Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies the Central African Republic as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The Central African Republic (CAR) is a presidential republic led by President Faustin-Archange Touadéra of the United Hearts Movement (MCU). The country has faced significant political instability and conflict, particularly since 2013, when the Séléka rebel coalition overthrew President François Bozizé, leading to ongoing violence and a humanitarian crisis. In 2020, former President Bozizé formed the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), a new rebel alliance including ex-Séléka and anti-balaka factions, aimed at opposing Touadéra’s government. The recent constitutional amendment, validated in 2024, removed presidential term limits and extended each term from five to seven years, allowing Touadéra to run for a third term in the 2025 elections.
National elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Elections are held; however, they are overshadowed by systematic hindrances to opposition campaigns, including arrests of prominent figures and legal and administrative barriers. The 2023 constitutional reforms removed term limits and imposed stricter nationality requirements. The regime has consistently secured landslide victories, most notably in 2025, amid protests by the mainstream opposition over the lack of genuine electoral competition.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Journalists and dissenters face serious risks, including intimidation, harassment, and violence from both state and non-state actors. The media environment is heavily biased in favor of the regime, and Russian forces have attempted to co-opt independent journalists to spread propaganda.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Judges who failed to capitulate to President Touadera were removed, and a July 2023 referendum boosted presidential appointment power and enabled court packing. Under its new dispensation, the Constitutional Court has rejected challenges to Touadera’s bid for a third term and validated his victory in the 2025 election.
National elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Opposition candidates face significant legal barriers, and the regime enjoys significant advantages. In 2025, elections were repeatedly postponed due to the ongoing financial crisis and logistical challenges, then held on December 28, where incumbent president Faustin-Archange Touadéra won following a change to the presidential term limits and allegations of fraud.
The regime has systematically, unfairly, and significantly hindered real, mainstream opposition parties’ or candidates’ electoral campaigns. Several high-profile candidates and opposition figures have been arrested or detained. Opposition leader Dominique Yandocka of the Republican Bloc for the Defence of the Constitution (BRDC) was imprisoned in December 2023 on charges of plotting a coup, despite his parliamentary immunity. He was held for a year during a crackdown on dissenting figures, many of whom had signed a communique stating they did not consider the new August 2023 constitution legitimate. Former presidential candidate and president of the PATRIE party, Crepin Mboli-Goumba, was arrested at the Bangui airport in March 2024 while attempting to board a flight. He faced charges of defamation after accusing magistrates of corruption.
The 2023 constitutional change not only removed the previous two-term limit for the presidency but also added a single-nationality requirement for candidates. This move was widely seen as an effort to disqualify the opposition, particularly Anicet-Georges Dologuele and Henri-Marie Dondra—Dologuele renounced his French citizenship to remain eligible, while Dondra was publicly accused of holding Congolese citizenship. Despite their legal eligibility to run, this reform introduced new legal hurdles in each case, ultimately requiring a Constitutional Court review that delayed their official clearance to campaign until November 2025—just six weeks before the presidential election. This targeted administrative obstacle effectively prevented both candidates from fully campaigning, helping secure incumbent Touadéra’s victory.
Opposition candidates have also faced systematic constraints on campaigning through restrictions on protest and assembly, particularly on grounds of security or public order concerns. Authorization for protests for opposition coalitions such as the BRDC has repeatedly been denied.
The regime has skewed the electoral playing field so much so that it generally claims victory with a very high vote share. In the 2025 presidential election, incumbent Touadéra won reelection through a landslide 77% vote share. Runner-up Dologuele only managed 13% of the vote, and Dondra a mere 3%. This was partially due to the main opposition coalition (BRDC) boycotting the election, which resulted in a low competition environment. The ruling MCU party enjoyed other advantages such as control over election infrastructure, media dominance, and resource dominance. The judiciary has also been captured and weaponized to narrow the playing field, disqualifying or creating barriers to challengers of the regime. One such example was the disqualification of former President Francois Bozize in 2020, just weeks before the election. Touadéra enjoyed a victory through exclusion, winning 53% of the vote compared to the runner-up Dologuele at 21%.
