Democracy
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HRF classifies Mexico as democratic.
For much of the 20th century, Mexico’s government was dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which held uninterrupted control over the presidency and state institutions for seven decades until its defeat in the 2000 election. The transition marked the beginning of a more pluralistic political era, with the rise of competitive elections and the gradual construction of autonomous institutions. During the 1990s and early 2000s, organized criminal groups expanded their territorial and institutional influence in parts of the country. Following the federal government’s militarized campaign against drug cartels launched in 2006, violence intensified and cartel fragmentation increased competition for local control, contributing to heightened coercive influence over municipal governments, police forces, and local political actors in certain regions. These security challenges unfolded alongside continued democratic competition at the national level. Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a longtime opposition leader who lost presidential bids in 2006 and 2012, came to power in 2018 under the banner of the newly created National Regeneration Movement (Morena) party. In 2024, his chosen successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, won the presidency by a wide margin and now governs with a Morena-led supermajority in both chambers of Congress. For the first time since democratization, a single coalition has the power to amend the Constitution without opposition support. Morena has used this majority to advance sweeping judicial reforms, including restructuring the federal judiciary and introducing the popular election of judges, as well as to weaken or absorb autonomous oversight bodies such as the national transparency institute, raising concerns about the concentration of power and the durability of institutional checks.
National elections in Mexico are largely free and fair. Major opposition candidates continue to run and campaign across the country. Independent electoral institutions such as the National Electoral Institute (INE) and the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary (TEPJF) maintain operational integrity, and international observers have been allowed to monitor elections without restrictions. While the ruling party benefits from structural advantages –– such as presidential interventions in favor of ruling party candidates, biased media coverage, and the instrumentalization of state resources –– these practices, though serious, have not yet reached the threshold of sustained or systematic obstruction. Electoral competition remains viable, though increasingly uneven.
Independent media, civil society organizations, political leaders, and regular citizens in Mexico are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Public dissent remains widespread and visible, exemplified by mass mobilizations such as the Democracy March in early 2024, which drew tens of thousands of anti-government protesters across the country and proceeded peacefully without state repression. Critical media outlets and NGOs continue to operate, and major opposition parties regularly denounce government policies without facing legal bans, harassment, or retaliation. However, there are some isolated cases with serious repression of protests and legal attacks against dissenters, including the use of excessive force against feminist demonstrators, the criminalization of environmental activists, and documented surveillance of journalists and human rights defenders using Pegasus spyware. While these incidents highlight real risks, they remain limited in scope and do not yet constitute a sustained or systematic assault on dissent.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Mexican courts continue to exercise review authority over executive and legislative actions, including politically sensitive cases. Most notably, the Supreme Court invalidated key provisions of the government’s 2023 “Plan B” electoral reform. However, their independence is under growing pressure. President López Obrador’s repeated public attacks on the press and opposition figures, including the unlawful disclosure of personal data belonging to journalists, have not resulted in meaningful legal sanctions. Courts have also not produced definitive accountability in the face of credible evidence that military forces used Pegasus spyware to surveil journalists. In addition, the abolition of several autonomous agencies in early 2025 and a constitutional reform mandating the popular election of judges raise concerns about future judicial autonomy. Taken together, these developments suggest a potential trajectory toward weakened institutional oversight, though courts presently remain capable of constraining government action.
National elections in Mexico are largely free and fair. The two successive victories of the Morena party in 2024 and 2018 reflect a shift in party dominance, but opposition parties such as the PAN, PRI, and PRD continued to contest elections nationwide and retained subnational offices. Independent electoral oversight bodies have administered elections with recognized technical integrity. Media coverage in the 2024 campaign period was generally pluralistic, although the incumbent president’s repeated public interventions in support of his preferred candidate led to injunctions from electoral authorities; weak enforcement mechanisms limited their impact but did not prevent opposition campaigning or participation.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Since Mexico’s democratic transition in 2000, when the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost the presidency to the historically opposition National Action Party (PAN) after 71 years in power, the country has developed a formally pluralistic electoral system. Presidents in Mexico serve for a single six-year term, and re-election is strictly prohibited under the Constitution, even if non-consecutive. The 2018 election marked a realignment in Mexican politics, as left-wing Andrés Manuel López Obrador won the presidency with 54.7% of the vote, defeating candidates from the PAN and PRI and ending the alternation between the two parties that had defined the previous electoral cycles. His party, the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), consolidated power nationally by also winning a congressional majority and securing several governorships. In the 2024 election, Claudia Sheinbaum, the candidate of the Morena-led coalition, won the presidency with 61.2% of the vote, defeating opposition candidate Xóchitl Gálvez, who ran under a coalition of the PAN, PRI, and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). This marked Morena’s second consecutive presidential victory, signaling a continued shift in party dominance. The PAN–PRI–PRD coalition fielded candidates for thousands of municipal and state-level offices and retained control of several local governments.
