Hybrid Authoritarian
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HRF classifies Malaysia as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
For over six decades after independence, Malaysia was ruled by the Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) coalition, until a surprise victory by the rival Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope, PH) coalition ended its monopoly of power in the 2018 general election, marking the country’s first peaceful transfer of power since 1957. The period that followed was characterized by sustained political infighting, leading Malaysia to change prime ministers three more times and allowing Barisan Nasional to briefly return to office in 2021. In 2022, Pakatan Harapan, led by former opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, formed a government once again by joining hands with Barisan Nasional and other smaller parties.
Electoral competition has significantly improved since 2018, shifting from a heavily skewed competition to one that is largely free and fair. The 2022 general election was marked by high levels of competition among parties on an equal footing, with limited advantages accruing to ruling-party candidates. Opposition campaigns, however, faced some obstruction from non-state actors online.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Since the 2022 electoral turnover, the Anwar Ibrahim regime has continued to restrict freedom of assembly, even though some peaceful gatherings have occurred without interference. Sedition laws remain in force and are used against critics, while service disruptions have targeted independent media outlets critical of the government. New cybersecurity legislation has strengthened the regime’s capacity to censor dissenting speech online.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Accountability mechanisms have been applied selectively, disproportionately targeting opposition leaders while favoring government officials. Judicial harassment against critics has continued under the incumbent government, although courts have at times issued rulings to protect freedom of expression. Executive control over appointments in the judiciary and oversight bodies remains in place, seriously limiting the impartiality of key institutions.
Electoral competition has significantly improved since 2018, shifting from a heavily skewed competition to one that is largely free and fair. During the 2022 general election, political parties and candidates were able to freely compete, and ruling-party candidates did not derive significant benefit from the resources and patronage networks previously leveraged by Barisan Nasional. However, non-state actors spread harmful online rhetoric against opposition candidates.
The Barisan Nasional regime has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Political parties have freely competed for seats in the parliament. Malaysia held its 15th general election on November 19, 2022, a month after then-Prime Minister Ismail Sabri had dissolved parliament and called for snap elections amid prolonged infighting within the ruling coalition. The election was highly competitive, with more than 900 candidates running for representation in the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives), which consists of 222 seats, one for each single-member constituency under Malaysia’s plurality voting system. Three major coalitions dominated the election: Pakatan Harapan, a center-left coalition led by Anwar Ibrahim; Barisan Nasional, Malaysia’s longest-serving political coalition; and Perikatan Nasional (National Alliance, PN), a nationalist, right-leaning coalition chaired by former Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin. Official results showed PH winning 82 seats, followed by PN with 74, and BN with only 30 seats. As no coalition obtained an outright majority, the election resulted in a hung parliament. Following the king’s request, Anwar formed a unity government with Barisan Nasional and other smaller coalitions and parties, and successfully assembled a 19-party governing coalition with a two-thirds majority in parliament. Anwar was officially sworn in as prime minister on November 24, 2022, marking the fourth peaceful transfer of power since 2018.
Ruling-party candidates did not enjoy significant and unfair campaign advantages during the 2022 election. Barisan Nasional’s traditional advantages in campaign financing and media influence have considerably diminished since 2018. Prior to that year, Barisan Nasional was able to leverage its close ties with private businesses and government-linked companies (GLCs), such as trust agencies, foundations, and investment enterprises, to finance its electoral campaigns as well as to maintain extensive control over traditional print and broadcast media to secure greater coverage for its candidates. Following its 2018 defeat and subsequent loss of the executive, however, the patronage network and resources underpinning BN’s electoral dominance have gradually weakened. For example, in 2019, BN-affiliated United Malays National Organization (UMNO) reduced its stakes in Utusan Malaysia, the country’s oldest Malay-language newspaper, as well as in the influential media group Media Prima. Although Barisan Nasional has retained influence over some media outlets, like the English-language newspaper The Star, its overall capacity to mobilize resources to skew elections has considerably declined. This shift was reflected in its performance at the 2022 general election, in which the coalition managed to obtain only 25% of the valid national votes, about nine percentage points lower than its share in 2018.
