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HRF classifies Panama as democratic.
Panama is a presidential republic that has been characterized by peaceful alternations of power between the mainstream parties since 1994, the year in which the country initiated its transition to democracy after over two decades of de facto military rule. In 1968, Omar Torrijos rose to power after a military coup against former president Arnulfo Arias Madrid; Torrijos ruled the country until his death in 1981. Panama’s military dictatorship then came to an end in 1989, during the rule of Manuel Noriega, when the United States invaded Panama and deposed Noriega. Guillermo Endara, who had decisively won the May 1989 election at the head of the opposition coalition Democratic Alliance of the Civilian Opposition (ADOC) that the Noriega regime arbitrarily annulled, was sworn in as president on December 20, 1989, shortly after the US invasion began and at the insistence of the American government. The removal of Noriega resulted in a lasting regime change, though at the cost of a military invasion by a foreign power, which caused mass displacement and hundreds of civilian deaths. At the end of Endara’s term, in 1994, Panama saw its first peaceful alternation of power in decades, and the center-left Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) emerged as one of the country’s leading parties, along with the center-right Panameñista Party. The PRD was originally founded by Torrijos, but underwent significant restructuring to democratize its institutions. Since 2009, newer parties have emerged and succeeded in garnering public support, producing a new multi-party system in Panama. The Realizing Goals (RM) Party has led Panama under the leadership of President José Mulino since 2024.
National elections in Panama are largely free and fair. Large mainstream parties, such as the PRD, the Panameñista party, and Democratic Change (CD), regularly compete for the presidency as well as for seats in the National Assembly, along with smaller parties like the Another Way Movement (MOCA) party. The Electoral Tribunal is the independent judicial body responsible for ensuring that the Electoral Code is respected and that elections are free and fair. While the Electoral Tribunal generally operates in an effective and transparent manner, there is room for improving Panama’s electoral framework and expanding the Electoral Tribunal’s oversight capacities.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people in Panama are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Media companies and civil society organizations and associations (CSOs) operate freely and are able to act as government watchdogs. Nonetheless, judicial harassment is an issue that affects the independent press. Some of this harassment is perpetrated by government officials who take retaliatory legal action against the press for critical media coverage. Notwithstanding the need to improve press safeguards, Panamanians are able to openly express criticism of the government. The right to peacefully assemble is guaranteed by the Panamanian Constitution and generally upheld by the government, although excessive use of state force against protesters has also been reported.
Institutions are independent and serve as a check on the government. Oversight institutions and courts are able to act and issue decisions that are unfavorable to the party in power. Moreover, the independence of the courts serves to mostly protect Panama’s electoral integrity and the rights of dissidents. However, procedural delays and operational opacity can occasionally hinder Panamanian institutions’ ability to act effectively.
National elections are largely free and fair. With the emergence of multi-party politics in Panama, large mainstream parties compete for the presidency and legislative seats alongside smaller parties and independent candidates. Moreover, the party elected into power must usually form coalitions with other parties to be able to effectively govern the country, as is the case for the incumbent Realizing Goals (RM) party, which has allied itself with members of the PRD and CD parties. Panama’s electoral oversight institution effectively and independently manages elections; however, weaknesses in the country’s electoral framework limit its oversight capacities.
The Panamanian government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Mainstream parties and their candidates are able to compete for the presidency as well as for representation in the National Assembly. The barring of candidates has only occurred when there is a clear failure to meet the constitutional requirements to be able to run for office. Furthermore, Panama’s Electoral Code sets clear guidelines for the creation of parties and maintaining party status, which are generally upheld by the Electoral Tribunal.
Since 2009, a multi-party system has emerged in Panama. The two traditional mainstream parties, the center-left PRD and the center-right Panameñista Party, have had to compete with newer parties that have successfully garnered public support—for instance, the CD and Realizing Goals (RM) parties, both founded by businessman and former president Ricardo Martinelli. In 2024, former president Martinelli attempted to run for a second term as the RM party presidential candidate. However, he was found to be constitutionally ineligible to run by the Electoral Tribunal due to a pending 10-year prison sentence for money laundering and other financial crimes during his term. While Martinelli has denounced his barring as political persecution, there is no evidence that the prosecution was politically motivated. Martinelli and his associates have also been investigated abroad for their involvement in high-level corruption, particularly in relation to a vast transnational bribery scandal involving the Brazilian construction company, Odebrecht, and public works projects throughout Latin America. Despite Martinelli’s conviction, the Electoral Tribunal acted to guarantee the RM party’s ability to participate in the 2024 general election with an alternative presidential candidate, José Mulino.