The mainstream opposition parties have boycotted the elections as a way of protesting the lack of free and fair electoral competition. In 2025, the main opposition coalition, BRDC, boycotted the election out of protest for the 2023 Constitutional referendum and the abolishing of term limits. Their boycott was a refusal to acknowledge the legality of Touadéra seeking a third term. Further, they believed the electoral playing field was strongly tilted in the incumbent’s favor, and because the National Election Authority (ANE) was captured, any legal appeal against fraud would be unsuccessful.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Touadera regime has consistently silenced dissenters through harassment, arrests, and restrictions on free expression. Non-state actors closely linked to the regime, especially Russian-affiliated forces, have actively contributed to repression by targeting critics and humanitarian workers and spreading propaganda through the media.
Touadéra’s regime has systematically and seriously intimidated and obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public. Prominent journalists have frequently faced harassment and targeting by the regime. In May 2025, Landry Ulrich Ngokpélé was arrested and jailed for publishing an article about the return of former President Bozizé to Bangui. He was previously arrested in October 2021. Journalist Jean Saint-Clair Gbossokotto died under suspicious circumstances in 2022, with acquaintances suspecting poisoning after he met with an individual linked to the government and Wagner Group.
Non-state actors with ties to the regime have systematically contributed to seriously intimidating independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public. Most notably, Russia has exerted significant influence in the country since 2017, when the Kremlin first dispatched military advisers to support President Touadéra’s government against armed rebel groups. Over time, the relationship has developed to the point that Russia effectively functions as a parallel government within the country. While the regime receives military protection, Russia in turn gains access to natural resources and geopolitical support. The Wagner Group’s influence has expanded beyond training and security to systematic atrocities, including over 360 incidents of violence against civilians and nearly 800 fatalities between 2018 and 2024.
Joseph Figueira Martin, a Belgian-Portuguese national and consultant for an American humanitarian civil society organization (CSO), was arrested in Zemio in May 2024 and found guilty of undermining state security. He was detained by Russian paramilitary forces, sentenced to 10 years of forced labor, and fined $82,000. While the CAR government accused Martin of serving as a liaison for the UPC rebel group, organizations such as Amnesty International argued that his arrest was unjustified and part of a broader strategy by the Wagner Group to intimidate humanitarian workers. This was one of many instances of intimidation, torture, disembowelment of women, abductions, and rape committed by non-state Russian forces in the country. Independent journalists who publish unfavorable stories often encounter threats, arrests, surveillance, and physical violence, which leads to self-censorship. Philip Obai Jr., an award-winning Nigerian journalist, was abducted and tortured for his investigations into human rights abuses carried out by the Wagner Group. Reporters Without Borders has reported a decline in press freedom in recent years.
The Touadéra regime has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. The media landscape is heavily influenced by pro-government outlets that spread propaganda in support of the regime. Already struggling with limited funding and resources, independent media outlets are further squeezed through restrictions on ad revenue and regulatory harassment. Platforms that criticize the government face boycotts from advertisers, and institutions like the High Council for Communication (HCC) impose fines or suspensions for critical coverage of the regime. For example, the HCC suspended all political debates on faith-based radio stations in 2023 following opposition spokesman Martin Ziguele’s radio interview criticizing the proposed new constitution.
Non-state actors with ties to the regime have systematically contributed to heavily manipulating media coverage. Russian-linked actors have conducted aggressive disinformation campaigns. Radio Lengo Songo, a local station, is widely documented to be financed by Russia via the Wagner Group/Africa Corps. The station highlights CAR-Russia military partnership, portraying President Touadéra as a liberator while condemning the United Nations and France as neocolonialists. Due to its substantial funding, the station has a broader reach than many other independent stations and is accessed by many Central Africans beyond Bangui.
A 2024 exposé by whistleblower Ephrem Yalike-Ngonzo revealed that Russian operatives recruit local journalists by offering payments that greatly exceed typical journalist salaries. These groups approach journalists to publish content supporting the CAR army and the Wagner Group, based on propaganda they provide, and ensure that journalists praise Russia’s presence while covering up abuses. Furthermore, internal Russian disinformation documents leaked in 2024 disclosed sophisticated, strategic plans and disinformation campaigns carried out between January and November of that year.
In the Central African Republic, institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Members of the judicial branch who have ruled against the regime’s interests have faced systematic retaliation. Recent major reforms have diminished judicial independence, most notably by restructuring the Constitutional Court into a new Constitutional Council with expanded executive appointment powers.
