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HRF classifies Albania as democratic.
Albania is a parliamentary republic with a unicameral parliament of 140 members. Executive power is exercised by the government headed by a prime minister. The president, formally the head of state, is elected through a three-fifths vote in Parliament, for a maximum of two consecutive five-year terms. The country democratized in 1990, after 45 years of totalitarian Communist rule. Two main political parties, the Socialist Party (SP) and the Democratic Party (DP), have dominated the political scene since, taking turns in power. However, the SP’s victories in the last four legislative elections, in 2013, 2017, 2021, and 2025, have been accompanied by allegations of electoral fraud and by DP election boycotts. The deeply fractious and polarized political environment has jeopardized Albania’s ongoing efforts to reform its electoral system and judiciary.
National elections remain largely free and fair, according to international observers, despite some unfair advantages enjoyed by the incumbent Socialist (PS) party, continuously in office since 2013. The PS and its main rival, the Democratic Party (PD), have dominated Albanian politics since the onset of democratization in the 1990s, taking turns in government and opposition. Both parties have traded accusations of electoral fraud and abuses of administrative resources and boycotted parliamentary proceedings or threatened to boycott national elections in response to their perceived inability to gain power through elections. In those instances, internationally mediated agreements between the two parties (2017) or substantive electoral reforms (2020) helped restore a fairly equal electoral playing field, secure the participation of the opposition, and avert protracted political crises.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Civil society is vibrant, and freedom of assembly is generally upheld in practice. Nevertheless, civil society and international bodies, such as the Council of Europe, have voiced concerns regarding the ruling PS party’s sporadic attempts to influence the editorial stance of public outlets and the increased incidence of SLAPPs (gratuitous lawsuits aimed at intimidating and silencing critics without necessarily succeeding on their legal merits).
Albanian institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government, whether directly or through the slow and partial implementation of essential reforms. Albania has not entirely reformed its judiciary, which was once susceptible to inefficiency and overt political interference. The courts have occasionally failed to prosecute electoral fraud or uphold the freedom of dissent when current political elites have challenged this freedom. On the other hand, the current government established or largely supported the independent functioning of oversight institutions that have increasingly held political elites accountable.
National elections are largely free and fair. The last four legislative elections, in 2013, 2017, 2021, and 2025, which the PS won by varying margins (between 2% in 2013 and nearly 20% in 2025), were free and fair, according to international observers, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The incumbent party enjoyed some unfair campaign advantages that skewed the playing field. Nonetheless, the presence of a generally competitive campaign and the incumbent’s moderate margins of victory suggest the mainstream opposition still has ample opportunities for gaining popular support and winning in future elections. The administration of recent elections has also been transparent and impartial overall, precluding the possibility of large-scale irregularities.
Nevertheless, the incumbent PS party also enjoyed some unfair campaign advantages, notably the abuse of administrative resources. In its monitoring report on the 2025 parliamentary elections, the OSCE noted that PS cabinet members campaigned in their official capacity, blurring the line between state and party, and enacted policies that amounted to unfair voter mobilization close to the election. For example, towards the end of 2024, the government decided to waive fines for unauthorized constructions, non-compliance with COVID-19 restrictions, and other minor offenses committed between 2015 and 2024, and only announced this policy several days ahead of the vote. OSCE observers also received credible reports that the PS benefitted from its extensive patron-client network, as local public officials used promises of employment in the public sector and other administrative favors to incentivize voters. The 2024 election wasn’t the first instance the PS-led government had circumvented legal restrictions on implementing policies that could benefit a narrow, specific segment of the population in the months leading up to a national election. In 2021, it recruited more than 10,000 new civil servants between December 2020 and the parliamentary election in April 2021. Domestic and international experts criticized the practice as a potential form of illicit voter mobilization. In 2023, it transpired that the PS also incentivized public servants to disseminate its media content on social networks through an app called Aktiv1st. Users of the app gain points for liking, commenting, and re-sharing suggested party content. Some public employees reported that their superiors pressured them to download the app and set a monthly quota of points of around 20,000, which would require consistent engagement. The app, released by the PS, raised electoral fairness and privacy concerns, as it was unclear how party officials managed users’ data. According to international observers, these practices skewed the electoral playing field to an extent, but not so much as to make the campaign fundamentally uncompetitive.
