Hybrid Authoritarian
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HRF classifies Pakistan as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Since gaining independence from British rule in 1947, Pakistan’s political landscape has been characterized by an ongoing tension between democratic aspirations and recurrent military interventions, with generals seizing power from civilian governments in 1958, 1977, and 1999. Despite these challenges, the democratic framework has progressively evolved, as seen in the regular transfers of power that have taken place almost every four years since 2008. Nonetheless, the military, commonly known as “the establishment,” remains a significant force in shaping domestic and foreign policy, particularly amid recurrent border conflicts with India and insurgencies in the Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. Following a no-confidence motion and subsequent removal of Prime Minister Imran Khan in April 2022, the parliament selected Shehbaz Sharif, leader of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), as prime minister. Sharif was inaugurated in April 2022 and remained in office until August 2023, when a caretaker government was seated to oversee the February 2024 general election. Sharif was reelected prime minister in the delayed general election and sworn in for a second term that March.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The military frequently interferes in the electoral process by seriously limiting the ability of opposition candidates and parties to campaign freely. The incumbent and military have selectively targeted opposition leaders, organized harassment campaigns against them, and manipulated the media in an effort to favor the military-backed party. Since 2008, successive electoral cycles have been marred by significant voting irregularities and outbursts of violence, although election authorities have consistently denied widespread rigging.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Sharif government has relied on repressive laws, expanded law enforcement capabilities, and tightened control over online spaces to stifle dissent and undermine the opposition. Amid high protest activity since 2023, state authorities have responded to demonstrations with excessive force and mass arrests. Moreover, cases of arbitrary killings and disappearances of journalists and minority groups have been widespread. To further limit criticism, the Sharif regime has hardened penalties for online disinformation, established censorship boards, and ordered temporary bans on social networks and other websites. The government has also engaged in transnational repression against journalists abroad by harassing family members, working with foreign security services, and recruiting hitmen.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. The judiciary has frequently sided with the incumbent and facilitated its efforts to sideline the main opposition during elections. Through selective accountability mechanisms, courts have dismissed or delayed cases involving prominent regime officials, while disproportionately prosecuting opposition figures. Moreover, anti-terrorism laws have allowed for the prosecution of civilians in military courts, including opposition party members and supporters. Finally, a series of constitutional amendments has recently extended political influence over the structure and functioning of the judiciary, further crippling its independence.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The influence of the military on the electoral process significantly affects the ability of opposition candidates and parties to run for elections and campaign freely. Tactics such as politically-motivated prosecutions and arrests, harassment of opposition figures, and media manipulation contribute to an uneven playing field that favors the military-backed party. Successive electoral cycles after 2008 have been marred by significant voting irregularities and episodes of violence, although election authorities have consistently denied widespread rigging.
The incumbent regime has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition candidates from competing in elections. Major political figures critical of the military’s outsized role in politics have been subjected to removal from office, electoral disqualification, and even arrests. In 2023, former Prime Minister and founder of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party Imran Khan, who was in office from 2018 to 2022, was disqualified from holding public office and barred from running in the 2023 general election based on what were widely seen as politically motivated charges, including the misreporting of state gifts. Just days before the vote, Khan and his wife were sentenced to seven years in jail over what authorities described as “unlawful marriage.” International observers interpreted Khan’s disqualification as an attempt by the military to limit his political influence amid his increasing criticism of the military’s unconstitutional overreach in governance. Khan was again sentenced to 14 and 17 years of imprisonment in two separate corruption cases in 2025. A similar pattern was present prior to the 2018 elections, when former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, founder of the now-governing PML-N, was removed from office in 2017 after being implicated in a number of corruption scandals. His dismissal resulted in a ten-year prison sentence and a lifetime disqualification from holding public office. Analysts pointed to the military’s covert role in engineering Nawaz’s disqualification, following his repeated criticism of the armed forces. Other prominent PML-N figures, including the former Minister for Privatization Daniyal Aziz (2017-2018) and former Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi (2017-2018), were also disqualified from contesting elections for five years and for life, respectively.
The influence of the military on Pakistan’s electoral process has also systematically and unfairly undermined the ability of opposition parties to campaign freely. Reflecting the military’s shift in support from the PTI in 2018 to the PML-N in 2024, opposition parties encountered significant barriers to organizing campaign activity, while their supporters reported incidents of harassment and intimidation. In 2024, the PTI’s campaign visibility was significantly curtailed when the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and the Supreme Court barred the party from using its iconic cricket bat symbol, citing irregularities in its intra-party elections. In response to this decision, all PTI candidates had to contest the 2024 elections independently, though they maintained explicit support for the party. PTI-aligned independent candidates managed to win a significant number of seats in the parliament — 92 out of 336 — with most of them subsequently joining the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC), an Islamic political party that had not contested the election, in order to be eligible for reserved seats. In a similar vein, prior to the 2018 elections, up to 17,000 PML-N supporters faced criminal investigations for their support of the party. At the same time, several media outlets were pressured or restricted from covering the PML-N, including the English-language newspaper Dawn, which has traditionally held sympathetic views toward the PML-N and was subjected to distribution restrictions across the country.
