Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Angola as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Angola is a unitary state, and the Head of State, João Lourenço, became president in 2017, succeeding José Eduardo dos Santos, who had ruled for 38 years. Lourenço and Dos Santos are both from the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which has ruled the country since independence in 1975. MPLA, along with the main opposition party, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), emerged as the main politico-military group that fought Angola’s war of independence from Portugal. But a power struggle between the two groups led to a 27-year civil war, which ended in 2002.
Elections are a sham to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The country’s first multi-party elections took place in 1992 during a period of ceasefire in the Angolan civil war, but the main opposition party UNITA’s contestation of their results led to the resumption of fighting. Since then, MPLA has claimed victory in every poll amid accusations of intimidation and fraud and frequent court challenges by UNITA.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Private media outlets face closures and confiscations, and journalists are frequently targeted with charges. The regime seriously and unfairly repressed dissenting protests. In August 2024, the defense team for approximately 200 individuals convicted of rebellion in Angola’s Lunda Sul province argued that the proceedings were politically motivated, aiming to suppress the right to protest.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The Constitutional Court has consistently dismissed legal challenges filed by the political opposition over electoral fraud as well as other petitions brought by ordinary citizens, civil society organisations (CSOs), and political parties.
Elections are a sham to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The ruling MPLA has claimed victory in every election since the country’s first multi-party elections in 1992, amid allegations of rigging of the electoral process and intimidation of the main opposition party, UNITA.
The regime has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. With its parliamentary majority, the MLPA appoints a greater proportion of its members and sympathizers as commissioners in the National Electoral Commission (CNE). In 2022, the CNE hired European electoral technology companies that were accused of manipulating the elections by producing more ballots than necessary and manipulating the electoral roll to add more ghost voters, as well as denying audits of the electoral roll. Additionally, in 2022, the regime passed the Organic Law on Elections and the Law on Electoral Registration, which bars independent civil society organizations from monitoring elections.
Although UNITA increased its share of parliamentary seats in the 2022 elections, UNITA and an electoral coalition of political parties, known as Convergência Ampla de Salvação de Angola – Coligação Eleitoral or Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola – Electoral Coalition (CASA-CE), rejected and challenged in court the official results of the elections due to credible allegations raised by independent observers of electoral fraud and misuse of state resources to secure MPLA dominance. The Constitutional Court rejected the appeal, upholding the results announced by the National Electoral Commission (CNE).
The regime has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. The MPLA regime systematically leverages its control of state resources and state institutions to skew elections in its favor by influencing decisions made by state institutions such as electoral courts and the CNE. For instance, in the 2022 election, the Constitutional Court ruled that issues such as forced voter abstention, polling stations located far from voters’ homes, inadequate accreditation of party agents, failure to disclose voter rolls, and discrepancies between the CNE’s count and the parties’ parallel counts either did not significantly impact the election results or were the responsibility of the parties or voters themselves. With this decision, the court confirmed the final election results, allowing João Lourenço to be sworn in as President of the Republic.
Additionally, the MPLA has persistently delayed local elections mandated by the 2010 constitution, which offers opportunities for the opposition to build competitive momentum for national elections. In 2024, the opposition and civil society criticized the regime’s contentious increase in the number of provinces and municipalities as a way to deliberately delay the holding of local elections.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and ordinary citizens face systematic retaliation for criticizing or opposing the regime. The regime tightly controls the state-owned media by appointing editors and dictating content. Private media outlets face closures and confiscations, either under the pretext of anti-corruption measures or due to administrative issues related to their media registrations. In 2021, the regime suspended three TV channels for alleged improper registration, while a year before, the regime confiscated three privately-owned leading media outlets, TV Zimbo, Radio Mais, and printed Newspaper O País, under allegations of asset recovery. Digital platforms operate under restrictive legislation. For example, private news outlet Camunda News, which broadcast via Facebook and YouTube, suspended operations in 2024 after enduring prolonged regime harassment, such as threats of criminal charges against journalists for holding political debates and for allegedly not having a license to broadcast on YouTube.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Journalists are frequently targeted by the regime. For instance, in 2023, journalist Liberato Furtado Pereira faced defamation charges brought by public prosecutor Elizabete Francisco after exposing a corruption case in which she allegedly received $25,000 in suspected bribes. Individuals who express dissent in social media are also frequently criminally prosecuted under Article 333 of the Angolan Penal Code, which refers to crimes of outrage against the state, its symbols, and organs.
