Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Burma as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Since gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1948, Burma (also known as Myanmar) has experienced recurrent cycles of military rule and civilian government, alongside persistent ethnic conflicts. Following the adoption of a new constitution in 2008 and the dissolution of military rule in 2011, Burma held nationwide competitive elections in 2015, marking the beginning of political liberalization. Although the military maintained significant policy-making influence under the 2008 constitution, the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won the polls in 2015 and again in 2020. In early February 2021, just hours before the new parliament was set to convene, the military seized power in a coup d’état, alleging widespread fraud in the November 2020 election. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing subsequently assumed the leadership of the junta, also officially known as the State Administration Council (SAC). In the aftermath, a nationwide civil conflict ensued between the junta and a range of ethnic resistance organizations. Control over territory has been in flux. Recent estimates show that the military only controls 21% of Burma, although it continues to retain authority over the capital and central state apparatus. As the junta ended the state of emergency in July 2025, the SAC was officially dissolved and replaced by the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), a body tasked with overseeing the phased elections scheduled between December 2025 and January 2026.
National elections are absent, rendering moot assessment of electoral competition. In February 2021, the Burmese military, led by General Min Aung Hlaing, seized power and imposed a total of four-and-a-half-year-long state of emergency. The ruling junta substantially went after the opposition, imposed restrictive conditions for political parties, and packed the electoral oversight body with loyalists to serve its interests.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The junta has repeatedly attacked independent news organizations, detained and prosecuted journalists, political figures, and pro-democracy activists. Peaceful protesters have been subjected to harsh penalties, including police violence and execution. The junta has also toughened legislation to criminalize criticism of the coup and the military corps, while significantly broadening online surveillance.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Since the coup, the junta has retained a monopoly over legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Courts have become heavily militarized, and cases concerning civilians are largely decided by either courts-martial or special courts that operate inside prisons under military supervision.
National elections are absent, rendering moot assessment of electoral competition. In 2021, a coup led by the Burmese armed forces seized power and imposed military rule. The ruling junta substantially diminished the opposition and restructured the electoral oversight body to serve its interests.
A democratically elected government was overthrown through a coup d’état. On February 1, 2021, Burma’s armed forces, also known as Tatmadaw, seized power and imposed military rule. The November 2020 general election had delivered a landslide victory to the National League for Democracy, whose de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, had governed the country as state counsellor since 2016. The NLD secured a majority of 396 seats across both chambers of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Burma’s parliament, in an election widely regarded as free and fair. The military’s proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), came in second place with 33 seats. Alleging widespread electoral fraud, the military demanded a rerun of the vote, but its claim was rejected by the country’s election oversight authority, the Union Election Commission (UEC). Following months of smear campaigns directed at the NLD, the military staged a coup on the day the newly elected parliament was due to convene for its first session. Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other NLD senior lawmakers were detained. Myint Swe was installed as acting president and quickly declared a year-long state of emergency, thereby devolving all powers to the coup leader, Senior General and Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing.
On February 2, 2021, Min Aung Hlaing established an 11-member junta under the name of the State Administration Council as the country’s highest governing body, with himself as chair. Despite repeated promises to hold elections, Min Aung Hlaing, who formally assumed the role of prime minister in August 2024 and that of acting president in July 2024, extended the state of emergency seven times, citing ongoing ethnic insurgencies that ensued across the country after the coup. On July 31, 2025, the regime officially ended the state of emergency, except in nine states and regions affected by the conflict, and declared that phased elections would be held between December 2025 and January 2026.
The regime has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties and candidates from competing in elections. In January 2023, the junta introduced new legislation imposing restrictive conditions for political parties seeking to contest elections. Under the Political Parties Registration Law, national parties must recruit a minimum of 100,000 members within 90 days of registration, which far exceeds the previous minimum of 1,000 members. Parties must additionally open offices in at least 150 of Burma’s 330 townships within 180 days, contest at least a quarter of the country’s constituencies, and have at least 100 million kyat (approximately $47,000) in their reserves. These requirements make it virtually impossible not only for ethnic and minority parties to compete, but also for the NLD, whose leaders have been subjected to sham trials, arbitrarily imprisoned, and exiled since the 2021 coup. Following the enactment of the law, the junta dissolved more than 40 parties, including the NLD, for failing to re-register within the prescribed timeframe. In September 2025, the junta-controlled UEC announced that 57 parties had been officially registered, though only six are expected to contest the December 2025/January 2026 election. Observers noted that many, if not all, of the registered parties appear aligned with or supportive of the military, suggesting a deliberate effort by the ruling junta to eliminate meaningful opposition to the military-backed USDP while maintaining a veil of electoral competition.