However, in the run-up to the 2022 election, non-state actors, with ties to the Barisan Nasional regime, contributed to the hindrance of a real, mainstream opposition party’s electoral campaign. During the 15th general election, “cyber-troopers” intensified the spread of harmful rhetoric online, often targeting opposition figures and branding them as “communists,” “corrupt,” or “Islamophobic”. Malay parties belonging to Barisan Nasional and Perikatan Nasional paid content creators to spread disinformation and orchestrate smear campaigns with the purpose of discrediting members and supporters of the rival Pakatan Harapan, which nevertheless went on to win the polls.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Following the electoral turnover in 2022, the government led by Anwar Ibrahim continued to restrict peaceful protests, used sedition laws against opposition leaders, and ordered interruptions to the online service of independent media outlets and blogs. Moreover, new legislation has strengthened the regime’s efforts at censoring critical speech online.
Under Anwar Ibrahim, the regime has seriously and unfairly repressed protests. Despite a 2025 pledge to ease permit requirements, the government has continued to use the Penal Code and the 2012 Peaceful Assembly Act (PAA) to limit peaceful demonstrations and harass protesters. Examples of punitive policing and undue disruptions include the October 2025 arrests of two individuals for allegedly obstructing civil servants at a peaceful demonstration in Kuala Lumpur held in solidarity with the Global Sumud Flotilla, an international maritime initiative to breach Israel’s siege and deliver aid to Gaza. In October 2024, officials detained seven activists for violating the PAA at a peaceful Palestine solidarity rally near the US embassy in the capital city. Police have also reportedly used disproportionate force on some occasions to intercept protesters, such as during a peaceful march in July 2024 organized by the human rights organization Teoh Beng Hock Association for Democratic Advancement, calling for justice for victims of custodial deaths. Although there have been cases of protests proceeding without state interference, including a July 2025 rally organized by the opposition in Kuala Lumpur to protest rising living costs and government corruption, such instances remain uncommon in Malaysia.
Dissenting media, opposition leaders, and members of the general public have been subjected to serious intimidation by the regime. Government officials have ordered temporary service outages, used vague laws to silence critics, and arbitrarily arrested independent journalists. Between June and August 2023, during governmental elections in six Malaysian states, at least four pro-opposition news outlets and blogs experienced state-ordered interruptions in a move that was highly criticized as an attempt to cripple the opposition’s electoral prospects. Moreover, sedition charges under the 1948 Sedition Act have continued to be abused to target investigative journalists and activists, including Mukmin Nantang, who was detained twice by the police in 2024 for investigating the destruction of homes belonging to the Bajau Laut seafaring community. In March 2025, B. Nantha Kumar, a journalist working for the independent news site Malaysiakini, was detained by anti-corruption authorities and later released on bail after reporting on a case of a migrant trafficking syndicate. Previously, in November 2024, the outlet had been ordered by the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) to take down its reports over a corruption scandal involving senior politicians in Sabah. Sedition charges have also been used to undermine key opposition leaders, such as former PM Muhyiddin Yassin, who was charged in August 2024 for criticizing then-monarch Sultan Abdullah for appointing Anwar Ibrahim as prime minister following the 2022 general election. Yassin had already faced multiple high-profile charges the year before, which his supporters alleged were politically motivated.
