Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Algeria as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Algeria has undergone significant political and social changes since the grassroots pro-democracy Hirak protests of 2010-2011. While the later Hirak movement was successful in ending former longtime ruler President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s authoritarian rule in 2019, the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN), which had ruled Algeria since its independence from France in 1961, remained in power under the current incumbent President Abdelmajid Tebboune, the former Minister of Housing under Bouteflika. By the end of 2024, the Hirak movement continued to inspire dissent and public calls for democratic reform, although its visibility and intensity had decreased significantly due to regime suppression. The movement has transitioned from large-scale protests to more subtle forms of resistance, such as online activism and symbolic gestures.
Elections in Algeria are a sham to the extent that the mainstream opposition has no realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. President Tebboune secured a second presidential term in September 2024 after winning an election marked by widespread voter abstention, following a call for snap elections, which inhibited political opponents from running effective campaigns. Furthermore, the new constitution has also allowed the regime to ban or dissolve opposition members and parties, such as by arresting leaders of the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (MAK) and dissolving the Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights (LADDH). Like his predecessor, President Tebboune continues to rule Algeria by maintaining close ties to the military, thereby guaranteeing the regime’s unchecked dominance over the political process through opaque and skewed electoral processes.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Since the Hirak protests, the regime has gradually implemented measures to curtail freedoms of expression, assembly, and association. To secure his grip on power, President Tebboune altered the penal code by expanding definitions of what constitutes a threat to national security, making it easier for regime agents to arrest dissidents on false and politically motivated charges, imprison journalists, shut down critical media outlets, and dissolve human rights groups. By systematically cracking down on protests, arresting and detaining activists and journalists, the regime has instilled a climate of fear among its opponents. Regime critics and civil society activists face surveillance, intimidation, and harassment, which has led to a decline in their activities. The regime also censors media outlets, limiting the ability of journalists to report critically on its policies and practices.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. President Tebboune’s regime has effectively consolidated authority within the executive branch, reducing the independence and influence of legislative bodies. The legislative process is frequently driven by presidential directives, and opposition voices and parliamentary debates have less impact on major policy decisions. Additionally, President Tebboune heads the Supreme Judicial Council and oversees a judiciary increasingly used as a tool to suppress dissent and silence regime critics. Algeria’s judiciary has played a critical role in suppressing dissidents, including journalists, activists, and political opponents, who are often accused of politically motivated vague crimes, such as undermining national security or inciting public unrest. Furthermore, non-transparent prosecutions by specialized military courts are frequently conducted hastily, with restricted access to legal representation and evidence.
Elections in Algeria are a sham, to the point where the genuine, mainstream political opposition has no realistic chance of competing and possibly winning. The regime actively suppresses opposition figures and dismantles opposition groups, particularly those associated with the Hirak movement, through judicial prosecutions, arrests, and disqualifications, preventing genuine competition. With only regime-proxy figures allowed to run amidst widespread voter abstention and boycotts, the regime ensures predictable outcomes like President Tebboune’s victory.
Algeria held presidential elections in 2019 and 2024, and a parliamentary election in 2021. In the buildup to each of these sham elections, the regime actively suppressed opposition figures and dismantled opposition groups. In the run-up to the 2024 vote, the regime actively suppressed opposition figures and those who criticized the regime online or called for a boycott. Prior to the vote, the government restricted popular leftist leader Karim Tabbou from both digital campaigning and taking part in televised or public political dialogues. While 34 candidates declared their nominations ahead of the elections, the regime charged several of them with fraud over candidacy paperwork, placed three candidates under judicial supervision for allegedly violating election laws, and allowed only two regime proxy figures to stand for election, which effectively guaranteed President Tebboune’s victory.
The regime unfairly bars real, mainstream opposition parties and candidates from competing in elections, including indirectly through judicial prosecution that leads to disqualification. In 2021 alone, at least 300 political detainees were being held in Algeria’s overcrowded prisons, compared to 61 in 2020. The regime’s detention of these opponents was largely aimed at discouraging participation in political processes and consolidating control, thereby hindering genuine opposition participation in elections and maintaining an illusion of legitimacy. In June 2021, the leader of the Democratic and Social Movement (MDS), one of the main opposition parties, Fethi Ghares, was prosecuted based on the bogus charge of “insulting the president of the republic” and “disseminating information that could harm national interest and undermine public order.” He was initially released in March 2022, and then rearrested ahead of the 2024 elections. His MDS party – successor to the Algerian Communist Party – was shuttered and barred from participating in politics in February 2023 for alleged non-compliance with political party registration laws.
