Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Gabon as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Gabon is a presidential republic. The Head of State, Brice Oligui Nguema, seized power in a 2023 military coup before legitimizing his power through a sham election in 2025. Since gaining independence from France in 1960, Gabon has known four leaders, with no formal handover of power between them: the first two presidents died in office, and the third was toppled in a coup. Moreover, it endured 56 continuous years of dynastic rule under Omar Bongo (1967-2009) and his son, Ali Bongo (2009-2023). Entrenched under the Bongos, a system of personalized, kleptocratic rule based on familial ties and clientelism endures under the new patronage of Nguema, a cousin of Ali Bongo. Nguema has maintained consolidation of power.
Elections are a sham to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime prevented a main challenger from participating in the electoral process, and skewed the playing field so much that it claimed one of the highest margins of victory in the country’s history. Ahead of the election, the regime, acting as a transitional military junta, orchestrated the establishment of a constitutional and electoral framework skewed in its favor. The junta led a coup, nullifying the rigged 2023 presidential election results
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime has seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent media, civil society leaders and organizations, prevented anti-regime protests from taking place, and censored dissenting speech.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Courts frequently and unfairly enabled the regime’s attempts to make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions systematically, frequently, and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. The regime directed certain cases, such as politically sensitive cases, to separate, governing authority-controlled courts and has implemented reforms that undermine the independence and operational effectiveness of judicial and executive institutions.
Elections are a sham to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The transition period following the 2023 coup concluded with a sham presidential election. The junta disqualified its main rivals from competing and benefited from significant advantages during the campaign, particularly by using state resources. Additionally, it manipulated electoral laws by establishing eligibility criteria that favored the incumbent. This unequal electoral playing field ultimately allowed the regime to secure a very high vote share.
The regime unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Ahead of the April 2025 presidential polls, judicial and electoral institutions subservient to the Nguema-led transitional military junta—known as the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions (CTRI)— barred the most serious political opponents from the ballot. For example, the National Commission for the Organization and Coordination of Elections and Referendums (CNOCER) rejected the candidacy of trade union leader Jean-Rémy Yama after he failed to timely submit a missing birth certificate of one of his parents. Yama attached the missing document to an appeal before the Constitutional Court, but the latter validated the CNOCER decision. Yama argued that his case is a politically motivated decision made by the regime to prevent him from running. Main opposition leader Albert Ondo Ossa was barred from running due to the newly imposed 70-year age limit. During the two-year military transition that began in 2023, the CTRI used an unelected transitional parliament, whose members it handpicked, to validate a Charter of Transition, a constitutional amendment, and a revised Electoral Code in its favor. The CTRI Charter of Transition explicitly prohibited junta and other members of the transitional government from running in the 2025 presidential elections, with the notable exception of Nguema. This allowed him to serve as President of the Transition while simultaneously preparing his presidential candidacy as the sole legitimate candidate from the Transition government.
The regime has engaged in systematic, significant electoral law manipulation. The CTRI pushed through the unelected transitional parliament a new electoral code that manipulated electoral eligibility criteria in a way that favored the regime and adversely impacted key opposition candidates. For example, the age limit of 70 for presidential candidates automatically disfavored the main opposition leader, Albert Ondo Ossa, as well as former Vice-President Pierre Moussavou. Another criterion under the new electoral code tripled the presidential registration deposit from $18,000 to $54,000, leading to the disqualification of at least nine candidates.
The regime has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. This has been achieved by shortening the campaign period and using state resources for political finance. The junta moved the election date up by four months, from August to April 2025, leaving the opposition with considerably less time to prepare their electoral campaigns. This reduction in the campaign period left insufficient time for all opposition candidates to effectively campaign across the vast territory, which includes nine provinces, some of which are remote and difficult to reach by road. They faced additional challenges, including the lack of a party structure to support them and a shortage of financial and human resources. While this shortened campaign period disadvantaged many candidates, particularly smaller ones, by limiting their ability to mobilize support, communicate their platforms, and reach voters nationwide, the incumbent, Nguema, benefited from his existing visibility and resources. External observers noted that the junta leader had the most campaign materials, including posters, banners, and billboards. He also used nearly every outdoor advertising platform, including mural posts, poster-holding poles, and mobile advertising. Furthermore, he was better equipped to hold rallies compared to other candidates. This disproportionate advantage enjoyed by Nguema attracted criticism, with allegations that he used state resources for his campaign, including helicopters and media access, enabling him to cover significantly more ground and dominate the race.