The Mexican government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. Mexico has allowed independent and international observers, including missions from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU), to monitor all electoral cycles in recent history. Domestic institutions such as the National Electoral Institute (INE) and the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary (TEPJF) have administered elections professionally, despite facing increasing political pressure and budgetary cuts, particularly under the administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024). These organizations have consistently reaffirmed the technical integrity of the Mexican electoral process.
Moreover, the government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. The EU report noted that media coverage during the 2024 elections was generally broad and pluralistic. However, while the INE’s monitoring showed that Claudia Sheinbaum, López Obrador’s chosen successor, received just slightly greater media visibility compared to her rivals, observers raised concerns regarding the president’s recurrent interventions in support of her candidacy during his daily morning press conferences, which were found to violate constitutional rules on impartiality during the electoral period. Although the INE issued 34 injunctions ordering President López Obrador to refrain from commenting on electoral matters, enforcement proved limited due to gaps in the legal framework, particularly the absence of strong penalties for elected officials who engage in partisan behavior during campaigns.
Independent media, civil society organizations, political opposition, and regular people in Mexico are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The government has not dissolved civil society groups or routinely blocked demonstrations. However, the environment for dissent remains strained. Isolated cases of excessive force against protesters occur, local officials sometimes criminalize activists, and journalists face serious violence largely from non-state actors amid persistent impunity. Surveillance incidents, hostile rhetoric toward critics, and funding and institutional pressures further raise the costs of dissent, even though they fall short of systematic prohibition or closure of independent organizations.
The Mexican government has not unfairly shut down independent and dissenting organizations. There is a vibrant public debate in the country, and high-profile dissent through investigative journalism, civil society advocacy, protests, and opposition campaigns remains frequent and visible. Watchdog organizations such as Mexicans Against Corruption and Impunity (MCCI) continue to publish investigations into alleged corruption involving senior officials and public projects despite public criticism from the president. Investigative journalism outlets regularly report on security policy, organized crime, and military conduct, and advocacy groups coordinate with legislators and international bodies without facing legal closure or formal bans.
Under both Sheinbaum and López Obrador, the government has not systematically repressed protests or gatherings. Large demonstrations against the government occur nationwide without state repression. For example, a mass mobilization in February 2023 against President López Obrador’s proposed electoral reform brought hundreds of thousands of peaceful demonstrators to the streets across more than 25 states without state repression. Another similar but smaller demonstration occurred uninterrupted in February 2024 across the country. However, repression of dissenting protests has occurred, but it is isolated rather than systematic. A significant example is the 2020 repression of women’s protests against gender-based violence in different cities across the country. Moreover, according to Amnesty International, Mexican authorities used illegal force, arbitrary detentions, and sexual violence against 93 protesters, most of them female students from a teachers’ school in Chiapas, Mexico’s poorest region, who were peacefully protesting to defend their right to education in 2021. Additionally, land and environmental defenders have faced criminalization for opposing state-linked projects, such as the 2017 case of Colonia Maya community leaders in Chiapas. These actions, often carried out by local authorities, persist within a national framework that fails to provide oversight or accountability.