The government has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities or electoral fraud. The Central Election Commission (CEC) has generally fulfilled its duties in a professional and transparent manner. There were some credible reports of vote-buying in both the 2025 and 2021 elections, but observers found no evidence that this was a systemic phenomenon clearly favoring a particular party.
While elections remain generally competitive, the mainstream opposition has, in limited instances, threatened or conducted boycotts to denounce the perceived absence of an equal playing field. For instance, the PD claimed that the 2017 parliamentary elections were fraudulent and declined to field candidates in the 2019 municipal elections in response to, among other things, the perceived inability to fairly compete with the PS. As a result of the 2019 boycott, the PS’s mayoral candidates ran unopposed in 31 out of 61 municipalities. The PD amended its position and decided to compete in the 2021 parliamentary elections following negotiations with the PS, which culminated in legislative amendments that redrew electoral districts to more accurately reflect internal migration and strengthened independent electoral oversight. The changes also addressed longstanding concerns that the CEC, whose members were previously appointed by Parliament, and lower-level electoral administration bodies are susceptible to political influence.
Despite its structural advantages, the PS has not typically won in landslide victories, indicating that there are sufficient avenues for the opposition to campaign freely and gain popular support. In 2025, the incumbent party won 52% of the popular vote, securing 82 seats out of 140 total in parliament, while DP won 32% and 52 seats. The results of the two main parties were even closer in 2021: 48.5% versus 39.4%. The DP’s worst results in 2025 also reflected the ongoing fragmentation of the party, which has split into rival factions led by former PM Sali Berisha and current party leader Lulzim Basha.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Some instances of overt editorial interference and legal harassment of critical journalists by public officials have raised concerns over the independence and impartiality of the media sector, as has the ongoing concentration of ownership in the hands of politically affiliated stakeholders. On the other hand, the government has largely upheld the freedoms of association and assembly, and civil society remains robust.
During its long tenure, the PS has taken some steps to unfairly bias media coverage in its favor, particularly by influencing state-owned outlets. In 2023, Alfred Peza, a former party member, was appointed head of the public broadcaster RTSH, where he oversaw the dismissal of about a dozen regime-critical journalists and editorial staff members. The move drew condemnation, including by the Union of Albanian journalists, an internationally recognized local watchdog. In addition to more overt editorial interference, the government has biased media coverage by directing state media subsidies disproportionately toward friendly media outlets. A prominent example is the Top Media conglomerate (and its Top Channel, once the most-watched outlet in Albania), owned by the prominent Hoxha family, which has close ties to members of the government. The Balkan Investigative and Reporting Network (BIRN) revealed that Top Media frequently received public funding under undisclosed terms from the Ministry of Tourism and the Municipality of Tirana. Unsurprisingly, Top Media consistently portrayed PS leader and PM Edi Rama positively, while frequently criticizing his counterparts in the rival PD, including Lulzim Basha and Sali Berisha.
The government and affiliated non-state actors have obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, albeit not to a systematic extent. Investigative journalists, in particular, have faced verbal harassment, smear campaigns, and arbitrary lawsuits by current and former public officials. To illustrate, in 2023, Tirana’s mayor, Erion Veliaj, publicly characterized BIRN journalist Ola Xama as a “militant” and “hired killer” after Xama reported on his possible involvement in a waste management corruption scandal. In the following weeks, pro-government outlets smeared Xama using sexist slurs and disclosed her home address. Another notable instance is a 2022 defamation lawsuit filed by former top prosecutor Elizabeta Imeraj against journalist Isa Myzyraj. Just two months before the lawsuit, Myzyraj reported he was facing threats and intimidation for commenting on Imeraj’s vetting and her alleged failure to properly disclose assets, which other channels hadn’t covered extensively. He also suggested Imeraj herself was behind some of the threats and the smearing articles he faced, exposing her links to three pro-government websites that published such materials. It was those speculations of Imeraj’s involvement in the smear campaign that formed the crux of her lawsuit against Myzyraj, which is still underway as of July 2024. The lawsuit drew criticism from international press freedom organizations, including the Council of Europe’s Platform for Safe Journalists, which stressed its potential “chilling effect” on the entire sector.
