Fully Authoritarian
World’s Population
Population
HRF classifies Bahrain as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa assumed the throne in March 1999, following the death of his father, Shaikh Isa bin Hamad Al Khalifa, who had ruled Bahrain from 1961 to 1999. Upon ascending to the throne, Shaikh Hamad asserted his commitment to pursuing reforms, and on February 15, 2001, the regime staged a referendum to codify a National Action Charter with reform pledges. This was supported by 98.4 percent of Bahrainis. In the wake of the referendum, a new constitution was drafted in 2002. However, Bahrain’s parliamentary body, the National Assembly, gained no new powers under the new constitution, proving that the National Action Charter and the referendum were a sham for democratization. As a result, coinciding with the ten-year anniversary of the National Charter, widespread dissatisfaction culminated in a countrywide revolt in February 2011, in the context of the broader Arab Spring, with the regime imposing a repressive political system and sustained crackdown on dissidents and opposition figures.
Elections in Bahrain are a sham, to the point where the genuine, mainstream political opposition has no realistic chance of competing and possibly winning. In the absence of an independent body to oversee the elections, they are administered and regulated by the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs, which is regularly led by a member of the royal family, prompting impartiality concerns. Furthermore, Bahrain’s three largest opposition groups have been declared illegal and barred from fielding candidates in parliamentary elections. Additionally, the regime designed the electoral system to deliberately underrepresent Shias in Bahrain, who constitute the majority of the population in the Sunni-ruled kingdom. Bahraini citizens make up about half of the population (719,333), with 62 percent being Shia and 38 percent Sunni.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Since 2011, the regime has repeatedly suppressed peaceful pro-democracy protests, arrested activists on spurious charges, stripped dissidents of their citizenship, and systematically restricted and suppressed free speech and free press through vaguely worded penal legislation. It also heavily monitors online activities and prosecutes individuals who criticize the regime, both in Bahrain and overseas.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Bahrain’s monarchy maintains significant control over political processes. The king has extensive powers, including appointing the members of the Shura Council (upper house of the National Assembly), dissolving the legislature, and overriding legislative decisions, which diminishes the parliament’s independence. With the majority of judges hailing from the ruling Al Khalifa family, courts being staffed with regime-aligned actors, the judiciary is characterized by a deep-rooted culture of impunity and bias in favor of the regime. Transparent procedures to efficiently prosecute regime abuses are absent in Bahrain, especially regarding torture, forced confessions, ill-treatment, and other violations perpetrated by regime agents.
Elections in Bahrain are a sham, to the point where the genuine, mainstream political opposition has no realistic chance of competing and possibly winning. The regime bars opposition candidates, disenfranchises large segments of the electorate, engages in gerrymandering and electoral fraud, and ensures that only loyalist Sunni groups dominate parliament.
In the framework of a constitutional monarchy, Bahrainis partake in parliamentary elections for the lower house (the Council of Representatives). Every four years, the public is allowed to elect the 40 members of the Council of Representatives using a single, non-transferable vote, while members of the upper house (the Shura, or Consultative Council) are appointed directly by the monarch. The Shura Council, also consisting of 40 members, is allegedly made up of technocratic experts, though it exists as a regime-aligned advisory body with limited legislative powers outside of blocking legislation enacted by the Council of Representatives. In 2025, the parliament consisted primarily of small conservative regime-aligned Sunni groups, such as Bahrain’s Muslim Brotherhood, the Arab-Islamic Wasat Society, the Islamic Shura Society, the National Islamic Platform Society, the National Unity Assembly, and the Salafist al-Asalah Society.