Under Min Aung Hlaing, independent electoral oversight has been systematically and seriously undermined. The ruling junta consolidated control over the UEC by detaining election officials, packing it with loyalists, and imposing restrictions on political parties. In the months following the 2021 coup, the junta detained at least 150 members of the UEC across all 14 states and regions, including Chief Election Commissioner U Hla Thein. Officials justified the arrests, citing the commission’s alleged failure to address irregularities in the 2020 general election as the justification for the detentions. The junta subsequently replaced the UEC with six new members led by U Thein Soe, a former army general who had overseen the 2010 sham election under the previous military regime. This commission revoked the letters of accreditation to parliamentarians who won representation in parliament, effectively negating the November 2020 election results, and oversaw the disqualification of 40 political parties following the junta’s enactment of the above-mentioned registration law. It has also issued notices requiring the remaining parties to seek its approval before meeting with foreign entities and individuals, barring them from receiving or utilizing any material and financial assistance from abroad, and instructing foreigners to report to the junta before meeting any local party member.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The junta has targeted independent media outlets, detained and prosecuted journalists, political opponents, and activists. It has also used disproportionate force to curb peaceful anti-coup protesters and executed critics. The junta has expanded legislation to criminalize dissent and its surveillance of online spaces.
Independent and dissenting media, political leaders, and civil society leaders have faced systematic and serious intimidation or obstruction of their work. The junta has repeatedly attacked independent media outlets and detained and prosecuted journalists, political opponents, and pro-democracy activists. Among the most recent attacks on press freedom, in November 2025, the junta filed charges against media outlet AAMIJ News after it published a report linking an election candidate to an illegal drug trafficking business. Officials alleged that the report violated the Law on the Protection of Elections from Interference and Disruption, which was enacted by the junta in July 2025 to protect candidates and election commissioners from outside interference during the election period. Earlier, in 2023, AAMIJ News freelance journalist Myat Thu Kyaw was arrested and sentenced to three years in prison for allegedly producing coverage supporting the National Unity Government (NUG), an in-exile coalition of ousted NLD lawmakers, democracy activists, and ethnic minorities claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma, and its armed resistance wing, the People’s Defense Forces (PDF). Myat Thu Kyaw was again sentenced to an additional five years and six months after being convicted on terrorism charges in January 2025. Two other independent outlets, Mizzima and Democratic Voice of Burma, were forced to work underground after security forces raided their offices and stripped them of their operating license right after the coup. In August 2024, a military court sentenced Myo Myint Oo and Aung San Oo, two journalists working for the independent online outlet Dewei Watch, to life and 20 years, respectively, on trumped-up terrorism charges. In May 2024, a military court found political activist Wai Moe Naing guilty of high treason and sentenced him to 20 years. The crackdown has also targeted the political opposition. Within a year of seizing power, the junta had already arrested more than 3,000 NLD members, killed 84, and carried out more than 100 attacks on the party’s offices nationwide. Former State Counsellor Suu Kyi remains held in a prison in the capital, serving multiple sentences totaling 33 years for various bogus charges. As of December 30, 2025, more than 30,000 individuals have been arrested since the coup, with 22,682 reportedly still in detention.
Protests have been systematically and seriously repressed. The junta has used disproportionate force to curb peaceful protesters associated with the pro-democracy movement that emerged in response to the coup. In March 2021, one month after the coup, military personnel and the national police force killed at least 65 participants of peaceful anti-coup protests, including children, in the Hlaing Tharyar Township of Yangon, before evicting thousands of residents from informal settlements in the area. Two weeks after the Hlaing Thayar massacre, junta officials also killed over 90 protesters who took to the streets of Yangon and other cities on Burma’s annual Armed Forces Day. State television had broadcast a warning 24 hours earlier, cautioning that anyone who participated in the demonstrations would risk being “shot in the head and back.” The crackdown continued throughout April 2021, bringing the death toll to at least 700 more people. Further investigations revealed rubber bullets, snipers, hunting rifles, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades were used on the crowds.