Over time, it has become evident that the party that obtains the support of the military systematically enjoys significant and unfair campaign advantages. Through the military’s pervasive influence over politics, the regime has used selective accountability measures, media manipulation, and pressure against opposition party members to secure an upper hand over its rivals. Ahead of the 2024 elections, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) rejected multiple electoral nominees from the PTI, and a large number of party leaders left the PTI following undue pressure and risk of arrest. Moreover, the postponement of the elections from November 2023 to February 2024 was viewed by the opposition as a two-fold strategy aimed at undermining Imran Khan’s PTI by amending constituency borders and providing additional time to Nawaz Sharif to return from self-imposed exile in the United Kingdom ahead of the January 2024 Supreme Court decision that lifted his disqualification, restoring his eligibility for public office. Similar tactics were also present during the 2018 electoral cycle, including disqualifications and politically-motivated prosecutions. However, in 2018, the military was accused of manipulating the electoral process in favor of Khan and the PTI, particularly through its influence over the Supreme Court. A European Union monitoring team further confirmed a “systematic effort to undermine the former ruling party” and a “lack of equality and opportunity” during the electoral process.
The caretaker government installed in August 2023, widely seen as close to the military, oversaw the delayed general election in February 2024, which featured significant voting irregularities. Although no conclusive evidence has confirmed widespread rigging, the 2024 election was marked by a serious lack of transparency. Following protests challenging the results of the elections, Rawalpindi Commissioner Liaqat Ali Chatta was arrested after admitting to election rigging in the Punjab province. He also accused the chief election commissioner and the chief justice at the time of taking part in doctoring the results of independent candidates. Both officials implicated by Chatta denied these allegations. The general elections of 2018 and 2013 were likewise characterized by incidents of violence and accusations of electoral fraud from the main opposition parties, although electoral bodies consistently reaffirmed their commitment to free and fair elections.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Sharif government has relied on vaguely defined laws to criminalize dissent, expanded law enforcement powers, tightened control over online spaces, and coordinated with the military to suppress key political figures. Since the May 9, 2023, protests, state authorities have responded to demonstrations with excessive force, mass arrests, and lethal violence. Killings and enforced disappearances of dissidents have been widespread, targeting journalists and minority groups specifically. To further limit criticism of state officials, the regime has hardened penalties for online disinformation, established censorship boards, and ordered temporary bans on social media platforms and other websites. The government has also carried out international reprisals against journalists abroad through harassment of family members, collaboration with foreign security services, and the recruitment of non-state actors. Finally, anti-terrorism legislation has been weaponized to curb minority rights activists and groups across the country.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated and obstructed the work of independent journalists, media outlets, activists, and political opponents. The Sharif government has used vague laws to criminalize dissent, increased law enforcement capabilities, extended state control over online spaces, and engaged with the military to target key political figures. While being struck down by the Lahore High Court in March 2023, state officials outside Punjab have continued resorting to Section 124-A of the Penal Code, which criminalizes sedition, to stifle dissent. In August 2023, human rights lawyer Imaan Mazari and former member of the National Assembly and leader of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), Ali Wazir, were charged with sedition and arrested after speaking at a rally criticizing the military’s role in a series of arbitrary killings and enforced disappearances in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Moreover, the Sharif government has toughened anti-terror laws, including the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), by extending the “preventive detention” powers of law enforcement authorities and the military to detain individuals suspected of terrorism and other serious offenses for up to three months without trial. Measures criminalizing online dissent, including defamation, have also been strengthened after the parliament amended the 2016 Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) in January 2025, criminalizing the spread of “false and fake information” with fines of up to 2 million rupees (approximately $7,200 at the time) or imprisonment for up to three years. According to government officials, between January and September 2025, over 1,200 cases were registered under PECA, including 10 against journalists. In March 2025, Muhammad Waheed Murad, an Urdu News reporter known for criticizing Pakistan’s army, was charged with “cyber terrorism” and spreading “false and fake information,” and was arrested after being abducted from his home by intelligence officials.
