Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Tunisia as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
After the fall of the longtime authoritarian regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011 following the anti-establishment Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia held three presidential elections in 2014, 2019, and 2024. However, since 2019, electoral, legislative, and judicial institutions have been weakened under the authoritarian rule of President Kais Saied, who, upon taking office in October 2019, began consolidating his power by redrafting the constitution and dismantling most of the country’s democratic institutions. In July 2021, President Saied suspended parliament by ordering the military to block access to the building and ousted Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi through a self-coup. In 2022, President Saied further solidified his power by passing an unpopular constitutional referendum that substantially reduced parliamentary powers. The new constitution allowed him to circumvent the checks and balances system created following the 2011 revolution.
Elections in Tunisia are a sham, to the point where the genuine, mainstream political opposition has no realistic chance of competing and possibly winning. While Tunisia was initially viewed as a successful democratizing case in the Middle East and North Africa, the political situation has deteriorated since 2011. The electoral process under Saied has been marked by a lack of transparency, constraints on political freedoms, suppression of criticism, and persecution of opposition figures. This was especially evident in the run-up to the 2024 elections, when the regime called for early elections, tightened candidacy requirements, and imprisoned multiple candidates.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Between 2011 and 2023, the Tunisian regime dramatically restricted the space for dissent, weakening several gains made in the context of freedom of expression established after the 2011 revolution. Following his rise to power, President Saied’s rule has been marked by an increase in authoritarianism, the issuance of presidential decrees restricting press freedom legislation, ensuring greater censorship of media outlets, and an increase in the harassment and intimidation of dissidents, political opponents, and journalists.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. With President Saied’s suspension of parliament and consolidation of power in 2021, the regime significantly undermined Tunisia’s institutional accountability by dismantling legislative oversight, sidelining judicial independence, and concentrating power in the executive. As a result, the regime increased its control over judicial institutions through extraordinary measures that compromised the separation of powers, such as taking over and appointing loyalists to the Supreme Judicial Council (the institution that is meant to ensure judicial independence) and other lower courts, and issuing a series of contentious presidential decrees that threatened judicial autonomy.
Elections in Tunisia are a sham, to the point where the genuine, mainstream political opposition has no realistic chance of competing and possibly winning. In contrast to the three parliamentary elections that took place in 2011, 2014, and 2019 and the two presidential elections in 2014 and 2019, the 2024 election essentially consolidated authoritarianism. In the run-up to the 2024 elections, the regime placed significant pressure on the president’s rivals by abruptly calling for early elections and tightening candidacy requirements, causing contenders to face various challenges in completing their candidacy applications, particularly in getting the requisite 10,000 signatures and the appropriate regime-issued police background clearances. While seventeen candidates had initially submitted their candidacy bids to run for the election, only three presidential candidates were allowed to appear on the ballot, including President Saied, Zouhair Maghzaoui, secretary-general of Echaab, an Arab nationalist party that had supported Saied’s power grab in 2021, and former lawmaker and businessman Ayachi Zammel, the head of the liberal Azimoun party, who was allowed to run his campaign from prison after being sentenced to 12 years in prison on alleged charges of falsifying documents days before Tunisia’s presidential election. In 2019, President Saied was initially elected as an anti-establishment candidate who resonated with a population frustrated by corruption, economic difficulties, and political instability that followed the 2011 revolution. His rise was marked by a campaign that promised to break from the traditional political impasse and promote a new vision for Tunisia. However, following his election, President Saied undertook a series of actions that led to a significant consolidation of power, an erosion of democratic norms, and the systematic suppression of political opponents.