Members of the judicial branch who rule contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the governing authority have faced systematic retaliation. The most notable instance occurred in 2022 when Danièle Darlan, the former President of the Constitutional Court, opposed the president’s attempt to amend the constitution to extend his time in office. The Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional the presidential decrees establishing the drafting committee to remove term limits. Consequently, Darlan was dismissed in October 2022 by presidential decree, including being compelled to retire from her academic position at Bangui University. Another judge, Trinité Bango Sangafio, was also replaced as a retaliatory measure for blocking Touadera’s referendum project aimed at extending his rule.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. The judiciary’s integrity has been substantially eroded by the transformation of the Constitutional Court into the Central African Constitutional Council under the new Constitution, enacted in August 2023. This restructuring, which increased the number of judges from nine to eleven, enabled the regime to appoint a majority of magistrates loyal to President Touadéra. Presidential appointment power under these reforms also increased from one member to three. The new president of the Constitutional Council, Jean-Pierre Waboué, was swiftly appointed and ratified the constitutional amendments, thereby consolidating the government’s control over the judiciary. Critics contend that this overhaul was orchestrated to ensure the president’s indefinite rule, effectively stripping the Constitutional Court of its independence.
Courts have systematically and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. After the court was restructured through the removal of President Darlan and the installation of a loyalist, Jean-Pierre Waboué, it reversed its position on the unconstitutionality of President Touadéra’s constitutional reforms. The court declared the plan to initiate a referendum legal in July 2023, which paved the way for core changes that skewed future elections in favor of the regime, namely the abolition of term limits and the extension of the presidential term from five to seven years. The Constitutional Court upheld the referendum outcome despite widespread criticism.
The courts also failed to intervene in the 2025 elections. The Constitutional Court allowed Touadéra to run for a third term and validated the candidacies of major opposition candidates just weeks before the December vote. A civil society group filed a legal challenge against Touadéra’s candidacy with the Constitutional Court, but the suit was dismissed. The court confirmed Touadéra’s victory with 78% vote share, despite appeals from runner-up Dologuélé alleging fraud and voting irregularities.
HRF classifies the Central African Republic as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
The Central African Republic (CAR) is a presidential republic led by President Faustin-Archange Touadéra of the United Hearts Movement (MCU). The country has faced significant political instability and conflict, particularly since 2013, when the Séléka rebel coalition overthrew President François Bozizé, leading to ongoing violence and a humanitarian crisis. In 2020, former President Bozizé formed the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), a new rebel alliance including ex-Séléka and anti-balaka factions, aimed at opposing Touadéra’s government. The recent constitutional amendment, validated in 2024, removed presidential term limits and extended each term from five to seven years, allowing Touadéra to run for a third term in the 2025 elections.
National elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Elections are held; however, they are overshadowed by systematic hindrances to opposition campaigns, including arrests of prominent figures and legal and administrative barriers. The 2023 constitutional reforms removed term limits and imposed stricter nationality requirements. The regime has consistently secured landslide victories, most notably in 2025, amid protests by the mainstream opposition over the lack of genuine electoral competition.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are seriously and unfairly hindered in their ability to openly criticize or challenge the regime. Journalists and dissenters face serious risks, including intimidation, harassment, and violence from both state and non-state actors. The media environment is heavily biased in favor of the regime, and Russian forces have attempted to co-opt independent journalists to spread propaganda.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Judges who failed to capitulate to President Touadera were removed, and a July 2023 referendum boosted presidential appointment power and enabled court packing. Under its new dispensation, the Constitutional Court has rejected challenges to Touadera’s bid for a third term and validated his victory in the 2025 election.
National elections are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. Opposition candidates face significant legal barriers, and the regime enjoys significant advantages. In 2025, elections were repeatedly postponed due to the ongoing financial crisis and logistical challenges, then held on December 28, where incumbent president Faustin-Archange Touadéra won following a change to the presidential term limits and allegations of fraud.
The regime has systematically, unfairly, and significantly hindered real, mainstream opposition parties’ or candidates’ electoral campaigns. Several high-profile candidates and opposition figures have been arrested or detained. Opposition leader Dominique Yandocka of the Republican Bloc for the Defence of the Constitution (BRDC) was imprisoned in December 2023 on charges of plotting a coup, despite his parliamentary immunity. He was held for a year during a crackdown on dissenting figures, many of whom had signed a communique stating they did not consider the new August 2023 constitution legitimate. Former presidential candidate and president of the PATRIE party, Crepin Mboli-Goumba, was arrested at the Bangui airport in March 2024 while attempting to board a flight. He faced charges of defamation after accusing magistrates of corruption.