While concerning, government actions against independent media are not as systemic and overt as in undemocratic regimes, leaving sufficient room for critical reporting. As a testament to the latter, several channels that are not pro-government, such as Klan TV and TRV Ora, enjoy significant viewership. Further, according to most observers, Albania’s legal and institutional framework is still broadly conducive to a diverse and independent media sector. While raising concerns about the government’s influence on state-owned outlets and key media regulators and the ongoing concentration of ownership, Reporters Without Borders has consistently assessed Albanian media as broadly pluralistic, albeit highly polarized.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings, notwithstanding some isolated instances of excessive use of force by law enforcement during anti-government or environmental protests. In March 2025, law enforcement officers were assigned to facilitate demolitions related to a controversial water-supply project aimed at redirecting water to the tourist resort of Dhërmi. The development, valued at approximately $7 million, prompted vehement local opposition because of its potential environmental impact. After several weeks of peaceful protest, tensions escalated during the increased deployment of officers to the scene, with media reporting some physical altercations between police and local residents. Several protesters were briefly detained and released thereafter. After reaching an agreement with the affected residents, authorities halted demolition activities.
Upholding the freedom of association, the government has not unfairly shut down independent and dissenting organizations. Albania has a robust civil society, as assessed by international observers. The CIVICUS monitor placed Albania in the second-highest tier in its analysis of civic space out of five, indicating that civil society organizations (CSOs) face few barriers. While state support leaves room for improvement, such as improving tax incentives and optimizing public funding for CSOs, the legal and policy framework is already largely conducive to a robust civil society.
Albanian institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. The judiciary’s functional independence was significantly bolstered by the introduction of integrity checks for magistrates, yet shortcomings in the main judicial oversight bodies persist. The courts’ adjudication of electoral integrity and freedom of expression cases is also not entirely consistent with democratic standards. Legislative oversight of the government is formally functional, but somewhat undermined by prolonged single-party governance and high polarization. On the other hand, oversight bodies have demonstrated a growing capacity and willingness to hold political elites accountable in recent years, to favorable assessment by international experts.
The government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness, but has made only partial progress towards mitigating the legacies of institutional capture it inherited from its predecessors. In the 2000s and 2010s, the courts frequently failed to check human rights abuses and questionable public policies. As noted in several Council of Europe monitoring reports, human rights violations perpetrated by law enforcement, including the violent crackdown of the 2011 Tirana demonstrations against the DP-led government’s corruption that claimed the lives of four peaceful protesters, were mostly met with impunity. In addition, credible allegations of high-level corruption were not investigated in a timely manner, if at all.
Seeking to curtail these issues and fulfill EU accession requirements, successive governments pursued judicial reforms, with guidance from external experts. A comprehensive system for vetting judges, including avenues for appeal, was first introduced in 2016, and has proved among the more efficacious reforms according to international observers: between 2017 and 2022, when Parliament voted to extend the vetting agency’s mandate until the end of 2024, about 500 of 800 judges and prosecutors had been reviewed, of which more than 200 were dismissed. In its 2024 Country Report on Albania, the European Commission noted that vetting had led to “significant improvements” in the functioning of the judiciary and should continue as intended. On the other hand, concerns remain about the impartiality and transparency of the appointment of non-magistrate members of the High Judicial Council (HJC) and the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC). Both councils have five non-magistrate (“lay”) members and six members drawn from the ranks of the judiciary and prosecution. While lay candidates are vetted by a parliamentary commission, their subsequent confirmation (a majority vote in parliament) is inherently susceptible to political influence by the dominant party. The HJC and HPC’s functional independence or lack thereof, in turn, is highly consequential, as they directly oversee the appointment, promotion, and disciplinary measures against magistrates.