Furthermore, Panama’s Electoral Code sets clear guidelines for parties to be able to participate in national elections, which involve meeting a series of quotas. These quotas have decreased since 2007, facilitating new party formation to a certain extent. In 2025, there were nine parties officially registered with the Electoral Tribunal. Independent candidates have also emerged as a growing political force in Panama. After electoral reform in 2004 and a Supreme Court ruling in 2009, independent candidates gained the right to full participation in general elections. In the 2024 elections, independent candidates obtained a relative majority of seats in the National Assembly for the first time in Panama’s history. It should be noted, however, that the majority of independent candidates elected to the National Assembly belonged to a coalition that included incumbents with prior party affiliation.
The Panamanian government has not engaged in voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Since the country’s transition to democracy in 1994, democratic governance in Panama has been characterized by competitive elections and peaceful exchanges of power. The 2024 general elections marked the end of PRD member Laurentino Cortizo’s five-year term as president (2019-2024) and the end of the PRD’s relative majority within the legislature. RM member José Mulino won the presidential elections with 34% of the vote. The RM party also obtained 15 seats in the National Assembly, becoming the second major political force within the legislature. Independent candidates formed the new parliamentary majority after winning 20 seats. The remaining 36 seats were split between larger parties—such as the PRD, Panameñista, and CD parties—and smaller parties like the anti-corruption MOCA party and the Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement (MOLIRENA) party. As a result of Panama’s multi-party politics and the rise of independent candidates, the party in power must usually form coalitions with other parties and independents to be able to effectively govern the country.
Independent electoral oversight has not been seriously undermined by the party in power. Panama’s electoral oversight institutions operate independently and effectively to protect the integrity of elections. At the same time, there exists room to improve electoral oversight capacities and expand the electoral framework. National elections are administered by the Electoral Tribunal, an independent judicial and administrative institution that effectively enforces election law. The Electoral Tribunal is led by three magistrates who serve 10-year terms that are staggered. Each branch of government—the president, the Supreme Court, and the National Assembly—appoints one of the magistrates, as is stipulated by the Panamanian Constitution. Independent international observers, like the Organization for American States (OAS), have praised the Electoral Tribunal’s professionalism and willingness to collaborate with observers. The OAS has monitored all general elections in Panama since 2004.
While the Electoral Tribunal effectively operates without undue influence from the party in power, some of its oversight capacities are limited due to weaknesses within Panama’s electoral framework. In particular, there is a low degree of transparency regarding political finances. The Electoral Tribunal is limited in its ability to oversee campaign financing and penalize financial electoral crimes. Electoral reform in 2017 and 2021 that received backing across party lines further weakened financial oversight and drew criticism from civil society members and magistrates of the Electoral Tribunal. According to the Panamanian chapter of the civil society organization (CSO) Transparency International, some of the changes introduced by the 2021 electoral reform foster impunity for corruption, such as reducing the penalties for electoral crimes and extending an amnesty to those who have failed to report campaign financing sources. Corruption and clientelist practices are perceived to be widespread by Panamanians, undermining the public’s trust in the electoral process.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are generally free to openly criticize or challenge the government in Panama. Media workers, activists, and civil society leaders operate in a mostly favorable environment. However, the press is vulnerable to judicial harassment due to some officials’ abuse of Panama’s libel and defamation law to retaliate against negative coverage. Individuals have the right to peacefully protest and assemble, which is constitutionally protected in Panama and generally upheld by the government. Nonetheless, instances of serious and excessive use of force by government officials against protesters have been reported.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. In Panama, civil society organizations (CSOs), labor unions, and other entities are able to organize effectively to publicly voice collective concerns over a wide range of issues—including corruption, censorship, and environmental exploitation. Between 2000 and 2019, approximately 4,060 new domestic CSOs were registered with Panama’s Ministry of Economics and Finance’s General Directorate of Revenue (DGI). Press associations, like the National Council for Journalism (CNP) and the Journalists’ Forum, are active within society as promoters of free press and civil watchdogs. Most notably, these press associations, along with the independent media, have been instrumental in exposing a trend of judicial harassment against media companies and workers through the abuse of Panama’s libel law. For instance, since 2020, the CNP and the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) have denounced retaliatory and disproportionate judicial action by former president Ernesto Pérez Balladares against one of Panama’s leading private media companies, Corprensa. This occurred after Corprensa’s print publication, La Prensa, published a series of articles covering investigations into alleged corruption during Balladares’ term. The ongoing defamation lawsuit has resulted in mounting legal costs for Corprensa and in a temporary seizure of Corprensa’s assets in 2023, which halted the company’s operations briefly.