The regime unfairly bars real, mainstream opposition parties and candidates from competing in elections, and blocks the active participation of eligible voters. The formation and operation of formal political parties are prohibited under the law. Despite the ban on formal political parties, the Bahraini regime permits the existence of political societies or groupings. These are often less formal and function as social or community groups. Bahrain’s three main opposition groups, Wa’d, Al-Wefaq, and Amal, were disbanded and prohibited from running for parliament in 2017, 2016, and 2012, on the false grounds of sponsoring terrorism and promoting disunity, particularly during the 2011 pro-democracy protests. Members of these parties were also barred from assuming positions of leadership in civil society organizations or the public sector. Additionally, since election laws stipulate that only Bahraini citizens are allowed to participate in and cast ballots during elections, the regime has regularly stripped political dissidents of their citizenship in order to prevent them from running for the Council of Representatives. For example, Shia cleric Sheikh Isa Qassim, leader of the disbanded Al-Wefaq Society, was stripped of his citizenship in 2016 for his involvement with the group. This effectively rendered him stateless, barring him from traveling, participating in political or religious activities within Bahrain, and diminishing his ability to serve as a political leader. Additionally, citizens are not allowed to vote if they had previously resigned from the Council of Representatives, belonged to opposition groups that the regime dissolved, or received a prison sentence longer than six months at any time. Combined, these regulations rendered between 20 and 30 percent of voters in Bahrain ineligible to vote in the 2022 elections. According to the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), an independent non-profit organization based in London, between 94,000 and 105,000 individuals were excluded from the voter bloc in 2022, which registered 354,000 voters.
Under Shaikh Hamad, the dynasty has engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, electoral fraud, and voting irregularities. For instance, prior to the 2014 National Assembly elections, the Council of Representatives lowered the number of electoral districts from five to four. This deliberately decreased the chances of Shia candidates winning seats since the redistribution favored regime-aligned Sunni candidates. During the 2010 parliamentary elections, the regime used gerrymandering to purposely influence the outcome of the elections by ensuring that more regime-aligned actors would be elected. For example, while Al Wefaq won 181,238 votes, and regime-aligned groups won 137,430, the latter was able to secure 22 seats in parliament, while Al Wefaq garnered 18 seats. By deliberately redrawing electoral districts to group the Shia population together and dilute their votes (with areas such as Northern 1, having 21 times the number of eligible voters as the smallest district, Southern 6, which is largely home to regime-aligned Sunnis), the regime ensured that more Sunni candidates would be elected. The regime also artificially distorts the electoral landscape by deflating voter turnout figures, ensuring that election results appear more favorable to the ruling authorities. For instance, in 2022, voters who had abstained from participating in elections in past years were barred from casting their votes under Legislative Decree No. (57), which conditioned their inclusion on the electoral roll on their prior voting history.
Independent media, political and civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the Khalifa dynasty. The regime controls all major media, represses protest and dissent through arrests and violence, targets dissidents abroad with spyware and extradition campaigns, and disproportionately represses Shia religious and civil society groups. According to the Human Freedom Index 2023, Bahrain saw one of the biggest declines in human freedoms worldwide between 2007 and 2021. Bahrain is also among the worst 10 nations for press freedom worldwide according to Reporters Without Borders’ 2023 World Press Freedom Index.
The regime heavily manipulates media coverage in its favor. By 2025, all of Bahrain’s media outlets were either pro-regime or under state control. Press freedom is severely curtailed by the 2002 Press Law, which places all media under regime control and gives the regime the right to prosecute, fine or imprison any journalist that violates one of the 14 offenses outlined in the law, including those who criticize Islam or the king, incite actions that undermine state security, or advocate for reform or a change in government. The regime increased its control over electronic media by expanding the Press Law through Decree 68 in 2016, which included a number of provisions designed to further restrict freedoms of expression and the press. For example, the decree required all news outlets to secure renewable one-year licenses, subject to providing the regime with the names and social media accounts of those responsible for them, and barred media outlets from live-streaming. Since 2019, the regime has broadened its scope of online monitoring and brought legal action against social media users who use the internet to express themselves freely. The sole independent newspaper in Bahrain, Al-Wasat, was shut down by the regime in 2017 after being accused of violating the Press Law.
The Bahraini regime uses spyware to collect personal information and capture files, videos, and audio from dissidents’ computers. This covert surveillance is primarily carried out by the Bahrain National Security Agency (NSA), which oversees electronic espionage and cyber operations targeting opposition figures. Additionally, other agencies such as the Ministry of Interior and specialized Cyber Crime Units are also involved. Saeed Shahabi, the leader of pro-democracy organization Al-Wefaq, and human rights photographer Moosa Mohammed sued the regime in February 2023 through the UK court system, alleging that their laptops were deliberately breached in September 2011. Both activists have been vocal opponents of the regime for over a decade, tracking and reporting on human rights abuses in the kingdom. In 2012, the Bahraini Ministry of Foreign Affairs included Shehabi and Mohammed on a list of Bahraini nationals stripped of citizenship. Between 2012 and 2020, at least 1000 dissidents were stripped of their citizenship.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses protests or gatherings. Dissidents who attempted to capitalize on international media coverage of important sports events, such as the Bahrain Grand Prix, to bring attention to human rights issues have been frequently persecuted. For instance, Salah Abbas Habib, a pro-democracy demonstrator, was shot and killed by a police officer right before the 2012 Bahrain Grand Prix. A Bahraini court cleared the policeman who was charged with his murder in 2013. Najah Yusuf, a Bahraini activist, was sentenced to three years in prison in 2017 after criticizing the Grand Prix on social media and suffering torture and sexual assault at the hands of regime agents. After intense international pressure, Najah was granted a royal pardon in August 2019, but she lost her job in the public sector shortly after.
