Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Uganda as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Uganda is a presidential republic. The Head of State, Yoweri Museveni, seized power in an armed uprising in 1986. After gaining independence in 1962, Uganda experienced violent power struggles between strongmen Milton Obote, Idi Amin, and Museveni that culminated in Museveni’s triumph and power consolidation over the last four decades. Since the first direct presidential elections in 1996 and the resumption of multiparty politics in 2005, Museveni and the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) have maintained power through electoral authoritarianism, constitutional manipulation, patronage, and systematic repression of dissent.
National elections in Uganda are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition parties do not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime exerted partisan control of electoral oversight, unfairly skewed the electoral process and campaigning in its favor, intimidated its main opposition challengers, and staged unfair and non-transparent polls, which have been tainted with allegations of fraud, voter intimidation, and disenfranchisement.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Security forces systematically stifle dissenting protests and unsanctioned public gatherings with excessive force. The regime targets critics, political opponents, and independent civil society organizations with arbitrary detentions, house arrests, politically motivated prosecutions by both civilian and military courts, the application of repressive laws, the withdrawal of operating licenses, and public threats and smears.
In Uganda, institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime, allowing it to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely-publicized policies, significantly undermine electoral competition, and consolidate the systematic dismantling of accountability mechanisms. Although courts occasionally issue dissenting judgments, these interventions have been insufficient to meaningfully check executive power or reverse the regime’s broader authoritarian practices.
National elections in Uganda are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime has employed a range of tactics to undermine electoral competition, including the disruptions of opposition campaigns by authorities, selective enforcement of assembly laws, the arrest and prolonged detention of opposition leaders, tight control over appointments to the Electoral Commission of Uganda (EC), selective accreditation or restriction of international election observers, hindrances to local monitoring groups, misuse of state resources for campaigning, preferential access to both state and private media, systematic voter intimidation, heavy military presence around polling stations, and vote buying.
Museveni’s regime systematically, unfairly, and significantly hinders the mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign through violence, intimidation, heavy-handed disruption of opposition rallies by the police and the military, selective enforcement of assembly laws, and the arrests and prolonged detention of opposition figures. For example, the NRM banned political parties from organizing or fielding candidates in the 1996 and 2001 polls in which Museveni claimed landslide victories. Since the NRM lifted a 20-year ban on party politics in 2005 and the first multi-party elections in 2006, it has systematically persecuted the main opposition presidential challenger and intimidated opposition supporters ahead of the national polls. For example, the regime charged Kizza Besigye, a prominent opposition leader, with treason three times, in 2005, 2016, and 2025, and Robert Kyagulanyi (known as Bobi Wine), another prominent opposition leader, in 2018. Besigye suffered repeated arbitrary detentions ahead of the polls in 2011 and 2016, and Kyagulanyi suffered multiple arrests and violent intimidation ahead of the 2021 and 2025 polls.
The ruling NRM party seriously undermines independent electoral oversight through presidential control over EC appointments, selective accreditation or restriction of international election observers, and hindering local monitoring groups. For example, Museveni alone appoints members of the EC, which an NRM-dominated parliament then approves. Prior to the 2021 election, authorities restricted international election observation by denying accreditation to international observer missions and preventing the deployment of the European Union observation mission, while also obstructing domestic monitoring efforts through the arrests of 27 local election observers.
In addition, the regime engages in significant electoral law manipulation and voting irregularities through systematic voter intimidation, heavy military deployments around polling stations, and vote buying. National-level elections have consistently been held under an atmosphere of intimidation, with security forces deployed en masse around polling stations, and ruling party officials engaging in vote-buying by exchanging cash, food, and household goods for votes at rallies, often in coordination with local administrators and in direct violation of Uganda’s electoral laws that prohibit voter inducements.
Moreover, the ruling party enjoys significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermine the mainstream opposition’s ability to compete, including the extensive use of state resources for campaigning, preferential access to state and private media, and the selective restriction of opposition campaign activities. For example, a 2016 Supreme Court ruling found that the NRM used its control of state resources to disadvantage its political opponents, and a 2021 media monitoring report found that Museveni received disproportionately higher coverage than Kyagulanyi.
Museveni’s government has systematically disenfranchised specific groups of voters by constraining voter registration and creating systematic barriers that disproportionately exclude young and first-time voters. For example, ahead of the 2021 election, the EC refused to register 1 million newly eligible youth voters, claiming it lacked time and resources.