The 2023 constitutional change not only removed the previous two-term limit for the presidency but also added a single-nationality requirement for candidates. This move was widely seen as an effort to disqualify the opposition, particularly Anicet-Georges Dologuele and Henri-Marie Dondra—Dologuele renounced his French citizenship to remain eligible, while Dondra was publicly accused of holding Congolese citizenship. Despite their legal eligibility to run, this reform introduced new legal hurdles in each case, ultimately requiring a Constitutional Court review that delayed their official clearance to campaign until November 2025—just six weeks before the presidential election. This targeted administrative obstacle effectively prevented both candidates from fully campaigning, helping secure incumbent Touadéra’s victory.
Opposition candidates have also faced systematic constraints on campaigning through restrictions on protest and assembly, particularly on grounds of security or public order concerns. Authorization for protests for opposition coalitions such as the BRDC has repeatedly been denied.
The regime has skewed the electoral playing field so much so that it generally claims victory with a very high vote share. In the 2025 presidential election, incumbent Touadéra won reelection through a landslide 77% vote share. Runner-up Dologuele only managed 13% of the vote, and Dondra a mere 3%. This was partially due to the main opposition coalition (BRDC) boycotting the election, which resulted in a low competition environment. The ruling MCU party enjoyed other advantages such as control over election infrastructure, media dominance, and resource dominance. The judiciary has also been captured and weaponized to narrow the playing field, disqualifying or creating barriers to challengers of the regime. One such example was the disqualification of former President Francois Bozize in 2020, just weeks before the election. Touadéra enjoyed a victory through exclusion, winning 53% of the vote compared to the runner-up Dologuele at 21%.
The mainstream opposition parties have boycotted the elections as a way of protesting the lack of free and fair electoral competition. In 2025, the main opposition coalition, BRDC, boycotted the election out of protest for the 2023 Constitutional referendum and the abolishing of term limits. Their boycott was a refusal to acknowledge the legality of Touadéra seeking a third term. Further, they believed the electoral playing field was strongly tilted in the incumbent’s favor, and because the National Election Authority (ANE) was captured, any legal appeal against fraud would be unsuccessful.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The Touadera regime has consistently silenced dissenters through harassment, arrests, and restrictions on free expression. Non-state actors closely linked to the regime, especially Russian-affiliated forces, have actively contributed to repression by targeting critics and humanitarian workers and spreading propaganda through the media.
Touadéra’s regime has systematically and seriously intimidated and obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public. Prominent journalists have frequently faced harassment and targeting by the regime. In May 2025, Landry Ulrich Ngokpélé was arrested and jailed for publishing an article about the return of former President Bozizé to Bangui. He was previously arrested in October 2021. Journalist Jean Saint-Clair Gbossokotto died under suspicious circumstances in 2022, with acquaintances suspecting poisoning after he met with an individual linked to the government and Wagner Group.
Non-state actors with ties to the regime have systematically contributed to seriously intimidating independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public. Most notably, Russia has exerted significant influence in the country since 2017, when the Kremlin first dispatched military advisers to support President Touadéra’s government against armed rebel groups. Over time, the relationship has developed to the point that Russia effectively functions as a parallel government within the country. While the regime receives military protection, Russia in turn gains access to natural resources and geopolitical support. The Wagner Group’s influence has expanded beyond training and security to systematic atrocities, including over 360 incidents of violence against civilians and nearly 800 fatalities between 2018 and 2024.
Joseph Figueira Martin, a Belgian-Portuguese national and consultant for an American humanitarian civil society organization (CSO), was arrested in Zemio in May 2024 and found guilty of undermining state security. He was detained by Russian paramilitary forces, sentenced to 10 years of forced labor, and fined $82,000. While the CAR government accused Martin of serving as a liaison for the UPC rebel group, organizations such as Amnesty International argued that his arrest was unjustified and part of a broader strategy by the Wagner Group to intimidate humanitarian workers. This was one of many instances of intimidation, torture, disembowelment of women, abductions, and rape committed by non-state Russian forces in the country. Independent journalists who publish unfavorable stories often encounter threats, arrests, surveillance, and physical violence, which leads to self-censorship. Philip Obai Jr., an award-winning Nigerian journalist, was abducted and tortured for his investigations into human rights abuses carried out by the Wagner Group. Reporters Without Borders has reported a decline in press freedom in recent years.