Dissenting speech has been systematically and unfairly censored by the Sharif regime. To limit criticism of state officials and other institutions, the regime has used a combination of punitive legal measures, enhanced regulatory oversight, and restrictions on social media platforms and other media outlets. Beyond increasing penalties for sharing fake information online, the 2025 PECA amendment requires social media platforms to register with the newly established Social Media Protection and Regulatory Authority (SMPRA), subjecting them to any conditions that the Authority deems “appropriate” upon registration. Moreover, in September 2025, the government proposed new changes to the act that would reduce protections against direct legal liability for internet service providers (ISPs) and social media platforms if they failed to comply with content removal orders. Some of these platforms have already faced temporary bans in the past. For instance, around 10 days after the 2024 elections, the government imposed a nationwide ban on X that lasted around 15 months as users shared claims about alleged rigging on the platform. Previously, in 2023, Wikipedia was blocked for allegedly hosting “blasphemous content.” In the same year, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulations Authority (PEMRA) enforced a broad censorship program prohibiting all media outlets from broadcasting Khan’s speeches and news conferences. ARY News, a pro-PTI television channel, was temporarily banned through a license suspension in 2023 for allegedly inciting violence and airing anti-government content during the unrest that followed Khan’s arrest on May 9 that year. In 2022, the same authority threatened legal action against satellite TV channels that spread propaganda, misinformation, or disinformation against state institutions. Additionally, in the conflict-ridden provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistani authorities have ordered local journalists and newspapers to cease reporting on separatist activities, further restricting the flow of independent information. Finally, the Central Board of Film Censors restricts movie screenings on politically sensitive topics, and books dealing with political issues, the military, or religion are subject to scrutiny and have been either banned or restricted.
In Pakistan, protests have been met with systematic and serious repression. Since 2023, state authorities have responded to demonstrations with excessive police force, mass arrests, and lethal violence. Following Khan’s arrest on May 9, 2023, large-scale demonstrations spread across the country, demanding the former prime minister’s release. Almost one year later, after the 2024 elections, protests sparked again in support of the PTI, after the party called for its supporters to demand the restoration of their “stolen mandate.” Although some of these protests turned violent, international observers have criticized the response of law enforcement authorities for having used excessive and unnecessary force against the protests, leading to killings and indiscriminate mass arrests. At least eight people died in 2023, and thousands were arrested on multiple charges, including terrorism. Although many were released, others remained in custody, where they were subjected to trials in military courts. In October 2024, over 500 people were arrested, and dozens of protesters and police were reportedly injured. In November 2024, the regime imposed a two-month ban on gatherings of five or more people in Islamabad ahead of a planned march by Khan’s supporters. This, however, did not stop the protests in support of the former leader, resulting in over 4,000 detentions by the police and 12 PTI supporters being killed. Furthermore, in July 2025, the Faisalabad Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) sentenced 108 PTI supporters over their role during the May 9 protests, including senior party leaders. Among them, Omar Ayub Khan and Syed Shibli Faraz, former opposition leaders in the National Assembly and Senate, received 10-year prison sentences and were disqualified from their roles.
Killings and enforced disappearances of dissidents have been systematic, targeting journalists and minority groups specifically. According to a UNESCO database, more than 100 journalists have been killed between 1993 and 2024, making Pakistan one of the worst-performing countries in press freedom. Observers have noted that members of marginalized groups in Pakistan are overrepresented among the victims of these abuses. For the period between January and June 2025, the Human Rights Council of Balochistan reported 814 enforced disappearances of students, activists, and ordinary citizens, almost the same number as in the whole of 2024, and at least 131 cases of killings without trial. Similarly, in the south-eastern province of Sindh, state security forces have been carrying out abductions and torture as part of their strategy to curb Sindh nationalism, leading to approximately 500 cases of enforced disappearances as of July 2024, mostly affecting young students and Sindh rights activists.
Dissidents abroad have been systematically repressed by or on behalf of the regime. State authorities have carried out international reprisals against journalists who are critical of the government and the military by targeting their family members residing in Pakistan, collaborating with foreign security services, or recruiting non-state actors overseas. In March 2025, 20 armed men believed to be officials from the Islamabad Police and the Inter-Services Intelligence forcibly disappeared two brothers of US-based journalist Ahmad Noorani after he published an investigation on his website exposing the appointment of family members of Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff, to high-level positions. In August 2022, Pakistani journalist Syed Fawad Ali Shah, who had reported on enforced disappearances linked to Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, was deported from Malaysia, where he was registered as a refugee, upon the request of Pakistan’s High Commission in Kuala Lumpur. Shah was imprisoned for five months and tortured, and later charged with defamation, intimidation of officials, and disseminating disinformation online. In February 2020, Ahmad Waqass Goraya, a Netherlands-based political reporter who worked on human rights abuses by the Pakistani military, was attacked in Rotterdam. He later claimed that the attacker followed the orders of the Pakistani intelligence services through a middleman. Two years later, a British hitman was convicted by a UK court of conspiracy to murder Goraya.
Finally, marginalized groups in Pakistan have been systematically and disproportionately prevented from voicing dissent. The regime has resorted to anti-terrorism legislation and police violence to curb minority rights activists and groups. In October 2024, ahead of a planned demonstration in the Khyber district, the government banned the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, a grassroots organization that peacefully advocates for the rights of the Pashtun people (the second largest ethnic group of Pakistan), by listing it as a “proscribed organization” under the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act. PTM’s leader, Manzoor Pashteen, had been charged with sedition in 2020 after accusing the army of human rights abuses and enforced disappearances. He has since faced multiple arrests for organizing rallies and criticizing state officials. Following the government’s decision to outlaw the PTM, Pashtun rights advocates took to the streets and were met by a violent crackdown by police forces, leading to at least three deaths.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. The judiciary has frequently sided with the Sharif government and issued rulings that undermined the ability of opposition parties like the PTI to compete freely, which tilts the playing field in favor of the governing coalition. Selective accountability mechanisms ensure that courts dismiss or delay cases involving prominent regime officials, while disproportionately prosecuting opposition figures whenever such actions are aligned with the interests of the military. Moreover, anti-terrorism laws have allowed the prosecution of civilians, including major PTI supporters and members involved in the May 9 protests, in military courts. Finally, new legislation has extended political influence over the structure and functioning of the judiciary.
