Democracy
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HRF classifies Peru as democratic.
Peru’s contemporary political trajectory is deeply shaped by the internal armed conflict (1980–2000) between the state and insurgent groups such as the Shining Path and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which left nearly 70,000 people dead and eroded trust in democratic institutions. In this context of violence and crisis, Alberto Fujimori rose to power in 1990 and carried out a self-coup in 1992, dissolving Congress and concentrating power in the executive. A new 1993 constitution strengthened presidential authority while weakening institutional checks, laying the groundwork for his decade-long rule. Fujimori’s regime collapsed in 2000 amid corruption and human rights scandals, ushering in a new democratic period characterized by competitive elections and more assertive oversight from institutions such as the Constitutional Tribunal and the Ombudsman’s Office. In the decades since, Peru has faced extreme party system fragmentation, recurring corruption scandals, and constant clashes between the executive and legislature. Since 2016, the country has cycled through seven presidents in just eight years, as Congress repeatedly used its broad impeachment powers to oust sitting leaders. One notable exception is the removal of Pedro Castillo in December 2022, which followed his attempted self-coup and is widely regarded as a constitutionally grounded response to an effort to break the democratic order. Beyond that case, impeachment has been applied more expansively. Following the impeachment of President Dina Boluarte in October 2025, Congress President José Jerí assumed the presidency by constitutional succession and will remain in office until July 2026, the end of the current term. With the exception of interim President Francisco Sagasti (2020-2021), nearly every living former president is imprisoned, under house arrest, or facing criminal investigations. The 2026 general elections will feature a contest that includes a record 43 presidential candidates, alongside the reintroduction of a bicameral legislature for the first time since it was abolished under the 1993 constitution.
National elections in Peru are largely free and fair. The country has a weak and fragmented party system, where new parties form and dissolve every electoral cycle. Since the return to democracy in 2001, there have been multiple peaceful transfers of power between competing parties. The last general election in 2021 was highly competitive. Pedro Castillo narrowly defeated Keiko Fujimori in a tightly contested runoff. Castillo was later impeached by Congress in 2022. His Vice President Dina Boluarte assumed office and was herself impeached in 2025. Congress President José Jerí assumed the presidency in October 2025. Efforts by Congress to impeach leaders are increasingly common because of a Constitutional clause that allows impeachment proceedings to be brought in Congress on a vague “moral incapacity” provision that does not require proof of legal wrongdoing.
Independent media, civil society organizations, and members of the general public in Peru are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government, though dissent has been seriously and unfairly hindered during episodes of political crisis. Civil society remains active and diverse, but the 2025 reform to the NGO law has introduced serious restrictions on civil society organizations that receive foreign funding. The press remains pluralistic and independent, with outlets such as IDL-Reporteros and Ojo Público regularly exposing corruption and abuses of power. However, protests have faced disproportionate repression: between December 2022 and March 2023, security forces under President Dina Boluarte killed 44 demonstrators and injured over 100 others during nationwide unrest.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. Institutional accountability in Peru is uneven; while electoral authorities remain independent, other oversight and judicial institutions have been severely politicized. Courts have not unfairly enabled the government’s attempts to undermine electoral competition. However, Congress has repeatedly weaponized the presidential impeachment mechanism — removing four presidents since 2016 under the vague “moral incapacity” clause — turning an accountability safeguard into a partisan tool that has generated chronic instability. The Attorney General’s Office has also suffered from politicization and interference, with successive prosecutors facing political pressure and removal amid scandals of corruption and influence-peddling. Meanwhile, Congress has sought to weaken judicial independence by attempting to suspend the National Board of Justice (JNJ) and by appointing politically aligned Constitutional Tribunal (TC) magistrates through opaque procedures. The resulting concentration of power in the legislature and erosion of judicial autonomy have undermined institutional checks and blurred the boundaries between accountability and political control.
Elections in Peru are largely free and fair, with extreme fragmentation consistently producing minority presidents with little congressional support, undermining political stability and governability. A wide variety of parties and candidates compete in elections without government interference, and electoral authorities have acted independently to uphold results in tight contests despite political tensions and unsubstantiated fraud allegations from the losing parties.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Peru’s fragmented party system produces crowded first rounds in which many candidates compete and the top two advance to a runoff with relatively small vote shares. In 2021, for instance, 18 candidates ran in the first round, and Pedro Castillo and Keiko Fujimori advanced with only 18.9% and 13.4% of the vote, respectively. Runoff results are typically extremely close: in 2021, Pedro Castillo of the Free Peru (PL) party defeated Keiko Fujimori of Popular Force (FP) 50.13% to 49.87%, and in 2016, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski of the Peruvians for Change (PPK) party defeated Fujimori also by a very narrow margin of 50.12% to 49.88%. This fragmentation means that presidents usually lack a congressional majority, leaving them exposed to persistent legislative opposition, regardless of political ideology, and repeated impeachment attempts, which have fueled political instability. For the upcoming 2026 elections, a record 43 presidential candidates have been registered.