Moreover, the incumbent regime has seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Since 2018, state-backed censorship has persisted in the forms of content restrictions, stricter cybersecurity regulations, and criminal sanctions against individuals and organizations spreading fake or offensive content online. Throughout 2024, Meta restricted access to over 31,000 items at the request of the MCMC for alleged violations of local laws, while TikTok removed or restricted just under 10,000 valid content URLs in response to government requests. Such restrictions have historically targeted critical views of government policies and misdeeds. In August 2024, a new Cyber Security Act (CSA) entered into force with the stated purpose of strengthening Malaysia’s cybersecurity framework and managing cybercrimes. However, observers have voiced concerns that the law may serve as an additional tool for government censorship, as it requires any “cyber security service” to obtain prior licensing and grants unaccountable search and seizure powers to special officers appointed by the National Cyber Security Committee (NCSC), a body empowered by the CSA to organize cybersecurity strategies. These developments cast serious doubts on the state of freedom of expression in Malaysia, where individuals and organizations can face fines up to RM 1 million (approximately $245,000) and/or imprisonment up to 5 years for spreading messages deemed “obscene,” “false,” or “grossly offensive” under the amended Communications and Multimedia Act (CMA). A notable case is that of street artist Fahmi Reza, who has been charged on multiple occasions since 2016 for posting state satire on social media as a form of creative dissent. According to the Ministry of Communications, 444 cases have been filed under the CMA between 2020 and January 2024, including 31 convictions.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Selective accountability mechanisms have disproportionately targeted opposition leaders and favored government officials. The current government has continued the practice of judicial harassment against critics, although courts have at times issued rulings to protect free speech. The judiciary and oversight bodies remain seriously limited in their independence, given the extent of executive influence over appointments.
Judicial institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Courts have reinforced selective accountability by acquitting prominent government authorities while pursuing prosecutions against opposition leaders. In February 2024, former PM Najib Razak, who had been convicted in 2022 over embezzlement of Malaysia’s state-owned wealth fund, was granted a pardon from a board chaired by then-monarch Sultan Abdullah, reducing his sentence to six years without providing a reason. While this decision did not fall within the executive’s purview, PM Anwar has publicly defended it and admitted to submitting Najib’s application for pardon. Similarly, in December 2022, UMNO politician Abdul Azeez Abdul Rahim was acquitted on nine charges of corruption and money laundering after the prosecution failed to challenge his application for a discharge and acquittal. Meanwhile, several senior politicians from the PN-affiliated BERSATU party are under investigation, including former PM Muhyiddin Yassin, who faces multiple charges of sedition and abuse of power. In February 2024, the Court of Appeal overturned his acquittal, and the trial is scheduled to begin in March 2026. If found guilty, Muhyiddin could face up to a maximum of 20 years, a sentence that would bar him from contesting the next general election in 2028.
Courts have frequently and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism. Judicial harassment against dissidents has continued since 2018, although courts have occasionally shown a willingness to protect free speech in the face of highly restrictive laws. In January 2024, a court charged two local filmmakers for “wounding the religious feelings of others” in “Mentega Terbang,” a film they produced that allegedly contradicted Islamic religious teachings. In October 2023, an activist was fined MYR 5,000 (approximately $1,200 at that time) for organizing a solo peaceful protest calling for the resignation of the vice-chancellor of a public university for making racially-charged remarks. However, in August 2025, a landmark Court of Appeal decision ruled that criminalizing “offensive” communication with the intent to “annoy” under Section 233(1) of the CMA was unconstitutional, reasoning that the provision undermined freedom of expression by enabling authorities to censor speech on subjective standards. The government responded by defending the contested provision and filing an application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court.
The operational independence of the judicial system remains seriously weakened. The incumbent government has failed to address the risk of executive interference, which impairs the functioning of the judiciary. Although a Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) was established in 2009 to curb executive power over judicial appointments to superior courts, its authority is limited to recommending candidates to the Prime Minister, who then advises the King on the final decision. Five of the JAC’s nine members are appointed by the prime minister himself. This level of interference has raised concerns that judicial promotions may reflect political considerations rather than seniority or merit, allowing judges perceived to hold connections with the governing coalition to be promoted ahead of more senior colleagues. An example is the July 2025 appointment of Wan Ahmad as chief justice of the Federal Court, a former UMNO member and the first judge to obtain the top job directly from the Court of Appeal. In the lower courts, appointments to the Session and Magistrate Courts have come for the most part from the Judicial and Legal Service, which is overseen by the executive. This has made it possible for members of this service to serve both as prosecutors and magistrates during their career, raising concerns over the independence and impartiality of judicial power. Potential conflicts of interest have also been identified in relation to the role of the Attorney-General, who currently functions both as the government’s legal adviser and as public prosecutor. In September 2025, Anwar Ibrahim’s cabinet announced plans to separate the AG office and to table amendments to the relevant laws in 2026.