The junta has systematically killed and forcibly disappeared dissidents. Beyond the context of protest crackdowns, military officials have sought out perceived opponents for arrest and execution. As of December 30, 2025, a total of 7,640 individuals have been killed by the junta and its affiliates since the coup. In January 2024, Myat Thu Tan, a contributor of the Democratic Voice of Burma, was shot and killed along with six other political prisoners while in military custody. In August, Win Htut Oo of Democratic Voice of Burma and Htet Myat Thu of Nation Voice were accused of being resistance fighters and killed in a junta raid. In mid-2022, the junta broke a 30-year moratorium on Burma’s death penalty by executing four prominent pro-democracy activists. The military has also conducted nighttime raids on homes and infiltrated private events to abduct people suspected of participating in anti-coup protests or the civil disobedience movement. Observers reported that, in just two months since the takeover, hundreds of people were forcibly disappeared, including well-known activists Nyi Nyi Kyaw and Mya Aye.
Marginalized groups have been systematically and disproportionately undermined in their ability to dissent. The Rohingya people, a Muslim minority living in the Rakhine State, have been exploited by the ruling military junta to support its fight against rival ethnic armed groups. Since Burma’s independence in 1948, the Rohingya have been targeted by the Bamar majority, in part because of their perceived pro-British stance during colonial rule. The 1982 Citizenship Law formally denied the Rohingya citizenship on the grounds that they were not among the groups residing in the country prior to British rule. This legal exclusion has persisted ever since, effectively rendering the Rohingya the world’s largest stateless population. In the aftermath of the coup, the military junta has abducted and forcibly conscripted Rohingya civilians into its military efforts against other ethnic armed organizations across the country. Evidence indicates that, between March and May 2024, more than 1,700 Rohingya refugees living in neighboring Bangladesh were taken from refugee camps and transported across the border to join the Burmese armed forces, underscoring the regime’s severe human trafficking practices. This occurred after the junta’s February 2024 decision to introduce compulsory conscription for men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 under the People’s Military Service Law. Earlier, between 2016 and 2017, the Tatmadaw under Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing launched violent campaigns in the Rakhine State, following militants’ attacks on police outposts. These operations involved a series of mass atrocities against civilians, which may amount to genocide, and forced the displacement of more than 700,000 Rohingya people to Bangladesh.
Dissenting speech has been systematically and seriously censored. The junta has expanded legislation to criminalize dissent and exercised tighter control over the online space. Following the takeover, the State Administration Council announced a series of amendments to the Penal Code designed to substantially curb opposition to the coup and the regime. Notably, the newly expanded section 505A imposes penalties of up to three years’ imprisonment for comments questioning the legitimacy of the coup or the military government; meanwhile, section 124A further criminalizes criticism of the military as an institution or of its personnel, carrying sentences of up to 20 years in prison.
Alongside these legislative measures, the junta has imposed blanket internet shutdowns and blocked access to critical websites and mainstream social media. All 330 of Burma’s townships have experienced an internet or telecommunications disruption, and approximately 50 were cut off from the internet for more than a year following the coup. In 2024 alone, Burma experienced 85 internet shutdowns, making it the worst-affected country in the world. Most shutdowns are imposed in resistance-controlled areas, such as Kachin state, where the longest shutdown has been recorded, lasting 18 months. These are also the regions suffering from significant price hikes for internet access and expansive regulations for IMEI and SIM card registration. Social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and X have also been restricted since the first wave of anti-coup protests, and encrypted messaging platforms such as Signal and WhatsApp have been blocked entirely. The junta has also banned and blocked access to nearly all independent news sites and international sources of information, such as Wikipedia. All internet service providers still available in the country – ATOM, Mytel, Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), and Ooredoo – have been acquired by military-linked companies. Finally, since the enactment of a new Cybersecurity Law in January 2025, Virtual Private Network (VPN) services have been banned across the country. Violations are punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment and fines ranging between 1 and 10 million kyat (approximately between $470 and $4,700). The new law has also allowed officials to intercept, block, and filter any content in the interest of national security and public good, thereby suffocating the ability of citizens to receive non-censored information.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Since the coup, the junta has consolidated control over the entire structure of governance, eliminating meaningful separation of powers. The judiciary, in particular, has become heavily dependent on the junta, as cases concerning civilians are largely decided by either courts-martial or special courts under military supervision.
