Democracy
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HRF classifies Czechia as democratic.
Czechia is a parliamentary republic that emerged following the peaceful division of the former Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993. Vaclav Havel, a leader of the popular movement Charter 77, which had defied the Communist regime before its eventual collapse in 1989, was elected the new state’s first president. The new state inherited and further strengthened the democratic institutions developed during the post-1989 period, consolidating constitutional checks and balances, competitive elections, and protections for civil liberties. The president is the official head of state, but has mostly ceremonial functions. Following the October 2025 elections, the Action for Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO), Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), and Motorists for Themselves (AUTO) parties formed a coalition government.
Czech national elections are largely free and fair, with frequent changes in government and no single party or coalition dominant over extended periods. The October 2025 election saw former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and his ANO political party return to office after a one-term hiatus, following a highly contested vote. While international observers have noted gaps in the legal framework regulating political campaigning (notably in the areas of paid advertising and potential misuse of state resources), these shortcomings have not systematically benefited particular political actors, as reflected in the small margins of victory.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to criticize or challenge the government openly. Czechia has a relatively concentrated but diverse media sector, which the government hasn’t unduly interfered with. Civil society is vibrant and also operates with no arbitrary restrictions, while dissenting demonstrations proceed largely unobstructed by the authorities.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Recent reforms to the prosecution have strengthened functional independence and improved appointment processes. At the same time, major corruption scandals, notably the Čapí Hnízdo case involving former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, have underscored the persistence and ubiquity of entrenched clientelist networks and abuses of office.
In Czechia, national elections are largely free and fair. As incumbents have not unfairly skewed the playing field in their favor, elections are typically highly competitive and do not result in outright majorities. It is also uncommon for even the established parties to spend more than one to two consecutive terms at the helm of government, indicating that the opposition has ample opportunities to win.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party from competing in elections, as evident from the frequent transfers of power between different political actors. The most recent parliamentary elections, in October 2025, marked the comeback of former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and his ANO political movement, previously in office between 2017 and 2021. In 2025, ANO won 34.7% of the vote and 80 out of 200 seats in Parliament. Following a month of negotiations, it formed a government with Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), which gained 7.8% (15 seats), and Motorists for Themselves (AUTO), with 6.8% (13 seats). The previous parliamentary elections, held in October 2021, resulted in a peaceful transfer of power and demonstrated similar levels of competitiveness. While narrowly defeated by the incumbent ANO party, the centrist SPOLU and PirStan alliances successfully formed a majority coalition and relegated the former governing party to the opposition.
The government has not undermined independent electoral oversight. International observers, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, have assessed electoral integrity favorably, while noting some persistent gaps in the country’s electoral legal framework. For instance, paid political advertising is mostly unregulated, with no specific requirements for outlets to designate it as such. In addition, the law does not explicitly prohibit campaigning in one’s official capacity and generally contains few safeguards against the misuse of administrative resources for electoral purposes, potentially conferring an unfair advantage on incumbents. Oversight of campaign financing, donations, and reporting obligations falls under the designated Office for the Supervision of the Management of Political Parties and Movements (ÚDHPSH), which is functionally independent, but its mandate does not fully address these regulatory gaps. Nonetheless, the small margins of victory suggest these minor shortcomings have not systematically and unfairly benefited any particular political faction.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and members of the public are broadly free to criticize the government. The latter has not unduly obstructed or skewed the media environment in its favor. Dissenting demonstrations are common and largely proceed without undue interference from law enforcement, and civil society organizations (CSOs) don’t face undue restrictions.
There have been no prominent instances of the government unduly manipulating media coverage in its favor, and the political context of Czechia is broadly conducive to media pluralism. The main public broadcasters, Česká Televize and Český Rozhlas, continue to enjoy high levels of public trust and generally operate free from overt political interference. There are multiple independent outlets operating, notwithstanding the concentration of ownership among several large conglomerates (e.g., the News Centre, MAFRA, and Economedia) has raised some concerns, especially around the media’s susceptibility to overt editorial interference.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings.