Despite these recent improvements in Albania’s judicial regulatory framework, the courts have occasionally failed to check the government’s attempts to undermine electoral competition. For instance, in a 2016 mayoral race, the prosecution did not adequately investigate plausible allegations of electoral fraud despite the existence of incriminating videotaped evidence. The recording, which aired on the national Klan TV, showed perpetrators attempting to bribe voters to support the SP candidate in the northern village of Kllobcisht. A supposed jurisdictional dispute between the local prosecutor’s office and the Serious Crime Prosecution in Tirana delayed formal charges for four years, ultimately allowing the statute of limitations to expire and leaving those responsible unpunished. The OSCE has also assessed the overall framework for electoral dispute resolution ambivalently: on the one hand, the Electoral College, the highest authority reviewing electoral disputes that consists of eight judges elected by lot among the members of the High Council of Justice, performs its duties relatively impartially and transparently. On the other hand, the OSCE has noted that the inefficient investigation of electoral irregularities by the prosecution has contributed to perceived impunity for serious crimes such as vote-buying and voter intimidation.
While generally upholding the freedom of expression, judicial institutions have also enabled the government’s efforts to repress criticism in limited but consequential instances. In 2022, the Public Prosecutor imposed a blanket ban on re-publishing data leaked after a cyberattack against the government. International watchdogs, such as the International Press Institute (IPI) and Reporters Without Borders, condemned the ban, arguing it prevented the dissemination of information “in the public interest.” The prosecution had issued such gag orders before. Earlier the same year, it precluded the media from publishing witness testimonies in a significant investigation against organized crime. In 2019, a similar order hampered the public disclosure of leaks shedding light on electoral fraud and corruption. According to local experts, such as the Albanian Association of Journalists, such bans represent a form of soft censorship that affects the entire media sector. These tactics by the prosecution contrast sharply with the courts’ adjudication of SLAPPs. The available evidence suggests that most defamation suits, albeit onerous for the defendants, do not result in convictions. According to data collected by the Albanian Association of Journalists, in 2017, only 8 out of 128 defamation suits led to convictions at the first instance, indicating a judicial reluctance to criminalize speech.
The government has not subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness, and Parliament continues to exercise its powers in a manner broadly consistent with democratic standards. However, the PS’s protracted single-handed dominance of the legislature and its generally adversarial relationship with the opposition have somewhat undermined Parliament’s capacity to oversee and check the executive as necessary. Observers have noted that the majority of new legislation originates from the Council of Ministers, rather than from the parliamentary floor. Clashes between the ruling majority and representatives of the opposition, resulting in obstruction of normal proceedings and lack of quorum, also repeatedly affected Parliament’s functioning in 2023 and 2024. On the other hand, executive institutions have carried out their mandates professionally, and observers have noted some improvements in public administration. The PS-led government created the new position of Minister of State for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption in January 2024, which should improve the overall coordination of accountability measures.
Despite persistent shortcomings in their overall functioning, the government has not subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational independence. It has created and empowered several key watchdog agencies, whose functioning international experts assess positively overall. The prime example is the Special Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Structure (SPAK), formed by a PS-led government in 2019. SPAK has since conducted complex high-profile corruption investigations and proven instrumental in holding political elites accountable: in 2022, its findings led to the criminal conviction of former interior minister Saimir Tahiri for abuse of power. Tahiri was sentenced to 20 months of house arrest as a result. Multiple other political elites have been indicted or remain under investigation by SPAK, including former Tirana mayor and SP member Erion Veliaj (arrested in February 2025 on corruption and money-laundering charges) and Belinda Balluku, Minister of Infrastructure (charged by SPAK in October 2025 for manipulating procurement procedures in a $190 million tunnel project).