The regime unfairly and significantly hinders real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates’ electoral campaigns. For political parties to operate legally in Algeria, they must first be licensed by the Interior Ministry and the President. Thus, there is a significant hurdle for opposition parties to register their parties. Furthermore, parties cannot be formed along ethnic lines or have separatist views, which leads to the disqualification of many critical voices, particularly those representing ethnic minority groups like the Amazigh. In 2021, the regime designated the Amazigh separatist group MAK as a terrorist organization, a move that gave regime agents additional legal tools to pursue MAK-affiliated political opponents, both in Algeria and abroad.
The real, mainstream opposition threatens to or ultimately boycott the elections, as a way of protesting the lack of a free and fair electoral competition. Elections in Algeria are marred by repeated boycotts and widespread voter abstention. Low voter participation, although not an indicator of authoritarianism in and of itself, in the case of Algeria, was due to the widespread cynicism among both the opposition and Algerian voters over the regime’s ability to conduct free and fair elections. In response to the regime’s exclusion of tens of candidates, over 70 percent of Algerians boycotted the 2024 elections. While boycotts were largely driven by the Hirak movement, several political parties also called for national boycotts at different stages. These include, but are not limited to, the Workers’ Party (PT), the Democratic and Social Movement (MDS), the Union for Change and Progress (UCP), the Party for Secularism and Democracy (PLD), the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), and the Democratic Alliance Alternative (FPAD).
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime in Algeria systematically represses dissent by arresting activists, targeting independent media and advocacy groups, and restricting freedom of expression and assembly. It censors critical reporting, manipulates information, and criminalizes protests and online activism to maintain control and suppress opposition.
The regime seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. The regime also employs spurious terrorism allegations to persecute dissidents for their activism, social media expression, or membership in groups seen to be sympathetic to mainstream dissenting organizations. In October 2021, Hirak activist Mohad Gasmi was sentenced to five years in prison for “praising terrorism” following his protests against shale gas drilling and demanding a more equitable distribution of Algerian resources. Similarly, Slimane Bouhafs, a Christian community leader, and Kamira Nait Sid, co-president of the World Amazigh Congress, both recently completed three-year sentences on disputed charges. Both were accused of “belonging to a terrorist organization” and “receiving foreign funds for propaganda.” In late 2021, Bouhafs and Sid were sentenced to three and five years’ imprisonment, respectively. In late 2022, Sid, the co-president of the World Amazigh Congress (WAC), an international NGO defending the rights of the minority Amazigh people, faced additional allegations ranging from “conspiracy” to “hate speech” for her work defending Amazigh rights. Sid’s sentence was reduced to three years in prison on appeal in mid-2023, and both were released upon completion of their prison terms in 2024. ” Both Sid and Bouhafs have denied having any links to the MAK. By December 2025, at least 230 prisoners of conscience remained in prison in Algeria.
The regime also targets advocacy groups, particularly organizations focused on providing legal assistance to detainees from the Hirak movement. For instance, lawyers affiliated with the Collective for the Defence of Hirak Detainees (CDHD), an organization focused on providing legal assistance to those arbitrarily arrested, detained, and prosecuted by the regime, were deliberately targeted with surveillance and obstruction to criminal prosecutions, arbitrary arrests, and imprisonment despite their legitimate work advocating for fair trials and human rights. In May 2022, attorney Abdelkader Chohra was detained during a protest regarding the suspicious death of Hakim Debbazi, an activist who died while in regime custody. Similarly, lawyer Yassine Khlifi faced imprisonment after publicly criticizing the minister of justice for a lack of transparency concerning Debbazi’s death. In Tlemcen, the crackdown extended to professional bans. Mohamed El-Amin Ben Dahmane and Mohamed Makkawi, both affiliated with the CDHD, were stripped of their right to practice law in the spring of 2021. These administrative sanctions were widely interpreted as retaliation for their work representing Hirak movement detainees.