Although the government has not killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes, persistent risks and institutional weaknesses remain. Journalists and activists operate in a dangerous environment, particularly at the local level. While most attacks on journalists and human rights defenders are carried out by non-state actors — who are not necessarily aligned with the government and act to protect their own criminal interests — the federal government consistently fails to investigate or punish these crimes, contributing to a climate of impunity that raises the cost of dissent. In 2024 alone, at least seven journalists were killed, most of whom reported on corruption and organized crime. And, from 2018 to 2024, eight people were killed while enrolled in the state’s protection mechanism for journalists and human rights defenders, underscoring the state’s incapacity to prevent killings.
The government in Mexico has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. However, surveillance practices have significantly undermined trust in the government’s respect for dissent. Despite earlier promises to halt such practices, the military’s continued use of Pegasus spyware under the López Obrador administration targeted at least two journalists and a human rights defender between 2019 and 2021. While this marked a sharp reduction from the 25 confirmed journalist targets under the Peña Nieto administration (2012-2018), it still constitutes a serious violation of privacy and press freedom. In addition, the rhetoric from government officials has also played a role in delegitimizing dissent. Under President López Obrador, frequent public attacks against journalists and NGOs contributed to a hostile climate, at times involving the public disclosure of private information –– known as doxing –– which placed critics at heightened personal risk. Although President Claudia Sheinbaum has notably moderated this tone and scaled back confrontational messaging since she took office in October 2024, the government continues to highlight and correct alleged misinformation through official channels, signaling a continued sensitivity to criticism.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts and autonomous bodies continue to review government actions and occasionally block major initiatives, yet enforcement is inconsistent, and rulings often produce no meaningful consequences. Additionally, persistent non-compliance, political pressure, and recent institutional reforms have begun to weaken oversight bodies’ practical capacity to hold officials accountable, potentially limiting their effectiveness as checks on power moving forward.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. In 2023, the Supreme Court (SCJN) struck down major parts of President López Obrador’s “Plan B” electoral reform, which would have significantly weakened the National Electoral Institute (INE). The Court ruled that the legislative process violated constitutional procedures and that the reform endangered democratic integrity. Similarly, the Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF) has on multiple occasions ruled that President López Obrador violated electoral neutrality by using government press conferences to disparage opposition candidates, including Xóchitl Gálvez in the 2024 cycle. These rulings demonstrate the judiciary’s capacity to safeguard the constitutional framework. However, enforcement has been limited. No legal or disciplinary consequences followed repeated infractions, reflecting executive non-compliance and weak accountability mechanisms rather than an absence of judicial review.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government authorities accountable. Independent oversight bodies have investigated alleged abuses and issued rulings against government officials, though enforcement has often been limited. In April 2022, President López Obrador publicly disclosed the personal financial information of journalist Carlos Loret de Mola, following his investigative reports on alleged corruption involving the president’s family. The National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information, and Protection of Personal Data (INAI) ruled that the disclosure violated federal data protection laws and ordered administrative sanctions. However, the Internal Control Office of the Presidency did not implement the ruling, and in 2023, the Ministry of Public Administration confirmed that no investigation had been pursued. Similarly, in 2024, the federal government released private financial and academic records of María Amparo Casar, a leading anti-corruption activist and head of Mexicans Against Corruption and Impunity (MCCI), after her organization criticized the administration. The INAI opened an investigation, but as of December 2025, no sanction had been reported. A third incident occurred in early 2024 when the phone number of journalist Natalie Kitroeff, the Mexico bureau chief of The New York Times, was disclosed during a presidential press briefing after her team submitted questions concerning alleged links between López Obrador’s campaign and organized crime. These cases indicate recurring non-compliance with oversight rulings, but they also show that complaints can be filed, investigated, and formally adjudicated by autonomous bodies, even if enforcement mechanisms remain weak.
Moreover, despite public revelations and multiple civil society investigations documenting the military’s use of Pegasus between 2019 and 2021, no prosecutions or sanctions have occurred. Journalists targeted during this period, as well as others affected during the Peña Nieto administration (2012-2018), have brought cases before Mexican courts seeking accountability. The Attorney General’s Office (FGR) opened investigations following the initial disclosures, but as of December 2025, they remain ongoing without substantive results, and no military officers or government officials have been held responsible. This prolonged lack of prosecutorial action reflects persistent obstacles to accountability in cases involving the armed forces rather than a complete absence of legal avenues for complaint.