HRF classifies Albania as democratic.
Albania is a parliamentary republic with a unicameral parliament of 140 members. Executive power is exercised by the government headed by a prime minister. The president, formally the head of state, is elected through a three-fifths vote in Parliament, for a maximum of two consecutive five-year terms. The country democratized in 1990, after 45 years of totalitarian Communist rule. Two main political parties, the Socialist Party (SP) and the Democratic Party (DP), have dominated the political scene since, taking turns in power. However, the SP’s victories in the last four legislative elections, in 2013, 2017, 2021, and 2025, have been accompanied by allegations of electoral fraud and by DP election boycotts. The deeply fractious and polarized political environment has jeopardized Albania’s ongoing efforts to reform its electoral system and judiciary.
National elections remain largely free and fair, according to international observers, despite some unfair advantages enjoyed by the incumbent Socialist (PS) party, continuously in office since 2013. The PS and its main rival, the Democratic Party (PD), have dominated Albanian politics since the onset of democratization in the 1990s, taking turns in government and opposition. Both parties have traded accusations of electoral fraud and abuses of administrative resources and boycotted parliamentary proceedings or threatened to boycott national elections in response to their perceived inability to gain power through elections. In those instances, internationally mediated agreements between the two parties (2017) or substantive electoral reforms (2020) helped restore a fairly equal electoral playing field, secure the participation of the opposition, and avert protracted political crises.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Civil society is vibrant, and freedom of assembly is generally upheld in practice. Nevertheless, civil society and international bodies, such as the Council of Europe, have voiced concerns regarding the ruling PS party’s sporadic attempts to influence the editorial stance of public outlets and the increased incidence of SLAPPs (gratuitous lawsuits aimed at intimidating and silencing critics without necessarily succeeding on their legal merits).
Albanian institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government, whether directly or through the slow and partial implementation of essential reforms. Albania has not entirely reformed its judiciary, which was once susceptible to inefficiency and overt political interference. The courts have occasionally failed to prosecute electoral fraud or uphold the freedom of dissent when current political elites have challenged this freedom. On the other hand, the current government established or largely supported the independent functioning of oversight institutions that have increasingly held political elites accountable.
National elections are largely free and fair. The last four legislative elections, in 2013, 2017, 2021, and 2025, which the PS won by varying margins (between 2% in 2013 and nearly 20% in 2025), were free and fair, according to international observers, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The incumbent party enjoyed some unfair campaign advantages that skewed the playing field. Nonetheless, the presence of a generally competitive campaign and the incumbent’s moderate margins of victory suggest the mainstream opposition still has ample opportunities for gaining popular support and winning in future elections. The administration of recent elections has also been transparent and impartial overall, precluding the possibility of large-scale irregularities.
Nevertheless, the incumbent PS party also enjoyed some unfair campaign advantages, notably the abuse of administrative resources. In its monitoring report on the 2025 parliamentary elections, the OSCE noted that PS cabinet members campaigned in their official capacity, blurring the line between state and party, and enacted policies that amounted to unfair voter mobilization close to the election. For example, towards the end of 2024, the government decided to waive fines for unauthorized constructions, non-compliance with COVID-19 restrictions, and other minor offenses committed between 2015 and 2024, and only announced this policy several days ahead of the vote. OSCE observers also received credible reports that the PS benefitted from its extensive patron-client network, as local public officials used promises of employment in the public sector and other administrative favors to incentivize voters. The 2024 election wasn’t the first instance the PS-led government had circumvented legal restrictions on implementing policies that could benefit a narrow, specific segment of the population in the months leading up to a national election. In 2021, it recruited more than 10,000 new civil servants between December 2020 and the parliamentary election in April 2021. Domestic and international experts criticized the practice as a potential form of illicit voter mobilization. In 2023, it transpired that the PS also incentivized public servants to disseminate its media content on social networks through an app called Aktiv1st. Users of the app gain points for liking, commenting, and re-sharing suggested party content. Some public employees reported that their superiors pressured them to download the app and set a monthly quota of points of around 20,000, which would require consistent engagement. The app, released by the PS, raised electoral fairness and privacy concerns, as it was unclear how party officials managed users’ data. According to international observers, these practices skewed the electoral playing field to an extent, but not so much as to make the campaign fundamentally uncompetitive.