The regime also targets civil society organizations and actors. Recent examples of repression include in 2023 when Angolan security forces arrested dozens during a human rights workshop in Cabinda, charging several organizers and participants with rebellion and criminal association, carrying penalties of up to eight years in prison. In 2021, ahead of the national elections, Angolan police prevented two NGOs from holding a conference on peacebuilding. Without a court order, the police blocked the entrance to the conference venue to prevent participants from entering, claiming they were following orders from their superiors. On June 20, 2015, Angolan police arrested 13 activists for participating in a discussion about Gene Sharp’s book From Dictatorship to Democracy, which explores peaceful protest methods. Two more activists were arrested two days later, and charges were also filed against two women—Laurinda Gouveia and Rosa Conde—though they were not detained. The group was known as 15+2. On March 28, 2016, the Luanda Provincial Court sentenced all 17 activists to prison terms ranging from two years and three months to eight years and six months for crimes of preparing rebellion and criminal association.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses dissenting protests through violent crackdowns. The defense and security forces were used to intimidate opposition supporters through violence, threats, and harassment of opposition leaders in order to repress political demonstrations contesting the 2022 election results. Between November 2020 and June 2023, at least 17 protesters, including a 12-year-old boy, were killed by security forces during incidents such as the 2023 fuel-hike protests. In 2023, 200 protesters in Angola’s Lunda Sul province were arrested. The demonstrators were associated with the Manifesto Jurídico Sociológico do Povo Lundês, led by Jota Malakito, which advocates for the autonomy of the Lunda-Tchokwe region. In August 2024, the National Assembly passed a draconian bill that criminalizes filming or taking photos of public services and property damage during protests, with prison sentences of up to 25 years in prison and the temporary closure of civil society organizations that organize demonstrations.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The Angolan judiciary operates as an extension of the regime, lacking the autonomy necessary to check regime overreach or ensure accountability. The Constitutional Court has dismissed legal challenges filed by the political opposition over electoral fraud.
The President has constitutional authority to appoint the entire Supreme Court bench, the country’s highest court. As a result, the Supreme Court consistently rules in favor of the regime. In 2021, President Lourenço controversially appointed former MPLA political bureau member Laurinda Cardoso as the chief justice of the Constitutional Court.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. In June 2024, the Supreme Court dismissed a petition filed by the Bar Association seeking disciplinary action against Supreme Court Chief Justice Joel Leonardo over multiple corruption allegations.
The judiciary fails to serve as a check on the regime in a way that allows it to significantly undermine electoral competition. For example, following the 2022 general elections, the Constitutional Court, led by MPLA political bureau member Laurinda Cardoso, dismissed the main opposition party, UNITA’s legal petition challenging the election results. This allowed João Lourenço to be sworn in as president.
The judiciary also fails to serve as a check on the regime in a way that allows it to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In August 2024, a court in Angola’s Lunda Sul province sentenced approximately 200 individuals to prison for rebellion charges. The defense team argued that the proceedings were politically motivated, aiming to suppress the right to protest. Guilherme Neves, president of the Association Mãos Livres, contended that the court failed to substantiate many of the charges, emphasizing that peaceful demonstrations should not result in imprisonment. The court convicted the defendants by determining that they had defied police orders to disperse and had engaged in violent actions near the provincial government’s palace. In another example, on March 28, 2016, the Luanda Provincial Court sentenced all 17 of the “15+2” activists to prison terms ranging from two years and three months to eight years and six months for crimes of preparing rebellion and criminal association.