The regime engages in and enables transnational repression against dissidents abroad, including through surveillance or other forms of intimidation. Bahrain has been linked to cyber espionage campaigns, with some instances involving the use of spyware like Pegasus and other sophisticated tools. These campaigns have targeted activists, journalists, and other citizens outside Bahrain. Between June 2020 and February 2021, the regime in Bahrain targeted at least nine Bahraini activists with cyber espionage campaigns using Pegasus. The victims included Waad and Al-Wefaq members and members of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights. At least two activists were granted asylum in the United Kingdom. The regime has also applied pressure on foreign governments to extradite Bahraini dissidents. For instance, in 2022, Serbia extradited dissident Ahmed Jafaar to Bahrain despite the European Court of Human Rights ruling against it given the risk of Jafaar being unlawfully detained and tortured, since he was sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia in Bahrain after unfair trials. In addition, Bahraini authorities have pressured Lebanon to expel members of Al-Wefaq after the opposition group held events and press conferences in Beirut in 2021. By the end of the year, the Lebanese Ministry of Interior moved to deport all non-Lebanese members of Al-Wefaq.
The regime systematically and disproportionately undermines marginalized groups’ ability to dissent. The 1989 Law of Associations allows the regime to monitor and control NGO funding. Although religious associations exist, NGOs affiliated with Shia clerics face disproportional regime pressures in the form of arbitrary restrictions and closures. Because Shia clerics are critical of the regime’s policies and have advocated for greater political rights and freedoms at various junctures, the regime often accuses Shia clerics and their affiliated NGOs of being influenced by foreign powers, particularly Iran. This accusation is used to delegitimize their activities and justify the crackdown on these organizations. Since 2020, authorities have increasingly used this law to veto numerous candidates in NGO board elections and appoint regime loyalists to replace them.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. While the constitution outlines a separation of legislative, executive, and judicial authority, in reality, there is no true separation of powers. The monarch has full authority over all three branches and retains the right to choose the prime minister, ministers of the cabinet, judges, and all members of the Shura Council. Furthermore, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the king has the authority to issue decrees that override the authority of all three powers, hold referendums, dissolve the elected lower house of parliament, and call for early elections. The National Assembly lacks the necessary constitutional provisions and legislative mechanisms to hold the king or prime minister accountable for their actions, but it does have limited power to voice its dissatisfaction with the ministerial cabinet.
Due to the extensive authority vested in the King, the National Assembly has largely acquiesced to executive dominance. Instead of serving as an independent legislative body, it has been employed primarily as a mechanism to legitimize regime repression. The legislature’s capacity to scrutinize the regime or hold regime officials accountable is substantially limited, as members of the Shura Council are appointed solely and personally by the King, thereby undermining the institution’s independence and effectiveness. The Shura Council’s main duty is to review and amend draft laws proposed by the Council of Representatives (lower chamber). This arrangement allows the regime to neutralize the legislative influence of the elected National Assembly by providing a counterweight that can block or dilute legislation, especially if it challenges the regime’s policies or authority.
Bahrain’s judiciary lacks accountability, transparency, and impartiality due to the monarch’s ability to select and remove judges at will, the majority of whom are members of the ruling Al Khalifa family or foreign contractors. The monarch also appoints and replaces Constitutional Court members, and chairs the High Judicial Council, the leading administrative authority that oversees the coherent functioning of Bahrain’s courts, and therefore exercises substantial influence over judicial processes and oversight mechanisms. Once a judge is appointed by the king, accountability is nonexistent because the Bahraini law prohibits judges from being impeached or replaced through legislative processes, even for serious human rights violations, resulting in absolute impunity for judicial behavior.