The government has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities or electoral fraud. The Central Election Commission (CEC) has generally fulfilled its duties in a professional and transparent manner. There were some credible reports of vote-buying in both the 2025 and 2021 elections, but observers found no evidence that this was a systemic phenomenon clearly favoring a particular party.
While elections remain generally competitive, the mainstream opposition has, in limited instances, threatened or conducted boycotts to denounce the perceived absence of an equal playing field. For instance, the PD claimed that the 2017 parliamentary elections were fraudulent and declined to field candidates in the 2019 municipal elections in response to, among other things, the perceived inability to fairly compete with the PS. As a result of the 2019 boycott, the PS’s mayoral candidates ran unopposed in 31 out of 61 municipalities. The PD amended its position and decided to compete in the 2021 parliamentary elections following negotiations with the PS, which culminated in legislative amendments that redrew electoral districts to more accurately reflect internal migration and strengthened independent electoral oversight. The changes also addressed longstanding concerns that the CEC, whose members were previously appointed by Parliament, and lower-level electoral administration bodies are susceptible to political influence.
Despite its structural advantages, the PS has not typically won in landslide victories, indicating that there are sufficient avenues for the opposition to campaign freely and gain popular support. In 2025, the incumbent party won 52% of the popular vote, securing 82 seats out of 140 total in parliament, while DP won 32% and 52 seats. The results of the two main parties were even closer in 2021: 48.5% versus 39.4%. The DP’s worst results in 2025 also reflected the ongoing fragmentation of the party, which has split into rival factions led by former PM Sali Berisha and current party leader Lulzim Basha.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Some instances of overt editorial interference and legal harassment of critical journalists by public officials have raised concerns over the independence and impartiality of the media sector, as has the ongoing concentration of ownership in the hands of politically affiliated stakeholders. On the other hand, the government has largely upheld the freedoms of association and assembly, and civil society remains robust.
During its long tenure, the PS has taken some steps to unfairly bias media coverage in its favor, particularly by influencing state-owned outlets. In 2023, Alfred Peza, a former party member, was appointed head of the public broadcaster RTSH, where he oversaw the dismissal of about a dozen regime-critical journalists and editorial staff members. The move drew condemnation, including by the Union of Albanian journalists, an internationally recognized local watchdog. In addition to more overt editorial interference, the government has biased media coverage by directing state media subsidies disproportionately toward friendly media outlets. A prominent example is the Top Media conglomerate (and its Top Channel, once the most-watched outlet in Albania), owned by the prominent Hoxha family, which has close ties to members of the government. The Balkan Investigative and Reporting Network (BIRN) revealed that Top Media frequently received public funding under undisclosed terms from the Ministry of Tourism and the Municipality of Tirana. Unsurprisingly, Top Media consistently portrayed PS leader and PM Edi Rama positively, while frequently criticizing his counterparts in the rival PD, including Lulzim Basha and Sali Berisha.
The government and affiliated non-state actors have obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, albeit not to a systematic extent. Investigative journalists, in particular, have faced verbal harassment, smear campaigns, and arbitrary lawsuits by current and former public officials. To illustrate, in 2023, Tirana’s mayor, Erion Veliaj, publicly characterized BIRN journalist Ola Xama as a “militant” and “hired killer” after Xama reported on his possible involvement in a waste management corruption scandal. In the following weeks, pro-government outlets smeared Xama using sexist slurs and disclosed her home address. Another notable instance is a 2022 defamation lawsuit filed by former top prosecutor Elizabeta Imeraj against journalist Isa Myzyraj. Just two months before the lawsuit, Myzyraj reported he was facing threats and intimidation for commenting on Imeraj’s vetting and her alleged failure to properly disclose assets, which other channels hadn’t covered extensively. He also suggested Imeraj herself was behind some of the threats and the smearing articles he faced, exposing her links to three pro-government websites that published such materials. It was those speculations of Imeraj’s involvement in the smear campaign that formed the crux of her lawsuit against Myzyraj, which is still underway as of July 2024. The lawsuit drew criticism from international press freedom organizations, including the Council of Europe’s Platform for Safe Journalists, which stressed its potential “chilling effect” on the entire sector.