In Uganda, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Museveni’s government has responded to dissent by shutting down independent organizations, intimidating and prosecuting critics, violently repressing protests, carrying out enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, extending repression beyond Uganda’s borders, and severely censoring the media and flow of information.
The regime has unfairly shut down several major independent dissenting organizations by revoking operating mandates, suspending or terminating accreditation, and selectively enforcing compliance rules. For example, ahead of the 2026 elections, the National Bureau for Non-Governmental Organisations suspended seven human rights NGOs on vague national security grounds. In February 2023, it shut down the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Office in Uganda (OHCHR) three months after the OHCHR criticized the regime’s use of torture, detention, and excessive force, in January 2021, it shut down the Democratic Governance Facility, a multi-donor entity working towards deepening democracy, promoting rights, and combating corruption, and, in August 2021, it suspended the work of 54 NGOs primarily focused on human rights and electoral democracy for alleged “non-compliance.”
Moreover, the regime has seriously and systematically intimidated independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public, through threats, violence, torture, house arrest, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and politically motivated prosecutions by both civilian and military courts. Those targeted for intimidation include politicians such as Kyagulanyi and Besigye, critics such as novelist Kakwenza Rukirabashaija and poet Stella Nyanzi, opposition supporters, and leaders of independent civil society groups such as Nicholas Opiyo. The Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) has reported 1053 torture cases of civilians by security agencies between 2018 and 2023.
The regime has killed and forcibly disappeared dissidents through extrajudicial killings, lethal repression of protests, torture, and enforced disappearances. Uganda has a high number of reported cases of enforced disappearances, along with systematic and arbitrary detention, torture, assault, and unlawful killing of dissidents. An investigation by the Parliament’s House Committee on Human Rights in 2019 revealed that Uganda’s Internal Security Organization had abducted over 400 individuals, subjecting them to torture and detention in undisclosed locations. John Bosco Kibalama, a supporter of the NUP, was forcibly disappeared in June 2019 and has not been seen since. On 28 November 2022, Joseph Kabuleta, a former presidential candidate, and Yahya Mwanje, a Muslim cleric, were abducted in separate incidents by plain-clothed security personnel and taken to undisclosed locations before being handed over to the police.
Authorities have seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. They systematically and brutally stifle dissenting protests and unsanctioned public gatherings with excessive force, including beatings, tear gas, rubber bullets, and lethal force, while invoking restrictive public order and security laws. Over the years, security forces have shot dead dozens of people with impunity during times of violent unrest in the country. For example, in November 2020, then Security Minister Elly Tumwine defended the police’s right to shoot to kill protesters after authorities shot dead 54 demonstrators who were protesting the arrest of opposition presidential candidate Robert Kyagulanyi, and in July 2024, authorities arrested more than 100 protesters for peacefully demonstrating against rampant public corruption and charged them with a variety of criminal offenses, such as “common nuisance” or “unlawful assembly.”
The Uganda Communications Commission (UCC), which is subservient to the regime and regulates the broadcast media, frequently threatens to revoke broadcasting licenses, shut down dissenting media outlets, and have journalists fired or arrested for reporting on politically sensitive issues. For instance, in May 2019, the UCC ordered the suspension of 39 journalists from 13 media houses for covering the campaign of Kyagulanyi.
The regime has engaged in transnational repression against dissidents abroad, including through surveillance, arrests, refoulement, and prosecution. Regime officials have extended domestic repression extraterritorially, most notably in Kenya, where prominent opposition figures have been detained and returned to Uganda to face politically charged legal proceedings. For example, in November 2024, Besigye was abducted from Kenya and brought to Uganda, where he was charged with firearms and treason-related offenses, and in July 2024, the regime, in conjunction with Kenyan authorities, arrested and refouled 36 members of the opposition Forum for Democratic Change party and charged them with terrorism after they traveled to Kenya to attend a training course.
Museveni’s government has seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech by imposing restrictions on media coverage and content, limiting the flow of information through social media or internet blackouts, criminalizing expression, and intimidating reporters. The regime regularly imposes nationwide internet shutdowns and social media blocks and uses the Computer Misuse Act and the Anti-Terrorism Act to crack down on dissenting speech. For example, in November 2016, journalist Doreen Biira was charged with “abetting terrorism” after she exposed what has been called the Kasese massacre, in which the regime forces killed at least 100 people during a security crackdown against the Rwenzururu Kingdom.