Moreover, the Peruvian government has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. In the most recent presidential election in 2021, the runoff between Castillo and Fujimori was decided by roughly 0.13 percentage points. Fujimori, the losing candidate, alleged widespread fraud and pursued a sustained legal and political challenge to the results, mobilizing her supporters to question the legitimacy of the vote. These claims were reviewed over the course of one month by Peru’s electoral authorities, which ultimately found no evidence of systematic irregularities and formally certified Castillo’s victory. Once the legal process was exhausted, Fujimori accepted the result, and Castillo took office.
The government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. In the 2021 elections, international observer missions, including the Organization of American States (OAS), deemed the process largely free and fair, despite the widespread fraud allegations made by Keiko Fujimori and her party, which marked the third consecutive time she had narrowly lost the presidency. Independent electoral authorities such as the National Jury of Elections (JNE) and the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) reviewed the complaints and confirmed the validity of the results.
In Peru, independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government, though protests have faced serious and disproportionate repression during moments of political crisis. The country maintains an active investigative press and a vocal civil society that regularly denounces corruption, human rights violations, and government misconduct. However, the lethal response to protests in recent years has raised concerns about the uneven protection of civil liberties, particularly for indigenous and rural groups that face heightened risks when mobilizing politically.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. Civil society remains vibrant, with prominent groups such as the National Coordinator of Human Rights (CNDDHH), Transparency International’s Peru chapter Proética, and others operating freely to monitor state actions, document abuses, and advocate for accountability. However, in 2025, Congress approved a reform to the law regulating the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI), granting the body broad powers to sanction or suspend NGOs that receive foreign funding. The reform’s first provision classifies it as a “serious offense” for organizations to litigate against the State in domestic or international courts, which include filing legal actions in defense of fundamental rights or on behalf of vulnerable individuals and groups unable to access justice. Civil society coalitions and international observers such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have warned that this vague and punitive clause could be used to intimidate or restrict human rights organizations engaged in strategic litigation against state abuses. However, as of December 2025, the law has not yet been enforced in ways that curtail civic activity.
Peru’s media landscape is pluralistic and largely privately owned, encompassing major outlets such as IDL-Reporteros, Ojo Público, La República, and El Comercio, which regularly publish investigative reports on corruption and abuses of power. Although some media companies have political or economic affiliations, a wide range of critical perspectives remains accessible to the public. The state does not systematically control advertising or licensing to favor pro-government outlets, and censorship is rare.
The government has, however, seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings during recent political crises. Between December 2022 and March 2023, security forces under President Dina Boluarte killed at least 44 civilians during nationwide protests following Pedro Castillo’s failed self-coup and subsequent impeachment. Investigations by the UN, Human Rights Watch, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found patterns of disproportionate and, in some cases, lethal force, with evidence suggesting possible extrajudicial executions. While the Attorney General’s Office opened a preliminary investigation into Boluarte for aggravated homicide related to these protests, as well as eight other criminal investigations for actions during her time in office, the Constitutional Tribunal later suspended these proceedings until the end of Boluarte’s presidential term, citing presidential immunity. However, a congressional commission archived three of her cases, which former Attorney General Delia Espinoza calls unconstitutional, preventing them from advancing at all unless more evidence surfaces. Moreover, the remaining cases have not been reopened despite Boluarte no longer enjoying presidential immunity since her impeachment in October 2025. Instances where protestors are killed in Peru are not new, and they have taken place under different presidents. In November 2020, two students were killed, and dozens were injured when police used excessive force to disperse protests against interim president Manuel Merino, leading to his resignation after five days in office.