The regime skews the electoral playing field so much so that it generally wins elections with a very high vote share, typically more than 70% of the vote. In the 2025 presidential elections, CNOCER coronated Nguema with 94% of the votes, the highest vote share the country has seen since the first multiparty elections in 1993. The official results also represented the least competitive score of all of Gabon’s multi-party polls, with the closest challenger, former Prime Minister Nze, garnering only 3% of the vote.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime has intimidated independent media and civil society leaders through judicial harassment and detention. It has systematically denied permits for protests and has continued the censorship imposed by the previous regime.
The regime systematically and seriously intimidates independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. Journalists face police detention, regulatory censorship, and criminal prosecutions. For example, in October 2023, several journalists from the independent news outlet Gabon Media Time were detained for 24 hours on the orders of the prosecutor over the publication of a report critical of him. Additionally, in the same month, the state-run media regulator, the Supreme Communications Authority (HAC), suspended the online media outlet Dépêches241 for one month following an article that reported financial mismanagement of Marie-Madeleine Mborantsuo, the former chief justice of the Constitutional Court. In January 2026, two teachers’ union leaders, Marcel Libama and Simon Ndong Edzo, were detained for one week for supporting a nationwide strike movement advocating for better working conditions for teachers. They were accused of disturbing public order after calling for the continuation of the strike. Libama described their arrests as a form of intimidation intended to discourage the strikers.
The regime has largely suppressed protests by employing methods that are less about direct violence and more about creating unfavorable conditions for organizing them. This includes implementing long curfews and outright refusing to grant permits for protest activities. Following the military coup, the junta imposed a curfew in August 2023 that lasted for over a year, severely limiting the freedom of assembly, until it was lifted in December 2024. The authorization to organize protests in the country is exclusively granted by the Ministry of the Interior, which often results in the regime banning dissenting protests while allowing pro-junta gatherings to take place. In December 2025, in response to the growing number of missing children, several citizens attempted to organize a peaceful march to denounce these disappearances and highlight the rampant insecurity facing the country. However, their efforts were met with resistance from the National Police, who chose to ban the march, igniting public outrage. In February 2025, the Gabonese Ministry of the Interior banned a demonstration planned by a group of citizens, the Collective of Committed Citizens (CCE), against the Gabon Energy and Water Company (SEEG). The ministry cited the need to preserve public order amid increasing unrest driven by significant social issues, including recurring power outages. Meanwhile, the following month, the regime authorized a pro-regime march in support of junta leader Nguema’s candidacy for the 2025 presidential elections.
The regime has somewhat censored dissenting speech. The Nguema regime has continued the censorship of the previous Bongo regime towards critical discussions and commentary. In February 2025, military authorities abruptly canceled the scheduled appearance of Ali Akbar Onanga Y’Obegue, the secretary general of the former ruling party, PDG, on the national public broadcaster Radio Gabon. This incident occurred during a time of division within the PDG, with one faction led by Y’Obegue distancing itself from the CTRI while another appeared to collaborate with the junta. For Onanga Y’Obegue, this act of censorship exemplifies the junta’s contradictory approach: claiming to break from the old regime while actively supporting an illegitimate leadership within the PDG to further secure its victory in the upcoming presidential elections. Another issue of censorship involved the junta’s handling of the country’s energy crisis. Recurrent power outages have fueled growing anger among Gabonese citizens. Given that this issue arose in the lead-up to the 2025 presidential elections, it has become sensitive for the regime, especially as the junta leader seeks to present himself as the most competent leader. One notable incident involved influencer Fanuel Ikapi Mamboundou, known as Novelas Overmax, who was arrested for filming a power outage in the emergency room of a hospital. He was detained for several days in the capital’s central prison before being released on bail.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. After seizing power in a coup in 2023, the CTRI summarily dissolved existing institutions and proceeded to restructure and reshape the constitutional, legal and institutional framework in a way that consolidated its power over all branches of governments and granted Nguema expanded presidential powers, negating any meaningful check to executive power.