The regime unfairly shuts down or takes measures that lead to the shutdown of major independent, dissenting organizations. With the aim of controlling information and curtailing organized opposition, the regime engages in systematic repression of independent media and civil society through arbitrary arrests, criminalization, and shutdowns to prevent dissent and social activism. It frequently uses unfounded charges and legal harassment as tools to intimidate and silence journalists and activists. By restricting dissenting voices, the regime seeks to stifle social and political activism that could lead to protests, unrest, or demands for change. For instance, in November 2024, Ihsane El-Kadi, the founder and director of private online station Radio M and the Maghreb Emergent media, was granted a presidential pardon after serving 22 months of a five-year sentence over “foreign funding” charges. El-Kadi was initially charged with undermining state security and violating the country’s laws prohibiting media organizations from receiving foreign funds. However, El-Kadi’s release only came after the regime shut down three independent media outlets he owned (Interface Médias, a parent company of Radio M and Maghreb Emergent) in June 2024. Between 2021 and 2023, the Algerian regime prosecuted, arrested, or detained at least 12 journalists and media workers, closed at least two media outlets, and suspended a private television station for 20 days. In August 2023, a Constantine court sentenced journalist Mustapha Bendjama and researcher Raouf Farrah to two years in prison for allegedly “disturbing public order.” Bendjama, a frequent target of regime harassment since the 2019 Hirak protests, has faced multiple arrests and travel bans. Despite his release in 2024, he remained under challenge by regime reprisals; notably, he was fired from his position as editor-in-chief of the independent newspaper Le Provincial after eight years of service.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses protests or gatherings. Between January and June 2025, the regime intensified its crackdown on dissent, resulting in the detention and prosecution of a minimum of 23 journalists and civil society members. These legal actions were directly linked to the “Manich Radi” (“I am not Satisfied”) online protest campaign, a digital initiative that gained momentum in late 2024. At least 11 members of the Youth Action Rally (RAJ)—an organization supporting the Hirak—were apprehended and prosecuted between 2019 and 2020. Nine of these members were held in unlawful custody for simply voicing their opinions on the web or joining peaceful rallies. In 2021, RAJ was forced to disband for allegedly violating the rules governing associations in Algeria outlined in the Law on Associations (No. 90-31 of 1990) and Law 12-06 (12 January 2012). Similarly, LADDH was dissolved in 2023 on spurious grounds after being accused of, among other things, meeting with groups “hostile to Algeria and under the influence of the Moroccan-Zionist lobby.” The claim was made due to the LADDH’s connections with foreign international human rights organizations such as the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), EuroMed Rights, and the Coordination of Human Rights Organizations in the Maghreb. Since 2019, both RAJ and LADDH have occupied a prominent role in denouncing the regime’s crackdown on Hirak activists and protesters. In 2019, the Hirak protest movement was highly repressed, with thousands of arrests based on reports by Algerian human rights organizations. To illustrate, the leader of the Algerian Workers’ Party, Louisa Hanoune, was held in solitary confinement in a military prison after she was falsely charged with “conspiring against the state and army” for aligning herself with protesters calling for full political reforms and refusing to accept the legitimacy of the military-driven transition.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. In September 2020, the Tunisian parliament passed a new constitution, which was then approved in November sham referendum marred by low turnout and enacted by President Tebboune in January 2021. The new constitution consolidated power in the presidency by expanding executive authority and limiting legislative independence. Since then, low legislative activity and the dominance of presidential decrees reflect a de facto sidelining of parliament from policymaking. Additionally, the Tebboune regime has increasingly relied on the judicial system to suspend opposition movements and disqualify opposition candidates from participating in elections. Moreover, the president, who heads the Supreme Judicial Council, appoints the heads of the Supreme Court (the highest ordinary court), the Council of State (the highest administrative court), the Court of Auditors (a body assigned to monitor public property and money), and the Constitutional Court, in addition to all of their corresponding judges.
Courts frequently and unfairly enabled the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition and make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. In January 2022, the Council of State ruled in favor of banning the Socialist Workers’ Party (PST) and issued an order to shutter its offices for alleged non-compliance with the rules regulating the functioning of political parties and for not organizing a general assembly to nominate a new leader. As a political opponent to the regime, the PST played a key role in launching a solidarity network for Algeria’s prisoners of conscience, called for national election boycotts, and played a significant role in mobilizing the Hirak movement. In 2021, dissolution procedures were opened against several other left-wing groups, including the UCP and the RAJ.