Finally, the independence of other oversight institutions remains seriously constrained. Executive interference in the appointment process of members of the Election Commission (EC) and the Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) has continued despite the change of government in 2022. Observers have criticized the politicization of the EC, the only body responsible for conducting elections in Malaysia, pointing to the close ties between some of its former members and Barisan Nasional. This has been possible due to the lack of appropriate checks on executive authority, as the cabinet is empowered by law to advise the king over the appointment of EC commissioners. Furthermore, the EC lacks fiscal independence, with its budget directly controlled by the prime minister’s department, thereby increasing the risk of executive influence over its operations in relation to elections. In March 2023, Anwar’s administration established a Parliamentary Special Select Committee (PSSC) consisting of both government and opposition lawmakers to review the appointment of new EC commissioners. However, in June 2024, the regime violated this promise by appointing a new Election Commission chairperson without previous consultations with parliament, raising doubts about the ability of the new committee to ensure checks and balances in the appointment process.
Similarly, under the 2009 Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act, the prime minister is empowered to advise the king on the appointment of the MACC’s chief commissioner. This level of executive interference undermines the independence of the commission and increases the risk of political appointments to the country’s principal anti-corruption agency. In May 2025, Azam Baki was reappointed as MACC’s chief commissioner until 2026, marking his fourth consecutive term. Under his leadership, the commission has investigated high-profile cases involving key political opponents, including former prime ministers Muhyiddin Yassin and Mahathir Mohamad.
HRF classifies Malaysia as ruled by a hybrid authoritarian regime.
For over six decades after independence, Malaysia was ruled by the Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) coalition, until a surprise victory by the rival Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope, PH) coalition ended its monopoly of power in the 2018 general election, marking the country’s first peaceful transfer of power since 1957. The period that followed was characterized by sustained political infighting, leading Malaysia to change prime ministers three more times and allowing Barisan Nasional to briefly return to office in 2021. In 2022, Pakatan Harapan, led by former opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, formed a government once again by joining hands with Barisan Nasional and other smaller parties.
Electoral competition has significantly improved since 2018, shifting from a heavily skewed competition to one that is largely free and fair. The 2022 general election was marked by high levels of competition among parties on an equal footing, with limited advantages accruing to ruling-party candidates. Opposition campaigns, however, faced some obstruction from non-state actors online.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Since the 2022 electoral turnover, the Anwar Ibrahim regime has continued to restrict freedom of assembly, even though some peaceful gatherings have occurred without interference. Sedition laws remain in force and are used against critics, while service disruptions have targeted independent media outlets critical of the government. New cybersecurity legislation has strengthened the regime’s capacity to censor dissenting speech online.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Accountability mechanisms have been applied selectively, disproportionately targeting opposition leaders while favoring government officials. Judicial harassment against critics has continued under the incumbent government, although courts have at times issued rulings to protect freedom of expression. Executive control over appointments in the judiciary and oversight bodies remains in place, seriously limiting the impartiality of key institutions.
Electoral competition has significantly improved since 2018, shifting from a heavily skewed competition to one that is largely free and fair. During the 2022 general election, political parties and candidates were able to freely compete, and ruling-party candidates did not derive significant benefit from the resources and patronage networks previously leveraged by Barisan Nasional. However, non-state actors spread harmful online rhetoric against opposition candidates.