Courts frequently and unfairly failed to check, and enabled the governing authority’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. This has occurred through various means, including validating the removal of legitimate opponents from electoral lists and making it difficult to file appeals against election results. For example, in March 2025, the Constitutional Court of the Transition dismissed top opposition presidential challenger Yama ’s legal petition challenging CNOCER’s disqualification of his candidacy based on his failure to timely submit a birth certificate of one of his parents. The Court upheld CNOCER’s decision despite the fact that Yama had included the missing document in his appeal. In March 2025, of the 13 candidates disqualified from the presidential race who subsequently filed appeals with the Constitutional Court, the court upheld only four.
The regime directed certain cases, such as politically sensitive cases, to separate, regime-controlled courts. In October 2025, the regime reconstituted the Special Criminal Court to stage a summary show trial of family members and associates of deposed former President Ali Bongo on politically motivated corruption charges. To oversee the trial, the judicial oversight body, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary (CSM), which is chaired by President Nguema, removed an experienced magistrate, Eugène Simanga, and replaced him with Jean Maixent Essa Assoumou, a more junior judge. This violated the legal requirement that the role be filled by a magistrate holding the rank of Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal. The main defendants in the trial were Bongo’s wife, Sylvia, and son, and former presidential adviser Nourreddin. Both were detained in the first 20 months after the coup before being allowed to travel out of the country. In November 2025, the Special Criminal Court in Libreville convicted Sylvia and Noureddin Bongo after a two-day summary trial and sentenced them in absentia to 20 years in prison and a fine of 100 million CFA francs (approximately $150,000). Additionally, at least nine associates of former President Bongo received prison sentences ranging from two to fifteen years for their alleged involvement in large-scale embezzlement of public funds, corruption, and money laundering.
The regime has implemented reforms that undermine the independence and operational effectiveness of judicial institutions. Following the 2023 coup, the CTRI junta dissolved all institutions, including the constitutional court. It reconstituted a new transitional constitutional court, appointing all nine members directly. This new court systematically ruled in favor of the regime. For example, it approved the December 2024 new constitution , despite criticisms about contentious changes limiting the separation of powers, maintaining the length of the presidential term, and the new eligibility requirements for the presidency. The new constitution also maintains the structure of subordination of the judiciary to the executive, with the President chairing the Supreme High Council of the Judiciary (CSM), the body responsible for oversight of judicial appointments. In this role, the executive branch oversees the appointments, assignments, and disciplinary proceedings of judges. This financial dependence of the judiciary on the executive branch limits its independence and effectiveness. In January 2026, during its review of the justice sector for 2025, the National Union of Magistrates of Gabon (SYNAMAG) condemned the “subtle” and institutional “pressure” exerted by the executive branch, which undermines judges’ impartiality, particularly given the judiciary’s lack of financial autonomy.
The regime subjected executive institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. The CTRI imposed a Transition Charter and pushed through a new constitution, which centralizes more powers within the executive branch of the government, and particularly the presidency. As president of the transitional government, Nguema wielded extraordinary authority, holding the positions of head of state, minister of defense, and minister of security simultaneously. The Transitional Charter made the prime minister and other members of the transitional government ineligible to participate in the presidential election scheduled for the end of the transition period, while exempting the junta leader Nguema from this restriction. The new constitution, passed in December 2024, transitioned Gabon from a semi-presidential system to a presidential system by eliminating the position of prime minister and establishing two vice presidential roles, thereby granting the president complete control over the government.