Through its judiciary, the regime actively represses criticism or retaliates against those who express open opposition to its most prominent policies. With dissidents being systematically persecuted, there is no evidence to suggest that Bahrain’s Constitutional Court has at any time checked the regime or lower courts against these practices, or intervened to reverse verdicts issued by lower courts that breach Bahrain’s constitution, which includes statues on the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention, and guarantees citizens’ ability to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. No high-ranking official has ever been held accountable in Bahrain, and the judiciary has played an active role in extending a culture of impunity to regime agents. For example, King Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa issued Royal Decree 56 of 2002, which protected security officers and state agents from prosecution for human rights violations committed before 2001. Despite frequent allegations of human rights violations after 2001, including torture and extrajudicial killings, the regime and its subservient judiciary continue to shield regime agents from prosecution, allowing perpetrators to get away with crimes and even rewarding such behavior with promotions. For example, by 2019, at least 12 senior commanders implicated in such violations during and after 2011, from Bahrain’s top eight most abusive units, have been promoted.
The regime directed certain cases, such as politically sensitive cases, to separate, regime-controlled courts. In response to the 2011 pro-democracy protests, the regime propped up specialized military courts, National Safety Courts, to try protesters, opposition leaders, human rights activists, and individuals perceived as supporting the Bahraini uprising. Headed by a military judge and answerable only to the Bahrain Defence Force commander-in-chief, these courts specialized in holding secret trials where defendants received harsh sentences, including life imprisonment and even execution, and were frequently denied legal counsel and fair due process. The regime reaffirmed the ability of specialized military courts to try civilians through a constitutional amendment in 2017. Using these courts and the Anti-Terrorism Law, the regime has increasingly targeted dissidents with false charges of sedition, threatening the security of the state, participation in unauthorized peaceful protests or demonstrations, among other dubious allegations. Despite recurrent and widespread abuses against protestors and dissidents, these courts have routinely acquitted security officials charged with these crimes, imposing only unduly lenient sentences on rare occasions.
HRF classifies Bahrain as ruled by a fully authoritarian regime.
Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa assumed the throne in March 1999, following the death of his father, Shaikh Isa bin Hamad Al Khalifa, who had ruled Bahrain from 1961 to 1999. Upon ascending to the throne, Shaikh Hamad asserted his commitment to pursuing reforms, and on February 15, 2001, the regime staged a referendum to codify a National Action Charter with reform pledges. This was supported by 98.4 percent of Bahrainis. In the wake of the referendum, a new constitution was drafted in 2002. However, Bahrain’s parliamentary body, the National Assembly, gained no new powers under the new constitution, proving that the National Action Charter and the referendum were a sham for democratization. As a result, coinciding with the ten-year anniversary of the National Charter, widespread dissatisfaction culminated in a countrywide revolt in February 2011, in the context of the broader Arab Spring, with the regime imposing a repressive political system and sustained crackdown on dissidents and opposition figures.
Elections in Bahrain are a sham, to the point where the genuine, mainstream political opposition has no realistic chance of competing and possibly winning. In the absence of an independent body to oversee the elections, they are administered and regulated by the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs, which is regularly led by a member of the royal family, prompting impartiality concerns. Furthermore, Bahrain’s three largest opposition groups have been declared illegal and barred from fielding candidates in parliamentary elections. Additionally, the regime designed the electoral system to deliberately underrepresent Shias in Bahrain, who constitute the majority of the population in the Sunni-ruled kingdom. Bahraini citizens make up about half of the population (719,333), with 62 percent being Shia and 38 percent Sunni.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the regime. Since 2011, the regime has repeatedly suppressed peaceful pro-democracy protests, arrested activists on spurious charges, stripped dissidents of their citizenship, and systematically restricted and suppressed free speech and free press through vaguely worded penal legislation. It also heavily monitors online activities and prosecutes individuals who criticize the regime, both in Bahrain and overseas.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. Bahrain’s monarchy maintains significant control over political processes. The king has extensive powers, including appointing the members of the Shura Council (upper house of the National Assembly), dissolving the legislature, and overriding legislative decisions, which diminishes the parliament’s independence. With the majority of judges hailing from the ruling Al Khalifa family, courts being staffed with regime-aligned actors, the judiciary is characterized by a deep-rooted culture of impunity and bias in favor of the regime. Transparent procedures to efficiently prosecute regime abuses are absent in Bahrain, especially regarding torture, forced confessions, ill-treatment, and other violations perpetrated by regime agents.