Courts frequently and unfairly failed to check and enabled the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The regime has repeatedly used the judicial system to levy false charges against dissidents who are prosecuted for allegedly undermining national interests or security. Dominated by pro-regime actors, the judiciary has played an instrumental role in restricting the operating space for human rights defenders and pro-democracy activists. For example, in 2021, the president of civil society organization SOS Bab El Oued, Nacer Meghnine, received a one-year prison sentence for possessing materials that condemned state repression and torture. The court ruled that his critiques of Algeria’s compliance with the United Nations (UN) human rights conventions damaged the nation’s international standing and threatened national security by inviting foreign intervention. Additionally, Meghnine was convicted of inciting unrest for distributing leaflets advocating for prisoners of conscience.
Algerian courts have routinely colluded with the regime by holding expedited trials in the absence of legal representation and have dismissed defendants’ requests to postpone court proceedings when their lawyers were not present. Expedited hearings, also known as accelerated procedures, are used to quickly process certain cases, particularly those involving activists and those accused of dissent. These expedited trials have been criticized for potentially undermining due process and fair trial rights, especially in cases involving freedom of expression. For instance, in January 2025, only four days after his arrest, an Algiers court sentenced Hirak activist and poet Mohamed Tadjadit to five years in prison on vague charges.
Members of the judicial branch, who act contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the regime, frequently face regime retaliation. The judicial system has also enabled the regime to persecute judges who express critical opinions or sympathy towards the Hirak movement. In May 2021, Judge Saadeddine Marzouk, founder of the Free Judges Club, an unregistered organization critical of the regime’s attempts to dominate the court and muzzle dissenting voices, was dismissed.
The regime directs certain cases, such as politically sensitive cases, to separate, regime-controlled courts, such as regime-controlled military courts. After a two-day trial in May 2019, Louisa Hanoune, the leader of the PT, was convicted by an Algerian military court and sentenced to 15 years in prison for allegedly conspiring against the authority of the state. This conviction was part of a larger case involving several high-profile figures, including Saïd Bouteflika, the brother of Algeria’s former president, and two former intelligence chiefs. Hanoune’s sentence was reduced from 15 to 3 years, with 9 months to be served in prison, on appeal in February 2020. She was immediately released after the new ruling was handed down, with the court’s recognition of time served. However, Hanoune’s conviction—as an established political leader—served as a warning to other politicians, activists, and public figures who aspired to challenge the regime, demonstrating that any form of opposition could lead to severe legal consequences, including lengthy imprisonment.
HRF classifies Algeria as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Algeria has undergone significant political and social changes since the grassroots pro-democracy Hirak protests of 2010-2011. While the later Hirak movement was successful in ending former longtime ruler President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s authoritarian rule in 2019, the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN), which had ruled Algeria since its independence from France in 1961, remained in power under the current incumbent President Abdelmajid Tebboune, the former Minister of Housing under Bouteflika. By the end of 2024, the Hirak movement continued to inspire dissent and public calls for democratic reform, although its visibility and intensity had decreased significantly due to regime suppression. The movement has transitioned from large-scale protests to more subtle forms of resistance, such as online activism and symbolic gestures.
Elections in Algeria are a sham to the extent that the mainstream opposition has no realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. President Tebboune secured a second presidential term in September 2024 after winning an election marked by widespread voter abstention, following a call for snap elections, which inhibited political opponents from running effective campaigns. Furthermore, the new constitution has also allowed the regime to ban or dissolve opposition members and parties, such as by arresting leaders of the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (MAK) and dissolving the Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights (LADDH). Like his predecessor, President Tebboune continues to rule Algeria by maintaining close ties to the military, thereby guaranteeing the regime’s unchecked dominance over the political process through opaque and skewed electoral processes.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Since the Hirak protests, the regime has gradually implemented measures to curtail freedoms of expression, assembly, and association. To secure his grip on power, President Tebboune altered the penal code by expanding definitions of what constitutes a threat to national security, making it easier for regime agents to arrest dissidents on false and politically motivated charges, imprison journalists, shut down critical media outlets, and dissolve human rights groups. By systematically cracking down on protests, arresting and detaining activists and journalists, the regime has instilled a climate of fear among its opponents. Regime critics and civil society activists face surveillance, intimidation, and harassment, which has led to a decline in their activities. The regime also censors media outlets, limiting the ability of journalists to report critically on its policies and practices.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. President Tebboune’s regime has effectively consolidated authority within the executive branch, reducing the independence and influence of legislative bodies. The legislative process is frequently driven by presidential directives, and opposition voices and parliamentary debates have less impact on major policy decisions. Additionally, President Tebboune heads the Supreme Judicial Council and oversees a judiciary increasingly used as a tool to suppress dissent and silence regime critics. Algeria’s judiciary has played a critical role in suppressing dissidents, including journalists, activists, and political opponents, who are often accused of politically motivated vague crimes, such as undermining national security or inciting public unrest. Furthermore, non-transparent prosecutions by specialized military courts are frequently conducted hastily, with restricted access to legal representation and evidence.