Courts have unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition. The judiciary has frequently sided with the Sharif government and issued rulings that undermined the ability of opposition parties to compete freely and tilted the playing field in favor of the governing coalition. In January 2025, former Prime Minister Imran Khan was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment on charges of misuse of authority and corruption. Although courts have overturned or suspended many of Khan’s earlier convictions, in December 2025, he was again sentenced to 17 years in prison in a separate graft case. Observers have denounced a pattern of weaponization of the legal system, characterized by multiple fair trial violations, aimed at keeping Khan distant from national politics, thereby weakening the opposition’s ability to challenge the regime. Additionally, in June 2025, the Supreme Court further consolidated the ruling coalition’s dominance by overruling its own 2024 decision that had granted the PTI/SIC reserved seats in the parliament. Citing legal and procedural flaws in the earlier decision, the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Bench stripped the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf of its 22 reserved seats in the National Assembly and reassigned them to the ruling coalition, effectively giving the ruling coalition a two-thirds majority in the parliament, which is the threshold needed to pass constitutional amendments.
The judiciary has frequently and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable, while at times facing pressure from the regime to target certain opposition figures. This has resulted in selective accountability, with courts dismissing or delaying cases involving prominent regime officials, while being incentivized to prosecute opposition figures whenever such actions are aligned with the interests of the military. Upon the PML-N’s return to power in 2024, in September, the Punjab regional government announced its decision to dismiss various politically motivated cases, including terrorism, against PML-N members, originally filed during the Khan administration. In March of that year, six out of eight members of the Islamabad High Court submitted a letter to the Supreme Court accusing the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of intimidating them and their families through abductions, torture, and secret surveillance in order to influence judicial decisions in certain high-profile cases. Additionally, disproportionate legal attacks against PTI members also took place following the events on May 9, as many have been charged of inciting terrorism, arson, and public disorder. While the judiciary attempted to uphold due process, the military continued to exercise its influence by promptly re-arresting members of the PTI on new charges or holding them under preventive detention laws. For instance, Chaudhry Parvez Elahi, a senior PTI leader, faced a series of arrests and releases, with court orders frequently discharging him from cases or granting bail, only for him to be immediately re-arrested on different charges.
The regime has systematically directed cases to separate, regime-controlled courts. In Pakistan, military courts are statutorily empowered to try civilians accused of terrorism. In May 2025, the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Bench overturned a previous decision of October 2023 that had declared the trial of civilians involved in the May 9 protests in military courts null and void. The bench justified its reversal on the grounds that the previous ruling, which struck down three provisions of the 1952 Pakistan Army Act (PAA), hindered the prosecution of individuals involved in the attacks on nearly 40 military installations and public buildings during the May 9 protests. Previously amended in 2015, following the deadly Peshawar school massacre, the PAA expanded military courts’ jurisdiction over civilians charged with terrorism. Since then, military courts have increasingly been used to handle politically sensitive cases, such as the 105 prosecutions related to the May 9 demonstrations.
Finally, systematic reforms have seriously weakened the operational independence of judicial institutions. The 27th constitutional amendment, passed by parliament in November 2025, introduced significant changes in the structure and functioning of the judicial system. The amendment creates a new Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) with exclusive jurisdiction over federal-provincial disputes and constitutional interpretation, effectively redirecting core functions away from the Supreme Court, which had previously exercised this role through ad hoc benches. The amendment further consolidates executive influence over appointments by granting the President the authority to nominate the inaugural group of FCC judges, including the chief justice, with the Prime Minister’s advice. After these first mandates, the Chief Justice will be appointed by a Special Parliamentary Committee (SPC), consisting uniquely of members of the National Assembly and Senate, while the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP) will propose candidates for the court’s remaining seats. The revised composition of the JCP has also raised serious concerns, as it now includes executive appointments, namely the FCC’s chief justice and one other judge, as well as five members of the parliament chosen by the speaker of the National Assembly. Moreover, under the new revision, the president may transfer judges from one high court to another on the JCP’s recommendation, increasing the range of retaliatory measures available to the regime to ensure judicial compliance. Judges who refuse reassignment may be subjected to disciplinary proceedings by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC). Finally, the amendment prevents courts from prosecuting key office holders such as the president and the chief of the armed forces via lifelong constitutional immunities, fundamentally shielding high-ranking public officials from accountability.