Elections in Bahrain are a sham, to the point where the genuine, mainstream political opposition has no realistic chance of competing and possibly winning. The regime bars opposition candidates, disenfranchises large segments of the electorate, engages in gerrymandering and electoral fraud, and ensures that only loyalist Sunni groups dominate parliament.
In the framework of a constitutional monarchy, Bahrainis partake in parliamentary elections for the lower house (the Council of Representatives). Every four years, the public is allowed to elect the 40 members of the Council of Representatives using a single, non-transferable vote, while members of the upper house (the Shura, or Consultative Council) are appointed directly by the monarch. The Shura Council, also consisting of 40 members, is allegedly made up of technocratic experts, though it exists as a regime-aligned advisory body with limited legislative powers outside of blocking legislation enacted by the Council of Representatives. In 2025, the parliament consisted primarily of small conservative regime-aligned Sunni groups, such as Bahrain’s Muslim Brotherhood, the Arab-Islamic Wasat Society, the Islamic Shura Society, the National Islamic Platform Society, the National Unity Assembly, and the Salafist al-Asalah Society.
The regime unfairly bars real, mainstream opposition parties and candidates from competing in elections, and blocks the active participation of eligible voters. The formation and operation of formal political parties are prohibited under the law. Despite the ban on formal political parties, the Bahraini regime permits the existence of political societies or groupings. These are often less formal and function as social or community groups. Bahrain’s three main opposition groups, Wa’d, Al-Wefaq, and Amal, were disbanded and prohibited from running for parliament in 2017, 2016, and 2012, on the false grounds of sponsoring terrorism and promoting disunity, particularly during the 2011 pro-democracy protests. Members of these parties were also barred from assuming positions of leadership in civil society organizations or the public sector. Additionally, since election laws stipulate that only Bahraini citizens are allowed to participate in and cast ballots during elections, the regime has regularly stripped political dissidents of their citizenship in order to prevent them from running for the Council of Representatives. For example, Shia cleric Sheikh Isa Qassim, leader of the disbanded Al-Wefaq Society, was stripped of his citizenship in 2016 for his involvement with the group. This effectively rendered him stateless, barring him from traveling, participating in political or religious activities within Bahrain, and diminishing his ability to serve as a political leader. Additionally, citizens are not allowed to vote if they had previously resigned from the Council of Representatives, belonged to opposition groups that the regime dissolved, or received a prison sentence longer than six months at any time. Combined, these regulations rendered between 20 and 30 percent of voters in Bahrain ineligible to vote in the 2022 elections. According to the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), an independent non-profit organization based in London, between 94,000 and 105,000 individuals were excluded from the voter bloc in 2022, which registered 354,000 voters.
Under Shaikh Hamad, the dynasty has engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, electoral fraud, and voting irregularities. For instance, prior to the 2014 National Assembly elections, the Council of Representatives lowered the number of electoral districts from five to four. This deliberately decreased the chances of Shia candidates winning seats since the redistribution favored regime-aligned Sunni candidates. During the 2010 parliamentary elections, the regime used gerrymandering to purposely influence the outcome of the elections by ensuring that more regime-aligned actors would be elected. For example, while Al Wefaq won 181,238 votes, and regime-aligned groups won 137,430, the latter was able to secure 22 seats in parliament, while Al Wefaq garnered 18 seats. By deliberately redrawing electoral districts to group the Shia population together and dilute their votes (with areas such as Northern 1, having 21 times the number of eligible voters as the smallest district, Southern 6, which is largely home to regime-aligned Sunnis), the regime ensured that more Sunni candidates would be elected. The regime also artificially distorts the electoral landscape by deflating voter turnout figures, ensuring that election results appear more favorable to the ruling authorities. For instance, in 2022, voters who had abstained from participating in elections in past years were barred from casting their votes under Legislative Decree No. (57), which conditioned their inclusion on the electoral roll on their prior voting history.