HRF classifies Gabon as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Gabon is a presidential republic. The Head of State, Brice Oligui Nguema, seized power in a 2023 military coup before legitimizing his power through a sham election in 2025. Since gaining independence from France in 1960, Gabon has known four leaders, with no formal handover of power between them: the first two presidents died in office, and the third was toppled in a coup. Moreover, it endured 56 continuous years of dynastic rule under Omar Bongo (1967-2009) and his son, Ali Bongo (2009-2023). Entrenched under the Bongos, a system of personalized, kleptocratic rule based on familial ties and clientelism endures under the new patronage of Nguema, a cousin of Ali Bongo. Nguema has maintained consolidation of power.
Elections are a sham to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The regime prevented a main challenger from participating in the electoral process, and skewed the playing field so much that it claimed one of the highest margins of victory in the country’s history. Ahead of the election, the regime, acting as a transitional military junta, orchestrated the establishment of a constitutional and electoral framework skewed in its favor. The junta led a coup, nullifying the rigged 2023 presidential election results
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime has seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent media, civil society leaders and organizations, prevented anti-regime protests from taking place, and censored dissenting speech.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Courts frequently and unfairly enabled the regime’s attempts to make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions systematically, frequently, and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. The regime directed certain cases, such as politically sensitive cases, to separate, governing authority-controlled courts and has implemented reforms that undermine the independence and operational effectiveness of judicial and executive institutions.
Elections are a sham to the point where the real, mainstream political opposition does not have a realistic chance to meaningfully compete and possibly win. The transition period following the 2023 coup concluded with a sham presidential election. The junta disqualified its main rivals from competing and benefited from significant advantages during the campaign, particularly by using state resources. Additionally, it manipulated electoral laws by establishing eligibility criteria that favored the incumbent. This unequal electoral playing field ultimately allowed the regime to secure a very high vote share.
The regime unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Ahead of the April 2025 presidential polls, judicial and electoral institutions subservient to the Nguema-led transitional military junta—known as the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions (CTRI)— barred the most serious political opponents from the ballot. For example, the National Commission for the Organization and Coordination of Elections and Referendums (CNOCER) rejected the candidacy of trade union leader Jean-Rémy Yama after he failed to timely submit a missing birth certificate of one of his parents. Yama attached the missing document to an appeal before the Constitutional Court, but the latter validated the CNOCER decision. Yama argued that his case is a politically motivated decision made by the regime to prevent him from running. Main opposition leader Albert Ondo Ossa was barred from running due to the newly imposed 70-year age limit. During the two-year military transition that began in 2023, the CTRI used an unelected transitional parliament, whose members it handpicked, to validate a Charter of Transition, a constitutional amendment, and a revised Electoral Code in its favor. The CTRI Charter of Transition explicitly prohibited junta and other members of the transitional government from running in the 2025 presidential elections, with the notable exception of Nguema. This allowed him to serve as President of the Transition while simultaneously preparing his presidential candidacy as the sole legitimate candidate from the Transition government.
The regime has engaged in systematic, significant electoral law manipulation. The CTRI pushed through the unelected transitional parliament a new electoral code that manipulated electoral eligibility criteria in a way that favored the regime and adversely impacted key opposition candidates. For example, the age limit of 70 for presidential candidates automatically disfavored the main opposition leader, Albert Ondo Ossa, as well as former Vice-President Pierre Moussavou. Another criterion under the new electoral code tripled the presidential registration deposit from $18,000 to $54,000, leading to the disqualification of at least nine candidates.
The regime has systematically enjoyed significant and unfair campaign advantages. This has been achieved by shortening the campaign period and using state resources for political finance. The junta moved the election date up by four months, from August to April 2025, leaving the opposition with considerably less time to prepare their electoral campaigns. This reduction in the campaign period left insufficient time for all opposition candidates to effectively campaign across the vast territory, which includes nine provinces, some of which are remote and difficult to reach by road. They faced additional challenges, including the lack of a party structure to support them and a shortage of financial and human resources. While this shortened campaign period disadvantaged many candidates, particularly smaller ones, by limiting their ability to mobilize support, communicate their platforms, and reach voters nationwide, the incumbent, Nguema, benefited from his existing visibility and resources. External observers noted that the junta leader had the most campaign materials, including posters, banners, and billboards. He also used nearly every outdoor advertising platform, including mural posts, poster-holding poles, and mobile advertising. Furthermore, he was better equipped to hold rallies compared to other candidates. This disproportionate advantage enjoyed by Nguema attracted criticism, with allegations that he used state resources for his campaign, including helicopters and media access, enabling him to cover significantly more ground and dominate the race.