Elections in Algeria are a sham, to the point where the genuine, mainstream political opposition has no realistic chance of competing and possibly winning. The regime actively suppresses opposition figures and dismantles opposition groups, particularly those associated with the Hirak movement, through judicial prosecutions, arrests, and disqualifications, preventing genuine competition. With only regime-proxy figures allowed to run amidst widespread voter abstention and boycotts, the regime ensures predictable outcomes like President Tebboune’s victory.
Algeria held presidential elections in 2019 and 2024, and a parliamentary election in 2021. In the buildup to each of these sham elections, the regime actively suppressed opposition figures and dismantled opposition groups. In the run-up to the 2024 vote, the regime actively suppressed opposition figures and those who criticized the regime online or called for a boycott. Prior to the vote, the government restricted popular leftist leader Karim Tabbou from both digital campaigning and taking part in televised or public political dialogues. While 34 candidates declared their nominations ahead of the elections, the regime charged several of them with fraud over candidacy paperwork, placed three candidates under judicial supervision for allegedly violating election laws, and allowed only two regime proxy figures to stand for election, which effectively guaranteed President Tebboune’s victory.
The regime unfairly bars real, mainstream opposition parties and candidates from competing in elections, including indirectly through judicial prosecution that leads to disqualification. In 2021 alone, at least 300 political detainees were being held in Algeria’s overcrowded prisons, compared to 61 in 2020. The regime’s detention of these opponents was largely aimed at discouraging participation in political processes and consolidating control, thereby hindering genuine opposition participation in elections and maintaining an illusion of legitimacy. In June 2021, the leader of the Democratic and Social Movement (MDS), one of the main opposition parties, Fethi Ghares, was prosecuted based on the bogus charge of “insulting the president of the republic” and “disseminating information that could harm national interest and undermine public order.” He was initially released in March 2022, and then rearrested ahead of the 2024 elections. His MDS party – successor to the Algerian Communist Party – was shuttered and barred from participating in politics in February 2023 for alleged non-compliance with political party registration laws.
The regime unfairly and significantly hinders real, mainstream opposition parties or candidates’ electoral campaigns. For political parties to operate legally in Algeria, they must first be licensed by the Interior Ministry and the President. Thus, there is a significant hurdle for opposition parties to register their parties. Furthermore, parties cannot be formed along ethnic lines or have separatist views, which leads to the disqualification of many critical voices, particularly those representing ethnic minority groups like the Amazigh. In 2021, the regime designated the Amazigh separatist group MAK as a terrorist organization, a move that gave regime agents additional legal tools to pursue MAK-affiliated political opponents, both in Algeria and abroad.
The real, mainstream opposition threatens to or ultimately boycott the elections, as a way of protesting the lack of a free and fair electoral competition. Elections in Algeria are marred by repeated boycotts and widespread voter abstention. Low voter participation, although not an indicator of authoritarianism in and of itself, in the case of Algeria, was due to the widespread cynicism among both the opposition and Algerian voters over the regime’s ability to conduct free and fair elections. In response to the regime’s exclusion of tens of candidates, over 70 percent of Algerians boycotted the 2024 elections. While boycotts were largely driven by the Hirak movement, several political parties also called for national boycotts at different stages. These include, but are not limited to, the Workers’ Party (PT), the Democratic and Social Movement (MDS), the Union for Change and Progress (UCP), the Party for Secularism and Democracy (PLD), the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), and the Democratic Alliance Alternative (FPAD).
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime in Algeria systematically represses dissent by arresting activists, targeting independent media and advocacy groups, and restricting freedom of expression and assembly. It censors critical reporting, manipulates information, and criminalizes protests and online activism to maintain control and suppress opposition.