Panamanian government officials have not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. However, the independent press does face some challenges due to the retaliatory legal action undertaken by some government officials. Notwithstanding the need to improve press safeguards, the space for criticism and dissidence remains significant in Panama. Dissidents work in a relatively safe and protected environment. CSOs are able to effectively organize and mobilize large segments of the population to express discontent with government policies and actions. For instance, in 2025, lawyers and civil society leaders came together to form a legal rights group, Movimiento de Abogados por la Patria (MAPA), to monitor the government’s adherence to legal rulings, particularly those that check government action and bring the ruling party’s agenda into question. Similarly, in 2023, a coalition of CSOs—Panamá Vale Más Sin Minería—came together to denounce the environmental and social impact of the government’s new mining concessions. In 2022, another coalition of CSOs representing indigenous and worker rights—Alianza Pueblo Unido por la Vida—formed to protest inequality and the misuse of public funds.
At the same time, independent journalists and media companies occasionally face retaliatory lawsuits from government officials, including incumbent legislators, particularly in response to investigative coverage of corruption accusations and other alleged misdeeds. These civil libel and defamation lawsuits leverage the loosely defined “offenses to an individual’s honor” in Panamanian law to initiate lengthy and costly civil legal processes. For example, the PRD party president and legislator Benicio Robinson has initiated multiple lawsuits against independent media workers who have criticized him. In 2022, Robinson leveled a lawsuit against the independent radio journalist Ronald Acosta Flores for criticism made on air; his legal team also attempted to have Acosta Flores’ assets frozen by the courts. The judiciary ultimately resolved the suit in favor of Acosta Flores. In 2023, Robinson also leveled a suit against Corprensa for publishing an image of him without his consent; the image of the legislator accompanied an article that covered corruption allegations. There is no upper limit to the amount in damages that can be imposed for slander and defamation in Panama—exorbitant fines can threaten the livelihood of journalists and the survival of media companies, in addition to the legal costs incurred when fighting multiple lawsuits at once. For example, digital media company Foco reported that between 2019 and 2022, it was served with 26 lawsuits for slander and defamation. While 20 of these lawsuits were dismissed, the remaining six carried fines up to $510,000. Similarly, in 2024, Corprensa faced 15 lawsuits for slander and defamation, which amounted to approximately $50,000,000 in fines. While not all the lawsuits are leveled by government officials, some officials, like Benicio Robinson, do contribute to the judicial harassment of the press. Moreover, some non-state actors with ties to the state, such as government contractors and political party leaders, have also been involved in this pattern of retaliatory legal action.
Protests or gatherings in Panama have not been seriously and unfairly repressed by the government. Individuals are mostly free to peacefully assemble and protest. However, excessive use of state force against protesters has been reported. During the first half of 2025, nationwide protests and strikes mobilized large sections of the population—including unionized workers, students, and members of the general public—who rejected the passage of a social security law (Law 462) as well as the security agreement signed with the United States. Protests were primarily peaceful, although some instances of rioting were reported in parts of the country. Disproportionate use of force by government officials was also reported. For example, according to a letter signed in May 2025 by representatives of the seven major indigenous groups in Panama, militarized state security forces came into their territories to arbitrarily detain individuals, including civil society leaders and their families, sometimes taking them directly from their homes. Security forces also used helicopters to spray large areas with pepper spray. Testimony collected and published by Panama’s ombudsman in 2025 also revealed serious allegations of arbitrary detention, torture, and deadly force inflicted by security forces against protesters and bystanders during the 2025 protests in the Bocas del Toro region. Some protesters also reported being unfairly prosecuted for alleged violent acts they did not commit. In 2023 and 2022, successful nationwide protests also saw instances of disproportionate use of force by authorities, especially in the deployment of rubber bullets and tear gas. While investigations of these incidents initiated by the ombudsman demonstrate that there are some basic institutional mechanisms to hold authorities accountable, further action is required to strengthen these mechanisms and guarantee accountability.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as a check on the government. Panama’s judiciary, as well as the country’s oversight institutions, operate with a degree of independence that allows them to issue decisions that challenge the agenda of the party in power. The courts are mostly able to protect Panama’s electoral integrity and the rights of dissidents. Nonetheless, operational opacity and delays can occasionally hinder institutions’ ability to act effectively.