The government has not subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. However, it has at times pursued measures affecting autonomous bodies. Most notably, the government entered into a prolonged conflict with the National Electoral Institute (INE), Mexico’s independent electoral authority. After the INE sanctioned public officials, including the president, for violating campaign neutrality rules, the administration, backed by a legislative majority, adopted a 2023 reform that significantly reduced the institute’s budget and professional staff and curtailed elements of its oversight capacity. Observers warned the changes could weaken election monitoring and enforcement. Mexico’s Supreme Court subsequently invalidated key provisions of the reform on constitutional and procedural grounds, preserving the INE’s core structure and authority. The episode, therefore, reflected an attempt to constrain an independent institution that was ultimately blocked through judicial review rather than the abolition or effective dismantling of the oversight body.
Finally, the Mexican government has subjected judicial institutions to reforms that may abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness, though the full consequences have not yet materialized. In September 2024, a constitutional amendment was passed requiring that all judges and magistrates, including those in the Supreme Court and Electoral Tribunal, be elected by popular vote, with current officeholders replaced between 2025 and 2027. The reform was heavily criticized by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, who warned that it could politicize judicial appointments and compromise due process. Additional provisions created a popularly elected Judicial Disciplinary Court and introduced “faceless judges” in organized crime cases, raising concerns about safeguards for impartiality. In March 2025, the government also abolished the INAI and six other autonomous agencies. The INAI was replaced by a body within the executive branch, allowing the government broader discretion to deny information requests on broad grounds and removing an important independent oversight mechanism. In June, the first judicial elections took place with only 13% turnout, producing a decisive victory for the ruling party, Morena, which will be able to control the new Disciplinary Court. While Mexican institutions have so far continued to operate and issue rulings against the government, these reforms indicate a potential trajectory toward reduced institutional autonomy and warrant close monitoring.
HRF classifies Mexico as democratic.
For much of the 20th century, Mexico’s government was dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which held uninterrupted control over the presidency and state institutions for seven decades until its defeat in the 2000 election. The transition marked the beginning of a more pluralistic political era, with the rise of competitive elections and the gradual construction of autonomous institutions. During the 1990s and early 2000s, organized criminal groups expanded their territorial and institutional influence in parts of the country. Following the federal government’s militarized campaign against drug cartels launched in 2006, violence intensified and cartel fragmentation increased competition for local control, contributing to heightened coercive influence over municipal governments, police forces, and local political actors in certain regions. These security challenges unfolded alongside continued democratic competition at the national level. Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a longtime opposition leader who lost presidential bids in 2006 and 2012, came to power in 2018 under the banner of the newly created National Regeneration Movement (Morena) party. In 2024, his chosen successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, won the presidency by a wide margin and now governs with a Morena-led supermajority in both chambers of Congress. For the first time since democratization, a single coalition has the power to amend the Constitution without opposition support. Morena has used this majority to advance sweeping judicial reforms, including restructuring the federal judiciary and introducing the popular election of judges, as well as to weaken or absorb autonomous oversight bodies such as the national transparency institute, raising concerns about the concentration of power and the durability of institutional checks.
National elections in Mexico are largely free and fair. Major opposition candidates continue to run and campaign across the country. Independent electoral institutions such as the National Electoral Institute (INE) and the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary (TEPJF) maintain operational integrity, and international observers have been allowed to monitor elections without restrictions. While the ruling party benefits from structural advantages –– such as presidential interventions in favor of ruling party candidates, biased media coverage, and the instrumentalization of state resources –– these practices, though serious, have not yet reached the threshold of sustained or systematic obstruction. Electoral competition remains viable, though increasingly uneven.