The regime seriously intimidates independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. The regime also employs spurious terrorism allegations to persecute dissidents for their activism, social media expression, or membership in groups seen to be sympathetic to mainstream dissenting organizations. In October 2021, Hirak activist Mohad Gasmi was sentenced to five years in prison for “praising terrorism” following his protests against shale gas drilling and demanding a more equitable distribution of Algerian resources. Similarly, Slimane Bouhafs, a Christian community leader, and Kamira Nait Sid, co-president of the World Amazigh Congress, both recently completed three-year sentences on disputed charges. Both were accused of “belonging to a terrorist organization” and “receiving foreign funds for propaganda.” In late 2021, Bouhafs and Sid were sentenced to three and five years’ imprisonment, respectively. In late 2022, Sid, the co-president of the World Amazigh Congress (WAC), an international NGO defending the rights of the minority Amazigh people, faced additional allegations ranging from “conspiracy” to “hate speech” for her work defending Amazigh rights. Sid’s sentence was reduced to three years in prison on appeal in mid-2023, and both were released upon completion of their prison terms in 2024. ” Both Sid and Bouhafs have denied having any links to the MAK. By December 2025, at least 230 prisoners of conscience remained in prison in Algeria.
The regime also targets advocacy groups, particularly organizations focused on providing legal assistance to detainees from the Hirak movement. For instance, lawyers affiliated with the Collective for the Defence of Hirak Detainees (CDHD), an organization focused on providing legal assistance to those arbitrarily arrested, detained, and prosecuted by the regime, were deliberately targeted with surveillance and obstruction to criminal prosecutions, arbitrary arrests, and imprisonment despite their legitimate work advocating for fair trials and human rights. In May 2022, attorney Abdelkader Chohra was detained during a protest regarding the suspicious death of Hakim Debbazi, an activist who died while in regime custody. Similarly, lawyer Yassine Khlifi faced imprisonment after publicly criticizing the minister of justice for a lack of transparency concerning Debbazi’s death. In Tlemcen, the crackdown extended to professional bans. Mohamed El-Amin Ben Dahmane and Mohamed Makkawi, both affiliated with the CDHD, were stripped of their right to practice law in the spring of 2021. These administrative sanctions were widely interpreted as retaliation for their work representing Hirak movement detainees.
The regime unfairly shuts down or takes measures that lead to the shutdown of major independent, dissenting organizations. With the aim of controlling information and curtailing organized opposition, the regime engages in systematic repression of independent media and civil society through arbitrary arrests, criminalization, and shutdowns to prevent dissent and social activism. It frequently uses unfounded charges and legal harassment as tools to intimidate and silence journalists and activists. By restricting dissenting voices, the regime seeks to stifle social and political activism that could lead to protests, unrest, or demands for change. For instance, in November 2024, Ihsane El-Kadi, the founder and director of private online station Radio M and the Maghreb Emergent media, was granted a presidential pardon after serving 22 months of a five-year sentence over “foreign funding” charges. El-Kadi was initially charged with undermining state security and violating the country’s laws prohibiting media organizations from receiving foreign funds. However, El-Kadi’s release only came after the regime shut down three independent media outlets he owned (Interface Médias, a parent company of Radio M and Maghreb Emergent) in June 2024. Between 2021 and 2023, the Algerian regime prosecuted, arrested, or detained at least 12 journalists and media workers, closed at least two media outlets, and suspended a private television station for 20 days. In August 2023, a Constantine court sentenced journalist Mustapha Bendjama and researcher Raouf Farrah to two years in prison for allegedly “disturbing public order.” Bendjama, a frequent target of regime harassment since the 2019 Hirak protests, has faced multiple arrests and travel bans. Despite his release in 2024, he remained under challenge by regime reprisals; notably, he was fired from his position as editor-in-chief of the independent newspaper Le Provincial after eight years of service.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses protests or gatherings. Between January and June 2025, the regime intensified its crackdown on dissent, resulting in the detention and prosecution of a minimum of 23 journalists and civil society members. These legal actions were directly linked to the “Manich Radi” (“I am not Satisfied”) online protest campaign, a digital initiative that gained momentum in late 2024. At least 11 members of the Youth Action Rally (RAJ)—an organization supporting the Hirak—were apprehended and prosecuted between 2019 and 2020. Nine of these members were held in unlawful custody for simply voicing their opinions on the web or joining peaceful rallies. In 2021, RAJ was forced to disband for allegedly violating the rules governing associations in Algeria outlined in the Law on Associations (No. 90-31 of 1990) and Law 12-06 (12 January 2012). Similarly, LADDH was dissolved in 2023 on spurious grounds after being accused of, among other things, meeting with groups “hostile to Algeria and under the influence of the Moroccan-Zionist lobby.” The claim was made due to the LADDH’s connections with foreign international human rights organizations such as the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), EuroMed Rights, and the Coordination of Human Rights Organizations in the Maghreb. Since 2019, both RAJ and LADDH have occupied a prominent role in denouncing the regime’s crackdown on Hirak activists and protesters. In 2019, the Hirak protest movement was highly repressed, with thousands of arrests based on reports by Algerian human rights organizations. To illustrate, the leader of the Algerian Workers’ Party, Louisa Hanoune, was held in solitary confinement in a military prison after she was falsely charged with “conspiring against the state and army” for aligning herself with protesters calling for full political reforms and refusing to accept the legitimacy of the military-driven transition.