While concerning, government actions against independent media are not as systemic and overt as in undemocratic regimes, leaving sufficient room for critical reporting. As a testament to the latter, several channels that are not pro-government, such as Klan TV and TRV Ora, enjoy significant viewership. Further, according to most observers, Albania’s legal and institutional framework is still broadly conducive to a diverse and independent media sector. While raising concerns about the government’s influence on state-owned outlets and key media regulators and the ongoing concentration of ownership, Reporters Without Borders has consistently assessed Albanian media as broadly pluralistic, albeit highly polarized.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings, notwithstanding some isolated instances of excessive use of force by law enforcement during anti-government or environmental protests. In March 2025, law enforcement officers were assigned to facilitate demolitions related to a controversial water-supply project aimed at redirecting water to the tourist resort of Dhërmi. The development, valued at approximately $7 million, prompted vehement local opposition because of its potential environmental impact. After several weeks of peaceful protest, tensions escalated during the increased deployment of officers to the scene, with media reporting some physical altercations between police and local residents. Several protesters were briefly detained and released thereafter. After reaching an agreement with the affected residents, authorities halted demolition activities.
Upholding the freedom of association, the government has not unfairly shut down independent and dissenting organizations. Albania has a robust civil society, as assessed by international observers. The CIVICUS monitor placed Albania in the second-highest tier in its analysis of civic space out of five, indicating that civil society organizations (CSOs) face few barriers. While state support leaves room for improvement, such as improving tax incentives and optimizing public funding for CSOs, the legal and policy framework is already largely conducive to a robust civil society.
Albanian institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. The judiciary’s functional independence was significantly bolstered by the introduction of integrity checks for magistrates, yet shortcomings in the main judicial oversight bodies persist. The courts’ adjudication of electoral integrity and freedom of expression cases is also not entirely consistent with democratic standards. Legislative oversight of the government is formally functional, but somewhat undermined by prolonged single-party governance and high polarization. On the other hand, oversight bodies have demonstrated a growing capacity and willingness to hold political elites accountable in recent years, to favorable assessment by international experts.
The government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness, but has made only partial progress towards mitigating the legacies of institutional capture it inherited from its predecessors. In the 2000s and 2010s, the courts frequently failed to check human rights abuses and questionable public policies. As noted in several Council of Europe monitoring reports, human rights violations perpetrated by law enforcement, including the violent crackdown of the 2011 Tirana demonstrations against the DP-led government’s corruption that claimed the lives of four peaceful protesters, were mostly met with impunity. In addition, credible allegations of high-level corruption were not investigated in a timely manner, if at all.
Seeking to curtail these issues and fulfill EU accession requirements, successive governments pursued judicial reforms, with guidance from external experts. A comprehensive system for vetting judges, including avenues for appeal, was first introduced in 2016, and has proved among the more efficacious reforms according to international observers: between 2017 and 2022, when Parliament voted to extend the vetting agency’s mandate until the end of 2024, about 500 of 800 judges and prosecutors had been reviewed, of which more than 200 were dismissed. In its 2024 Country Report on Albania, the European Commission noted that vetting had led to “significant improvements” in the functioning of the judiciary and should continue as intended. On the other hand, concerns remain about the impartiality and transparency of the appointment of non-magistrate members of the High Judicial Council (HJC) and the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC). Both councils have five non-magistrate (“lay”) members and six members drawn from the ranks of the judiciary and prosecution. While lay candidates are vetted by a parliamentary commission, their subsequent confirmation (a majority vote in parliament) is inherently susceptible to political influence by the dominant party. The HJC and HPC’s functional independence or lack thereof, in turn, is highly consequential, as they directly oversee the appointment, promotion, and disciplinary measures against magistrates.