The regime unfairly bars real, mainstream opposition parties and candidates from competing in elections, including indirectly through judicial prosecution that leads to disqualification. Numerous candidates received prison sentences after being falsely accused of forging signatures during their 2024 or 2019 campaigns. Among those targeted were Abdellatif El Mekki, a former health minister who led the Islamist-inspired Ennahda party; Nizar Chaari, founder of the New Carthage movement, who withdrew his presidential bid in support of Saied in 2019; Neji Jalloul, a former education minister; and K2Rhym, a rapper and former President Ben Ali’s son-in-law. In September 2024, at least 97 members of the opposition group Ennahda were detained, denied access to their lawyers for 48 hours, and brought before the Anti-Terrorism Brigade for questioning. During the pre-election clampdown, the Ennahda detainees were investigated for allegedly conspiring against the state and breaching counter-terrorism laws. Among those arrested were Mohamed Guelwi, a member of the party’s executive committee, and Mohamed Ali Boukhatim, a regional party leader. Given President Saied’s consolidation of power, the 2024 elections were also marked by widespread demands for a national boycott by various dissident political groups.
With many arrested, detained, or convicted on bogus charges designed to interrupt their political activities, Tunisia’s most well-known opposition figures were blocked from participating in the 2024 elections. Among those barred from running was Rached Ghannouchi, the 83-year-old co-founder of Tunisia’s most prominent political party, Ennahda, which rose to power after the 2011 pro-democracy protests. Ghannouchi was scheduled to be released in April 2024, after being falsely charged with incitement in 2023 and sentenced to a year in prison. However, in February 2024, Ghannouchi was sentenced to three additional years in prison, under the dubious charge of receiving foreign funds, ensuring that he could not run a meaningful campaign. In February 2025, he was sentenced to an additional 22 years on charges that included “plotting against state security.” In another case, Riad Ben Fadhel, the general coordinator of the left-wing group Al Qotb, was arrested in November 2023 for allegedly violating Decree 54 after refusing to unlock his phone at the request of regime agents. Under Decree 54, which purported to combat “false information and rumours,” regime agents are allowed to seize and search phones without a warrant. In May 2024, Ben Fadhel was sentenced to an additional four and a half years in prison. Following a legal challenge by Tunisia’s election commission, Free Destourian Party President Abir Moussi was handed a two-year prison term in August 2024 under Decree 54. Moussi has been held since late 2023 on various charges, including “provoking disorder” and “inciting violence” under Article 72 of the Penal Code. These proceedings began after she attempted to contest presidential directives ahead of legislative elections, leading to what many describe as a period of arbitrary and politically charged detention. With mainstream opposition candidates blocked from participating in the electoral process, President Saied won a second term in office with more than 90 percent of the vote in an election heavily denounced by human rights groups.
The regime seriously undermines independent electoral oversight by taking control of the country’s main electoral authority, the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE). While the ISIE has supervised the various legislative, presidential, and municipal elections in Tunisia since 2011, in April 2022, President Saied issued a presidential decree granting him powers to appoint the head of ISIE and to nominate all seven members himself. The ISIE blocked several civil society groups from monitoring the October 2024 elections. The ISIE also denied accreditation requests made by at least two election monitors, including IWatch and Mourakiboun, two Tunisian organizations that have been monitoring elections since 2014. Both organizations were falsely accused of receiving suspicious foreign funding.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. In the run-up to the 2024 election, the regime ramped up its suppression of free speech under Decree-Law 2022-54 on Cybercrime and other penal laws, utilizing them to crack down on civil society groups, notably those campaigning for democratic reforms and migrants’ and refugees’ rights, resulting in an unprecedented contraction in civic space since the 2011 revolution. By May 2024, at least 40 dissidents, including political opponents, activists, human rights defenders, social media users, and lawyers, remained in detention on bogus charges relating to violating presidential decrees. By the end of 2024, the environment for dissent had deteriorated substantially, with numerous dissidents facing imprisonment and public protests effectively suppressed.
The regime unfairly shuts down or takes measures that led to the shutdown of a major independent, dissenting organization. Since 2019, the Tunisian regime has cracked down on dissenting media and implemented various measures that have impeded the work of independent news outlets, contributing to a challenging environment for press freedom. In October 2021, regime agents raided and shut down the independent outlet Zaytouna TV, days after one of its main presenters was arrested over comments, specifically a poem, critical of President Kais Saied expressed during the TV show Hassad 24. In another incident, one day after President Saied dissolved parliament in 2021, regime agents raided and shut down news outlet Al Jazeera’s Tunis bureau, ushering in the beginning of measures to roll back hard-won gains in media freedom and independence.