The government in Panama has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Courts and oversight institutions in Panama can issue decisions that are unfavorable to the party in power. For example, in 2023 and 2017, the Supreme Court struck down twice a major government contract for the rights to exploit the country’s largest open-air copper mine. These contracts breached environmental guarantees within the Panamanian Constitution and were the subject of the nationwide protests in 2023. Despite accusations that between 2019 and 2024 the PRD packed the Supreme Court with biased judges, the judiciary effectively acted as a check on the then-PRD-controlled executive and legislative branches. At the same time, Panama’s institutions sometimes operate with a lack of transparency and significant delays, which can hinder individuals’ ability to raise issues that challenge the government. For instance, magistrates from the Electoral Tribunal initiated challenges to the constitutionality of electoral reforms in 2017 and 2021 that reduced transparency of campaign and political financing. After procedural delays that have spanned multiple years, some of these challenges were left unanswered by the Supreme Court.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The real independence of Panamanian institutions serves to protect electoral integrity. At the same time, the judiciary has been criticized for delays that can foster uncertainty, especially with regard to time-sensitive electoral issues. During the 2024 general elections, the Supreme Court and the Electoral Tribunal demonstrated their ability to both protect the integrity of electoral competition and hold public officials accountable in the face of crisis. In February 2024, the Supreme Court upheld former president Ricardo Martinelli’s guilty sentence of 128 months in prison for engaging in money laundering during his term. The charges against Martinelli are well-founded, and he is scheduled to face additional charges for alleged corruption in 2026, along with other former top officials, such as former president Juan Carlos Varela. As a result of the criminal sentencing, the Electoral Tribunal removed Martinelli from the presidential race as he had become constitutionally ineligible to run. Given the exceptional circumstances, the Electoral Tribunal permitted Martinelli’s RM party to propose an alternative candidate, José Mulino. While disagreements surfaced about the legality of an alternative candidacy, the Supreme Court ultimately approved Mulino’s candidacy, which allowed the RM party to fully participate in the 2024 elections. However, the Supreme Court only approved Mulino’s candidacy two days before the presidential election was scheduled to take place, which created confusion around the electoral process. In response, the National Commission for Electoral Reform (CNRE) proposed updates to electoral law in 2025 that include a clear protocol to follow in the case of a presidential candidate’s sudden ineligibility or inability to run.
Courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The judiciary in Panama regularly dismisses many libel and defamation lawsuits leveled at journalists and media companies for publishing criticism or investigative work on government corruption. Still, the courts have been criticized for their inconsistent approach to defamation cases that are not dismissed, which often become unpredictable multi-year litigations that drain media companies’ time and resources. Of the 26 libel lawsuits filed against the independent digital media company FOCO between 2019 and 2022, ultimately, 20 were dismissed by the courts. However, the remaining six lawsuits carried fines up to $510,000 due to the lack of limits on financial damages that can be awarded in these cases.
On occasions, judges have also approved requests from powerful plaintiffs to seize the assets of journalists and media companies long before a decision is reached, which is permitted in Panamanian civil law. In 2023, independent radio journalist Ronald Acosta Flores received a judicial order for the seizure of $121,000 at the request of PRD party chief and legislator Benicio Robison’s legal team during an ongoing libel suit. In 2023, attempts to seize FOCO’s assets were also made at the request of former president Martinelli’s legal team during an ongoing trial. These seizures are often reversed, but Panamanian judges’ approval of arbitrary requests from political leaders to seize assets creates unstable ground for media companies and independent journalists to operate in. In January 2025, the anti-corruption MOCA party attempted to amend the law and prevent the arbitrary seizure of assets during ongoing defamation lawsuits, but the party in power and allies within the PRD and CD parties blocked this reform. Ultimately, in the case of radio journalist Acosta Flores, the courts resolved the lawsuit in his favor. In June 2025, Acosta Flores announced he would press charges against Benicio Robison for harassment and intimidation.
HRF classifies Panama as democratic.