Independent media, political and civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public face overt and systematic retaliation if they openly criticize or challenge the Khalifa dynasty. The regime controls all major media, represses protest and dissent through arrests and violence, targets dissidents abroad with spyware and extradition campaigns, and disproportionately represses Shia religious and civil society groups. According to the Human Freedom Index 2023, Bahrain saw one of the biggest declines in human freedoms worldwide between 2007 and 2021. Bahrain is also among the worst 10 nations for press freedom worldwide according to Reporters Without Borders’ 2023 World Press Freedom Index.
The regime heavily manipulates media coverage in its favor. By 2025, all of Bahrain’s media outlets were either pro-regime or under state control. Press freedom is severely curtailed by the 2002 Press Law, which places all media under regime control and gives the regime the right to prosecute, fine or imprison any journalist that violates one of the 14 offenses outlined in the law, including those who criticize Islam or the king, incite actions that undermine state security, or advocate for reform or a change in government. The regime increased its control over electronic media by expanding the Press Law through Decree 68 in 2016, which included a number of provisions designed to further restrict freedoms of expression and the press. For example, the decree required all news outlets to secure renewable one-year licenses, subject to providing the regime with the names and social media accounts of those responsible for them, and barred media outlets from live-streaming. Since 2019, the regime has broadened its scope of online monitoring and brought legal action against social media users who use the internet to express themselves freely. The sole independent newspaper in Bahrain, Al-Wasat, was shut down by the regime in 2017 after being accused of violating the Press Law.
The Bahraini regime uses spyware to collect personal information and capture files, videos, and audio from dissidents’ computers. This covert surveillance is primarily carried out by the Bahrain National Security Agency (NSA), which oversees electronic espionage and cyber operations targeting opposition figures. Additionally, other agencies such as the Ministry of Interior and specialized Cyber Crime Units are also involved. Saeed Shahabi, the leader of pro-democracy organization Al-Wefaq, and human rights photographer Moosa Mohammed sued the regime in February 2023 through the UK court system, alleging that their laptops were deliberately breached in September 2011. Both activists have been vocal opponents of the regime for over a decade, tracking and reporting on human rights abuses in the kingdom. In 2012, the Bahraini Ministry of Foreign Affairs included Shehabi and Mohammed on a list of Bahraini nationals stripped of citizenship. Between 2012 and 2020, at least 1000 dissidents were stripped of their citizenship.
The regime seriously and unfairly represses protests or gatherings. Dissidents who attempted to capitalize on international media coverage of important sports events, such as the Bahrain Grand Prix, to bring attention to human rights issues have been frequently persecuted. For instance, Salah Abbas Habib, a pro-democracy demonstrator, was shot and killed by a police officer right before the 2012 Bahrain Grand Prix. A Bahraini court cleared the policeman who was charged with his murder in 2013. Najah Yusuf, a Bahraini activist, was sentenced to three years in prison in 2017 after criticizing the Grand Prix on social media and suffering torture and sexual assault at the hands of regime agents. After intense international pressure, Najah was granted a royal pardon in August 2019, but she lost her job in the public sector shortly after.
The regime engages in and enables transnational repression against dissidents abroad, including through surveillance or other forms of intimidation. Bahrain has been linked to cyber espionage campaigns, with some instances involving the use of spyware like Pegasus and other sophisticated tools. These campaigns have targeted activists, journalists, and other citizens outside Bahrain. Between June 2020 and February 2021, the regime in Bahrain targeted at least nine Bahraini activists with cyber espionage campaigns using Pegasus. The victims included Waad and Al-Wefaq members and members of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights. At least two activists were granted asylum in the United Kingdom. The regime has also applied pressure on foreign governments to extradite Bahraini dissidents. For instance, in 2022, Serbia extradited dissident Ahmed Jafaar to Bahrain despite the European Court of Human Rights ruling against it given the risk of Jafaar being unlawfully detained and tortured, since he was sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia in Bahrain after unfair trials. In addition, Bahraini authorities have pressured Lebanon to expel members of Al-Wefaq after the opposition group held events and press conferences in Beirut in 2021. By the end of the year, the Lebanese Ministry of Interior moved to deport all non-Lebanese members of Al-Wefaq.