Institutions in Peru are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. While electoral authorities like the JNE and ONPE remain autonomous and have upheld electoral integrity, other oversight and judicial bodies have been increasingly politicized. Congress has repeatedly weaponized impeachment for political purposes, undermined prosecutorial and judicial independence through interference in the Attorney General’s Office, and sought to control oversight bodies such as the National Board of Justice and the Constitutional Tribunal. These actions have concentrated power in the legislature and eroded institutional checks, weakening accountability and deepening political instability.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. Electoral competition in Peru remains genuine and highly pluralistic, with independent electoral bodies such as the National Jury of Elections (JNE) and the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) operating autonomously in the most recent electoral cycles. These institutions upheld their integrity during the 2021 general elections, when courts and electoral authorities resisted intense political pressure and unsubstantiated fraud allegations from the losing side, confirming Pedro Castillo’s narrow victory as legitimate.
The Peruvian legislature has subjected executive institutions in ways that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Peru’s presidential impeachment mechanism, intended as an accountability safeguard, has been repeatedly weaponized by Congress for political ends due to the broad and ambiguous wording of the constitutional clause allowing removal for “permanent moral incapacity.” Since 2016, the country has had seven presidents, four of whom were removed from office by Congress or forced to resign in the context of impeachment proceedings — Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in 2018, Martín Vizcarra in 2020, Pedro Castillo in 2022, and Dina Boluarte in 2025. The constant use of impeachment has produced severe institutional instability, blurring the line between legitimate oversight and partisan maneuvering. For example, after Congress removed Castillo following his attempted self-coup in December 2022, the legislature archived and delayed multiple corruption and human rights investigations that could have triggered President Boluarte’s removal. These cases remained inactive for nearly three years despite their potential constitutional relevance. This pattern illustrates how impeachment and oversight mechanisms have been applied inconsistently, with congressional scrutiny intensifying or receding depending on shifting political incentives rather than institutional standards. In October 2025, amid mounting scandals, protests, and political pressure, the legislature voted to impeach Boluarte — bringing an end to her presidency and elevating Congress President José Jerí to the country’s top office by constitutional succession.
Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to government interests or who are perceived as a threat to the governing authority, have faced retaliation. To illustrate, in 2023, Peru’s Congress took formal action against the National Board of Justice (JNJ), the constitutionally autonomous body responsible for appointing, evaluating, and disciplining judges and prosecutors. Earlier that year, the JNJ initiated disciplinary proceedings against Attorney General (AG) Patricia Benavides for, among other things, shielding her sister, a judge who was under investigation for corruption. These measures occurred while the AG Office itself was overseeing corruption investigations against members of Congress, and Benavides would possess the ultimate jurisdiction over those cases. Later, media investigations and prosecutorial inquiries reported allegations that Benavides’ inner circle sought congressional support for key votes in exchange for favorable prosecutorial outcomes. In response to the JNJ investigations, Congress initiated an exceptional procedure to remove all seven members of the board, citing “serious misconduct.” The process resulted in the removal and ten-year disqualification of two magistrates, Inés Tello and Aldo Vásquez. Subsequent judicial rulings suspended the effects of these sanctions, allowing both magistrates to return to their positions until the scheduled end of their term in late 2024. During this period, Peru’s Attorney General’s Office also experienced significant internal instability that intersected with congressional actions toward the JNJ. Following Benavides’ suspension and removal, subsequent leadership within the Attorney General’s Office faced motions, investigations, and public criticism from members of Congress, particularly in connection with cases involving legislators or executive officials. After the appointment of a new JNJ in January 2025 for the 2025-2029 term, disputes between the board and Congress became less frequent, but instability within the AG Office continued, marked by leadership changes and contested disciplinary decisions. The rapid turnover of top prosecutors, coupled with congressional attempts to influence prosecutorial and judicial leadership, has weakened the independence of the AG Office and the JNJ and further eroded public trust in Peru’s justice system.
Peru’s Congress has also subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. In 2022, Congress reshaped the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal (TC) by appointing six of its seven magistrates through a non-transparent, quota-based process that prioritized political loyalty over merit, according to local investigative reporting and political analysis. Several of the newly appointed justices faced allegations of academic misconduct, ideological bias, or partisan ties. Following these appointments, the TC issued a series of rulings that upheld legislative priorities and limited judicial constraints on congressional authority. These included validating the pardon of former president Alberto Fujimori, and rejecting challenges to the 2024 NGO law, thereby allowing Congress’ regulatory framework to remain in force despite concerns about its effects on civil society organizations. Together, these developments reduced judicial scrutiny over legislative action and weakened institutional checks on congressional power.
HRF classifies Peru as democratic.