In Uganda, institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime, as courts dismiss electoral challenges and validate disputed poll results while enabling procedural delays, bail denials, prolonged pre-trial detention, and harsh sentences for protesters. Dissenting judges face retaliation, and the executive has a consistent pattern of either disregarding or circumventing court rulings, alongside constitutional changes that entrench its power.
The Museveni government has subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence through legal frameworks that centralize judicial authority under executive control. Uganda’s constitution grants the President the power to appoint judges to the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, and High Court, with the advice of the presidentially appointed Judicial Service Commission (JSC) and the approval of Parliament. With the JSC and Parliament subservient to Museveni, there is effectively no separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. As a result, the judiciary in Uganda frequently and unfairly sides with the regime when reviewing challenges to regime policies or interests.
Courts largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime, allowing it to significantly undermine electoral competition and make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor by dismissing electoral challenges and validating disputed poll results. The courts consistently support the regime in presidential election disputes and term-limit cases, dismissing electoral fraud claims in opposition legal challenges. In 2006, despite establishing that the integrity of free and fair elections was compromised by widespread bribery, intimidation, violence, violations of equal suffrage, lack of transparency, and vote stuffing, the Supreme Court ruled that these irregularities did not substantially affect the outcome of the election. In February 2021, Kyagulanyi dropped his legal challenge of the election results, citing bias of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, courts frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enable the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies through procedural delays, bail denials, allowing prolonged detention without trial, and imposing harsh sentences on protesters. Besigye and Kyagulanyi have been repeatedly detained and placed under house arrest, with some of their cases unresolved for years. Charges against both figures have lingered in the courts. For example, Kyagulanyi was charged in 2018, and his case went unheard for years, while treason proceedings against Besigye, initiated in late 2024, remained pending and procedurally contested through 2025.
Members of the judicial branch who act contrary to the regime’s interests or who are perceived as a threat face retaliation through intimidation, public attacks, disciplinary action, and institutional sidelining. Supreme Court Justice Esther Kisaakye encountered disciplinary proceedings after delivering a dissenting judgment favoring an opposition leader in the 2021 presidential election petition. In retaliation, the JSC withheld her salary and refused to allocate work to her. In 2005, armed security officials invaded the High Court during proceedings to intimidate judges and disrupt judicial proceedings related to bail applications for alleged members of the People’s Redemption Army.
In addition, Museveni’s government has seriously undermined institutional independence, not by preventing challenges to the regime from reaching the courts but by disregarding judicial decisions. The regime follows a consistent pattern of ignoring court rulings that check its attempts to undermine constitutional rights. In a landmark ruling in January 2025, the Supreme Court upheld a 2021 Constitutional ruling declaring the trials of civilians in military courts unconstitutional, but the regime resisted, continued prosecutions, and later complied while exploring legislative ways to challenge it. Over the years, the Constitutional and Supreme courts have, in some rare instances, ruled against the regime by striking certain sections of the penal code or other repressive laws, such as the POMA, sedition, offensive communication, and the 2014 Anti-Homosexuality Act, as unconstitutional, but the regime has defied the rulings.
The regime has directed politically sensitive cases to separate, regime-controlled military courts, and has kept scores of political opponents and critics in prolonged pre-trial detention before the General Court Martial (GCM) on trumped-up charges such as possession of firearms, terrorism, and treason. For example, 28 NUP supporters arrested in 2021 on trumped-up charges of possessing weapons and ammunition spent more than 3 years in the custody of the GCM without trial. Between November 2024 and February 2025, the GCM detained Besigye on trumped-up charges of possession of firearms and treachery until the Supreme Court, in early 2025, ordered that all civilian cases in military courts be transferred to the civilian judiciary.
The executive has subjected legislative institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence by leveraging ruling-party dominance to enact constitutional and legislative changes that entrench executive power and curtail dissent within Parliament through suspensions and intimidation of opposition members. For example, the executive leveraged ruling-party dominance in Parliament to remove presidential term limits in 2005 and age limits in 2017 despite significant public opposition. It also curtailed parliamentary dissent by suspending protesting opposition legislators and forcibly removing them from parliament during politically sensitive debates, particularly during the 2017 age-limit proceedings.