HRF classifies Angola as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Angola is a unitary state, and the Head of State, João Lourenço, became president in 2017, succeeding José Eduardo dos Santos, who had ruled for 38 years. Lourenço and Dos Santos are both from the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which has ruled the country since independence in 1975. MPLA, along with the main opposition party, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), emerged as the main politico-military group that fought Angola’s war of independence from Portugal. But a power struggle between the two groups led to a 27-year civil war, which ended in 2002.
Elections are a sham to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The country’s first multi-party elections took place in 1992 during a period of ceasefire in the Angolan civil war, but the main opposition party UNITA’s contestation of their results led to the resumption of fighting. Since then, MPLA has claimed victory in every poll amid accusations of intimidation and fraud and frequent court challenges by UNITA.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Private media outlets face closures and confiscations, and journalists are frequently targeted with charges. The regime seriously and unfairly repressed dissenting protests. In August 2024, the defense team for approximately 200 individuals convicted of rebellion in Angola’s Lunda Sul province argued that the proceedings were politically motivated, aiming to suppress the right to protest.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The Constitutional Court has consistently dismissed legal challenges filed by the political opposition over electoral fraud as well as other petitions brought by ordinary citizens, civil society organisations (CSOs), and political parties.
Elections are a sham to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The ruling MPLA has claimed victory in every election since the country’s first multi-party elections in 1992, amid allegations of rigging of the electoral process and intimidation of the main opposition party, UNITA.
The regime has systematically and seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. With its parliamentary majority, the MLPA appoints a greater proportion of its members and sympathizers as commissioners in the National Electoral Commission (CNE). In 2022, the CNE hired European electoral technology companies that were accused of manipulating the elections by producing more ballots than necessary and manipulating the electoral roll to add more ghost voters, as well as denying audits of the electoral roll. Additionally, in 2022, the regime passed the Organic Law on Elections and the Law on Electoral Registration, which bars independent civil society organizations from monitoring elections.
Although UNITA increased its share of parliamentary seats in the 2022 elections, UNITA and an electoral coalition of political parties, known as Convergência Ampla de Salvação de Angola – Coligação Eleitoral or Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola – Electoral Coalition (CASA-CE), rejected and challenged in court the official results of the elections due to credible allegations raised by independent observers of electoral fraud and misuse of state resources to secure MPLA dominance. The Constitutional Court rejected the appeal, upholding the results announced by the National Electoral Commission (CNE).
The regime has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. The MPLA regime systematically leverages its control of state resources and state institutions to skew elections in its favor by influencing decisions made by state institutions such as electoral courts and the CNE. For instance, in the 2022 election, the Constitutional Court ruled that issues such as forced voter abstention, polling stations located far from voters’ homes, inadequate accreditation of party agents, failure to disclose voter rolls, and discrepancies between the CNE’s count and the parties’ parallel counts either did not significantly impact the election results or were the responsibility of the parties or voters themselves. With this decision, the court confirmed the final election results, allowing João Lourenço to be sworn in as President of the Republic.
Additionally, the MPLA has persistently delayed local elections mandated by the 2010 constitution, which offers opportunities for the opposition to build competitive momentum for national elections. In 2024, the opposition and civil society criticized the regime’s contentious increase in the number of provinces and municipalities as a way to deliberately delay the holding of local elections.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and ordinary citizens face systematic retaliation for criticizing or opposing the regime. The regime tightly controls the state-owned media by appointing editors and dictating content. Private media outlets face closures and confiscations, either under the pretext of anti-corruption measures or due to administrative issues related to their media registrations. In 2021, the regime suspended three TV channels for alleged improper registration, while a year before, the regime confiscated three privately-owned leading media outlets, TV Zimbo, Radio Mais, and printed Newspaper O País, under allegations of asset recovery. Digital platforms operate under restrictive legislation. For example, private news outlet Camunda News, which broadcast via Facebook and YouTube, suspended operations in 2024 after enduring prolonged regime harassment, such as threats of criminal charges against journalists for holding political debates and for allegedly not having a license to broadcast on YouTube.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. Journalists are frequently targeted by the regime. For instance, in 2023, journalist Liberato Furtado Pereira faced defamation charges brought by public prosecutor Elizabete Francisco after exposing a corruption case in which she allegedly received $25,000 in suspected bribes. Individuals who express dissent in social media are also frequently criminally prosecuted under Article 333 of the Angolan Penal Code, which refers to crimes of outrage against the state, its symbols, and organs.