Peru’s contemporary political trajectory is deeply shaped by the internal armed conflict (1980–2000) between the state and insurgent groups such as the Shining Path and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which left nearly 70,000 people dead and eroded trust in democratic institutions. In this context of violence and crisis, Alberto Fujimori rose to power in 1990 and carried out a self-coup in 1992, dissolving Congress and concentrating power in the executive. A new 1993 constitution strengthened presidential authority while weakening institutional checks, laying the groundwork for his decade-long rule. Fujimori’s regime collapsed in 2000 amid corruption and human rights scandals, ushering in a new democratic period characterized by competitive elections and more assertive oversight from institutions such as the Constitutional Tribunal and the Ombudsman’s Office. In the decades since, Peru has faced extreme party system fragmentation, recurring corruption scandals, and constant clashes between the executive and legislature. Since 2016, the country has cycled through seven presidents in just eight years, as Congress repeatedly used its broad impeachment powers to oust sitting leaders. One notable exception is the removal of Pedro Castillo in December 2022, which followed his attempted self-coup and is widely regarded as a constitutionally grounded response to an effort to break the democratic order. Beyond that case, impeachment has been applied more expansively. Following the impeachment of President Dina Boluarte in October 2025, Congress President José Jerí assumed the presidency by constitutional succession and will remain in office until July 2026, the end of the current term. With the exception of interim President Francisco Sagasti (2020-2021), nearly every living former president is imprisoned, under house arrest, or facing criminal investigations. The 2026 general elections will feature a contest that includes a record 43 presidential candidates, alongside the reintroduction of a bicameral legislature for the first time since it was abolished under the 1993 constitution.
National elections in Peru are largely free and fair. The country has a weak and fragmented party system, where new parties form and dissolve every electoral cycle. Since the return to democracy in 2001, there have been multiple peaceful transfers of power between competing parties. The last general election in 2021 was highly competitive. Pedro Castillo narrowly defeated Keiko Fujimori in a tightly contested runoff. Castillo was later impeached by Congress in 2022. His Vice President Dina Boluarte assumed office and was herself impeached in 2025. Congress President José Jerí assumed the presidency in October 2025. Efforts by Congress to impeach leaders are increasingly common because of a Constitutional clause that allows impeachment proceedings to be brought in Congress on a vague “moral incapacity” provision that does not require proof of legal wrongdoing.
Independent media, civil society organizations, and members of the general public in Peru are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government, though dissent has been seriously and unfairly hindered during episodes of political crisis. Civil society remains active and diverse, but the 2025 reform to the NGO law has introduced serious restrictions on civil society organizations that receive foreign funding. The press remains pluralistic and independent, with outlets such as IDL-Reporteros and Ojo Público regularly exposing corruption and abuses of power. However, protests have faced disproportionate repression: between December 2022 and March 2023, security forces under President Dina Boluarte killed 44 demonstrators and injured over 100 others during nationwide unrest.
Institutions are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. Institutional accountability in Peru is uneven; while electoral authorities remain independent, other oversight and judicial institutions have been severely politicized. Courts have not unfairly enabled the government’s attempts to undermine electoral competition. However, Congress has repeatedly weaponized the presidential impeachment mechanism — removing four presidents since 2016 under the vague “moral incapacity” clause — turning an accountability safeguard into a partisan tool that has generated chronic instability. The Attorney General’s Office has also suffered from politicization and interference, with successive prosecutors facing political pressure and removal amid scandals of corruption and influence-peddling. Meanwhile, Congress has sought to weaken judicial independence by attempting to suspend the National Board of Justice (JNJ) and by appointing politically aligned Constitutional Tribunal (TC) magistrates through opaque procedures. The resulting concentration of power in the legislature and erosion of judicial autonomy have undermined institutional checks and blurred the boundaries between accountability and political control.
Elections in Peru are largely free and fair, with extreme fragmentation consistently producing minority presidents with little congressional support, undermining political stability and governability. A wide variety of parties and candidates compete in elections without government interference, and electoral authorities have acted independently to uphold results in tight contests despite political tensions and unsubstantiated fraud allegations from the losing parties.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Peru’s fragmented party system produces crowded first rounds in which many candidates compete and the top two advance to a runoff with relatively small vote shares. In 2021, for instance, 18 candidates ran in the first round, and Pedro Castillo and Keiko Fujimori advanced with only 18.9% and 13.4% of the vote, respectively. Runoff results are typically extremely close: in 2021, Pedro Castillo of the Free Peru (PL) party defeated Keiko Fujimori of Popular Force (FP) 50.13% to 49.87%, and in 2016, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski of the Peruvians for Change (PPK) party defeated Fujimori also by a very narrow margin of 50.12% to 49.88%. This fragmentation means that presidents usually lack a congressional majority, leaving them exposed to persistent legislative opposition, regardless of political ideology, and repeated impeachment attempts, which have fueled political instability. For the upcoming 2026 elections, a record 43 presidential candidates have been registered.