Independent media, civil society organizations, political leaders, and regular citizens in Mexico are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. Public dissent remains widespread and visible, exemplified by mass mobilizations such as the Democracy March in early 2024, which drew tens of thousands of anti-government protesters across the country and proceeded peacefully without state repression. Critical media outlets and NGOs continue to operate, and major opposition parties regularly denounce government policies without facing legal bans, harassment, or retaliation. However, there are some isolated cases with serious repression of protests and legal attacks against dissenters, including the use of excessive force against feminist demonstrators, the criminalization of environmental activists, and documented surveillance of journalists and human rights defenders using Pegasus spyware. While these incidents highlight real risks, they remain limited in scope and do not yet constitute a sustained or systematic assault on dissent.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Mexican courts continue to exercise review authority over executive and legislative actions, including politically sensitive cases. Most notably, the Supreme Court invalidated key provisions of the government’s 2023 “Plan B” electoral reform. However, their independence is under growing pressure. President López Obrador’s repeated public attacks on the press and opposition figures, including the unlawful disclosure of personal data belonging to journalists, have not resulted in meaningful legal sanctions. Courts have also not produced definitive accountability in the face of credible evidence that military forces used Pegasus spyware to surveil journalists. In addition, the abolition of several autonomous agencies in early 2025 and a constitutional reform mandating the popular election of judges raise concerns about future judicial autonomy. Taken together, these developments suggest a potential trajectory toward weakened institutional oversight, though courts presently remain capable of constraining government action.
National elections in Mexico are largely free and fair. The two successive victories of the Morena party in 2024 and 2018 reflect a shift in party dominance, but opposition parties such as the PAN, PRI, and PRD continued to contest elections nationwide and retained subnational offices. Independent electoral oversight bodies have administered elections with recognized technical integrity. Media coverage in the 2024 campaign period was generally pluralistic, although the incumbent president’s repeated public interventions in support of his preferred candidate led to injunctions from electoral authorities; weak enforcement mechanisms limited their impact but did not prevent opposition campaigning or participation.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate from competing in elections. Since Mexico’s democratic transition in 2000, when the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost the presidency to the historically opposition National Action Party (PAN) after 71 years in power, the country has developed a formally pluralistic electoral system. Presidents in Mexico serve for a single six-year term, and re-election is strictly prohibited under the Constitution, even if non-consecutive. The 2018 election marked a realignment in Mexican politics, as left-wing Andrés Manuel López Obrador won the presidency with 54.7% of the vote, defeating candidates from the PAN and PRI and ending the alternation between the two parties that had defined the previous electoral cycles. His party, the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), consolidated power nationally by also winning a congressional majority and securing several governorships. In the 2024 election, Claudia Sheinbaum, the candidate of the Morena-led coalition, won the presidency with 61.2% of the vote, defeating opposition candidate Xóchitl Gálvez, who ran under a coalition of the PAN, PRI, and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). This marked Morena’s second consecutive presidential victory, signaling a continued shift in party dominance. The PAN–PRI–PRD coalition fielded candidates for thousands of municipal and state-level offices and retained control of several local governments.
The Mexican government has not seriously undermined independent electoral oversight. Mexico has allowed independent and international observers, including missions from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU), to monitor all electoral cycles in recent history. Domestic institutions such as the National Electoral Institute (INE) and the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary (TEPJF) have administered elections professionally, despite facing increasing political pressure and budgetary cuts, particularly under the administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024). These organizations have consistently reaffirmed the technical integrity of the Mexican electoral process.
Moreover, the government has not unfairly and significantly hindered a real, mainstream opposition party or candidate’s electoral campaign. The EU report noted that media coverage during the 2024 elections was generally broad and pluralistic. However, while the INE’s monitoring showed that Claudia Sheinbaum, López Obrador’s chosen successor, received just slightly greater media visibility compared to her rivals, observers raised concerns regarding the president’s recurrent interventions in support of her candidacy during his daily morning press conferences, which were found to violate constitutional rules on impartiality during the electoral period. Although the INE issued 34 injunctions ordering President López Obrador to refrain from commenting on electoral matters, enforcement proved limited due to gaps in the legal framework, particularly the absence of strong penalties for elected officials who engage in partisan behavior during campaigns.
Independent media, civil society organizations, political opposition, and regular people in Mexico are largely free to openly criticize or challenge the government. The government has not dissolved civil society groups or routinely blocked demonstrations. However, the environment for dissent remains strained. Isolated cases of excessive force against protesters occur, local officials sometimes criminalize activists, and journalists face serious violence largely from non-state actors amid persistent impunity. Surveillance incidents, hostile rhetoric toward critics, and funding and institutional pressures further raise the costs of dissent, even though they fall short of systematic prohibition or closure of independent organizations.