The Touadéra regime has systematically and heavily manipulated media coverage in its favor. The media landscape is heavily influenced by pro-government outlets that spread propaganda in support of the regime. Already struggling with limited funding and resources, independent media outlets are further squeezed through restrictions on ad revenue and regulatory harassment. Platforms that criticize the government face boycotts from advertisers, and institutions like the High Council for Communication (HCC) impose fines or suspensions for critical coverage of the regime. For example, the HCC suspended all political debates on faith-based radio stations in 2023 following opposition spokesman Martin Ziguele’s radio interview criticizing the proposed new constitution.
Non-state actors with ties to the regime have systematically contributed to heavily manipulating media coverage. Russian-linked actors have conducted aggressive disinformation campaigns. Radio Lengo Songo, a local station, is widely documented to be financed by Russia via the Wagner Group/Africa Corps. The station highlights CAR-Russia military partnership, portraying President Touadéra as a liberator while condemning the United Nations and France as neocolonialists. Due to its substantial funding, the station has a broader reach than many other independent stations and is accessed by many Central Africans beyond Bangui.
A 2024 exposé by whistleblower Ephrem Yalike-Ngonzo revealed that Russian operatives recruit local journalists by offering payments that greatly exceed typical journalist salaries. These groups approach journalists to publish content supporting the CAR army and the Wagner Group, based on propaganda they provide, and ensure that journalists praise Russia’s presence while covering up abuses. Furthermore, internal Russian disinformation documents leaked in 2024 disclosed sophisticated, strategic plans and disinformation campaigns carried out between January and November of that year.
In the Central African Republic, institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Members of the judicial branch who have ruled against the regime’s interests have faced systematic retaliation. Recent major reforms have diminished judicial independence, most notably by restructuring the Constitutional Court into a new Constitutional Council with expanded executive appointment powers.
Members of the judicial branch who rule contrary to regime interests or who are perceived as a threat to the governing authority have faced systematic retaliation. The most notable instance occurred in 2022 when Danièle Darlan, the former President of the Constitutional Court, opposed the president’s attempt to amend the constitution to extend his time in office. The Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional the presidential decrees establishing the drafting committee to remove term limits. Consequently, Darlan was dismissed in October 2022 by presidential decree, including being compelled to retire from her academic position at Bangui University. Another judge, Trinité Bango Sangafio, was also replaced as a retaliatory measure for blocking Touadera’s referendum project aimed at extending his rule.
The regime has systematically subjected judicial institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. The judiciary’s integrity has been substantially eroded by the transformation of the Constitutional Court into the Central African Constitutional Council under the new Constitution, enacted in August 2023. This restructuring, which increased the number of judges from nine to eleven, enabled the regime to appoint a majority of magistrates loyal to President Touadéra. Presidential appointment power under these reforms also increased from one member to three. The new president of the Constitutional Council, Jean-Pierre Waboué, was swiftly appointed and ratified the constitutional amendments, thereby consolidating the government’s control over the judiciary. Critics contend that this overhaul was orchestrated to ensure the president’s indefinite rule, effectively stripping the Constitutional Court of its independence.
Courts have systematically and unfairly failed to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. After the court was restructured through the removal of President Darlan and the installation of a loyalist, Jean-Pierre Waboué, it reversed its position on the unconstitutionality of President Touadéra’s constitutional reforms. The court declared the plan to initiate a referendum legal in July 2023, which paved the way for core changes that skewed future elections in favor of the regime, namely the abolition of term limits and the extension of the presidential term from five to seven years. The Constitutional Court upheld the referendum outcome despite widespread criticism.
The courts also failed to intervene in the 2025 elections. The Constitutional Court allowed Touadéra to run for a third term and validated the candidacies of major opposition candidates just weeks before the December vote. A civil society group filed a legal challenge against Touadéra’s candidacy with the Constitutional Court, but the suit was dismissed. The court confirmed Touadéra’s victory with 78% vote share, despite appeals from runner-up Dologuélé alleging fraud and voting irregularities.