The Barisan Nasional regime has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Political parties have freely competed for seats in the parliament. Malaysia held its 15th general election on November 19, 2022, a month after then-Prime Minister Ismail Sabri had dissolved parliament and called for snap elections amid prolonged infighting within the ruling coalition. The election was highly competitive, with more than 900 candidates running for representation in the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives), which consists of 222 seats, one for each single-member constituency under Malaysia’s plurality voting system. Three major coalitions dominated the election: Pakatan Harapan, a center-left coalition led by Anwar Ibrahim; Barisan Nasional, Malaysia’s longest-serving political coalition; and Perikatan Nasional (National Alliance, PN), a nationalist, right-leaning coalition chaired by former Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin. Official results showed PH winning 82 seats, followed by PN with 74, and BN with only 30 seats. As no coalition obtained an outright majority, the election resulted in a hung parliament. Following the king’s request, Anwar formed a unity government with Barisan Nasional and other smaller coalitions and parties, and successfully assembled a 19-party governing coalition with a two-thirds majority in parliament. Anwar was officially sworn in as prime minister on November 24, 2022, marking the fourth peaceful transfer of power since 2018.
Ruling-party candidates did not enjoy significant and unfair campaign advantages during the 2022 election. Barisan Nasional’s traditional advantages in campaign financing and media influence have considerably diminished since 2018. Prior to that year, Barisan Nasional was able to leverage its close ties with private businesses and government-linked companies (GLCs), such as trust agencies, foundations, and investment enterprises, to finance its electoral campaigns as well as to maintain extensive control over traditional print and broadcast media to secure greater coverage for its candidates. Following its 2018 defeat and subsequent loss of the executive, however, the patronage network and resources underpinning BN’s electoral dominance have gradually weakened. For example, in 2019, BN-affiliated United Malays National Organization (UMNO) reduced its stakes in Utusan Malaysia, the country’s oldest Malay-language newspaper, as well as in the influential media group Media Prima. Although Barisan Nasional has retained influence over some media outlets, like the English-language newspaper The Star, its overall capacity to mobilize resources to skew elections has considerably declined. This shift was reflected in its performance at the 2022 general election, in which the coalition managed to obtain only 25% of the valid national votes, about nine percentage points lower than its share in 2018.
However, in the run-up to the 2022 election, non-state actors, with ties to the Barisan Nasional regime, contributed to the hindrance of a real, mainstream opposition party’s electoral campaign. During the 15th general election, “cyber-troopers” intensified the spread of harmful rhetoric online, often targeting opposition figures and branding them as “communists,” “corrupt,” or “Islamophobic”. Malay parties belonging to Barisan Nasional and Perikatan Nasional paid content creators to spread disinformation and orchestrate smear campaigns with the purpose of discrediting members and supporters of the rival Pakatan Harapan, which nevertheless went on to win the polls.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Following the electoral turnover in 2022, the government led by Anwar Ibrahim continued to restrict peaceful protests, used sedition laws against opposition leaders, and ordered interruptions to the online service of independent media outlets and blogs. Moreover, new legislation has strengthened the regime’s efforts at censoring critical speech online.
Under Anwar Ibrahim, the regime has seriously and unfairly repressed protests. Despite a 2025 pledge to ease permit requirements, the government has continued to use the Penal Code and the 2012 Peaceful Assembly Act (PAA) to limit peaceful demonstrations and harass protesters. Examples of punitive policing and undue disruptions include the October 2025 arrests of two individuals for allegedly obstructing civil servants at a peaceful demonstration in Kuala Lumpur held in solidarity with the Global Sumud Flotilla, an international maritime initiative to breach Israel’s siege and deliver aid to Gaza. In October 2024, officials detained seven activists for violating the PAA at a peaceful Palestine solidarity rally near the US embassy in the capital city. Police have also reportedly used disproportionate force on some occasions to intercept protesters, such as during a peaceful march in July 2024 organized by the human rights organization Teoh Beng Hock Association for Democratic Advancement, calling for justice for victims of custodial deaths. Although there have been cases of protests proceeding without state interference, including a July 2025 rally organized by the opposition in Kuala Lumpur to protest rising living costs and government corruption, such instances remain uncommon in Malaysia.