Panama is a presidential republic that has been characterized by peaceful alternations of power between the mainstream parties since 1994, the year in which the country initiated its transition to democracy after over two decades of de facto military rule. In 1968, Omar Torrijos rose to power after a military coup against former president Arnulfo Arias Madrid; Torrijos ruled the country until his death in 1981. Panama’s military dictatorship then came to an end in 1989, during the rule of Manuel Noriega, when the United States invaded Panama and deposed Noriega. Guillermo Endara, who had decisively won the May 1989 election at the head of the opposition coalition Democratic Alliance of the Civilian Opposition (ADOC) that the Noriega regime arbitrarily annulled, was sworn in as president on December 20, 1989, shortly after the US invasion began and at the insistence of the American government. The removal of Noriega resulted in a lasting regime change, though at the cost of a military invasion by a foreign power, which caused mass displacement and hundreds of civilian deaths. At the end of Endara’s term, in 1994, Panama saw its first peaceful alternation of power in decades, and the center-left Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) emerged as one of the country’s leading parties, along with the center-right Panameñista Party. The PRD was originally founded by Torrijos, but underwent significant restructuring to democratize its institutions. Since 2009, newer parties have emerged and succeeded in garnering public support, producing a new multi-party system in Panama. The Realizing Goals (RM) Party has led Panama under the leadership of President José Mulino since 2024.
National elections in Panama are largely free and fair. Large mainstream parties, such as the PRD, the Panameñista party, and Democratic Change (CD), regularly compete for the presidency as well as for seats in the National Assembly, along with smaller parties like the Another Way Movement (MOCA) party. The Electoral Tribunal is the independent judicial body responsible for ensuring that the Electoral Code is respected and that elections are free and fair. While the Electoral Tribunal generally operates in an effective and transparent manner, there is room for improving Panama’s electoral framework and expanding the Electoral Tribunal’s oversight capacities.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people in Panama are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Media companies and civil society organizations and associations (CSOs) operate freely and are able to act as government watchdogs. Nonetheless, judicial harassment is an issue that affects the independent press. Some of this harassment is perpetrated by government officials who take retaliatory legal action against the press for critical media coverage. Notwithstanding the need to improve press safeguards, Panamanians are able to openly express criticism of the government. The right to peacefully assemble is guaranteed by the Panamanian Constitution and generally upheld by the government, although excessive use of state force against protesters has also been reported.
Institutions are independent and serve as a check on the government. Oversight institutions and courts are able to act and issue decisions that are unfavorable to the party in power. Moreover, the independence of the courts serves to mostly protect Panama’s electoral integrity and the rights of dissidents. However, procedural delays and operational opacity can occasionally hinder Panamanian institutions’ ability to act effectively.
National elections are largely free and fair. With the emergence of multi-party politics in Panama, large mainstream parties compete for the presidency and legislative seats alongside smaller parties and independent candidates. Moreover, the party elected into power must usually form coalitions with other parties to be able to effectively govern the country, as is the case for the incumbent Realizing Goals (RM) party, which has allied itself with members of the PRD and CD parties. Panama’s electoral oversight institution effectively and independently manages elections; however, weaknesses in the country’s electoral framework limit its oversight capacities.
The Panamanian government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Mainstream parties and their candidates are able to compete for the presidency as well as for representation in the National Assembly. The barring of candidates has only occurred when there is a clear failure to meet the constitutional requirements to be able to run for office. Furthermore, Panama’s Electoral Code sets clear guidelines for the creation of parties and maintaining party status, which are generally upheld by the Electoral Tribunal.
Since 2009, a multi-party system has emerged in Panama. The two traditional mainstream parties, the center-left PRD and the center-right Panameñista Party, have had to compete with newer parties that have successfully garnered public support—for instance, the CD and Realizing Goals (RM) parties, both founded by businessman and former president Ricardo Martinelli. In 2024, former president Martinelli attempted to run for a second term as the RM party presidential candidate. However, he was found to be constitutionally ineligible to run by the Electoral Tribunal due to a pending 10-year prison sentence for money laundering and other financial crimes during his term. While Martinelli has denounced his barring as political persecution, there is no evidence that the prosecution was politically motivated. Martinelli and his associates have also been investigated abroad for their involvement in high-level corruption, particularly in relation to a vast transnational bribery scandal involving the Brazilian construction company, Odebrecht, and public works projects throughout Latin America. Despite Martinelli’s conviction, the Electoral Tribunal acted to guarantee the RM party’s ability to participate in the 2024 general election with an alternative presidential candidate, José Mulino.