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. In September 2020, the Tunisian parliament passed a new constitution, which was then approved in November sham referendum marred by low turnout and enacted by President Tebboune in January 2021. The new constitution consolidated power in the presidency by expanding executive authority and limiting legislative independence. Since then, low legislative activity and the dominance of presidential decrees reflect a de facto sidelining of parliament from policymaking. Additionally, the Tebboune regime has increasingly relied on the judicial system to suspend opposition movements and disqualify opposition candidates from participating in elections. Moreover, the president, who heads the Supreme Judicial Council, appoints the heads of the Supreme Court (the highest ordinary court), the Council of State (the highest administrative court), the Court of Auditors (a body assigned to monitor public property and money), and the Constitutional Court, in addition to all of their corresponding judges.
Courts frequently and unfairly enabled the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition and make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. In January 2022, the Council of State ruled in favor of banning the Socialist Workers’ Party (PST) and issued an order to shutter its offices for alleged non-compliance with the rules regulating the functioning of political parties and for not organizing a general assembly to nominate a new leader. As a political opponent to the regime, the PST played a key role in launching a solidarity network for Algeria’s prisoners of conscience, called for national election boycotts, and played a significant role in mobilizing the Hirak movement. In 2021, dissolution procedures were opened against several other left-wing groups, including the UCP and the RAJ.
Courts frequently and unfairly failed to check and enabled the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The regime has repeatedly used the judicial system to levy false charges against dissidents who are prosecuted for allegedly undermining national interests or security. Dominated by pro-regime actors, the judiciary has played an instrumental role in restricting the operating space for human rights defenders and pro-democracy activists. For example, in 2021, the president of civil society organization SOS Bab El Oued, Nacer Meghnine, received a one-year prison sentence for possessing materials that condemned state repression and torture. The court ruled that his critiques of Algeria’s compliance with the United Nations (UN) human rights conventions damaged the nation’s international standing and threatened national security by inviting foreign intervention. Additionally, Meghnine was convicted of inciting unrest for distributing leaflets advocating for prisoners of conscience.
Algerian courts have routinely colluded with the regime by holding expedited trials in the absence of legal representation and have dismissed defendants’ requests to postpone court proceedings when their lawyers were not present. Expedited hearings, also known as accelerated procedures, are used to quickly process certain cases, particularly those involving activists and those accused of dissent. These expedited trials have been criticized for potentially undermining due process and fair trial rights, especially in cases involving freedom of expression. For instance, in January 2025, only four days after his arrest, an Algiers court sentenced Hirak activist and poet Mohamed Tadjadit to five years in prison on vague charges.
Members of the judicial branch, who act contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the regime, frequently face regime retaliation. The judicial system has also enabled the regime to persecute judges who express critical opinions or sympathy towards the Hirak movement. In May 2021, Judge Saadeddine Marzouk, founder of the Free Judges Club, an unregistered organization critical of the regime’s attempts to dominate the court and muzzle dissenting voices, was dismissed.
The regime directs certain cases, such as politically sensitive cases, to separate, regime-controlled courts, such as regime-controlled military courts. After a two-day trial in May 2019, Louisa Hanoune, the leader of the PT, was convicted by an Algerian military court and sentenced to 15 years in prison for allegedly conspiring against the authority of the state. This conviction was part of a larger case involving several high-profile figures, including Saïd Bouteflika, the brother of Algeria’s former president, and two former intelligence chiefs. Hanoune’s sentence was reduced from 15 to 3 years, with 9 months to be served in prison, on appeal in February 2020. She was immediately released after the new ruling was handed down, with the court’s recognition of time served. However, Hanoune’s conviction—as an established political leader—served as a warning to other politicians, activists, and public figures who aspired to challenge the regime, demonstrating that any form of opposition could lead to severe legal consequences, including lengthy imprisonment.