HRF classifies Uganda as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Uganda is a presidential republic. The Head of State, Yoweri Museveni, seized power in an armed uprising in 1986. After gaining independence in 1962, Uganda experienced violent power struggles between strongmen Milton Obote, Idi Amin, and Museveni that culminated in Museveni’s triumph and power consolidation over the last four decades. Since the first direct presidential elections in 1996 and the resumption of multiparty politics in 2005, Museveni and the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) have maintained power through electoral authoritarianism, constitutional manipulation, patronage, and systematic repression of dissent.
National elections in Uganda are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition parties do not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime exerted partisan control of electoral oversight, unfairly skewed the electoral process and campaigning in its favor, intimidated its main opposition challengers, and staged unfair and non-transparent polls, which have been tainted with allegations of fraud, voter intimidation, and disenfranchisement.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Security forces systematically stifle dissenting protests and unsanctioned public gatherings with excessive force. The regime targets critics, political opponents, and independent civil society organizations with arbitrary detentions, house arrests, politically motivated prosecutions by both civilian and military courts, the application of repressive laws, the withdrawal of operating licenses, and public threats and smears.
In Uganda, institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime, allowing it to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely-publicized policies, significantly undermine electoral competition, and consolidate the systematic dismantling of accountability mechanisms. Although courts occasionally issue dissenting judgments, these interventions have been insufficient to meaningfully check executive power or reverse the regime’s broader authoritarian practices.
National elections in Uganda are a sham, to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime has employed a range of tactics to undermine electoral competition, including the disruptions of opposition campaigns by authorities, selective enforcement of assembly laws, the arrest and prolonged detention of opposition leaders, tight control over appointments to the Electoral Commission of Uganda (EC), selective accreditation or restriction of international election observers, hindrances to local monitoring groups, misuse of state resources for campaigning, preferential access to both state and private media, systematic voter intimidation, heavy military presence around polling stations, and vote buying.
Museveni’s regime systematically, unfairly, and significantly hinders the mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign through violence, intimidation, heavy-handed disruption of opposition rallies by the police and the military, selective enforcement of assembly laws, and the arrests and prolonged detention of opposition figures. For example, the NRM banned political parties from organizing or fielding candidates in the 1996 and 2001 polls in which Museveni claimed landslide victories. Since the NRM lifted a 20-year ban on party politics in 2005 and the first multi-party elections in 2006, it has systematically persecuted the main opposition presidential challenger and intimidated opposition supporters ahead of the national polls. For example, the regime charged Kizza Besigye, a prominent opposition leader, with treason three times, in 2005, 2016, and 2025, and Robert Kyagulanyi (known as Bobi Wine), another prominent opposition leader, in 2018. Besigye suffered repeated arbitrary detentions ahead of the polls in 2011 and 2016, and Kyagulanyi suffered multiple arrests and violent intimidation ahead of the 2021 and 2025 polls.
The ruling NRM party seriously undermines independent electoral oversight through presidential control over EC appointments, selective accreditation or restriction of international election observers, and hindering local monitoring groups. For example, Museveni alone appoints members of the EC, which an NRM-dominated parliament then approves. Prior to the 2021 election, authorities restricted international election observation by denying accreditation to international observer missions and preventing the deployment of the European Union observation mission, while also obstructing domestic monitoring efforts through the arrests of 27 local election observers.
In addition, the regime engages in significant electoral law manipulation and voting irregularities through systematic voter intimidation, heavy military deployments around polling stations, and vote buying. National-level elections have consistently been held under an atmosphere of intimidation, with security forces deployed en masse around polling stations, and ruling party officials engaging in vote-buying by exchanging cash, food, and household goods for votes at rallies, often in coordination with local administrators and in direct violation of Uganda’s electoral laws that prohibit voter inducements.
Moreover, the ruling party enjoys significant and unfair campaign advantages that seriously undermine the mainstream opposition’s ability to compete, including the extensive use of state resources for campaigning, preferential access to state and private media, and the selective restriction of opposition campaign activities. For example, a 2016 Supreme Court ruling found that the NRM used its control of state resources to disadvantage its political opponents, and a 2021 media monitoring report found that Museveni received disproportionately higher coverage than Kyagulanyi.
Museveni’s government has systematically disenfranchised specific groups of voters by constraining voter registration and creating systematic barriers that disproportionately exclude young and first-time voters. For example, ahead of the 2021 election, the EC refused to register 1 million newly eligible youth voters, claiming it lacked time and resources.