Dissenting media, opposition leaders, and members of the general public have been subjected to serious intimidation by the regime. Government officials have ordered temporary service outages, used vague laws to silence critics, and arbitrarily arrested independent journalists. Between June and August 2023, during governmental elections in six Malaysian states, at least four pro-opposition news outlets and blogs experienced state-ordered interruptions in a move that was highly criticized as an attempt to cripple the opposition’s electoral prospects. Moreover, sedition charges under the 1948 Sedition Act have continued to be abused to target investigative journalists and activists, including Mukmin Nantang, who was detained twice by the police in 2024 for investigating the destruction of homes belonging to the Bajau Laut seafaring community. In March 2025, B. Nantha Kumar, a journalist working for the independent news site Malaysiakini, was detained by anti-corruption authorities and later released on bail after reporting on a case of a migrant trafficking syndicate. Previously, in November 2024, the outlet had been ordered by the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) to take down its reports over a corruption scandal involving senior politicians in Sabah. Sedition charges have also been used to undermine key opposition leaders, such as former PM Muhyiddin Yassin, who was charged in August 2024 for criticizing then-monarch Sultan Abdullah for appointing Anwar Ibrahim as prime minister following the 2022 general election. Yassin had already faced multiple high-profile charges the year before, which his supporters alleged were politically motivated.
Moreover, the incumbent regime has seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech. Since 2018, state-backed censorship has persisted in the forms of content restrictions, stricter cybersecurity regulations, and criminal sanctions against individuals and organizations spreading fake or offensive content online. Throughout 2024, Meta restricted access to over 31,000 items at the request of the MCMC for alleged violations of local laws, while TikTok removed or restricted just under 10,000 valid content URLs in response to government requests. Such restrictions have historically targeted critical views of government policies and misdeeds. In August 2024, a new Cyber Security Act (CSA) entered into force with the stated purpose of strengthening Malaysia’s cybersecurity framework and managing cybercrimes. However, observers have voiced concerns that the law may serve as an additional tool for government censorship, as it requires any “cyber security service” to obtain prior licensing and grants unaccountable search and seizure powers to special officers appointed by the National Cyber Security Committee (NCSC), a body empowered by the CSA to organize cybersecurity strategies. These developments cast serious doubts on the state of freedom of expression in Malaysia, where individuals and organizations can face fines up to RM 1 million (approximately $245,000) and/or imprisonment up to 5 years for spreading messages deemed “obscene,” “false,” or “grossly offensive” under the amended Communications and Multimedia Act (CMA). A notable case is that of street artist Fahmi Reza, who has been charged on multiple occasions since 2016 for posting state satire on social media as a form of creative dissent. According to the Ministry of Communications, 444 cases have been filed under the CMA between 2020 and January 2024, including 31 convictions.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the regime. Selective accountability mechanisms have disproportionately targeted opposition leaders and favored government officials. The current government has continued the practice of judicial harassment against critics, although courts have at times issued rulings to protect free speech. The judiciary and oversight bodies remain seriously limited in their independence, given the extent of executive influence over appointments.
Judicial institutions have frequently and unfairly failed to hold regime officials accountable. Courts have reinforced selective accountability by acquitting prominent government authorities while pursuing prosecutions against opposition leaders. In February 2024, former PM Najib Razak, who had been convicted in 2022 over embezzlement of Malaysia’s state-owned wealth fund, was granted a pardon from a board chaired by then-monarch Sultan Abdullah, reducing his sentence to six years without providing a reason. While this decision did not fall within the executive’s purview, PM Anwar has publicly defended it and admitted to submitting Najib’s application for pardon. Similarly, in December 2022, UMNO politician Abdul Azeez Abdul Rahim was acquitted on nine charges of corruption and money laundering after the prosecution failed to challenge his application for a discharge and acquittal. Meanwhile, several senior politicians from the PN-affiliated BERSATU party are under investigation, including former PM Muhyiddin Yassin, who faces multiple charges of sedition and abuse of power. In February 2024, the Court of Appeal overturned his acquittal, and the trial is scheduled to begin in March 2026. If found guilty, Muhyiddin could face up to a maximum of 20 years, a sentence that would bar him from contesting the next general election in 2028.