Legislative, executive, and judiciary institutions in post-coup Burma have not operated independently. Since the military takeover, effective authority has resided within the junta headed by Min Aung Hlaing. Immediately after the coup, Acting President Myint Swe issued an order declaring the state of emergency, citing the Union Election Commission’s alleged failure to address electoral irregularities in the November 2020 election. By invoking the emergency provisions under articles 417 and 418 of the constitution, he transferred all powers to Min Aung Hlaing as Commander-in-Chief. Through repeated extensions of the state of emergency, Min Aung Hlaing consolidated authority as chairman of the State Administration Council, the country’s central governing body. The SAC was originally composed of 11 members, of which eight were senior Tatmadaw officers and three civilians, but its membership was subsequently expanded to include pro-military political figures and representatives from ethnic minority groups. Under Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership, the SAC assumed responsibility for overseeing the allocation of ministerial portfolios, forming a military-led cabinet under Min Aung Hlaing as Prime Minister, and appointing members to the various administrative bodies at the sub-national level. With the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw being dissolved, legislative authority was exercised entirely by the council through decrees and amendments. In the judicial sphere, although courts continued to function formally, the council reconstituted key judicial bodies, including the Supreme Court of the Union, the Constitutional Tribunal, and the State and Region High Courts, by dismissing sitting judges appointed by the previous government and replacing them with loyalists.
On July 31, 2025, as the junta declared the end of the state of emergency, the SAC was dissolved and its powers transferred to the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), a constitutionally mandated body dominated by the military, which is empowered to exercise sovereign powers in the absence of a regular legislature. The NDSC subsequently nominated Min Aung Hlaing to lead a new transitional entity called the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), tasked with overseeing and coordinating the phased elections scheduled between December 2025 and January 2026. However, observers contend that the new commission functions only as a pretense of political transition, as effective authority remains in military hands and many SSPC members simultaneously serve on the NDSC or previously held positions within the now-defunct SAC.
The ruling junta has systematically directed cases to separate, regime-controlled courts. Courts have become heavily militarized since the coup, and cases concerning civilians are largely decided by either courts-martial or special courts that operate inside prisons under military supervision. Both hold closed-door trials that abandon due process and the defendants’ fair trial rights, and frequently hand down stiff sentences to dissidents. These courts were behind the convictions of Aung San Suu Kyi, former President U Win Myint, and other NLD leaders on a series of bogus charges, including possession of walkie-talkies, COVID-19 protocol violations, election fraud, and corruption. Suu Kyi and Win Myint were sentenced to a total of 33 years and 12 years, respectively, which were later reduced by the junta through an amnesty to 27 and eight years. In 2022, a court-martial sentenced former parliamentarian Win Myint Hlaing to a total of 173 years’ imprisonment on multiple counts of incitement and terrorism for his participation in anti-coup protests, the longest given to any NLD member. Within just one year of the military takeover, more than 300 cases were reported in which a military court sentenced civilians. In May 2023, a court in the high-security Insein Prison in Yangon handed the death penalty to five members of a resistance group accused of killing four police officers on a Yangon train. As of December 30, 2025, they are among 173 political prisoners who have been sentenced to death since the coup.
Special courts have also been deployed to target criminal defense lawyers. Attorneys representing political detainees such as democracy activists and ousted lawmakers have faced threats, harassment, and, in some cases, arrest sentences in connection with their work. In April 2022, prominent human rights lawyer Ywet Nu Aung was detained by police as she was leaving a prison in Mandalay after meeting her client, the ousted NLD Chief Minister Zaw Myint Maung. In December of that year, she was charged with financing anti-junta militias and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment with hard labor. Her colleagues asserted that Ywet Nu Aung’s trial was intended to obstruct her legal defense of opposition figureheads and was based on politically motivated charges.