In Uganda, independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Museveni’s government has responded to dissent by shutting down independent organizations, intimidating and prosecuting critics, violently repressing protests, carrying out enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, extending repression beyond Uganda’s borders, and severely censoring the media and flow of information.
The regime has unfairly shut down several major independent dissenting organizations by revoking operating mandates, suspending or terminating accreditation, and selectively enforcing compliance rules. For example, ahead of the 2026 elections, the National Bureau for Non-Governmental Organisations suspended seven human rights NGOs on vague national security grounds. In February 2023, it shut down the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Office in Uganda (OHCHR) three months after the OHCHR criticized the regime’s use of torture, detention, and excessive force, in January 2021, it shut down the Democratic Governance Facility, a multi-donor entity working towards deepening democracy, promoting rights, and combating corruption, and, in August 2021, it suspended the work of 54 NGOs primarily focused on human rights and electoral democracy for alleged “non-compliance.”
Moreover, the regime has seriously and systematically intimidated independent, dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public, through threats, violence, torture, house arrest, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and politically motivated prosecutions by both civilian and military courts. Those targeted for intimidation include politicians such as Kyagulanyi and Besigye, critics such as novelist Kakwenza Rukirabashaija and poet Stella Nyanzi, opposition supporters, and leaders of independent civil society groups such as Nicholas Opiyo. The Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) has reported 1053 torture cases of civilians by security agencies between 2018 and 2023.
The regime has killed and forcibly disappeared dissidents through extrajudicial killings, lethal repression of protests, torture, and enforced disappearances. Uganda has a high number of reported cases of enforced disappearances, along with systematic and arbitrary detention, torture, assault, and unlawful killing of dissidents. An investigation by the Parliament’s House Committee on Human Rights in 2019 revealed that Uganda’s Internal Security Organization had abducted over 400 individuals, subjecting them to torture and detention in undisclosed locations. John Bosco Kibalama, a supporter of the NUP, was forcibly disappeared in June 2019 and has not been seen since. On 28 November 2022, Joseph Kabuleta, a former presidential candidate, and Yahya Mwanje, a Muslim cleric, were abducted in separate incidents by plain-clothed security personnel and taken to undisclosed locations before being handed over to the police.
Authorities have seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings. They systematically and brutally stifle dissenting protests and unsanctioned public gatherings with excessive force, including beatings, tear gas, rubber bullets, and lethal force, while invoking restrictive public order and security laws. Over the years, security forces have shot dead dozens of people with impunity during times of violent unrest in the country. For example, in November 2020, then Security Minister Elly Tumwine defended the police’s right to shoot to kill protesters after authorities shot dead 54 demonstrators who were protesting the arrest of opposition presidential candidate Robert Kyagulanyi, and in July 2024, authorities arrested more than 100 protesters for peacefully demonstrating against rampant public corruption and charged them with a variety of criminal offenses, such as “common nuisance” or “unlawful assembly.”
The Uganda Communications Commission (UCC), which is subservient to the regime and regulates the broadcast media, frequently threatens to revoke broadcasting licenses, shut down dissenting media outlets, and have journalists fired or arrested for reporting on politically sensitive issues. For instance, in May 2019, the UCC ordered the suspension of 39 journalists from 13 media houses for covering the campaign of Kyagulanyi.
The regime has engaged in transnational repression against dissidents abroad, including through surveillance, arrests, refoulement, and prosecution. Regime officials have extended domestic repression extraterritorially, most notably in Kenya, where prominent opposition figures have been detained and returned to Uganda to face politically charged legal proceedings. For example, in November 2024, Besigye was abducted from Kenya and brought to Uganda, where he was charged with firearms and treason-related offenses, and in July 2024, the regime, in conjunction with Kenyan authorities, arrested and refouled 36 members of the opposition Forum for Democratic Change party and charged them with terrorism after they traveled to Kenya to attend a training course.
Museveni’s government has seriously and unfairly censored dissenting speech by imposing restrictions on media coverage and content, limiting the flow of information through social media or internet blackouts, criminalizing expression, and intimidating reporters. The regime regularly imposes nationwide internet shutdowns and social media blocks and uses the Computer Misuse Act and the Anti-Terrorism Act to crack down on dissenting speech. For example, in November 2016, journalist Doreen Biira was charged with “abetting terrorism” after she exposed what has been called the Kasese massacre, in which the regime forces killed at least 100 people during a security crackdown against the Rwenzururu Kingdom.