HRF classifies Pakistan as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
Since gaining independence from British rule in 1947, Pakistan’s political landscape has been characterized by an ongoing tension between democratic aspirations and recurrent military interventions, with generals seizing power from civilian governments in 1958, 1977, and 1999. Despite these challenges, the democratic framework has progressively evolved, as seen in the regular transfers of power that have taken place almost every four years since 2008. Nonetheless, the military, commonly known as “the establishment,” remains a significant force in shaping domestic and foreign policy, particularly amid recurrent border conflicts with India and insurgencies in the Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. Following a no-confidence motion and subsequent removal of Prime Minister Imran Khan in April 2022, the parliament selected Shehbaz Sharif, leader of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), as prime minister. Sharif was inaugurated in April 2022 and remained in office until August 2023, when a caretaker government was seated to oversee the February 2024 general election. Sharif was reelected prime minister in the delayed general election and sworn in for a second term that March.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The military frequently interferes in the electoral process by seriously limiting the ability of opposition candidates and parties to campaign freely. The incumbent and military have selectively targeted opposition leaders, organized harassment campaigns against them, and manipulated the media in an effort to favor the military-backed party. Since 2008, successive electoral cycles have been marred by significant voting irregularities and outbursts of violence, although election authorities have consistently denied widespread rigging.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Sharif government has relied on repressive laws, expanded law enforcement capabilities, and tightened control over online spaces to stifle dissent and undermine the opposition. Amid high protest activity since 2023, state authorities have responded to demonstrations with excessive force and mass arrests. Moreover, cases of arbitrary killings and disappearances of journalists and minority groups have been widespread. To further limit criticism, the Sharif regime has hardened penalties for online disinformation, established censorship boards, and ordered temporary bans on social networks and other websites. The government has also engaged in transnational repression against journalists abroad by harassing family members, working with foreign security services, and recruiting hitmen.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. The judiciary has frequently sided with the incumbent and facilitated its efforts to sideline the main opposition during elections. Through selective accountability mechanisms, courts have dismissed or delayed cases involving prominent regime officials, while disproportionately prosecuting opposition figures. Moreover, anti-terrorism laws have allowed for the prosecution of civilians in military courts, including opposition party members and supporters. Finally, a series of constitutional amendments has recently extended political influence over the structure and functioning of the judiciary, further crippling its independence.
Electoral competition is significantly skewed in favor of the regime, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition has a highly unlikely, although realistic chance to win. The influence of the military on the electoral process significantly affects the ability of opposition candidates and parties to run for elections and campaign freely. Tactics such as politically-motivated prosecutions and arrests, harassment of opposition figures, and media manipulation contribute to an uneven playing field that favors the military-backed party. Successive electoral cycles after 2008 have been marred by significant voting irregularities and episodes of violence, although election authorities have consistently denied widespread rigging.
The incumbent regime has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition candidates from competing in elections. Major political figures critical of the military’s outsized role in politics have been subjected to removal from office, electoral disqualification, and even arrests. In 2023, former Prime Minister and founder of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party Imran Khan, who was in office from 2018 to 2022, was disqualified from holding public office and barred from running in the 2023 general election based on what were widely seen as politically motivated charges, including the misreporting of state gifts. Just days before the vote, Khan and his wife were sentenced to seven years in jail over what authorities described as “unlawful marriage.” International observers interpreted Khan’s disqualification as an attempt by the military to limit his political influence amid his increasing criticism of the military’s unconstitutional overreach in governance. Khan was again sentenced to 14 and 17 years of imprisonment in two separate corruption cases in 2025. A similar pattern was present prior to the 2018 elections, when former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, founder of the now-governing PML-N, was removed from office in 2017 after being implicated in a number of corruption scandals. His dismissal resulted in a ten-year prison sentence and a lifetime disqualification from holding public office. Analysts pointed to the military’s covert role in engineering Nawaz’s disqualification, following his repeated criticism of the armed forces. Other prominent PML-N figures, including the former Minister for Privatization Daniyal Aziz (2017-2018) and former Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi (2017-2018), were also disqualified from contesting elections for five years and for life, respectively.
The influence of the military on Pakistan’s electoral process has also systematically and unfairly undermined the ability of opposition parties to campaign freely. Reflecting the military’s shift in support from the PTI in 2018 to the PML-N in 2024, opposition parties encountered significant barriers to organizing campaign activity, while their supporters reported incidents of harassment and intimidation. In 2024, the PTI’s campaign visibility was significantly curtailed when the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and the Supreme Court barred the party from using its iconic cricket bat symbol, citing irregularities in its intra-party elections. In response to this decision, all PTI candidates had to contest the 2024 elections independently, though they maintained explicit support for the party. PTI-aligned independent candidates managed to win a significant number of seats in the parliament — 92 out of 336 — with most of them subsequently joining the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC), an Islamic political party that had not contested the election, in order to be eligible for reserved seats. In a similar vein, prior to the 2018 elections, up to 17,000 PML-N supporters faced criminal investigations for their support of the party. At the same time, several media outlets were pressured or restricted from covering the PML-N, including the English-language newspaper Dawn, which has traditionally held sympathetic views toward the PML-N and was subjected to distribution restrictions across the country.