The regime seriously intimidates independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. Journalists in Tunisia have faced state-sponsored harassment, intimidation, and judicial intimidation for reporting on critical issues, creating a climate of fear that encourages self-censorship. According to Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF), at least six Tunisian journalists were wrongfully imprisoned in 2024, and another 40 journalists and media workers were prosecuted for doing their job. Furthermore, the National Syndicate for Tunisian Journalists (SNJT) reported that 211 journalists were attacked or prevented from working, mostly by officials and regime representatives. In February 2023, the Director General of Radio Mosaïque FM, journalist Noureddine Boutar, was arrested in the absence of any clear charges against him after regime agents searched his home, without disclosing any warrants or indicating the reason for the search. He was released in May 2023 after posting bail in the amount of one million dinars (about $323,500 USD), but remained subject to a travel ban. Over the course of his detention, he was transferred to a detention facility in Tunis, where he was questioned on the radio station’s editorial line, its financial and administrative management, sources of funding, and the mandates guiding the journalists and employees he manages.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses protests or gatherings through presidential decrees designed to block demonstrations and the use of brutal force. For example, in January 2022, at least one protester died after suffering serious injuries as a result of the excessive violence by police who attempted to disperse protests against President Kais Saied’s assumption of extra powers. In January 2021, regime security forces arrested more than 600 people as a fourth night of violent protests saw protesters return to the streets of the capital, demanding economic reforms to address rising unemployment among youth.
Institutions largely fail to check the regime. After suspending parliament in July 2021, President Saied began pursuing a series of presidential decrees, including the February 2022 decree dissolving the Supreme Judicial Council, an institution that was formed in 2016 to ensure judicial independence. Less than a week later, Saied issued another decree to establish a temporary Supreme Judicial Council, whose members he chose. The decree granted the council the right to appoint judges and oversee transfers, promotions, dismissals, and resignation requests. Saied granted himself the power to object to the appointment, promotion, transfer, or dismissal of any judge and to directly dismiss any judge himself.
Members of the judicial branch, who act contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the regime, frequently face regime retaliation. In June 2022, Saied issued a presidential decree granting himself the power to fire any judge in the country. He then proceeded to fire 57 judges, who were all framed as part of an anti-corruption campaign but were criticized as politically motivated dismissals of judges who refused to persecute political dissidents. For instance, Youssef Bouzakher, former president of the High Judicial Council and prosecutor at the Court of Cassation, was dismissed after being falsely accused of corruption and terrorism following comments he made on Facebook criticizing Saied’s power grab. After she went on strike to protest the firing of her peers, Judge Khira Ben Khlifa was prosecuted for alleged adultery charges at the time of her dismissal in June 2022, deprived of her right to resume her duties, and denied access to legal recourse.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check or enable the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. For instance, during the 2024 elections, at least three candidates successfully appealed to the Administrative Court after the ISIE rejected their applications. They included Abdellatif El Mekki, Mondher Znaidi, a former Ben Ali minister, and Imed Daimi of the center-left Congress for the Republic Party. However, the ISIE did not reverse its decision.
Courts frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In the case of opposition leader Moussi, following a complaint from the ISIE, the Tunis Court of First Instance sentenced Moussi to a two-year term for her remarks concerning legislative elections. This legal action utilized Decree-Law 54 to penalize her dissent. Moussi’s legal jeopardy began in earnest in October 2023, coinciding with her interest in the presidential race and her attempts to challenge presidential decrees in court. Currently held in pre-trial detention, she was investigated for a complex array of alleged offenses ranging from “attempting to change the form of government” (Article 72) to specific violations of data protection and labor laws (Articles 27, 87, and 136). In January 2024, the investigative judge decided to drop the charges under Article 72 but kept Moussi in pre-trial detention under the two other charges. In August 2024, she was sentenced to two additional years in prison under Decree-Law 54. In December 2025, during her third trial over the span of two years, she was sentenced to 12 years in prison as part of a sweeping crackdown on critics of President Saied.