May 2024 saw the country’s largest demonstrations in years, as the Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions (ČMKOS) rallied thousands of members denouncing the government’s proposed reforms to the Labour Code and pension system. The most controversial measures included a retirement age increase and new provisions enabling dismissal without cause. While the outgoing government proceeded to enact and implement the reform, its potential reversal became a prominent issue in the 2025 electoral campaign.
The government has not shut down or otherwise unfairly obstructed independent, dissenting organizations. The collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia (the so-called “Velvet Revolution”) precipitated a proliferation of independent civil society organizations (CSOs). The subsequent, democratic, governments of Czechia have upheld the freedom of association, adopting and expanding (most recently in 2014) legislation conducive to the development of civil society. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 provided a new impetus to CSOs, with an unprecedented surge in donations, volunteering, and humanitarian mobilization aimed at supporting Ukrainian refugees.
Czechia’s institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. The courts have proved capable of holding elected officials accountable when necessary. Ongoing reforms have also strengthened the prosecution’s functional independence, shielding the powerful office of the Prosecutor General from overt political interference. At the same time, concerns of endemic corruption persist, as illustrated by several recent high-profile scandals.
The Czech government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. On the contrary, the ongoing reform of the prosecutorial system has strengthened it, as noted in EU monitoring reports. These significant changes included new safeguards regulating the dismissal of the Prosecutor General and other senior prosecutors, further mitigating the likelihood of politically motivated reprisals against members of the prosecution. The staggered replacement process for senior prosecutors whose mandates are expiring, which would allow for thorough review and more meritocratic selection, has also gained broad expert approval. Lastly, the outgoing government advanced a new anti-corruption strategy under the Anti-Corruption Council, an advisory body that includes civil society representatives aimed at systematizing integrity policies across sectors.
The government has not systematically subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational independence. In August 2023, a new law establishing some protections for whistleblowers came into effect. Despite its uneven implementation, it has already helped check some government institutions’ attempts to retaliate against individuals exposing possible wrongdoing. To illustrate, in December 2024, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled in favor of plaintiff Pavel Kodym, affirming his status as a whistleblower under the new legislation. Kodym had his reappointment as director of the Office for Access to Transportation Infrastructure rescinded at the last moment, after it transpired he had alerted the European Commission of suspicious transactions at the state-owned company, Czech Railroads. The court found the measure was clearly retaliatory and ordered Kodym reinstated. Despite these recent positive developments, concerns of endemic high-level corruption persist. Notable examples include multiple public procurement irregularities (e.g., within the municipal administrations of Olomouc and Pardubice) and abuses of office of varying severity (such as the questionable privatization of municipal apartments in Brno, which came to light in 2022 and prompted international calls for implicated members of the then-cabinet to resign). The ongoing Čapí Hnízdo (Stork’s Nest) case involving ANO leader and former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš is emblematic. Prosecutors allege that Babiš and his associate Jana Nagyová manipulated the ownership structure of a conference center to unlawfully secure €2 million in EU subsidies intended for small businesses. Although a lower court acquitted both defendants, Prague’s High Court overturned the ruling in June 2025 and remanded the case for further review, underscoring the judiciary’s willingness to reopen politically sensitive cases.
On the other hand, judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not failed to hold government officials accountable. Despite persistent challenges, Czechia’s judiciary and oversight institutions have repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to act independently and investigate powerful political actors, inspiring high trust among citizens and business representatives. According to the 2024 EU Rule of Law Report, 64% of the general public and 63% of business respondents assess the independence of courts and judges as “good” or “very good,” a high percentage by EU standards.
HRF classifies Czechia as democratic.