Moreover, the Peruvian government has not engaged in significant electoral law manipulation, voting irregularities, or electoral fraud. In the most recent presidential election in 2021, the runoff between Castillo and Fujimori was decided by roughly 0.13 percentage points. Fujimori, the losing candidate, alleged widespread fraud and pursued a sustained legal and political challenge to the results, mobilizing her supporters to question the legitimacy of the vote. These claims were reviewed over the course of one month by Peru’s electoral authorities, which ultimately found no evidence of systematic irregularities and formally certified Castillo’s victory. Once the legal process was exhausted, Fujimori accepted the result, and Castillo took office.
The government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. In the 2021 elections, international observer missions, including the Organization of American States (OAS), deemed the process largely free and fair, despite the widespread fraud allegations made by Keiko Fujimori and her party, which marked the third consecutive time she had narrowly lost the presidency. Independent electoral authorities such as the National Jury of Elections (JNE) and the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) reviewed the complaints and confirmed the validity of the results.
In Peru, independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and members of the general public are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government, though protests have faced serious and disproportionate repression during moments of political crisis. The country maintains an active investigative press and a vocal civil society that regularly denounces corruption, human rights violations, and government misconduct. However, the lethal response to protests in recent years has raised concerns about the uneven protection of civil liberties, particularly for indigenous and rural groups that face heightened risks when mobilizing politically.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. Civil society remains vibrant, with prominent groups such as the National Coordinator of Human Rights (CNDDHH), Transparency International’s Peru chapter Proética, and others operating freely to monitor state actions, document abuses, and advocate for accountability. However, in 2025, Congress approved a reform to the law regulating the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI), granting the body broad powers to sanction or suspend NGOs that receive foreign funding. The reform’s first provision classifies it as a “serious offense” for organizations to litigate against the State in domestic or international courts, which include filing legal actions in defense of fundamental rights or on behalf of vulnerable individuals and groups unable to access justice. Civil society coalitions and international observers such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have warned that this vague and punitive clause could be used to intimidate or restrict human rights organizations engaged in strategic litigation against state abuses. However, as of December 2025, the law has not yet been enforced in ways that curtail civic activity.
Peru’s media landscape is pluralistic and largely privately owned, encompassing major outlets such as IDL-Reporteros, Ojo Público, La República, and El Comercio, which regularly publish investigative reports on corruption and abuses of power. Although some media companies have political or economic affiliations, a wide range of critical perspectives remains accessible to the public. The state does not systematically control advertising or licensing to favor pro-government outlets, and censorship is rare.
The government has, however, seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings during recent political crises. Between December 2022 and March 2023, security forces under President Dina Boluarte killed at least 44 civilians during nationwide protests following Pedro Castillo’s failed self-coup and subsequent impeachment. Investigations by the UN, Human Rights Watch, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found patterns of disproportionate and, in some cases, lethal force, with evidence suggesting possible extrajudicial executions. While the Attorney General’s Office opened a preliminary investigation into Boluarte for aggravated homicide related to these protests, as well as eight other criminal investigations for actions during her time in office, the Constitutional Tribunal later suspended these proceedings until the end of Boluarte’s presidential term, citing presidential immunity. However, a congressional commission archived three of her cases, which former Attorney General Delia Espinoza calls unconstitutional, preventing them from advancing at all unless more evidence surfaces. Moreover, the remaining cases have not been reopened despite Boluarte no longer enjoying presidential immunity since her impeachment in October 2025. Instances where protestors are killed in Peru are not new, and they have taken place under different presidents. In November 2020, two students were killed, and dozens were injured when police used excessive force to disperse protests against interim president Manuel Merino, leading to his resignation after five days in office.