HRF classifies Tunisia as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
After the fall of the longtime authoritarian regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011 following the anti-establishment Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia held three presidential elections in 2014, 2019, and 2024. However, since 2019, electoral, legislative, and judicial institutions have been weakened under the authoritarian rule of President Kais Saied, who, upon taking office in October 2019, began consolidating his power by redrafting the constitution and dismantling most of the country’s democratic institutions. In July 2021, President Saied suspended parliament by ordering the military to block access to the building and ousted Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi through a self-coup. In 2022, President Saied further solidified his power by passing an unpopular constitutional referendum that substantially reduced parliamentary powers. The new constitution allowed him to circumvent the checks and balances system created following the 2011 revolution.
Elections in Tunisia are a sham, to the point where the genuine, mainstream political opposition has no realistic chance of competing and possibly winning. While Tunisia was initially viewed as a successful democratizing case in the Middle East and North Africa, the political situation has deteriorated since 2011. The electoral process under Saied has been marked by a lack of transparency, constraints on political freedoms, suppression of criticism, and persecution of opposition figures. This was especially evident in the run-up to the 2024 elections, when the regime called for early elections, tightened candidacy requirements, and imprisoned multiple candidates.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Between 2011 and 2023, the Tunisian regime dramatically restricted the space for dissent, weakening several gains made in the context of freedom of expression established after the 2011 revolution. Following his rise to power, President Saied’s rule has been marked by an increase in authoritarianism, the issuance of presidential decrees restricting press freedom legislation, ensuring greater censorship of media outlets, and an increase in the harassment and intimidation of dissidents, political opponents, and journalists.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. With President Saied’s suspension of parliament and consolidation of power in 2021, the regime significantly undermined Tunisia’s institutional accountability by dismantling legislative oversight, sidelining judicial independence, and concentrating power in the executive. As a result, the regime increased its control over judicial institutions through extraordinary measures that compromised the separation of powers, such as taking over and appointing loyalists to the Supreme Judicial Council (the institution that is meant to ensure judicial independence) and other lower courts, and issuing a series of contentious presidential decrees that threatened judicial autonomy.
Elections in Tunisia are a sham, to the point where the genuine, mainstream political opposition has no realistic chance of competing and possibly winning. In contrast to the three parliamentary elections that took place in 2011, 2014, and 2019 and the two presidential elections in 2014 and 2019, the 2024 election essentially consolidated authoritarianism. In the run-up to the 2024 elections, the regime placed significant pressure on the president’s rivals by abruptly calling for early elections and tightening candidacy requirements, causing contenders to face various challenges in completing their candidacy applications, particularly in getting the requisite 10,000 signatures and the appropriate regime-issued police background clearances. While seventeen candidates had initially submitted their candidacy bids to run for the election, only three presidential candidates were allowed to appear on the ballot, including President Saied, Zouhair Maghzaoui, secretary-general of Echaab, an Arab nationalist party that had supported Saied’s power grab in 2021, and former lawmaker and businessman Ayachi Zammel, the head of the liberal Azimoun party, who was allowed to run his campaign from prison after being sentenced to 12 years in prison on alleged charges of falsifying documents days before Tunisia’s presidential election. In 2019, President Saied was initially elected as an anti-establishment candidate who resonated with a population frustrated by corruption, economic difficulties, and political instability that followed the 2011 revolution. His rise was marked by a campaign that promised to break from the traditional political impasse and promote a new vision for Tunisia. However, following his election, President Saied undertook a series of actions that led to a significant consolidation of power, an erosion of democratic norms, and the systematic suppression of political opponents.