Furthermore, Panama’s Electoral Code sets clear guidelines for parties to be able to participate in national elections, which involve meeting a series of quotas. These quotas have decreased since 2007, facilitating new party formation to a certain extent. In 2025, there were nine parties officially registered with the Electoral Tribunal. Independent candidates have also emerged as a growing political force in Panama. After electoral reform in 2004 and a Supreme Court ruling in 2009, independent candidates gained the right to full participation in general elections. In the 2024 elections, independent candidates obtained a relative majority of seats in the National Assembly for the first time in Panama’s history. It should be noted, however, that the majority of independent candidates elected to the National Assembly belonged to a coalition that included incumbents with prior party affiliation.
The Panamanian government has not engaged in voting irregularities or electoral fraud. Since the country’s transition to democracy in 1994, democratic governance in Panama has been characterized by competitive elections and peaceful exchanges of power. The 2024 general elections marked the end of PRD member Laurentino Cortizo’s five-year term as president (2019-2024) and the end of the PRD’s relative majority within the legislature. RM member José Mulino won the presidential elections with 34% of the vote. The RM party also obtained 15 seats in the National Assembly, becoming the second major political force within the legislature. Independent candidates formed the new parliamentary majority after winning 20 seats. The remaining 36 seats were split between larger parties—such as the PRD, Panameñista, and CD parties—and smaller parties like the anti-corruption MOCA party and the Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement (MOLIRENA) party. As a result of Panama’s multi-party politics and the rise of independent candidates, the party in power must usually form coalitions with other parties and independents to be able to effectively govern the country.
Independent electoral oversight has not been seriously undermined by the party in power. Panama’s electoral oversight institutions operate independently and effectively to protect the integrity of elections. At the same time, there exists room to improve electoral oversight capacities and expand the electoral framework. National elections are administered by the Electoral Tribunal, an independent judicial and administrative institution that effectively enforces election law. The Electoral Tribunal is led by three magistrates who serve 10-year terms that are staggered. Each branch of government—the president, the Supreme Court, and the National Assembly—appoints one of the magistrates, as is stipulated by the Panamanian Constitution. Independent international observers, like the Organization for American States (OAS), have praised the Electoral Tribunal’s professionalism and willingness to collaborate with observers. The OAS has monitored all general elections in Panama since 2004.
While the Electoral Tribunal effectively operates without undue influence from the party in power, some of its oversight capacities are limited due to weaknesses within Panama’s electoral framework. In particular, there is a low degree of transparency regarding political finances. The Electoral Tribunal is limited in its ability to oversee campaign financing and penalize financial electoral crimes. Electoral reform in 2017 and 2021 that received backing across party lines further weakened financial oversight and drew criticism from civil society members and magistrates of the Electoral Tribunal. According to the Panamanian chapter of the civil society organization (CSO) Transparency International, some of the changes introduced by the 2021 electoral reform foster impunity for corruption, such as reducing the penalties for electoral crimes and extending an amnesty to those who have failed to report campaign financing sources. Corruption and clientelist practices are perceived to be widespread by Panamanians, undermining the public’s trust in the electoral process.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and members of the general public are generally free to openly criticize or challenge the government in Panama. Media workers, activists, and civil society leaders operate in a mostly favorable environment. However, the press is vulnerable to judicial harassment due to some officials’ abuse of Panama’s libel and defamation law to retaliate against negative coverage. Individuals have the right to peacefully protest and assemble, which is constitutionally protected in Panama and generally upheld by the government. Nonetheless, instances of serious and excessive use of force by government officials against protesters have been reported.
The government has not unfairly shut down independent, dissenting organizations. In Panama, civil society organizations (CSOs), labor unions, and other entities are able to organize effectively to publicly voice collective concerns over a wide range of issues—including corruption, censorship, and environmental exploitation. Between 2000 and 2019, approximately 4,060 new domestic CSOs were registered with Panama’s Ministry of Economics and Finance’s General Directorate of Revenue (DGI). Press associations, like the National Council for Journalism (CNP) and the Journalists’ Forum, are active within society as promoters of free press and civil watchdogs. Most notably, these press associations, along with the independent media, have been instrumental in exposing a trend of judicial harassment against media companies and workers through the abuse of Panama’s libel law. For instance, since 2020, the CNP and the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) have denounced retaliatory and disproportionate judicial action by former president Ernesto Pérez Balladares against one of Panama’s leading private media companies, Corprensa. This occurred after Corprensa’s print publication, La Prensa, published a series of articles covering investigations into alleged corruption during Balladares’ term. The ongoing defamation lawsuit has resulted in mounting legal costs for Corprensa and in a temporary seizure of Corprensa’s assets in 2023, which halted the company’s operations briefly.