HRF classifies Burma as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Since gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1948, Burma (also known as Myanmar) has experienced recurrent cycles of military rule and civilian government, alongside persistent ethnic conflicts. Following the adoption of a new constitution in 2008 and the dissolution of military rule in 2011, Burma held nationwide competitive elections in 2015, marking the beginning of political liberalization. Although the military maintained significant policy-making influence under the 2008 constitution, the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won the polls in 2015 and again in 2020. In early February 2021, just hours before the new parliament was set to convene, the military seized power in a coup d’état, alleging widespread fraud in the November 2020 election. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing subsequently assumed the leadership of the junta, also officially known as the State Administration Council (SAC). In the aftermath, a nationwide civil conflict ensued between the junta and a range of ethnic resistance organizations. Control over territory has been in flux. Recent estimates show that the military only controls 21% of Burma, although it continues to retain authority over the capital and central state apparatus. As the junta ended the state of emergency in July 2025, the SAC was officially dissolved and replaced by the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), a body tasked with overseeing the phased elections scheduled between December 2025 and January 2026.
National elections are absent, rendering moot assessment of electoral competition. In February 2021, the Burmese military, led by General Min Aung Hlaing, seized power and imposed a total of four-and-a-half-year-long state of emergency. The ruling junta substantially went after the opposition, imposed restrictive conditions for political parties, and packed the electoral oversight body with loyalists to serve its interests.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The junta has repeatedly attacked independent news organizations, detained and prosecuted journalists, political figures, and pro-democracy activists. Peaceful protesters have been subjected to harsh penalties, including police violence and execution. The junta has also toughened legislation to criminalize criticism of the coup and the military corps, while significantly broadening online surveillance.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Since the coup, the junta has retained a monopoly over legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Courts have become heavily militarized, and cases concerning civilians are largely decided by either courts-martial or special courts that operate inside prisons under military supervision.
National elections are absent, rendering moot assessment of electoral competition. In 2021, a coup led by the Burmese armed forces seized power and imposed military rule. The ruling junta substantially diminished the opposition and restructured the electoral oversight body to serve its interests.
A democratically elected government was overthrown through a coup d’état. On February 1, 2021, Burma’s armed forces, also known as Tatmadaw, seized power and imposed military rule. The November 2020 general election had delivered a landslide victory to the National League for Democracy, whose de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, had governed the country as state counsellor since 2016. The NLD secured a majority of 396 seats across both chambers of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Burma’s parliament, in an election widely regarded as free and fair. The military’s proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), came in second place with 33 seats. Alleging widespread electoral fraud, the military demanded a rerun of the vote, but its claim was rejected by the country’s election oversight authority, the Union Election Commission (UEC). Following months of smear campaigns directed at the NLD, the military staged a coup on the day the newly elected parliament was due to convene for its first session. Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other NLD senior lawmakers were detained. Myint Swe was installed as acting president and quickly declared a year-long state of emergency, thereby devolving all powers to the coup leader, Senior General and Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing.
On February 2, 2021, Min Aung Hlaing established an 11-member junta under the name of the State Administration Council as the country’s highest governing body, with himself as chair. Despite repeated promises to hold elections, Min Aung Hlaing, who formally assumed the role of prime minister in August 2024 and that of acting president in July 2024, extended the state of emergency seven times, citing ongoing ethnic insurgencies that ensued across the country after the coup. On July 31, 2025, the regime officially ended the state of emergency, except in nine states and regions affected by the conflict, and declared that phased elections would be held between December 2025 and January 2026.
The regime has systematically and unfairly barred real, mainstream opposition parties and candidates from competing in elections. In January 2023, the junta introduced new legislation imposing restrictive conditions for political parties seeking to contest elections. Under the Political Parties Registration Law, national parties must recruit a minimum of 100,000 members within 90 days of registration, which far exceeds the previous minimum of 1,000 members. Parties must additionally open offices in at least 150 of Burma’s 330 townships within 180 days, contest at least a quarter of the country’s constituencies, and have at least 100 million kyat (approximately $47,000) in their reserves. These requirements make it virtually impossible not only for ethnic and minority parties to compete, but also for the NLD, whose leaders have been subjected to sham trials, arbitrarily imprisoned, and exiled since the 2021 coup. Following the enactment of the law, the junta dissolved more than 40 parties, including the NLD, for failing to re-register within the prescribed timeframe. In September 2025, the junta-controlled UEC announced that 57 parties had been officially registered, though only six are expected to contest the December 2025/January 2026 election. Observers noted that many, if not all, of the registered parties appear aligned with or supportive of the military, suggesting a deliberate effort by the ruling junta to eliminate meaningful opposition to the military-backed USDP while maintaining a veil of electoral competition.