The regime unfairly bars real, mainstream opposition parties and candidates from competing in elections, including indirectly through judicial prosecution that leads to disqualification. Numerous candidates received prison sentences after being falsely accused of forging signatures during their 2024 or 2019 campaigns. Among those targeted were Abdellatif El Mekki, a former health minister who led the Islamist-inspired Ennahda party; Nizar Chaari, founder of the New Carthage movement, who withdrew his presidential bid in support of Saied in 2019; Neji Jalloul, a former education minister; and K2Rhym, a rapper and former President Ben Ali’s son-in-law. In September 2024, at least 97 members of the opposition group Ennahda were detained, denied access to their lawyers for 48 hours, and brought before the Anti-Terrorism Brigade for questioning. During the pre-election clampdown, the Ennahda detainees were investigated for allegedly conspiring against the state and breaching counter-terrorism laws. Among those arrested were Mohamed Guelwi, a member of the party’s executive committee, and Mohamed Ali Boukhatim, a regional party leader. Given President Saied’s consolidation of power, the 2024 elections were also marked by widespread demands for a national boycott by various dissident political groups.
With many arrested, detained, or convicted on bogus charges designed to interrupt their political activities, Tunisia’s most well-known opposition figures were blocked from participating in the 2024 elections. Among those barred from running was Rached Ghannouchi, the 83-year-old co-founder of Tunisia’s most prominent political party, Ennahda, which rose to power after the 2011 pro-democracy protests. Ghannouchi was scheduled to be released in April 2024, after being falsely charged with incitement in 2023 and sentenced to a year in prison. However, in February 2024, Ghannouchi was sentenced to three additional years in prison, under the dubious charge of receiving foreign funds, ensuring that he could not run a meaningful campaign. In February 2025, he was sentenced to an additional 22 years on charges that included “plotting against state security.” In another case, Riad Ben Fadhel, the general coordinator of the left-wing group Al Qotb, was arrested in November 2023 for allegedly violating Decree 54 after refusing to unlock his phone at the request of regime agents. Under Decree 54, which purported to combat “false information and rumours,” regime agents are allowed to seize and search phones without a warrant. In May 2024, Ben Fadhel was sentenced to an additional four and a half years in prison. Following a legal challenge by Tunisia’s election commission, Free Destourian Party President Abir Moussi was handed a two-year prison term in August 2024 under Decree 54. Moussi has been held since late 2023 on various charges, including “provoking disorder” and “inciting violence” under Article 72 of the Penal Code. These proceedings began after she attempted to contest presidential directives ahead of legislative elections, leading to what many describe as a period of arbitrary and politically charged detention. With mainstream opposition candidates blocked from participating in the electoral process, President Saied won a second term in office with more than 90 percent of the vote in an election heavily denounced by human rights groups.
The regime seriously undermines independent electoral oversight by taking control of the country’s main electoral authority, the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE). While the ISIE has supervised the various legislative, presidential, and municipal elections in Tunisia since 2011, in April 2022, President Saied issued a presidential decree granting him powers to appoint the head of ISIE and to nominate all seven members himself. The ISIE blocked several civil society groups from monitoring the October 2024 elections. The ISIE also denied accreditation requests made by at least two election monitors, including IWatch and Mourakiboun, two Tunisian organizations that have been monitoring elections since 2014. Both organizations were falsely accused of receiving suspicious foreign funding.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. In the run-up to the 2024 election, the regime ramped up its suppression of free speech under Decree-Law 2022-54 on Cybercrime and other penal laws, utilizing them to crack down on civil society groups, notably those campaigning for democratic reforms and migrants’ and refugees’ rights, resulting in an unprecedented contraction in civic space since the 2011 revolution. By May 2024, at least 40 dissidents, including political opponents, activists, human rights defenders, social media users, and lawyers, remained in detention on bogus charges relating to violating presidential decrees. By the end of 2024, the environment for dissent had deteriorated substantially, with numerous dissidents facing imprisonment and public protests effectively suppressed.
The regime unfairly shuts down or takes measures that led to the shutdown of a major independent, dissenting organization. Since 2019, the Tunisian regime has cracked down on dissenting media and implemented various measures that have impeded the work of independent news outlets, contributing to a challenging environment for press freedom. In October 2021, regime agents raided and shut down the independent outlet Zaytouna TV, days after one of its main presenters was arrested over comments, specifically a poem, critical of President Kais Saied expressed during the TV show Hassad 24. In another incident, one day after President Saied dissolved parliament in 2021, regime agents raided and shut down news outlet Al Jazeera’s Tunis bureau, ushering in the beginning of measures to roll back hard-won gains in media freedom and independence.