Panamanian government officials have not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. However, the independent press does face some challenges due to the retaliatory legal action undertaken by some government officials. Notwithstanding the need to improve press safeguards, the space for criticism and dissidence remains significant in Panama. Dissidents work in a relatively safe and protected environment. CSOs are able to effectively organize and mobilize large segments of the population to express discontent with government policies and actions. For instance, in 2025, lawyers and civil society leaders came together to form a legal rights group, Movimiento de Abogados por la Patria (MAPA), to monitor the government’s adherence to legal rulings, particularly those that check government action and bring the ruling party’s agenda into question. Similarly, in 2023, a coalition of CSOs—Panamá Vale Más Sin Minería—came together to denounce the environmental and social impact of the government’s new mining concessions. In 2022, another coalition of CSOs representing indigenous and worker rights—Alianza Pueblo Unido por la Vida—formed to protest inequality and the misuse of public funds.
At the same time, independent journalists and media companies occasionally face retaliatory lawsuits from government officials, including incumbent legislators, particularly in response to investigative coverage of corruption accusations and other alleged misdeeds. These civil libel and defamation lawsuits leverage the loosely defined “offenses to an individual’s honor” in Panamanian law to initiate lengthy and costly civil legal processes. For example, the PRD party president and legislator Benicio Robinson has initiated multiple lawsuits against independent media workers who have criticized him. In 2022, Robinson leveled a lawsuit against the independent radio journalist Ronald Acosta Flores for criticism made on air; his legal team also attempted to have Acosta Flores’ assets frozen by the courts. The judiciary ultimately resolved the suit in favor of Acosta Flores. In 2023, Robinson also leveled a suit against Corprensa for publishing an image of him without his consent; the image of the legislator accompanied an article that covered corruption allegations. There is no upper limit to the amount in damages that can be imposed for slander and defamation in Panama—exorbitant fines can threaten the livelihood of journalists and the survival of media companies, in addition to the legal costs incurred when fighting multiple lawsuits at once. For example, digital media company Foco reported that between 2019 and 2022, it was served with 26 lawsuits for slander and defamation. While 20 of these lawsuits were dismissed, the remaining six carried fines up to $510,000. Similarly, in 2024, Corprensa faced 15 lawsuits for slander and defamation, which amounted to approximately $50,000,000 in fines. While not all the lawsuits are leveled by government officials, some officials, like Benicio Robinson, do contribute to the judicial harassment of the press. Moreover, some non-state actors with ties to the state, such as government contractors and political party leaders, have also been involved in this pattern of retaliatory legal action.
Protests or gatherings in Panama have not been seriously and unfairly repressed by the government. Individuals are mostly free to peacefully assemble and protest. However, excessive use of state force against protesters has been reported. During the first half of 2025, nationwide protests and strikes mobilized large sections of the population—including unionized workers, students, and members of the general public—who rejected the passage of a social security law (Law 462) as well as the security agreement signed with the United States. Protests were primarily peaceful, although some instances of rioting were reported in parts of the country. Disproportionate use of force by government officials was also reported. For example, according to a letter signed in May 2025 by representatives of the seven major indigenous groups in Panama, militarized state security forces came into their territories to arbitrarily detain individuals, including civil society leaders and their families, sometimes taking them directly from their homes. Security forces also used helicopters to spray large areas with pepper spray. Testimony collected and published by Panama’s ombudsman in 2025 also revealed serious allegations of arbitrary detention, torture, and deadly force inflicted by security forces against protesters and bystanders during the 2025 protests in the Bocas del Toro region. Some protesters also reported being unfairly prosecuted for alleged violent acts they did not commit. In 2023 and 2022, successful nationwide protests also saw instances of disproportionate use of force by authorities, especially in the deployment of rubber bullets and tear gas. While investigations of these incidents initiated by the ombudsman demonstrate that there are some basic institutional mechanisms to hold authorities accountable, further action is required to strengthen these mechanisms and guarantee accountability.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as a check on the government. Panama’s judiciary, as well as the country’s oversight institutions, operate with a degree of independence that allows them to issue decisions that challenge the agenda of the party in power. The courts are mostly able to protect Panama’s electoral integrity and the rights of dissidents. Nonetheless, operational opacity and delays can occasionally hinder institutions’ ability to act effectively.