Czechia is a parliamentary republic that emerged following the peaceful division of the former Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993. Vaclav Havel, a leader of the popular movement Charter 77, which had defied the Communist regime before its eventual collapse in 1989, was elected the new state’s first president. The new state inherited and further strengthened the democratic institutions developed during the post-1989 period, consolidating constitutional checks and balances, competitive elections, and protections for civil liberties. The president is the official head of state, but has mostly ceremonial functions. Following the October 2025 elections, the Action for Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO), Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), and Motorists for Themselves (AUTO) parties formed a coalition government.
Czech national elections are largely free and fair, with frequent changes in government and no single party or coalition dominant over extended periods. The October 2025 election saw former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and his ANO political party return to office after a one-term hiatus, following a highly contested vote. While international observers have noted gaps in the legal framework regulating political campaigning (notably in the areas of paid advertising and potential misuse of state resources), these shortcomings have not systematically benefited particular political actors, as reflected in the small margins of victory.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society leaders, organizations, and regular people are largely free to criticize or challenge the government openly. Czechia has a relatively concentrated but diverse media sector, which the government hasn’t unduly interfered with. Civil society is vibrant and also operates with no arbitrary restrictions, while dissenting demonstrations proceed largely unobstructed by the authorities.
Institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. Recent reforms to the prosecution have strengthened functional independence and improved appointment processes. At the same time, major corruption scandals, notably the Čapí Hnízdo case involving former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, have underscored the persistence and ubiquity of entrenched clientelist networks and abuses of office.
In Czechia, national elections are largely free and fair. As incumbents have not unfairly skewed the playing field in their favor, elections are typically highly competitive and do not result in outright majorities. It is also uncommon for even the established parties to spend more than one to two consecutive terms at the helm of government, indicating that the opposition has ample opportunities to win.
The government has not unfairly barred a real, mainstream opposition party from competing in elections, as evident from the frequent transfers of power between different political actors. The most recent parliamentary elections, in October 2025, marked the comeback of former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and his ANO political movement, previously in office between 2017 and 2021. In 2025, ANO won 34.7% of the vote and 80 out of 200 seats in Parliament. Following a month of negotiations, it formed a government with Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), which gained 7.8% (15 seats), and Motorists for Themselves (AUTO), with 6.8% (13 seats). The previous parliamentary elections, held in October 2021, resulted in a peaceful transfer of power and demonstrated similar levels of competitiveness. While narrowly defeated by the incumbent ANO party, the centrist SPOLU and PirStan alliances successfully formed a majority coalition and relegated the former governing party to the opposition.
The government has not undermined independent electoral oversight. International observers, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, have assessed electoral integrity favorably, while noting some persistent gaps in the country’s electoral legal framework. For instance, paid political advertising is mostly unregulated, with no specific requirements for outlets to designate it as such. In addition, the law does not explicitly prohibit campaigning in one’s official capacity and generally contains few safeguards against the misuse of administrative resources for electoral purposes, potentially conferring an unfair advantage on incumbents. Oversight of campaign financing, donations, and reporting obligations falls under the designated Office for the Supervision of the Management of Political Parties and Movements (ÚDHPSH), which is functionally independent, but its mandate does not fully address these regulatory gaps. Nonetheless, the small margins of victory suggest these minor shortcomings have not systematically and unfairly benefited any particular political faction.
Independent media, political leaders, civil society organizations, and members of the public are broadly free to criticize the government. The latter has not unduly obstructed or skewed the media environment in its favor. Dissenting demonstrations are common and largely proceed without undue interference from law enforcement, and civil society organizations (CSOs) don’t face undue restrictions.
There have been no prominent instances of the government unduly manipulating media coverage in its favor, and the political context of Czechia is broadly conducive to media pluralism. The main public broadcasters, Česká Televize and Český Rozhlas, continue to enjoy high levels of public trust and generally operate free from overt political interference. There are multiple independent outlets operating, notwithstanding the concentration of ownership among several large conglomerates (e.g., the News Centre, MAFRA, and Economedia) has raised some concerns, especially around the media’s susceptibility to overt editorial interference.
