrictive legislation. For example, private news outlet Camunda News, which broadcast via Facebook and YouTube, suspended operations in 2023 after enduring prolonged regime harassment, such as threats of criminal charges against journalists for holding political debates and for allegedly not having a license to broadcast on YouTube.
Lourenço’s regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Journalists are frequently targeted by the regime. For instance, in 2023, journalist Liberato Furtado Pereira faced defamation charges brought by public prosecutor Elizabete Francisco after exposing a corruption case in which she allegedly received $25,000 in suspected bribes. That same month, Carlos Alberto, editor of A Gazeta do Bengo, was arrested by 15 officers and forced to serve a three-year sentence on charges of criminal defamation and “injurious denunciation.” Individuals who express dissent on social media are also frequently criminally prosecuted under Article 333 of the Angolan Penal Code, which refers to crimes of outrage against the state, its symbols, and organs.
The regime also targets civil society organizations and actors. In 2023, Angolan security forces arrested dozens at a human rights workshop in Cabinda, charging several organizers and participants with rebellion and criminal association, with penalties of up to eight years in prison. In 2021, ahead of the national elections, Angolan police prevented two CSOs from holding a peacebuilding conference. Without a court order, the police blocked the entrance to the conference venue to prevent participants from entering, claiming they were following orders from their superiors. On June 20, 2015, Angolan police arrested 13 activists for participating in a discussion about Gene Sharp’s book From Dictatorship to Democracy, which explores peaceful protest methods. Two more activists were arrested two days later, and charges were also filed against two women—Laurinda Gouveia and Rosa Conde—though they were not detained. The group was known as 15+2. On March 28, 2016, the Luanda Provincial Court sentenced all 17 activists to prison terms ranging from two years and three months to eight years and six months for crimes of preparing rebellion and criminal association.
Opposition figures and members of the UNITA party have also faced severe intimidation and violence. On April 28, 2025, UNITA secretary Enoque Sapalo MBangu was executed at point-blank range inside his home in Luanda. It is believed that the assassination was targeted and politically motivated. Although there is no direct evidence of state involvement, the attack had the hallmarks of an organized operation: nine armed individuals broke into his home, and one explicitly told him it would be his last day alive, and his execution followed two prior attempts on his life, suggesting targeted intimidation rather than a random crime. In May 2025, a UNITA delegation was brutally assaulted by self-identified MPLA supporters. The assault took place meters away from the National Police Municipal Command, which failed to intervene to protect the opposition delegation. There has been no state investigation or accountability toward the attackers in either case, perpetuating the pattern of impunity for violence against opposition figures.
In August 2024, the National Assembly passed the National Security Bill, a law that extends executive power into the civil society and media sectors. It grants authorities increased surveillance powers, reduces judicial oversight, allows the government to shut down the internet under situations of “exceptional circumstance,” and generally limits freedom of speech and assembly.
The regime has systematically, seriously, and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. Between November 2020 and June 2023, at least 17 protesters, including a 12-year-old boy, were killed by security forces during demonstrations such as the 2023 fuel-hike protests. In 2023, roughly 200 protesters linked to the Manifesto Jurídico Sociológico do Povo Lundês, led by Jota Malakito, were arrested in Lunda Sul. Fuel price hikes sparked more protests in 2025, leading to deadly unrest and at least 22 deaths. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned Angolan authorities for using live ammunition, tear gas, and disproportionate force against protesters. In 2020, a march in the capital of Luanda calling for job creation and municipal elections was met by live ammunition, tear gas, and dogs from the police. State force was also used against protesters in Cafunfo, a mining town, in January 2021, when citizens demonstrated against the high cost of living. Protesters were chased into surrounding neighborhoods and forests, with dead bodies later found dumped in the Cuango River.
In August 2024, President Lourenco signed the Law on Crimes of Vandalism of Public Goods and Services. This law imposes prison sentences of up to 25 years on citizens who participate in protests that result in vandalism or disrupt services. Although intended to prevent damage to infrastructure, critics argue that it could be misused to target protesters and further restrict civil liberties. Activist Serrote Jose de Oliveira was targeted in 2025 through this law when he was arrested and charged under Articles 4 and 10 and subsequently held for months in pretrial detention. Oliveira had been livestreaming during a taxi driver’s strike in Luanda, and his family claimed no actual protest or vandalism had occurred where he was.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The Angolan judiciary operates as an extension of the regime, lacking the autonomy necessary to check regime overreach or ensure accountability. High-profile corruption probes have resulted in some resignations and temporary restrictions; however, they rarely result in criminal convictions. The courts have similarly upheld the electoral status quo by dismissing opposition challenges and delaying legalization of parties such as PRA-JA Servir Angola, resulting in perceived alignment with the ruling MPLA.
Judicial institutions have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. The President has constitutional authority to appoint the entire Supreme Court bench, the country’s highest court. As a result, the Supreme Court consistently rules in favor of the regime. In June 2024, the Supreme Court rejected a popular action filed by a group of lawyers seeking disciplinary action against then-Supreme Court President Joel Leonardo. Leonardo was accused of embezzlement, extortion, mismanagement of court resources, and favoritism toward family businesses. The court dismissed the petition on procedural grounds. The Attorney General’s Office had separately opened a criminal investigation into Leonardo for similar corruption-related offenses, but it faced procedural delays and ultimately resulted in no public conviction.
Former president of the Court of Auditors, Exalgina Gambôa, was constituted as a suspect by the Attorney General’s office in 2023 on allegations of corruption and embezzlement, yet as of 2025, she has not faced any criminal conviction or trial. The criminal case against her was dismissed by a judge in June 2024 on the grounds of a lack of competence and procedural nullities. In September 2025, the Constitutional Court also ruled in Gambôa’s favor, lifting her travel ban and ordering the return of her passports.
Courts have systematically failed to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. There has been a systematic dismissal of post-election challenges. Following the 2017 elections, the Constitutional Court dismissed the opposition’s claim of grave irregularities at the CNE, citing a lack of evidence. In 2022, the court made a similar ruling rejecting UNITA’s petition to annul the general election results, upholding the victory of the ruling MPLA despite substantial claims of irregularities. The court took just two weeks to consider the case without requesting verification of the results.
The Constitutional Court has also hindered the formation of opposition parties. In August 2020, it rejected the legalization of the new opposition party, PRA-JA Servir Angola, due to doubts about the validity of the signatures collected. Led by opposition figure Abel Chivukuvuku, the party was then forced to wait four more years before reapplying. It was officially legalized in October 2024. Critics argue that PRA-JA was obstructed by the court because it “posed a threat to the MPLA.”
Courts have systematically, frequently, and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In July 2024, a mass trial took place for the roughly 200 Manifesto Jurídico Sociológico do Povo Lundês protesters. The trial took place in a prison facility and was closed to the public and journalists, and ultimately, the court sentenced the group to prison on charges including rebellion, criminal association, rioting, and damage to public property. The defense team argued that the proceedings were politically motivated, aiming to suppress the right to protest. Guilherme Neves, president of the Association Mãos Livres, contended that the court failed to substantiate many of the charges, emphasizing that peaceful demonstrations should not result in imprisonment. The court convicted the defendants by determining that they had defied police orders to disperse and had engaged in violent actions near the provincial government’s palace. In another example, on March 28, 2016, the Luanda Provincial Court sentenced all 17 of the “15+2” activists to prison terms ranging from two years and three months to eight years and six months for crimes of preparing rebellion and criminal association.