The Mexican government has not unfairly shut down independent and dissenting organizations. There is a vibrant public debate in the country, and high-profile dissent through investigative journalism, civil society advocacy, protests, and opposition campaigns remains frequent and visible. Watchdog organizations such as Mexicans Against Corruption and Impunity (MCCI) continue to publish investigations into alleged corruption involving senior officials and public projects despite public criticism from the president. Investigative journalism outlets regularly report on security policy, organized crime, and military conduct, and advocacy groups coordinate with legislators and international bodies without facing legal closure or formal bans.
Under both Sheinbaum and López Obrador, the government has not systematically repressed protests or gatherings. Large demonstrations against the government occur nationwide without state repression. For example, a mass mobilization in February 2023 against President López Obrador’s proposed electoral reform brought hundreds of thousands of peaceful demonstrators to the streets across more than 25 states without state repression. Another similar but smaller demonstration occurred uninterrupted in February 2024 across the country. However, repression of dissenting protests has occurred, but it is isolated rather than systematic. A significant example is the 2020 repression of women’s protests against gender-based violence in different cities across the country. Moreover, according to Amnesty International, Mexican authorities used illegal force, arbitrary detentions, and sexual violence against 93 protesters, most of them female students from a teachers’ school in Chiapas, Mexico’s poorest region, who were peacefully protesting to defend their right to education in 2021. Additionally, land and environmental defenders have faced criminalization for opposing state-linked projects, such as the 2017 case of Colonia Maya community leaders in Chiapas. These actions, often carried out by local authorities, persist within a national framework that fails to provide oversight or accountability.
Although the government has not killed or forcibly disappeared dissidents or attempted to commit these crimes, persistent risks and institutional weaknesses remain. Journalists and activists operate in a dangerous environment, particularly at the local level. While most attacks on journalists and human rights defenders are carried out by non-state actors — who are not necessarily aligned with the government and act to protect their own criminal interests — the federal government consistently fails to investigate or punish these crimes, contributing to a climate of impunity that raises the cost of dissent. In 2024 alone, at least seven journalists were killed, most of whom reported on corruption and organized crime. And, from 2018 to 2024, eight people were killed while enrolled in the state’s protection mechanism for journalists and human rights defenders, underscoring the state’s incapacity to prevent killings.
The government in Mexico has not seriously intimidated or obstructed the work of independent and dissenting media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, or members of the general public. However, surveillance practices have significantly undermined trust in the government’s respect for dissent. Despite earlier promises to halt such practices, the military’s continued use of Pegasus spyware under the López Obrador administration targeted at least two journalists and a human rights defender between 2019 and 2021. While this marked a sharp reduction from the 25 confirmed journalist targets under the Peña Nieto administration (2012-2018), it still constitutes a serious violation of privacy and press freedom. In addition, the rhetoric from government officials has also played a role in delegitimizing dissent. Under President López Obrador, frequent public attacks against journalists and NGOs contributed to a hostile climate, at times involving the public disclosure of private information –– known as doxing –– which placed critics at heightened personal risk. Although President Claudia Sheinbaum has notably moderated this tone and scaled back confrontational messaging since she took office in October 2024, the government continues to highlight and correct alleged misinformation through official channels, signaling a continued sensitivity to criticism.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Courts and autonomous bodies continue to review government actions and occasionally block major initiatives, yet enforcement is inconsistent, and rulings often produce no meaningful consequences. Additionally, persistent non-compliance, political pressure, and recent institutional reforms have begun to weaken oversight bodies’ practical capacity to hold officials accountable, potentially limiting their effectiveness as checks on power moving forward.