Institutions in Peru are somewhat independent but frequently constrained by the government. While electoral authorities like the JNE and ONPE remain autonomous and have upheld electoral integrity, other oversight and judicial bodies have been increasingly politicized. Congress has repeatedly weaponized impeachment for political purposes, undermined prosecutorial and judicial independence through interference in the Attorney General’s Office, and sought to control oversight bodies such as the National Board of Justice and the Constitutional Tribunal. These actions have concentrated power in the legislature and eroded institutional checks, weakening accountability and deepening political instability.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. Electoral competition in Peru remains genuine and highly pluralistic, with independent electoral bodies such as the National Jury of Elections (JNE) and the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) operating autonomously in the most recent electoral cycles. These institutions upheld their integrity during the 2021 general elections, when courts and electoral authorities resisted intense political pressure and unsubstantiated fraud allegations from the losing side, confirming Pedro Castillo’s narrow victory as legitimate.
The Peruvian legislature has subjected executive institutions in ways that seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. Peru’s presidential impeachment mechanism, intended as an accountability safeguard, has been repeatedly weaponized by Congress for political ends due to the broad and ambiguous wording of the constitutional clause allowing removal for “permanent moral incapacity.” Since 2016, the country has had seven presidents, four of whom were removed from office by Congress or forced to resign in the context of impeachment proceedings — Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in 2018, Martín Vizcarra in 2020, Pedro Castillo in 2022, and Dina Boluarte in 2025. The constant use of impeachment has produced severe institutional instability, blurring the line between legitimate oversight and partisan maneuvering. For example, after Congress removed Castillo following his attempted self-coup in December 2022, the legislature archived and delayed multiple corruption and human rights investigations that could have triggered President Boluarte’s removal. These cases remained inactive for nearly three years despite their potential constitutional relevance. This pattern illustrates how impeachment and oversight mechanisms have been applied inconsistently, with congressional scrutiny intensifying or receding depending on shifting political incentives rather than institutional standards. In October 2025, amid mounting scandals, protests, and political pressure, the legislature voted to impeach Boluarte — bringing an end to her presidency and elevating Congress President José Jerí to the country’s top office by constitutional succession.
Members of the judicial branch, who rule contrary to government interests or who are perceived as a threat to the governing authority, have faced retaliation. To illustrate, in 2023, Peru’s Congress took formal action against the National Board of Justice (JNJ), the constitutionally autonomous body responsible for appointing, evaluating, and disciplining judges and prosecutors. Earlier that year, the JNJ initiated disciplinary proceedings against Attorney General (AG) Patricia Benavides for, among other things, shielding her sister, a judge who was under investigation for corruption. These measures occurred while the AG Office itself was overseeing corruption investigations against members of Congress, and Benavides would possess the ultimate jurisdiction over those cases. Later, media investigations and prosecutorial inquiries reported allegations that Benavides’ inner circle sought congressional support for key votes in exchange for favorable prosecutorial outcomes. In response to the JNJ investigations, Congress initiated an exceptional procedure to remove all seven members of the board, citing “serious misconduct.” The process resulted in the removal and ten-year disqualification of two magistrates, Inés Tello and Aldo Vásquez. Subsequent judicial rulings suspended the effects of these sanctions, allowing both magistrates to return to their positions until the scheduled end of their term in late 2024. During this period, Peru’s Attorney General’s Office also experienced significant internal instability that intersected with congressional actions toward the JNJ. Following Benavides’ suspension and removal, subsequent leadership within the Attorney General’s Office faced motions, investigations, and public criticism from members of Congress, particularly in connection with cases involving legislators or executive officials. After the appointment of a new JNJ in January 2025 for the 2025-2029 term, disputes between the board and Congress became less frequent, but instability within the AG Office continued, marked by leadership changes and contested disciplinary decisions. The rapid turnover of top prosecutors, coupled with congressional attempts to influence prosecutorial and judicial leadership, has weakened the independence of the AG Office and the JNJ and further eroded public trust in Peru’s justice system.
Peru’s Congress has also subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. In 2022, Congress reshaped the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal (TC) by appointing six of its seven magistrates through a non-transparent, quota-based process that prioritized political loyalty over merit, according to local investigative reporting and political analysis. Several of the newly appointed justices faced allegations of academic misconduct, ideological bias, or partisan ties. Following these appointments, the TC issued a series of rulings that upheld legislative priorities and limited judicial constraints on congressional authority. These included validating the pardon of former president Alberto Fujimori, and rejecting challenges to the 2024 NGO law, thereby allowing Congress’ regulatory framework to remain in force despite concerns about its effects on civil society organizations. Together, these developments reduced judicial scrutiny over legislative action and weakened institutional checks on congressional power.