In Uganda, institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime, as courts dismiss electoral challenges and validate disputed poll results while enabling procedural delays, bail denials, prolonged pre-trial detention, and harsh sentences for protesters. Dissenting judges face retaliation, and the executive has a consistent pattern of either disregarding or circumventing court rulings, alongside constitutional changes that entrench its power.
The Museveni government has subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence through legal frameworks that centralize judicial authority under executive control. Uganda’s constitution grants the President the power to appoint judges to the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, and High Court, with the advice of the presidentially appointed Judicial Service Commission (JSC) and the approval of Parliament. With the JSC and Parliament subservient to Museveni, there is effectively no separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. As a result, the judiciary in Uganda frequently and unfairly sides with the regime when reviewing challenges to regime policies or interests.
Courts largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime, allowing it to significantly undermine electoral competition and make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor by dismissing electoral challenges and validating disputed poll results. The courts consistently support the regime in presidential election disputes and term-limit cases, dismissing electoral fraud claims in opposition legal challenges. In 2006, despite establishing that the integrity of free and fair elections was compromised by widespread bribery, intimidation, violence, violations of equal suffrage, lack of transparency, and vote stuffing, the Supreme Court ruled that these irregularities did not substantially affect the outcome of the election. In February 2021, Kyagulanyi dropped his legal challenge of the election results, citing bias of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, courts frequently and unfairly failed to check, or enable the regime’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies through procedural delays, bail denials, allowing prolonged detention without trial, and imposing harsh sentences on protesters. Besigye and Kyagulanyi have been repeatedly detained and placed under house arrest, with some of their cases unresolved for years. Charges against both figures have lingered in the courts. For example, Kyagulanyi was charged in 2018, and his case went unheard for years, while treason proceedings against Besigye, initiated in late 2024, remained pending and procedurally contested through 2025.
Members of the judicial branch who act contrary to the regime’s interests or who are perceived as a threat face retaliation through intimidation, public attacks, disciplinary action, and institutional sidelining. Supreme Court Justice Esther Kisaakye encountered disciplinary proceedings after delivering a dissenting judgment favoring an opposition leader in the 2021 presidential election petition. In retaliation, the JSC withheld her salary and refused to allocate work to her. In 2005, armed security officials invaded the High Court during proceedings to intimidate judges and disrupt judicial proceedings related to bail applications for alleged members of the People’s Redemption Army.
In addition, Museveni’s government has seriously undermined institutional independence, not by preventing challenges to the regime from reaching the courts but by disregarding judicial decisions. The regime follows a consistent pattern of ignoring court rulings that check its attempts to undermine constitutional rights. In a landmark ruling in January 2025, the Supreme Court upheld a 2021 Constitutional ruling declaring the trials of civilians in military courts unconstitutional, but the regime resisted, continued prosecutions, and later complied while exploring legislative ways to challenge it. Over the years, the Constitutional and Supreme courts have, in some rare instances, ruled against the regime by striking certain sections of the penal code or other repressive laws, such as the POMA, sedition, offensive communication, and the 2014 Anti-Homosexuality Act, as unconstitutional, but the regime has defied the rulings.
The regime has directed politically sensitive cases to separate, regime-controlled military courts, and has kept scores of political opponents and critics in prolonged pre-trial detention before the General Court Martial (GCM) on trumped-up charges such as possession of firearms, terrorism, and treason. For example, 28 NUP supporters arrested in 2021 on trumped-up charges of possessing weapons and ammunition spent more than 3 years in the custody of the GCM without trial. Between November 2024 and February 2025, the GCM detained Besigye on trumped-up charges of possession of firearms and treachery until the Supreme Court, in early 2025, ordered that all civilian cases in military courts be transferred to the civilian judiciary.
The executive has subjected legislative institutions to reforms that seriously weaken their independence by leveraging ruling-party dominance to enact constitutional and legislative changes that entrench executive power and curtail dissent within Parliament through suspensions and intimidation of opposition members. For example, the executive leveraged ruling-party dominance in Parliament to remove presidential term limits in 2005 and age limits in 2017 despite significant public opposition. It also curtailed parliamentary dissent by suspending protesting opposition legislators and forcibly removing them from parliament during politically sensitive debates, particularly during the 2017 age-limit proceedings.