Over time, it has become evident that the party that obtains the support of the military systematically enjoys significant and unfair campaign advantages. Through the military’s pervasive influence over politics, the regime has used selective accountability measures, media manipulation, and pressure against opposition party members to secure an upper hand over its rivals. Ahead of the 2024 elections, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) rejected multiple electoral nominees from the PTI, and a large number of party leaders left the PTI following undue pressure and risk of arrest. Moreover, the postponement of the elections from November 2023 to February 2024 was viewed by the opposition as a two-fold strategy aimed at undermining Imran Khan’s PTI by amending constituency borders and providing additional time to Nawaz Sharif to return from self-imposed exile in the United Kingdom ahead of the January 2024 Supreme Court decision that lifted his disqualification, restoring his eligibility for public office. Similar tactics were also present during the 2018 electoral cycle, including disqualifications and politically-motivated prosecutions. However, in 2018, the military was accused of manipulating the electoral process in favor of Khan and the PTI, particularly through its influence over the Supreme Court. A European Union monitoring team further confirmed a “systematic effort to undermine the former ruling party” and a “lack of equality and opportunity” during the electoral process.
The caretaker government installed in August 2023, widely seen as close to the military, oversaw the delayed general election in February 2024, which featured significant voting irregularities. Although no conclusive evidence has confirmed widespread rigging, the 2024 election was marked by a serious lack of transparency. Following protests challenging the results of the elections, Rawalpindi Commissioner Liaqat Ali Chatta was arrested after admitting to election rigging in the Punjab province. He also accused the chief election commissioner and the chief justice at the time of taking part in doctoring the results of independent candidates. Both officials implicated by Chatta denied these allegations. The general elections of 2018 and 2013 were likewise characterized by incidents of violence and accusations of electoral fraud from the main opposition parties, although electoral bodies consistently reaffirmed their commitment to free and fair elections.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Sharif government has relied on vaguely defined laws to criminalize dissent, expanded law enforcement powers, tightened control over online spaces, and coordinated with the military to suppress key political figures. Since the May 9, 2023, protests, state authorities have responded to demonstrations with excessive force, mass arrests, and lethal violence. Killings and enforced disappearances of dissidents have been widespread, targeting journalists and minority groups specifically. To further limit criticism of state officials, the regime has hardened penalties for online disinformation, established censorship boards, and ordered temporary bans on social media platforms and other websites. The government has also carried out international reprisals against journalists abroad through harassment of family members, collaboration with foreign security services, and the recruitment of non-state actors. Finally, anti-terrorism legislation has been weaponized to curb minority rights activists and groups across the country.
The regime has systematically and seriously intimidated and obstructed the work of independent journalists, media outlets, activists, and political opponents. The Sharif government has used vague laws to criminalize dissent, increased law enforcement capabilities, extended state control over online spaces, and engaged with the military to target key political figures. While being struck down by the Lahore High Court in March 2023, state officials outside Punjab have continued resorting to Section 124-A of the Penal Code, which criminalizes sedition, to stifle dissent. In August 2023, human rights lawyer Imaan Mazari and former member of the National Assembly and leader of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), Ali Wazir, were charged with sedition and arrested after speaking at a rally criticizing the military’s role in a series of arbitrary killings and enforced disappearances in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Moreover, the Sharif government has toughened anti-terror laws, including the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), by extending the “preventive detention” powers of law enforcement authorities and the military to detain individuals suspected of terrorism and other serious offenses for up to three months without trial. Measures criminalizing online dissent, including defamation, have also been strengthened after the parliament amended the 2016 Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) in January 2025, criminalizing the spread of “false and fake information” with fines of up to 2 million rupees (approximately $7,200 at the time) or imprisonment for up to three years. According to government officials, between January and September 2025, over 1,200 cases were registered under PECA, including 10 against journalists. In March 2025, Muhammad Waheed Murad, an Urdu News reporter known for criticizing Pakistan’s army, was charged with “cyber terrorism” and spreading “false and fake information,” and was arrested after being abducted from his home by intelligence officials.