The regime skews the electoral playing field so much so that it generally wins elections with a very high vote share, typically more than 70% of the vote. In the 2025 presidential elections, CNOCER coronated Nguema with 94% of the votes, the highest vote share the country has seen since the first multiparty elections in 1993. The official results also represented the least competitive score of all of Gabon’s multi-party polls, with the closest challenger, former Prime Minister Nze, garnering only 3% of the vote.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The regime has intimidated independent media and civil society leaders through judicial harassment and detention. It has systematically denied permits for protests and has continued the censorship imposed by the previous regime.
The regime systematically and seriously intimidates independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public, or otherwise seriously and unfairly obstructs their work. Journalists face police detention, regulatory censorship, and criminal prosecutions. For example, in October 2023, several journalists from the independent news outlet Gabon Media Time were detained for 24 hours on the orders of the prosecutor over the publication of a report critical of him. Additionally, in the same month, the state-run media regulator, the Supreme Communications Authority (HAC), suspended the online media outlet Dépêches241 for one month following an article that reported financial mismanagement of Marie-Madeleine Mborantsuo, the former chief justice of the Constitutional Court. In January 2026, two teachers’ union leaders, Marcel Libama and Simon Ndong Edzo, were detained for one week for supporting a nationwide strike movement advocating for better working conditions for teachers. They were accused of disturbing public order after calling for the continuation of the strike. Libama described their arrests as a form of intimidation intended to discourage the strikers.
The regime has largely suppressed protests by employing methods that are less about direct violence and more about creating unfavorable conditions for organizing them. This includes implementing long curfews and outright refusing to grant permits for protest activities. Following the military coup, the junta imposed a curfew in August 2023 that lasted for over a year, severely limiting the freedom of assembly, until it was lifted in December 2024. The authorization to organize protests in the country is exclusively granted by the Ministry of the Interior, which often results in the regime banning dissenting protests while allowing pro-junta gatherings to take place. In December 2025, in response to the growing number of missing children, several citizens attempted to organize a peaceful march to denounce these disappearances and highlight the rampant insecurity facing the country. However, their efforts were met with resistance from the National Police, who chose to ban the march, igniting public outrage. In February 2025, the Gabonese Ministry of the Interior banned a demonstration planned by a group of citizens, the Collective of Committed Citizens (CCE), against the Gabon Energy and Water Company (SEEG). The ministry cited the need to preserve public order amid increasing unrest driven by significant social issues, including recurring power outages. Meanwhile, the following month, the regime authorized a pro-regime march in support of junta leader Nguema’s candidacy for the 2025 presidential elections.
The regime has somewhat censored dissenting speech. The Nguema regime has continued the censorship of the previous Bongo regime towards critical discussions and commentary. In February 2025, military authorities abruptly canceled the scheduled appearance of Ali Akbar Onanga Y’Obegue, the secretary general of the former ruling party, PDG, on the national public broadcaster Radio Gabon. This incident occurred during a time of division within the PDG, with one faction led by Y’Obegue distancing itself from the CTRI while another appeared to collaborate with the junta. For Onanga Y’Obegue, this act of censorship exemplifies the junta’s contradictory approach: claiming to break from the old regime while actively supporting an illegitimate leadership within the PDG to further secure its victory in the upcoming presidential elections. Another issue of censorship involved the junta’s handling of the country’s energy crisis. Recurrent power outages have fueled growing anger among Gabonese citizens. Given that this issue arose in the lead-up to the 2025 presidential elections, it has become sensitive for the regime, especially as the junta leader seeks to present himself as the most competent leader. One notable incident involved influencer Fanuel Ikapi Mamboundou, known as Novelas Overmax, who was arrested for filming a power outage in the emergency room of a hospital. He was detained for several days in the capital’s central prison before being released on bail.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. After seizing power in a coup in 2023, the CTRI summarily dissolved existing institutions and proceeded to restructure and reshape the constitutional, legal and institutional framework in a way that consolidated its power over all branches of governments and granted Nguema expanded presidential powers, negating any meaningful check to executive power.