The government in Panama has not undermined institutional independence to the point where cases or issues challenging the governing authority are no longer brought or are frequently dismissed. Courts and oversight institutions in Panama can issue decisions that are unfavorable to the party in power. For example, in 2023 and 2017, the Supreme Court struck down twice a major government contract for the rights to exploit the country’s largest open-air copper mine. These contracts breached environmental guarantees within the Panamanian Constitution and were the subject of the nationwide protests in 2023. Despite accusations that between 2019 and 2024 the PRD packed the Supreme Court with biased judges, the judiciary effectively acted as a check on the then-PRD-controlled executive and legislative branches. At the same time, Panama’s institutions sometimes operate with a lack of transparency and significant delays, which can hinder individuals’ ability to raise issues that challenge the government. For instance, magistrates from the Electoral Tribunal initiated challenges to the constitutionality of electoral reforms in 2017 and 2021 that reduced transparency of campaign and political financing. After procedural delays that have spanned multiple years, some of these challenges were left unanswered by the Supreme Court.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. The real independence of Panamanian institutions serves to protect electoral integrity. At the same time, the judiciary has been criticized for delays that can foster uncertainty, especially with regard to time-sensitive electoral issues. During the 2024 general elections, the Supreme Court and the Electoral Tribunal demonstrated their ability to both protect the integrity of electoral competition and hold public officials accountable in the face of crisis. In February 2024, the Supreme Court upheld former president Ricardo Martinelli’s guilty sentence of 128 months in prison for engaging in money laundering during his term. The charges against Martinelli are well-founded, and he is scheduled to face additional charges for alleged corruption in 2026, along with other former top officials, such as former president Juan Carlos Varela. As a result of the criminal sentencing, the Electoral Tribunal removed Martinelli from the presidential race as he had become constitutionally ineligible to run. Given the exceptional circumstances, the Electoral Tribunal permitted Martinelli’s RM party to propose an alternative candidate, José Mulino. While disagreements surfaced about the legality of an alternative candidacy, the Supreme Court ultimately approved Mulino’s candidacy, which allowed the RM party to fully participate in the 2024 elections. However, the Supreme Court only approved Mulino’s candidacy two days before the presidential election was scheduled to take place, which created confusion around the electoral process. In response, the National Commission for Electoral Reform (CNRE) proposed updates to electoral law in 2025 that include a clear protocol to follow in the case of a presidential candidate’s sudden ineligibility or inability to run.
Courts have not frequently and unfairly failed to check the government’s attempts to repress criticism or retaliate against those who express open opposition to its most prominent, widely publicized policies. The judiciary in Panama regularly dismisses many libel and defamation lawsuits leveled at journalists and media companies for publishing criticism or investigative work on government corruption. Still, the courts have been criticized for their inconsistent approach to defamation cases that are not dismissed, which often become unpredictable multi-year litigations that drain media companies’ time and resources. Of the 26 libel lawsuits filed against the independent digital media company FOCO between 2019 and 2022, ultimately, 20 were dismissed by the courts. However, the remaining six lawsuits carried fines up to $510,000 due to the lack of limits on financial damages that can be awarded in these cases.
On occasions, judges have also approved requests from powerful plaintiffs to seize the assets of journalists and media companies long before a decision is reached, which is permitted in Panamanian civil law. In 2023, independent radio journalist Ronald Acosta Flores received a judicial order for the seizure of $121,000 at the request of PRD party chief and legislator Benicio Robison’s legal team during an ongoing libel suit. In 2023, attempts to seize FOCO’s assets were also made at the request of former president Martinelli’s legal team during an ongoing trial. These seizures are often reversed, but Panamanian judges’ approval of arbitrary requests from political leaders to seize assets creates unstable ground for media companies and independent journalists to operate in. In January 2025, the anti-corruption MOCA party attempted to amend the law and prevent the arbitrary seizure of assets during ongoing defamation lawsuits, but the party in power and allies within the PRD and CD parties blocked this reform. Ultimately, in the case of radio journalist Acosta Flores, the courts resolved the lawsuit in his favor. In June 2025, Acosta Flores announced he would press charges against Benicio Robison for harassment and intimidation.