Courts have not unfairly failed to check, or enabled, the government’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition or make the electoral process significantly skewed in its favor. In 2023, the Supreme Court (SCJN) struck down major parts of President López Obrador’s “Plan B” electoral reform, which would have significantly weakened the National Electoral Institute (INE). The Court ruled that the legislative process violated constitutional procedures and that the reform endangered democratic integrity. Similarly, the Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF) has on multiple occasions ruled that President López Obrador violated electoral neutrality by using government press conferences to disparage opposition candidates, including Xóchitl Gálvez in the 2024 cycle. These rulings demonstrate the judiciary’s capacity to safeguard the constitutional framework. However, enforcement has been limited. No legal or disciplinary consequences followed repeated infractions, reflecting executive non-compliance and weak accountability mechanisms rather than an absence of judicial review.
Judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not frequently and unfairly failed to hold government authorities accountable. Independent oversight bodies have investigated alleged abuses and issued rulings against government officials, though enforcement has often been limited. In April 2022, President López Obrador publicly disclosed the personal financial information of journalist Carlos Loret de Mola, following his investigative reports on alleged corruption involving the president’s family. The National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information, and Protection of Personal Data (INAI) ruled that the disclosure violated federal data protection laws and ordered administrative sanctions. However, the Internal Control Office of the Presidency did not implement the ruling, and in 2023, the Ministry of Public Administration confirmed that no investigation had been pursued. Similarly, in 2024, the federal government released private financial and academic records of María Amparo Casar, a leading anti-corruption activist and head of Mexicans Against Corruption and Impunity (MCCI), after her organization criticized the administration. The INAI opened an investigation, but as of December 2025, no sanction had been reported. A third incident occurred in early 2024 when the phone number of journalist Natalie Kitroeff, the Mexico bureau chief of The New York Times, was disclosed during a presidential press briefing after her team submitted questions concerning alleged links between López Obrador’s campaign and organized crime. These cases indicate recurring non-compliance with oversight rulings, but they also show that complaints can be filed, investigated, and formally adjudicated by autonomous bodies, even if enforcement mechanisms remain weak.
Moreover, despite public revelations and multiple civil society investigations documenting the military’s use of Pegasus between 2019 and 2021, no prosecutions or sanctions have occurred. Journalists targeted during this period, as well as others affected during the Peña Nieto administration (2012-2018), have brought cases before Mexican courts seeking accountability. The Attorney General’s Office (FGR) opened investigations following the initial disclosures, but as of December 2025, they remain ongoing without substantive results, and no military officers or government officials have been held responsible. This prolonged lack of prosecutorial action reflects persistent obstacles to accountability in cases involving the armed forces rather than a complete absence of legal avenues for complaint.
The government has not subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. However, it has at times pursued measures affecting autonomous bodies. Most notably, the government entered into a prolonged conflict with the National Electoral Institute (INE), Mexico’s independent electoral authority. After the INE sanctioned public officials, including the president, for violating campaign neutrality rules, the administration, backed by a legislative majority, adopted a 2023 reform that significantly reduced the institute’s budget and professional staff and curtailed elements of its oversight capacity. Observers warned the changes could weaken election monitoring and enforcement. Mexico’s Supreme Court subsequently invalidated key provisions of the reform on constitutional and procedural grounds, preserving the INE’s core structure and authority. The episode, therefore, reflected an attempt to constrain an independent institution that was ultimately blocked through judicial review rather than the abolition or effective dismantling of the oversight body.
Finally, the Mexican government has subjected judicial institutions to reforms that may abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness, though the full consequences have not yet materialized. In September 2024, a constitutional amendment was passed requiring that all judges and magistrates, including those in the Supreme Court and Electoral Tribunal, be elected by popular vote, with current officeholders replaced between 2025 and 2027. The reform was heavily criticized by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, who warned that it could politicize judicial appointments and compromise due process. Additional provisions created a popularly elected Judicial Disciplinary Court and introduced “faceless judges” in organized crime cases, raising concerns about safeguards for impartiality. In March 2025, the government also abolished the INAI and six other autonomous agencies. The INAI was replaced by a body within the executive branch, allowing the government broader discretion to deny information requests on broad grounds and removing an important independent oversight mechanism. In June, the first judicial elections took place with only 13% turnout, producing a decisive victory for the ruling party, Morena, which will be able to control the new Disciplinary Court. While Mexican institutions have so far continued to operate and issue rulings against the government, these reforms indicate a potential trajectory toward reduced institutional autonomy and warrant close monitoring.