Despite these recent improvements in Albania’s judicial regulatory framework, the courts have occasionally failed to check the government’s attempts to undermine electoral competition. For instance, in a 2016 mayoral race, the prosecution did not adequately investigate plausible allegations of electoral fraud despite the existence of incriminating videotaped evidence. The recording, which aired on the national Klan TV, showed perpetrators attempting to bribe voters to support the SP candidate in the northern village of Kllobcisht. A supposed jurisdictional dispute between the local prosecutor’s office and the Serious Crime Prosecution in Tirana delayed formal charges for four years, ultimately allowing the statute of limitations to expire and leaving those responsible unpunished. The OSCE has also assessed the overall framework for electoral dispute resolution ambivalently: on the one hand, the Electoral College, the highest authority reviewing electoral disputes that consists of eight judges elected by lot among the members of the High Council of Justice, performs its duties relatively impartially and transparently. On the other hand, the OSCE has noted that the inefficient investigation of electoral irregularities by the prosecution has contributed to perceived impunity for serious crimes such as vote-buying and voter intimidation.
While generally upholding the freedom of expression, judicial institutions have also enabled the government’s efforts to repress criticism in limited but consequential instances. In 2022, the Public Prosecutor imposed a blanket ban on re-publishing data leaked after a cyberattack against the government. International watchdogs, such as the International Press Institute (IPI) and Reporters Without Borders, condemned the ban, arguing it prevented the dissemination of information “in the public interest.” The prosecution had issued such gag orders before. Earlier the same year, it precluded the media from publishing witness testimonies in a significant investigation against organized crime. In 2019, a similar order hampered the public disclosure of leaks shedding light on electoral fraud and corruption. According to local experts, such as the Albanian Association of Journalists, such bans represent a form of soft censorship that affects the entire media sector. These tactics by the prosecution contrast sharply with the courts’ adjudication of SLAPPs. The available evidence suggests that most defamation suits, albeit onerous for the defendants, do not result in convictions. According to data collected by the Albanian Association of Journalists, in 2017, only 8 out of 128 defamation suits led to convictions at the first instance, indicating a judicial reluctance to criminalize speech.
The government has not subjected legislative institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness, and Parliament continues to exercise its powers in a manner broadly consistent with democratic standards. However, the PS’s protracted single-handed dominance of the legislature and its generally adversarial relationship with the opposition have somewhat undermined Parliament’s capacity to oversee and check the executive as necessary. Observers have noted that the majority of new legislation originates from the Council of Ministers, rather than from the parliamentary floor. Clashes between the ruling majority and representatives of the opposition, resulting in obstruction of normal proceedings and lack of quorum, also repeatedly affected Parliament’s functioning in 2023 and 2024. On the other hand, executive institutions have carried out their mandates professionally, and observers have noted some improvements in public administration. The PS-led government created the new position of Minister of State for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption in January 2024, which should improve the overall coordination of accountability measures.
Despite persistent shortcomings in their overall functioning, the government has not subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational independence. It has created and empowered several key watchdog agencies, whose functioning international experts assess positively overall. The prime example is the Special Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Structure (SPAK), formed by a PS-led government in 2019. SPAK has since conducted complex high-profile corruption investigations and proven instrumental in holding political elites accountable: in 2022, its findings led to the criminal conviction of former interior minister Saimir Tahiri for abuse of power. Tahiri was sentenced to 20 months of house arrest as a result. Multiple other political elites have been indicted or remain under investigation by SPAK, including former Tirana mayor and SP member Erion Veliaj (arrested in February 2025 on corruption and money-laundering charges) and Belinda Balluku, Minister of Infrastructure (charged by SPAK in October 2025 for manipulating procurement procedures in a $190 million tunnel project).