Courts frequently and unfairly failed to check, and enabled the governing authority’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. This has occurred through various means, including validating the removal of legitimate opponents from electoral lists and making it difficult to file appeals against election results. For example, in March 2025, the Constitutional Court of the Transition dismissed top opposition presidential challenger Yama ’s legal petition challenging CNOCER’s disqualification of his candidacy based on his failure to timely submit a birth certificate of one of his parents. The Court upheld CNOCER’s decision despite the fact that Yama had included the missing document in his appeal. In March 2025, of the 13 candidates disqualified from the presidential race who subsequently filed appeals with the Constitutional Court, the court upheld only four.
The regime directed certain cases, such as politically sensitive cases, to separate, regime-controlled courts. In October 2025, the regime reconstituted the Special Criminal Court to stage a summary show trial of family members and associates of deposed former President Ali Bongo on politically motivated corruption charges. To oversee the trial, the judicial oversight body, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary (CSM), which is chaired by President Nguema, removed an experienced magistrate, Eugène Simanga, and replaced him with Jean Maixent Essa Assoumou, a more junior judge. This violated the legal requirement that the role be filled by a magistrate holding the rank of Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal. The main defendants in the trial were Bongo’s wife, Sylvia, and son, and former presidential adviser Nourreddin. Both were detained in the first 20 months after the coup before being allowed to travel out of the country. In November 2025, the Special Criminal Court in Libreville convicted Sylvia and Noureddin Bongo after a two-day summary trial and sentenced them in absentia to 20 years in prison and a fine of 100 million CFA francs (approximately $150,000). Additionally, at least nine associates of former President Bongo received prison sentences ranging from two to fifteen years for their alleged involvement in large-scale embezzlement of public funds, corruption, and money laundering.
The regime has implemented reforms that undermine the independence and operational effectiveness of judicial institutions. Following the 2023 coup, the CTRI junta dissolved all institutions, including the constitutional court. It reconstituted a new transitional constitutional court, appointing all nine members directly. This new court systematically ruled in favor of the regime. For example, it approved the December 2024 new constitution , despite criticisms about contentious changes limiting the separation of powers, maintaining the length of the presidential term, and the new eligibility requirements for the presidency. The new constitution also maintains the structure of subordination of the judiciary to the executive, with the President chairing the Supreme High Council of the Judiciary (CSM), the body responsible for oversight of judicial appointments. In this role, the executive branch oversees the appointments, assignments, and disciplinary proceedings of judges. This financial dependence of the judiciary on the executive branch limits its independence and effectiveness. In January 2026, during its review of the justice sector for 2025, the National Union of Magistrates of Gabon (SYNAMAG) condemned the “subtle” and institutional “pressure” exerted by the executive branch, which undermines judges’ impartiality, particularly given the judiciary’s lack of financial autonomy.
The regime subjected executive institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. The CTRI imposed a Transition Charter and pushed through a new constitution, which centralizes more powers within the executive branch of the government, and particularly the presidency. As president of the transitional government, Nguema wielded extraordinary authority, holding the positions of head of state, minister of defense, and minister of security simultaneously. The Transitional Charter made the prime minister and other members of the transitional government ineligible to participate in the presidential election scheduled for the end of the transition period, while exempting the junta leader Nguema from this restriction. The new constitution, passed in December 2024, transitioned Gabon from a semi-presidential system to a presidential system by eliminating the position of prime minister and establishing two vice presidential roles, thereby granting the president complete control over the government.