The regime seriously intimidates independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. Journalists in Tunisia have faced state-sponsored harassment, intimidation, and judicial intimidation for reporting on critical issues, creating a climate of fear that encourages self-censorship. According to Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF), at least six Tunisian journalists were wrongfully imprisoned in 2024, and another 40 journalists and media workers were prosecuted for doing their job. Furthermore, the National Syndicate for Tunisian Journalists (SNJT) reported that 211 journalists were attacked or prevented from working, mostly by officials and regime representatives. In February 2023, the Director General of Radio Mosaïque FM, journalist Noureddine Boutar, was arrested in the absence of any clear charges against him after regime agents searched his home, without disclosing any warrants or indicating the reason for the search. He was released in May 2023 after posting bail in the amount of one million dinars (about $323,500 USD), but remained subject to a travel ban. Over the course of his detention, he was transferred to a detention facility in Tunis, where he was questioned on the radio station’s editorial line, its financial and administrative management, sources of funding, and the mandates guiding the journalists and employees he manages.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses protests or gatherings through presidential decrees designed to block demonstrations and the use of brutal force. For example, in January 2022, at least one protester died after suffering serious injuries as a result of the excessive violence by police who attempted to disperse protests against President Kais Saied’s assumption of extra powers. In January 2021, regime security forces arrested more than 600 people as a fourth night of violent protests saw protesters return to the streets of the capital, demanding economic reforms to address rising unemployment among youth.
Institutions largely fail to check the regime. After suspending parliament in July 2021, President Saied began pursuing a series of presidential decrees, including the February 2022 decree dissolving the Supreme Judicial Council, an institution that was formed in 2016 to ensure judicial independence. Less than a week later, Saied issued another decree to establish a temporary Supreme Judicial Council, whose members he chose. The decree granted the council the right to appoint judges and oversee transfers, promotions, dismissals, and resignation requests. Saied granted himself the power to object to the appointment, promotion, transfer, or dismissal of any judge and to directly dismiss any judge himself.
Members of the judicial branch, who act contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the regime, frequently face regime retaliation. In June 2022, Saied issued a presidential decree granting himself the power to fire any judge in the country. He then proceeded to fire 57 judges, who were all framed as part of an anti-corruption campaign but were criticized as politically motivated dismissals of judges who refused to persecute political dissidents. For instance, Youssef Bouzakher, former president of the High Judicial Council and prosecutor at the Court of Cassation, was dismissed after being falsely accused of corruption and terrorism following comments he made on Facebook criticizing Saied’s power grab. After she went on strike to protest the firing of her peers, Judge Khira Ben Khlifa was prosecuted for alleged adultery charges at the time of her dismissal in June 2022, deprived of her right to resume her duties, and denied access to legal recourse.
Courts frequently and unfairly fail to check or enable the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. For instance, during the 2024 elections, at least three candidates successfully appealed to the Administrative Court after the ISIE rejected their applications. They included Abdellatif El Mekki, Mondher Znaidi, a former Ben Ali minister, and Imed Daimi of the center-left Congress for the Republic Party. However, the ISIE did not reverse its decision.
Courts frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enabled the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. In the case of opposition leader Moussi, following a complaint from the ISIE, the Tunis Court of First Instance sentenced Moussi to a two-year term for her remarks concerning legislative elections. This legal action utilized Decree-Law 54 to penalize her dissent. Moussi’s legal jeopardy began in earnest in October 2023, coinciding with her interest in the presidential race and her attempts to challenge presidential decrees in court. Currently held in pre-trial detention, she was investigated for a complex array of alleged offenses ranging from “attempting to change the form of government” (Article 72) to specific violations of data protection and labor laws (Articles 27, 87, and 136). In January 2024, the investigative judge decided to drop the charges under Article 72 but kept Moussi in pre-trial detention under the two other charges. In August 2024, she was sentenced to two additional years in prison under Decree-Law 54. In December 2025, during her third trial over the span of two years, she was sentenced to 12 years in prison as part of a sweeping crackdown on critics of President Saied.