The government has not seriously and unfairly repressed protests or gatherings.
May 2024 saw the country’s largest demonstrations in years, as the Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions (ČMKOS) rallied thousands of members denouncing the government’s proposed reforms to the Labour Code and pension system. The most controversial measures included a retirement age increase and new provisions enabling dismissal without cause. While the outgoing government proceeded to enact and implement the reform, its potential reversal became a prominent issue in the 2025 electoral campaign.
The government has not shut down or otherwise unfairly obstructed independent, dissenting organizations. The collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia (the so-called “Velvet Revolution”) precipitated a proliferation of independent civil society organizations (CSOs). The subsequent, democratic, governments of Czechia have upheld the freedom of association, adopting and expanding (most recently in 2014) legislation conducive to the development of civil society. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 provided a new impetus to CSOs, with an unprecedented surge in donations, volunteering, and humanitarian mobilization aimed at supporting Ukrainian refugees.
Czechia’s institutions are independent and largely serve as effective checks on the government. The courts have proved capable of holding elected officials accountable when necessary. Ongoing reforms have also strengthened the prosecution’s functional independence, shielding the powerful office of the Prosecutor General from overt political interference. At the same time, concerns of endemic corruption persist, as illustrated by several recent high-profile scandals.
The Czech government has not subjected judicial institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational effectiveness. On the contrary, the ongoing reform of the prosecutorial system has strengthened it, as noted in EU monitoring reports. These significant changes included new safeguards regulating the dismissal of the Prosecutor General and other senior prosecutors, further mitigating the likelihood of politically motivated reprisals against members of the prosecution. The staggered replacement process for senior prosecutors whose mandates are expiring, which would allow for thorough review and more meritocratic selection, has also gained broad expert approval. Lastly, the outgoing government advanced a new anti-corruption strategy under the Anti-Corruption Council, an advisory body that includes civil society representatives aimed at systematizing integrity policies across sectors.
The government has not systematically subjected independent oversight institutions to reforms that abolish or seriously weaken their independence or operational independence. In August 2023, a new law establishing some protections for whistleblowers came into effect. Despite its uneven implementation, it has already helped check some government institutions’ attempts to retaliate against individuals exposing possible wrongdoing. To illustrate, in December 2024, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled in favor of plaintiff Pavel Kodym, affirming his status as a whistleblower under the new legislation. Kodym had his reappointment as director of the Office for Access to Transportation Infrastructure rescinded at the last moment, after it transpired he had alerted the European Commission of suspicious transactions at the state-owned company, Czech Railroads. The court found the measure was clearly retaliatory and ordered Kodym reinstated. Despite these recent positive developments, concerns of endemic high-level corruption persist. Notable examples include multiple public procurement irregularities (e.g., within the municipal administrations of Olomouc and Pardubice) and abuses of office of varying severity (such as the questionable privatization of municipal apartments in Brno, which came to light in 2022 and prompted international calls for implicated members of the then-cabinet to resign). The ongoing Čapí Hnízdo (Stork’s Nest) case involving ANO leader and former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš is emblematic. Prosecutors allege that Babiš and his associate Jana Nagyová manipulated the ownership structure of a conference center to unlawfully secure €2 million in EU subsidies intended for small businesses. Although a lower court acquitted both defendants, Prague’s High Court overturned the ruling in June 2025 and remanded the case for further review, underscoring the judiciary’s willingness to reopen politically sensitive cases.
On the other hand, judicial, legislative, or executive institutions have not failed to hold government officials accountable. Despite persistent challenges, Czechia’s judiciary and oversight institutions have repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to act independently and investigate powerful political actors, inspiring high trust among citizens and business representatives. According to the 2024 EU Rule of Law Report, 64% of the general public and 63% of business respondents assess the independence of courts and judges as “good” or “very good,” a high percentage by EU standards.