Dissenting speech has been systematically and unfairly censored by the Sharif regime. To limit criticism of state officials and other institutions, the regime has used a combination of punitive legal measures, enhanced regulatory oversight, and restrictions on social media platforms and other media outlets. Beyond increasing penalties for sharing fake information online, the 2025 PECA amendment requires social media platforms to register with the newly established Social Media Protection and Regulatory Authority (SMPRA), subjecting them to any conditions that the Authority deems “appropriate” upon registration. Moreover, in September 2025, the government proposed new changes to the act that would reduce protections against direct legal liability for internet service providers (ISPs) and social media platforms if they failed to comply with content removal orders. Some of these platforms have already faced temporary bans in the past. For instance, around 10 days after the 2024 elections, the government imposed a nationwide ban on X that lasted around 15 months as users shared claims about alleged rigging on the platform. Previously, in 2023, Wikipedia was blocked for allegedly hosting “blasphemous content.” In the same year, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulations Authority (PEMRA) enforced a broad censorship program prohibiting all media outlets from broadcasting Khan’s speeches and news conferences. ARY News, a pro-PTI television channel, was temporarily banned through a license suspension in 2023 for allegedly inciting violence and airing anti-government content during the unrest that followed Khan’s arrest on May 9 that year. In 2022, the same authority threatened legal action against satellite TV channels that spread propaganda, misinformation, or disinformation against state institutions. Additionally, in the conflict-ridden provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistani authorities have ordered local journalists and newspapers to cease reporting on separatist activities, further restricting the flow of independent information. Finally, the Central Board of Film Censors restricts movie screenings on politically sensitive topics, and books dealing with political issues, the military, or religion are subject to scrutiny and have been either banned or restricted.
In Pakistan, protests have been met with systematic and serious repression. Since 2023, state authorities have responded to demonstrations with excessive police force, mass arrests, and lethal violence. Following Khan’s arrest on May 9, 2023, large-scale demonstrations spread across the country, demanding the former prime minister’s release. Almost one year later, after the 2024 elections, protests sparked again in support of the PTI, after the party called for its supporters to demand the restoration of their “stolen mandate.” Although some of these protests turned violent, international observers have criticized the response of law enforcement authorities for having used excessive and unnecessary force against the protests, leading to killings and indiscriminate mass arrests. At least eight people died in 2023, and thousands were arrested on multiple charges, including terrorism. Although many were released, others remained in custody, where they were subjected to trials in military courts. In October 2024, over 500 people were arrested, and dozens of protesters and police were reportedly injured. In November 2024, the regime imposed a two-month ban on gatherings of five or more people in Islamabad ahead of a planned march by Khan’s supporters. This, however, did not stop the protests in support of the former leader, resulting in over 4,000 detentions by the police and 12 PTI supporters being killed. Furthermore, in July 2025, the Faisalabad Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) sentenced 108 PTI supporters over their role during the May 9 protests, including senior party leaders. Among them, Omar Ayub Khan and Syed Shibli Faraz, former opposition leaders in the National Assembly and Senate, received 10-year prison sentences and were disqualified from their roles.
Killings and enforced disappearances of dissidents have been systematic, targeting journalists and minority groups specifically. According to a UNESCO database, more than 100 journalists have been killed between 1993 and 2024, making Pakistan one of the worst-performing countries in press freedom. Observers have noted that members of marginalized groups in Pakistan are overrepresented among the victims of these abuses. For the period between January and June 2025, the Human Rights Council of Balochistan reported 814 enforced disappearances of students, activists, and ordinary citizens, almost the same number as in the whole of 2024, and at least 131 cases of killings without trial. Similarly, in the south-eastern province of Sindh, state security forces have been carrying out abductions and torture as part of their strategy to curb Sindh nationalism, leading to approximately 500 cases of enforced disappearances as of July 2024, mostly affecting young students and Sindh rights activists.
Dissidents abroad have been systematically repressed by or on behalf of the regime. State authorities have carried out international reprisals against journalists who are critical of the government and the military by targeting their family members residing in Pakistan, collaborating with foreign security services, or recruiting non-state actors overseas. In March 2025, 20 armed men believed to be officials from the Islamabad Police and the Inter-Services Intelligence forcibly disappeared two brothers of US-based journalist Ahmad Noorani after he published an investigation on his website exposing the appointment of family members of Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff, to high-level positions. In August 2022, Pakistani journalist Syed Fawad Ali Shah, who had reported on enforced disappearances linked to Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, was deported from Malaysia, where he was registered as a refugee, upon the request of Pakistan’s High Commission in Kuala Lumpur. Shah was imprisoned for five months and tortured, and later charged with defamation, intimidation of officials, and disseminating disinformation online. In February 2020, Ahmad Waqass Goraya, a Netherlands-based political reporter who worked on human rights abuses by the Pakistani military, was attacked in Rotterdam. He later claimed that the attacker followed the orders of the Pakistani intelligence services through a middleman. Two years later, a British hitman was convicted by a UK court of conspiracy to murder Goraya.
Finally, marginalized groups in Pakistan have been systematically and disproportionately prevented from voicing dissent. The regime has resorted to anti-terrorism legislation and police violence to curb minority rights activists and groups. In October 2024, ahead of a planned demonstration in the Khyber district, the government banned the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, a grassroots organization that peacefully advocates for the rights of the Pashtun people (the second largest ethnic group of Pakistan), by listing it as a “proscribed organization” under the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act. PTM’s leader, Manzoor Pashteen, had been charged with sedition in 2020 after accusing the army of human rights abuses and enforced disappearances. He has since faced multiple arrests for organizing rallies and criticizing state officials. Following the government’s decision to outlaw the PTM, Pashtun rights advocates took to the streets and were met by a violent crackdown by police forces, leading to at least three deaths.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. The judiciary has frequently sided with the Sharif government and issued rulings that undermined the ability of opposition parties like the PTI to compete freely, which tilts the playing field in favor of the governing coalition. Selective accountability mechanisms ensure that courts dismiss or delay cases involving prominent regime officials, while disproportionately prosecuting opposition figures whenever such actions are aligned with the interests of the military. Moreover, anti-terrorism laws have allowed the prosecution of civilians, including major PTI supporters and members involved in the May 9 protests, in military courts. Finally, new legislation has extended political influence over the structure and functioning of the judiciary.