Courts have frequently and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to repress criticism. Judicial harassment against dissidents has continued since 2018, although courts have occasionally shown a willingness to protect free speech in the face of highly restrictive laws. In January 2024, a court charged two local filmmakers for “wounding the religious feelings of others” in “Mentega Terbang,” a film they produced that allegedly contradicted Islamic religious teachings. In October 2023, an activist was fined MYR 5,000 (approximately $1,200 at that time) for organizing a solo peaceful protest calling for the resignation of the vice-chancellor of a public university for making racially-charged remarks. However, in August 2025, a landmark Court of Appeal decision ruled that criminalizing “offensive” communication with the intent to “annoy” under Section 233(1) of the CMA was unconstitutional, reasoning that the provision undermined freedom of expression by enabling authorities to censor speech on subjective standards. The government responded by defending the contested provision and filing an application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court.
The operational independence of the judicial system remains seriously weakened. The incumbent government has failed to address the risk of executive interference, which impairs the functioning of the judiciary. Although a Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) was established in 2009 to curb executive power over judicial appointments to superior courts, its authority is limited to recommending candidates to the Prime Minister, who then advises the King on the final decision. Five of the JAC’s nine members are appointed by the prime minister himself. This level of interference has raised concerns that judicial promotions may reflect political considerations rather than seniority or merit, allowing judges perceived to hold connections with the governing coalition to be promoted ahead of more senior colleagues. An example is the July 2025 appointment of Wan Ahmad as chief justice of the Federal Court, a former UMNO member and the first judge to obtain the top job directly from the Court of Appeal. In the lower courts, appointments to the Session and Magistrate Courts have come for the most part from the Judicial and Legal Service, which is overseen by the executive. This has made it possible for members of this service to serve both as prosecutors and magistrates during their career, raising concerns over the independence and impartiality of judicial power. Potential conflicts of interest have also been identified in relation to the role of the Attorney-General, who currently functions both as the government’s legal adviser and as public prosecutor. In September 2025, Anwar Ibrahim’s cabinet announced plans to separate the AG office and to table amendments to the relevant laws in 2026.
Finally, the independence of other oversight institutions remains seriously constrained. Executive interference in the appointment process of members of the Election Commission (EC) and the Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) has continued despite the change of government in 2022. Observers have criticized the politicization of the EC, the only body responsible for conducting elections in Malaysia, pointing to the close ties between some of its former members and Barisan Nasional. This has been possible due to the lack of appropriate checks on executive authority, as the cabinet is empowered by law to advise the king over the appointment of EC commissioners. Furthermore, the EC lacks fiscal independence, with its budget directly controlled by the prime minister’s department, thereby increasing the risk of executive influence over its operations in relation to elections. In March 2023, Anwar’s administration established a Parliamentary Special Select Committee (PSSC) consisting of both government and opposition lawmakers to review the appointment of new EC commissioners. However, in June 2024, the regime violated this promise by appointing a new Election Commission chairperson without previous consultations with parliament, raising doubts about the ability of the new committee to ensure checks and balances in the appointment process.
Similarly, under the 2009 Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act, the prime minister is empowered to advise the king on the appointment of the MACC’s chief commissioner. This level of executive interference undermines the independence of the commission and increases the risk of political appointments to the country’s principal anti-corruption agency. In May 2025, Azam Baki was reappointed as MACC’s chief commissioner until 2026, marking his fourth consecutive term. Under his leadership, the commission has investigated high-profile cases involving key political opponents, including former prime ministers Muhyiddin Yassin and Mahathir Mohamad.