Under Min Aung Hlaing, independent electoral oversight has been systematically and seriously undermined. The ruling junta consolidated control over the UEC by detaining election officials, packing it with loyalists, and imposing restrictions on political parties. In the months following the 2021 coup, the junta detained at least 150 members of the UEC across all 14 states and regions, including Chief Election Commissioner U Hla Thein. Officials justified the arrests, citing the commission’s alleged failure to address irregularities in the 2020 general election as the justification for the detentions. The junta subsequently replaced the UEC with six new members led by U Thein Soe, a former army general who had overseen the 2010 sham election under the previous military regime. This commission revoked the letters of accreditation to parliamentarians who won representation in parliament, effectively negating the November 2020 election results, and oversaw the disqualification of 40 political parties following the junta’s enactment of the above-mentioned registration law. It has also issued notices requiring the remaining parties to seek its approval before meeting with foreign entities and individuals, barring them from receiving or utilizing any material and financial assistance from abroad, and instructing foreigners to report to the junta before meeting any local party member.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. The junta has targeted independent media outlets, detained and prosecuted journalists, political opponents, and activists. It has also used disproportionate force to curb peaceful anti-coup protesters and executed critics. The junta has expanded legislation to criminalize dissent and its surveillance of online spaces.
Independent and dissenting media, political leaders, and civil society leaders have faced systematic and serious intimidation or obstruction of their work. The junta has repeatedly attacked independent media outlets and detained and prosecuted journalists, political opponents, and pro-democracy activists. Among the most recent attacks on press freedom, in November 2025, the junta filed charges against media outlet AAMIJ News after it published a report linking an election candidate to an illegal drug trafficking business. Officials alleged that the report violated the Law on the Protection of Elections from Interference and Disruption, which was enacted by the junta in July 2025 to protect candidates and election commissioners from outside interference during the election period. Earlier, in 2023, AAMIJ News freelance journalist Myat Thu Kyaw was arrested and sentenced to three years in prison for allegedly producing coverage supporting the National Unity Government (NUG), an in-exile coalition of ousted NLD lawmakers, democracy activists, and ethnic minorities claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma, and its armed resistance wing, the People’s Defense Forces (PDF). Myat Thu Kyaw was again sentenced to an additional five years and six months after being convicted on terrorism charges in January 2025. Two other independent outlets, Mizzima and Democratic Voice of Burma, were forced to work underground after security forces raided their offices and stripped them of their operating license right after the coup. In August 2024, a military court sentenced Myo Myint Oo and Aung San Oo, two journalists working for the independent online outlet Dewei Watch, to life and 20 years, respectively, on trumped-up terrorism charges. In May 2024, a military court found political activist Wai Moe Naing guilty of high treason and sentenced him to 20 years. The crackdown has also targeted the political opposition. Within a year of seizing power, the junta had already arrested more than 3,000 NLD members, killed 84, and carried out more than 100 attacks on the party’s offices nationwide. Former State Counsellor Suu Kyi remains held in a prison in the capital, serving multiple sentences totaling 33 years for various bogus charges. As of December 30, 2025, more than 30,000 individuals have been arrested since the coup, with 22,682 reportedly still in detention.
Protests have been systematically and seriously repressed. The junta has used disproportionate force to curb peaceful protesters associated with the pro-democracy movement that emerged in response to the coup. In March 2021, one month after the coup, military personnel and the national police force killed at least 65 participants of peaceful anti-coup protests, including children, in the Hlaing Tharyar Township of Yangon, before evicting thousands of residents from informal settlements in the area. Two weeks after the Hlaing Thayar massacre, junta officials also killed over 90 protesters who took to the streets of Yangon and other cities on Burma’s annual Armed Forces Day. State television had broadcast a warning 24 hours earlier, cautioning that anyone who participated in the demonstrations would risk being “shot in the head and back.” The crackdown continued throughout April 2021, bringing the death toll to at least 700 more people. Further investigations revealed rubber bullets, snipers, hunting rifles, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades were used on the crowds.