Courts have unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition. The judiciary has frequently sided with the Sharif government and issued rulings that undermined the ability of opposition parties to compete freely and tilted the playing field in favor of the governing coalition. In January 2025, former Prime Minister Imran Khan was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment on charges of misuse of authority and corruption. Although courts have overturned or suspended many of Khan’s earlier convictions, in December 2025, he was again sentenced to 17 years in prison in a separate graft case. Observers have denounced a pattern of weaponization of the legal system, characterized by multiple fair trial violations, aimed at keeping Khan distant from national politics, thereby weakening the opposition’s ability to challenge the regime. Additionally, in June 2025, the Supreme Court further consolidated the ruling coalition’s dominance by overruling its own 2024 decision that had granted the PTI/SIC reserved seats in the parliament. Citing legal and procedural flaws in the earlier decision, the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Bench stripped the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf of its 22 reserved seats in the National Assembly and reassigned them to the ruling coalition, effectively giving the ruling coalition a two-thirds majority in the parliament, which is the threshold needed to pass constitutional amendments.
The judiciary has frequently and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable, while at times facing pressure from the regime to target certain opposition figures. This has resulted in selective accountability, with courts dismissing or delaying cases involving prominent regime officials, while being incentivized to prosecute opposition figures whenever such actions are aligned with the interests of the military. Upon the PML-N’s return to power in 2024, in September, the Punjab regional government announced its decision to dismiss various politically motivated cases, including terrorism, against PML-N members, originally filed during the Khan administration. In March of that year, six out of eight members of the Islamabad High Court submitted a letter to the Supreme Court accusing the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of intimidating them and their families through abductions, torture, and secret surveillance in order to influence judicial decisions in certain high-profile cases. Additionally, disproportionate legal attacks against PTI members also took place following the events on May 9, as many have been charged of inciting terrorism, arson, and public disorder. While the judiciary attempted to uphold due process, the military continued to exercise its influence by promptly re-arresting members of the PTI on new charges or holding them under preventive detention laws. For instance, Chaudhry Parvez Elahi, a senior PTI leader, faced a series of arrests and releases, with court orders frequently discharging him from cases or granting bail, only for him to be immediately re-arrested on different charges.
The regime has systematically directed cases to separate, regime-controlled courts. In Pakistan, military courts are statutorily empowered to try civilians accused of terrorism. In May 2025, the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Bench overturned a previous decision of October 2023 that had declared the trial of civilians involved in the May 9 protests in military courts null and void. The bench justified its reversal on the grounds that the previous ruling, which struck down three provisions of the 1952 Pakistan Army Act (PAA), hindered the prosecution of individuals involved in the attacks on nearly 40 military installations and public buildings during the May 9 protests. Previously amended in 2015, following the deadly Peshawar school massacre, the PAA expanded military courts’ jurisdiction over civilians charged with terrorism. Since then, military courts have increasingly been used to handle politically sensitive cases, such as the 105 prosecutions related to the May 9 demonstrations.
Finally, systematic reforms have seriously weakened the operational independence of judicial institutions. The 27th constitutional amendment, passed by parliament in November 2025, introduced significant changes in the structure and functioning of the judicial system. The amendment creates a new Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) with exclusive jurisdiction over federal-provincial disputes and constitutional interpretation, effectively redirecting core functions away from the Supreme Court, which had previously exercised this role through ad hoc benches. The amendment further consolidates executive influence over appointments by granting the President the authority to nominate the inaugural group of FCC judges, including the chief justice, with the Prime Minister’s advice. After these first mandates, the Chief Justice will be appointed by a Special Parliamentary Committee (SPC), consisting uniquely of members of the National Assembly and Senate, while the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP) will propose candidates for the court’s remaining seats. The revised composition of the JCP has also raised serious concerns, as it now includes executive appointments, namely the FCC’s chief justice and one other judge, as well as five members of the parliament chosen by the speaker of the National Assembly. Moreover, under the new revision, the president may transfer judges from one high court to another on the JCP’s recommendation, increasing the range of retaliatory measures available to the regime to ensure judicial compliance. Judges who refuse reassignment may be subjected to disciplinary proceedings by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC). Finally, the amendment prevents courts from prosecuting key office holders such as the president and the chief of the armed forces via lifelong constitutional immunities, fundamentally shielding high-ranking public officials from accountability.