The regime systematically and disproportionately undermines marginalized groups’ ability to dissent. The 1989 Law of Associations allows the regime to monitor and control NGO funding. Although religious associations exist, NGOs affiliated with Shia clerics face disproportional regime pressures in the form of arbitrary restrictions and closures. Because Shia clerics are critical of the regime’s policies and have advocated for greater political rights and freedoms at various junctures, the regime often accuses Shia clerics and their affiliated NGOs of being influenced by foreign powers, particularly Iran. This accusation is used to delegitimize their activities and justify the crackdown on these organizations. Since 2020, authorities have increasingly used this law to veto numerous candidates in NGO board elections and appoint regime loyalists to replace them.
Institutions largely fail to serve as independent checks on the regime. While the constitution outlines a separation of legislative, executive, and judicial authority, in reality, there is no true separation of powers. The monarch has full authority over all three branches and retains the right to choose the prime minister, ministers of the cabinet, judges, and all members of the Shura Council. Furthermore, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the king has the authority to issue decrees that override the authority of all three powers, hold referendums, dissolve the elected lower house of parliament, and call for early elections. The National Assembly lacks the necessary constitutional provisions and legislative mechanisms to hold the king or prime minister accountable for their actions, but it does have limited power to voice its dissatisfaction with the ministerial cabinet.
Due to the extensive authority vested in the King, the National Assembly has largely acquiesced to executive dominance. Instead of serving as an independent legislative body, it has been employed primarily as a mechanism to legitimize regime repression. The legislature’s capacity to scrutinize the regime or hold regime officials accountable is substantially limited, as members of the Shura Council are appointed solely and personally by the King, thereby undermining the institution’s independence and effectiveness. The Shura Council’s main duty is to review and amend draft laws proposed by the Council of Representatives (lower chamber). This arrangement allows the regime to neutralize the legislative influence of the elected National Assembly by providing a counterweight that can block or dilute legislation, especially if it challenges the regime’s policies or authority.
Bahrain’s judiciary lacks accountability, transparency, and impartiality due to the monarch’s ability to select and remove judges at will, the majority of whom are members of the ruling Al Khalifa family or foreign contractors. The monarch also appoints and replaces Constitutional Court members, and chairs the High Judicial Council, the leading administrative authority that oversees the coherent functioning of Bahrain’s courts, and therefore exercises substantial influence over judicial processes and oversight mechanisms. Once a judge is appointed by the king, accountability is nonexistent because the Bahraini law prohibits judges from being impeached or replaced through legislative processes, even for serious human rights violations, resulting in absolute impunity for judicial behavior.
Through its judiciary, the regime actively represses criticism or retaliates against those who express open opposition to its most prominent policies. With dissidents being systematically persecuted, there is no evidence to suggest that Bahrain’s Constitutional Court has at any time checked the regime or lower courts against these practices, or intervened to reverse verdicts issued by lower courts that breach Bahrain’s constitution, which includes statues on the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention, and guarantees citizens’ ability to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions frequently and unfairly fail to hold regime officials accountable. No high-ranking official has ever been held accountable in Bahrain, and the judiciary has played an active role in extending a culture of impunity to regime agents. For example, King Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa issued Royal Decree 56 of 2002, which protected security officers and state agents from prosecution for human rights violations committed before 2001. Despite frequent allegations of human rights violations after 2001, including torture and extrajudicial killings, the regime and its subservient judiciary continue to shield regime agents from prosecution, allowing perpetrators to get away with crimes and even rewarding such behavior with promotions. For example, by 2019, at least 12 senior commanders implicated in such violations during and after 2011, from Bahrain’s top eight most abusive units, have been promoted.
The regime directed certain cases, such as politically sensitive cases, to separate, regime-controlled courts. In response to the 2011 pro-democracy protests, the regime propped up specialized military courts, National Safety Courts, to try protesters, opposition leaders, human rights activists, and individuals perceived as supporting the Bahraini uprising. Headed by a military judge and answerable only to the Bahrain Defence Force commander-in-chief, these courts specialized in holding secret trials where defendants received harsh sentences, including life imprisonment and even execution, and were frequently denied legal counsel and fair due process. The regime reaffirmed the ability of specialized military courts to try civilians through a constitutional amendment in 2017. Using these courts and the Anti-Terrorism Law, the regime has increasingly targeted dissidents with false charges of sedition, threatening the security of the state, participation in unauthorized peaceful protests or demonstrations, among other dubious allegations. Despite recurrent and widespread abuses against protestors and dissidents, these courts have routinely acquitted security officials charged with these crimes, imposing only unduly lenient sentences on rare occasions.