The junta has systematically killed and forcibly disappeared dissidents. Beyond the context of protest crackdowns, military officials have sought out perceived opponents for arrest and execution. As of December 30, 2025, a total of 7,640 individuals have been killed by the junta and its affiliates since the coup. In January 2024, Myat Thu Tan, a contributor of the Democratic Voice of Burma, was shot and killed along with six other political prisoners while in military custody. In August, Win Htut Oo of Democratic Voice of Burma and Htet Myat Thu of Nation Voice were accused of being resistance fighters and killed in a junta raid. In mid-2022, the junta broke a 30-year moratorium on Burma’s death penalty by executing four prominent pro-democracy activists. The military has also conducted nighttime raids on homes and infiltrated private events to abduct people suspected of participating in anti-coup protests or the civil disobedience movement. Observers reported that, in just two months since the takeover, hundreds of people were forcibly disappeared, including well-known activists Nyi Nyi Kyaw and Mya Aye.
Marginalized groups have been systematically and disproportionately undermined in their ability to dissent. The Rohingya people, a Muslim minority living in the Rakhine State, have been exploited by the ruling military junta to support its fight against rival ethnic armed groups. Since Burma’s independence in 1948, the Rohingya have been targeted by the Bamar majority, in part because of their perceived pro-British stance during colonial rule. The 1982 Citizenship Law formally denied the Rohingya citizenship on the grounds that they were not among the groups residing in the country prior to British rule. This legal exclusion has persisted ever since, effectively rendering the Rohingya the world’s largest stateless population. In the aftermath of the coup, the military junta has abducted and forcibly conscripted Rohingya civilians into its military efforts against other ethnic armed organizations across the country. Evidence indicates that, between March and May 2024, more than 1,700 Rohingya refugees living in neighboring Bangladesh were taken from refugee camps and transported across the border to join the Burmese armed forces, underscoring the regime’s severe human trafficking practices. This occurred after the junta’s February 2024 decision to introduce compulsory conscription for men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 under the People’s Military Service Law. Earlier, between 2016 and 2017, the Tatmadaw under Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing launched violent campaigns in the Rakhine State, following militants’ attacks on police outposts. These operations involved a series of mass atrocities against civilians, which may amount to genocide, and forced the displacement of more than 700,000 Rohingya people to Bangladesh.
Dissenting speech has been systematically and seriously censored. The junta has expanded legislation to criminalize dissent and exercised tighter control over the online space. Following the takeover, the State Administration Council announced a series of amendments to the Penal Code designed to substantially curb opposition to the coup and the regime. Notably, the newly expanded section 505A imposes penalties of up to three years’ imprisonment for comments questioning the legitimacy of the coup or the military government; meanwhile, section 124A further criminalizes criticism of the military as an institution or of its personnel, carrying sentences of up to 20 years in prison.
Alongside these legislative measures, the junta has imposed blanket internet shutdowns and blocked access to critical websites and mainstream social media. All 330 of Burma’s townships have experienced an internet or telecommunications disruption, and approximately 50 were cut off from the internet for more than a year following the coup. In 2024 alone, Burma experienced 85 internet shutdowns, making it the worst-affected country in the world. Most shutdowns are imposed in resistance-controlled areas, such as Kachin state, where the longest shutdown has been recorded, lasting 18 months. These are also the regions suffering from significant price hikes for internet access and expansive regulations for IMEI and SIM card registration. Social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and X have also been restricted since the first wave of anti-coup protests, and encrypted messaging platforms such as Signal and WhatsApp have been blocked entirely. The junta has also banned and blocked access to nearly all independent news sites and international sources of information, such as Wikipedia. All internet service providers still available in the country – ATOM, Mytel, Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), and Ooredoo – have been acquired by military-linked companies. Finally, since the enactment of a new Cybersecurity Law in January 2025, Virtual Private Network (VPN) services have been banned across the country. Violations are punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment and fines ranging between 1 and 10 million kyat (approximately between $470 and $4,700). The new law has also allowed officials to intercept, block, and filter any content in the interest of national security and public good, thereby suffocating the ability of citizens to receive non-censored information.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Since the coup, the junta has consolidated control over the entire structure of governance, eliminating meaningful separation of powers. The judiciary, in particular, has become heavily dependent on the junta, as cases concerning civilians are largely decided by either courts-martial or special courts under military supervision.