The regime also targets civil society organizations and actors. Recent examples of repression include in 2023 when Angolan security forces arrested dozens during a human rights workshop in Cabinda, charging several organizers and participants with rebellion and criminal association, carrying penalties of up to eight years in prison. In 2021, ahead of the national elections, Angolan police prevented two NGOs from holding a conference on peacebuilding. Without a court order, the police blocked the entrance to the conference venue to prevent participants from entering, claiming they were following orders from their superiors. On June 20, 2015, Angolan police arrested 13 activists for participating in a discussion about Gene Sharp’s book From Dictatorship to Democracy, which explores peaceful protest methods. Two more activists were arrested two days later, and charges were also filed against two women—Laurinda Gouveia and Rosa Conde—though they were not detained. The group was known as 15+2. On March 28, 2016, the Luanda Provincial Court sentenced all 17 activists to prison terms ranging from two years and three months to eight years and six months for crimes of preparing rebellion and criminal association.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses dissenting protests through violent crackdowns. The defense and security forces were used to intimidate opposition supporters through violence, threats, and harassment of opposition leaders in order to repress political demonstrations contesting the 2022 election results. Between November 2020 and June 2023, at least 17 protesters, including a 12-year-old boy, were killed by security forces during incidents such as the 2023 fuel-hike protests. In 2023, 200 protesters in Angola’s Lunda Sul province were arrested. The demonstrators were associated with the Manifesto Jurídico Sociológico do Povo Lundês, led by Jota Malakito, which advocates for the autonomy of the Lunda-Tchokwe region. In August 2024, the National Assembly passed a draconian bill that criminalizes filming or taking photos of public services and property damage during protests, with prison sentences of up to 25 years in prison and the temporary closure of civil society organizations that organize demonstrations.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. The Angolan judiciary operates as an extension of the regime, lacking the autonomy necessary to check regime overreach or ensure accountability. The Constitutional Court has dismissed legal challenges filed by the political opposition over electoral fraud.
The President has constitutional authority to appoint the entire Supreme Court bench, the country’s highest court. As a result, the Supreme Court consistently rules in favor of the regime. In 2021, President Lourenço controversially appointed former MPLA political bureau member Laurinda Cardoso as the chief justice of the Constitutional Court.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. In June 2024, the Supreme Court dismissed a petition filed by the Bar Association seeking disciplinary action against Supreme Court Chief Justice Joel Leonardo over multiple corruption allegations.
The judiciary fails to serve as a check on the regime in a way that allows it to significantly undermine electoral competition. For example, following the 2022 general elections, the Constitutional Court, led by MPLA political bureau member Laurinda Cardoso, dismissed the main opposition party, UNITA’s legal petition challenging the election results. This allowed João Lourenço to be sworn in as president.
The judiciary also fails to serve as a check on the regime in a way that allows it to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In August 2024, a court in Angola’s Lunda Sul province sentenced approximately 200 individuals to prison for rebellion charges. The defense team argued that the proceedings were politically motivated, aiming to suppress the right to protest. Guilherme Neves, president of the Association Mãos Livres, contended that the court failed to substantiate many of the charges, emphasizing that peaceful demonstrations should not result in imprisonment. The court convicted the defendants by determining that they had defied police orders to disperse and had engaged in violent actions near the provincial government’s palace. In another example, on March 28, 2016, the Luanda Provincial Court sentenced all 17 of the “15+2” activists to prison terms ranging from two years and three months to eight years and six months for crimes of preparing rebellion and criminal association.