Legislative, executive, and judiciary institutions in post-coup Burma have not operated independently. Since the military takeover, effective authority has resided within the junta headed by Min Aung Hlaing. Immediately after the coup, Acting President Myint Swe issued an order declaring the state of emergency, citing the Union Election Commission’s alleged failure to address electoral irregularities in the November 2020 election. By invoking the emergency provisions under articles 417 and 418 of the constitution, he transferred all powers to Min Aung Hlaing as Commander-in-Chief. Through repeated extensions of the state of emergency, Min Aung Hlaing consolidated authority as chairman of the State Administration Council, the country’s central governing body. The SAC was originally composed of 11 members, of which eight were senior Tatmadaw officers and three civilians, but its membership was subsequently expanded to include pro-military political figures and representatives from ethnic minority groups. Under Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership, the SAC assumed responsibility for overseeing the allocation of ministerial portfolios, forming a military-led cabinet under Min Aung Hlaing as Prime Minister, and appointing members to the various administrative bodies at the sub-national level. With the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw being dissolved, legislative authority was exercised entirely by the council through decrees and amendments. In the judicial sphere, although courts continued to function formally, the council reconstituted key judicial bodies, including the Supreme Court of the Union, the Constitutional Tribunal, and the State and Region High Courts, by dismissing sitting judges appointed by the previous government and replacing them with loyalists.
On July 31, 2025, as the junta declared the end of the state of emergency, the SAC was dissolved and its powers transferred to the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), a constitutionally mandated body dominated by the military, which is empowered to exercise sovereign powers in the absence of a regular legislature. The NDSC subsequently nominated Min Aung Hlaing to lead a new transitional entity called the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), tasked with overseeing and coordinating the phased elections scheduled between December 2025 and January 2026. However, observers contend that the new commission functions only as a pretense of political transition, as effective authority remains in military hands and many SSPC members simultaneously serve on the NDSC or previously held positions within the now-defunct SAC.
The ruling junta has systematically directed cases to separate, regime-controlled courts. Courts have become heavily militarized since the coup, and cases concerning civilians are largely decided by either courts-martial or special courts that operate inside prisons under military supervision. Both hold closed-door trials that abandon due process and the defendants’ fair trial rights, and frequently hand down stiff sentences to dissidents. These courts were behind the convictions of Aung San Suu Kyi, former President U Win Myint, and other NLD leaders on a series of bogus charges, including possession of walkie-talkies, COVID-19 protocol violations, election fraud, and corruption. Suu Kyi and Win Myint were sentenced to a total of 33 years and 12 years, respectively, which were later reduced by the junta through an amnesty to 27 and eight years. In 2022, a court-martial sentenced former parliamentarian Win Myint Hlaing to a total of 173 years’ imprisonment on multiple counts of incitement and terrorism for his participation in anti-coup protests, the longest given to any NLD member. Within just one year of the military takeover, more than 300 cases were reported in which a military court sentenced civilians. In May 2023, a court in the high-security Insein Prison in Yangon handed the death penalty to five members of a resistance group accused of killing four police officers on a Yangon train. As of December 30, 2025, they are among 173 political prisoners who have been sentenced to death since the coup.
Special courts have also been deployed to target criminal defense lawyers. Attorneys representing political detainees such as democracy activists and ousted lawmakers have faced threats, harassment, and, in some cases, arrest sentences in connection with their work. In April 2022, prominent human rights lawyer Ywet Nu Aung was detained by police as she was leaving a prison in Mandalay after meeting her client, the ousted NLD Chief Minister Zaw Myint Maung. In December of that year, she was charged with financing anti-junta militias and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment with hard labor. Her colleagues asserted that Ywet Nu Aung’s trial was intended to obstruct her legal defense of opposition figureheads and was based on politically motivated charges.
